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PRINCETON,  N.  J. 


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HINDU  PHILOSOPHY 


POPULARLY  EXPLAINED. 

THE  ORTHODOX  SYSTEMS. 


BY 

RAM  CHANDRA  ‘'BOSE,  A.M., 

OF  LUCKNOW,  INDIA, 

Author  of  “ Brahmoismf  etc. 


FUNK  & WAGNALLS. 


NEW  YORK : 1884. 

10  and  12  Dey  Street. 


All  Rights  Reserved. 


LONDON : 

44  Fleet  Street. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1884,  by 
PUNK  & WAGNALLS, 

In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington,  D.  C. 


PREFACE. 


Some  of  the  papers  embodied  in  this  volume  present 
the  substance  of  lectures  delivered  in  various  places  in 
India  in  furtherance  of  the  work  in  which  the  author 
has  been  engaged  for  years.  Two  of  them — those  on  the 
Sankhya  Philosophy — appeared  as  articles  in  the  Calcutta 
Review , and  the  paper  on  Yoga  Philosophy  in  the 
Indian  Evangelical  Review  j while  the  supplemental 
paper,  written  years  ago,  was  published  as  an  article  in  the 
Methodist  Quarterly , then  edited  by  Dr.  D.  D.  Whedon. 
The  paper  on  “ Hindu  and  Christian  Philosophy  Con- 
trasted ’ ’ was  delivered  as  a lecture  at  Key  East,  under 
the  auspices  of  the  American  Institute  of  Christian  Phi- 
losophy. All  the  papers  embodied  are  based  on  standard 
translations  of  original  works,  and  present  the  leading 
principles  of  the  schools  in  the  words  of  their  celebrated 
founders  and  champions.  There  are  a few  works  of 
recognized  merit  on  Hindu  Philosophy  in  the  English 
language,  barring  the  translations  utilized  in  this  vol- 
ume ; but  there  is  not  one  which  makes  such  a copious 
use  of  the  original  sources  of  information  as  the  volume 
now  presented  to  the  public,  or  which  is  better  adapted 
to  give  an  insight  into  the  contents  of  standard  works  on 
the  six  great  systems  of  Hindu  Philosophy,  as  well  as  to 
show  the  similarity  that  subsists  between  its  broad  prin- 
ciples and  those  which  modern  philosophers  are  prone  to 
represent  as  original,  the  peculiar  outgrowth  of  the 


IV 


PREFACE. 


advanced  tli ought  of  tlie  nineteenth  century.  The 
writer’s  humility  trusts  that  the  book  may  be  of  use  to 
those  who,  whether  missionaries  and  clergymen  or  mere 
lovers  of  literature,  wish  to  have  a bird’s-eye  view  of 
Hindu  Philosophy  without  taking  the  trouble  of  going 
to  the  sources.  The  volume,  if  it  be  encouraged  by  the 
public  here,  will  be  followed  by  another  of  the  same  size 
on  the  Heterodox  Systems  of  Hindu  Philosophy. 

Ram  Chandra  Bose. 


July  28,  1884. 


CONTESTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAGE 

The  Sources  of  Hindu  Philosophy 7 

CHAPTER  II. 

The  Sources  of  Hindu  Philosophy  Continued 36 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Age  of  Hindu  Philosophy 69 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Sankhya  Philosophy,  or  the  Hindu  Theory  of 
Evolution 96 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Sankhya  Philosophy,  or  the  Hindu  Theory  of 
Evolution  Continued 129 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Yoga  Philosophy,  or  Hindu  Asceticism 157 


VI 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

PACK 

The  Nayaya  System,  or  the  Hindu  Logic 194 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

TnE  Vaiseshika  Philosophy,  or  the  Hindu  Atomic  Theory.  22G 

CHAPTER  IX. 

The  Purva  Mimansa,  or  Hindu  Ritualism 259 

CHAPTER  X. 

The  Vedanta  System,  or  Hindu  Pantheism 291 

CHAPTER  XI. 

The  Maya,  or  the  Illusion  Theory 327 

CHAPTER  XII. 

The  Hindu  and  Christian  Philosophy  Contrasted......  3G1 

SUPPLEMENT. 

Hindu  Eclecticism 39G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTEK  I. 

THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is  very  interesting  to  trace  a noble  river,  through 
hundreds  of  miles  of  fertile  land  dotted  with  beautiful 
cities,  thriving  towns,  and  romantic  villages,  to  where 
its  broad  sea-like  expanse  dwindles  into  a small,  brawl- 
ing mountain  stream.  It  ought  to  be,  if  it  is  not,  much 
more  interesting  to  trace  a broad,  expansive  stream  of 
philosophic  thought,  which  has  moulded  and  fashioned 
the  inner  life  of  a great  though  fallen  people,  and  left 
its  mark  also  on  their  outer  life,  to  where  its  omnipo- 
tent influence  is  but  faintly  foreshadowed.  India,  as  a 
country,  presents  an  accumulation  of  differentiating 
marks,  or  such  as  are  calculated  to  distinguish  it  from 
the  other  countries  of  the  world.  It  has  a unique  con- 
figuration, unique  features  of  beauty  and  grandeur, 
and  a unique  history.  But  the  most  remarkable  thing 
one  notices  within  its  precincts  is  its  universally  adopt- 
ed, all-embracing,  all-comprehensive  pantheism. 

Pantheism  in  other  lands  is  the  monopoly  of  a few 
gifted  but  misguided  minds,  and  its  influence  is  scarcely 
felt  outside  of  very  narrow  and  narrowing  circles.  In 
India,  however,  it  is  co-extensive  with  social  or  national 


8 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


life,  being  held  both  by  the  learned  and  the  ignorant, 
the  rich  and  the  poor,  the  high  and  the  low.  The 
miracle  Western  scholars  scarcely  expect  to  see  realized, 
or  transferred  from  the  domain  of  possibility  into  the 
domain  of  fact,  is  a great  nation  of  pantheists  ; and 
this  miracle  is  presented  in  all  its  entireness  in  India  ! 
Here  pantheism  of  a thoroughly  spiritual  type  is 
preached  and  advocated,  not  only  in  temples  of  piety 
and  halls  of  learning,  but  in  places  of  public  resort,  in 
streets  and  thoroughfares  ; not  only  in  the  seclusion  of 
cloisters  and  cells,  but  amid  the  din  and  bustle  of  hives 
of  industry  and  marts  of  commerce. 

And  it  is  very  interesting  to  note  that  the  phrase- 
ology in  which  it  is  couched,  the  imagery  by  which  it 
is  illustrated,  and  the  arguments  by  which  its  positions 
are  fortified,  are  all  as  old  as  itself  is,  or  the  many- 
sided,  hydra-headed  religion  of  which  it  professes  to  be 
the  essential  part.  The  turns  of  expression,  which  are 
to-day  bandied  backward  and  forward  by  the  cham- 
pions of  pantheism  in  India,  were  coined  under  the 
shade,  so  to  speak,  of  a rich,  sonorous,  and  remarkably 
flexible  language,  about  two  thousand  five  hundred 
years  ago.  The  tropes  and  metaphors  utilized  to-day 
by  our  countrymen  to  set  forth  the  essential  features 
of  their  pantheistic  belief  were  first  pressed  into  such 
service  about  the  time  when  the  prophet  Isaiah  was  de- 
nouncing with  characteristic  fervor  the  vices  by  which 
his  beloved  country,  the  vineyard  of  the  Lord  of  Glory, 
was  being  ruined.  And  the  varied  lines  of  reasoning 
by  which  this  dreamy  system  is  now  defended  by  them 
were  first  arrayed  under  its  banner  by  their  forefathers, 
long  before  the  initiation  of  their  present  forms  of  wor- 
ship. India  appears  a scene  of  mental  immobility,  both 
when  the  backward  condition  of  its  arts  is  taken  into 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


9 


consideration,  and  when  the  significant  fact  is  realized 
that  its  rich  literature  has  remained  unimproved  and 
unexpanded  for  ages  untold. 

Had  the  influence  of  our  national  pantheism  been 
confined  to  our  own  country,  and  not  felt  anywhere 
else,  still,  universal  and  all-powerful  as  its  sway  has  for 
ages  been  within  its  limits,  an  attempt  to  trace  it  to  its 
original  source  would  have  appeared  very  desirable. 
But  we  have  reason  to  believe  that  its  influence  has  not 
been  thus  confined.  The  varied  forms  of  pantheistic 
belief,  which  flourished  in  schools  of  philosophy,  if  not 
in  thoroughfares  and  market-places,  in  Western  coun- 
tries in  ancient  times,  have  confessedly  a dash  of 
Orientalism  about  them  ; and  if  not  traceable  to  its 
direct  influence,  a common  origin  of  all  these  phases  of 
thought  and  of  those  associated  with  it  must  be  sought 
in  some  Eastern  region  which  brought  speculative  phi- 
losophy to  the  birth  in  some  prehistoric  age.  Its  influ- 
ence, however,  is  most  assuredly  noticeable  in  the  dis- 
quisitions, and  even  in  the  phraseology  in  which  the 
idealistic  and  pantheistic  speculations  of  modern  times 
are  embodied.  Pantheism  certainly  appears  in  these 
days  in  a new  garb,  and  in  forms  more  apparently 
rational  and  really  attractive  than  it  did  in  days  long 
since  gone  by,  but  the  likeness  of  the  ectypes  of  the 
day  to  the  archetypes  of  ancient  times  is  so  obvious 
that  their  essential  identity  is  one  of  those  facts  which 
cannot  possibly  be  ignored.  At  all  events,  it  may 
safely  be  assumed  that  Indian  pantheism  has,  besides 
moulding  and  fashioning  the  varied  phases  of  our 
national  life,  largely  influenced  the  more  advanced 
philosophic  notions  of  the  age.  An  attempt,  therefore, 
to  trace  it  through  successive  phases  of  development  to 
its  original  sources  is  doubly  important,  even  more  so 


10 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


than  an  attempt  to  trace  the  requirements  of  modern 
jurisprudence  to  the  well-known  code  of  Justinian. 

Fortunately  an  attempt  of  this  description  is  not 
likely  to  end  in  failure.  Certain  documents  of  unim- 
peachable integrity  have  come  down  to  us  from  a 
remote  antiquity,  and  in  them  we  may  discover  the 
germs  not  only  of  the  universally  adopted  pantheism  of 
our  country,  but  of  the  varied  systems  of  philosophic 
thought,  which  it  has  either  swallowed  up  and  assimi- 
lated to  its  own  nature,  or  overcome  and  thrown  into 
the  shade.  These  are  the  Upanishads,  or  philosophical 
treatises  attached  to  the  Vedas.  Each  of  the  four 
Vedas,  on  which  the  Hindu  concentrates  his  present 
homage  and  retrospective  veneration  and  builds  up  his 
hopes  of  prospective  bliss,  consists  of  three  parts — the 
Mantra,  the  Brahmana,  and  the  Hpanishad.  The 
hymns,  prayers,  and  doxologies,  which  form  its  initial 
and  certainly  the  most  fascinating  part,  make  up  its 
Mantra  division  ; and  the  ceremonial  directories,  which 
have  to  be  consulted  when  the  oblations  and  sacrifices 
associated  with  the  hymnology,  are  actually  brought  to 
the  altar,  constitute  its  Brahmana  portion.  The  Upan- 
ishad  or  concluding  portion  embodies  the  philosophy  by 
which  the  occult  meaning  of  the  hymnology  and  the 
ritual  is  inquired  into,  ascertained,  and  set  forth.  The 
word  Upanishad,  like  many  words  of  a doubtful  origin, 
has  been  variously  interpreted  by  Oriental  scholars, 
and  an  array  of  fanciful  etymologies  has  been  presented 
in  connection  with  it.  But  the  meaning  of  the  word  is 
plain — viz.,  that  which  destroys  the  sense-bred  igno- 
rance, which  the  hymnology  and  the  ritual  it  explains 
are  fitted  to  nourish  and  mature. 

Every  Veda  has  its  Mantras  or  hymns  of  prayer  and 
praise,  its  Brahmanas  or  ceremonial  directories  or  ritual 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


11 


guide-books,  and  its  Upanishads  or  philosophical  trea- 
tises of  an  explanatory  and  discursive  character.  The 
number  of  the  hymns  may  be  fixed,  if  not  with  the 
strictest  accuracy,  at  least  with  a close  approximation 
to  truth.  A few  of  the  hymns  may  have  been  lost,  but 
the  vast  body  has  come  down  almost  as  it  existed  in 
primitive  times.  But  the  number  of  the  supplementary 
treatises,  by  which  their  right  use  and  occult  meaning 
are  indicated,  cannot  possibly  be  fixed,  owing  specially 
to  Oriental  proneness  to  exaggeration.  Lists  are  pre- 
served, such  as  may  encourage  the  belief  that  the  num- 
ber of  the  Upanishads  alone  exceeded  two  hundred  and 
thirty,  but  only  a few  of  these  are  now  extant  ; and 
the  complete  disappearance  of  the  rest  cannot  be  satis- 
factorily explained  except  by  representing  their  alleged 
numerical  bulk  and  strength  as  apocryphal.  Nor  is  it 
at  all  necessary  to  plunge  ourselves  into  learned  dis- 
quisitions for  the  purpose  of  arriving  at  an  approximate 
conclusion  with  reference  to  the  original  number  of 
these  treatises,  as  the  few  commented  on  by  Sankar 
Acharya,  one  of  the  acutest  thinkers  and  most  volumi- 
nous writers  India  every  saw,  are  represented  by  all 
parties  as  the  most  important  ; and  these  are,  properly 
speaking,  the  sources  of  Hindu  Philosophy. 

The  eleven  Upanishads  commented  upon  by  Sankar 
Acharya  may  be  divided  into  two  classes,  the  major 
and  the  minor  ; the  two  larger  Upanishads  and  the 
nine  smaller  ones.  It  is  possible  that  two  or  three  of 
the  smaller  of  these  treatises  were  extant  before  the 
appearance  of  the  larger  ones  ; but  the  logical  precision 
by  which  they  are  as  a body  characterized,  together 
with  their  lucidness  of  arrangement  and  coherence  of 
thought,  speaking  of  course  comparatively,  leads  us  to 
assign  to  their  composition  a date  posterior  to  that  of 


12 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


the  more  bulky  and  certainly  the  more  important  docu- 
ments in  an  archaeological  point  of  view. 

The  two  larger  U pan i shads  are  the  Chliandogya  and 
the  Briliad  Aranyaka,  the  former  belonging  to  the 
Sama  Veda,  and  the  latter  to  the  collection  of  the 
Yajur  Veda,  called  Vajasaneyi  or  white  ; and  their 
composition  is  traced  by  general  consent  to  a period 
prior  to  the  appearance  of  Buddha  on  the  stage  of  his- 
tory. They  have  many  legends  in  common,  related 
almost  in  the  same  words  ; and  this  fact,  if  not  any- 
thing else  or  anything  partaking  of  the  nature  of  ex- 
ternal evidence,  may  justify  the  presumption  that  one  of 
them  was  written  before  the  other.  But  the  question, 
Which  is  the  earlier  of  these  two  documents?  cannot 
be  solved  any  more  than  the  length  of  the  interval  be- 
tween the  composition  of  the  one  and  that  of  the  other 
can  be  ascertained.  The  features  of  similarity  in 
thought  and  expression  noticeable,  together  with  the 
want  of  system  characteristic  of  both,  tend  to  confirm 
the  views  of  those  learned  scholars  who  represent  them 
as  contemporary  documents  based  on  sources  of  infor- 
mation now  lost,  or  on  traditions  and  legends  current 
at  the  time  when  they  were  both  composed  by  inde- 
pendent writers. 

As  it  is  our  intention  to  analyze  in  this  paper  the 
contents  of  these  two  hoary  documents,  let  us  present 
the  evidences  of  a high  antiquity  we  have  noticed  in 
the  course  of  a careful  perusal,  with  pencil  in  hand,  in 
consecutive  order.  The  translations  we  shall  utilize  are 
that  of  the  “ Chliandogya,”  by  Dr.  Rajendra  Lall 
Mittra,  and  that  of  “ Briliad  Aranyaka,”  by  Dr.  Roer. 

And  first  of  all  let  it  be  observed  that  the  imagery 
presented  is,  together  with  the  forms  of  expression, 
emphatically  archaic.  The  truths  presented  are  cer- 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


13 


tainly  of  a recondite  character,  but  the  images  pressed 
into  service  are  of  the  simplest  order.  The  fire  pro- 
duced by  the  attrition  of  two  pieces  of  wood,  the  spokes 
issuing  from  the  nave  of  a wheel,  the  athlete  running  a 
race,  cows  suckling  their  calves,  leaves  attached  to  the 
branches  and  the  stocks,  a bow  strung,  an  arrow  let 
fly,  a flaming  fire,  a rolling  car,  a bellowing  ox,  a drop 
of  water  on  a lotus  leaf — such  are  the  images  which  flit 
across  our  minds  as  we  turn  page  after  page  of  these 
ancient  books.  A favorite  storehouse  of  figures  is  the 
beehive  and  the  honey  squeezed  from  it,  which  is  now 
the  best  of  gods,  then  the  best  of  sacred  writings,  and 
anon  the  best  of  ceremonial  observances.  It  is  cer- 
tainly not  proper  to  lay  great  stress  on  this  feature  of 
these  Upanishads,  inasmuch  as  the  polite  literature  of 
our  country,  its  poetry  and  romance,  does  not  seem  to 
have  gone  very  far  beyond  the  archaic  stage  of  develop- 
ment. But  yet,  as  the  speculations  of  its  philosophic 
age  were  characterized  by  a remarkable  stiffness  of 
style,  the  frequency  with  which  such  simple  images 
occur  in  these  documents,  together  with  the  flexibility 
of  them  style,  is  an  indubitable  proof  of  great  antiquity. 

And  this  may  be  said  also  of  the  want  of  artistic 
finish  manifested  by  the  legends  related,  and  the  clumsy 
way  in  which  these  are  arranged,  and  the  truths  incul- 
cated are  presented.  Not  to  speak  of  the  remarkable 
brevity  and  conciseness  which  characterized  the  pro- 
ductions of  what  might  in  India  be  called  the  age  of 
philosophy,  the  minor  Upanishads  are  ahead  of  the 
major  in  the  terseness  of  their  style,  in  the  concatenated 
order  in  which  their  contents  are  presented,  and  in  the 
absence  from  them  of  mythical  stories,  such  as  are  of  a 
puerile  character. 

Akin  to  this  sort  of  evidence  is  that  based  on  the 


14 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


longevity  of  the  persons  referred  to,  and  in  that  pre- 
supposed in  the  division  of  life  into  distinct  periods 
presented  in  chap,  iii.,  sec.  16,  of  the  Chhandagaya 
Upanishad.  Man  is  in  this  part  represented  as  Yajna 
or  sacrifice,  and  the  different  periods  of  his  life  are  thus 
indicated.  The  first  twenty-four  years  of  his  life, 
during  which  he  is  under  the  special  protection  of  the 
Yashus  or  the  fire-gods,  are  the  matin  sacrifice.  The 
period  between  the  twenty-fourth  and  the  forty-fourth 
year  of  his  life  is  the  midday  oblation  ; and  during  these 
years  his  presiding  deities  are  the  Rudras  or  storm-gods. 
The  afternoon  sacrifice  is  the  period  intervening  be- 
tween the  forty-fourth  and  the  eighty-fourth  year  of 
his  life,  when  he  is  under  the  special  guidance  of  the 
Adityas  or  sun-gods.  The  closing  period,  which  in  the 
case  of  a devotee,  Mahidasa,  son  of  Itara,  extended 
from  the  eighty-fourth  to  the  one  hundred  and  six- 
teenth, may  be  represented  as  the  evening  sacrifice, 
though  it  is  not  characterized  as  such,  and  the  deities 
protecting  it  are  not  named.  It  is,  however,  distinctly 
stated  that  the  person  who  knows  the  significance  of 
the  first  three  periods  of  life  will  live  for  one  hundred 
and  sixteen  years.  All  this  betokens  general  longevity, 
which  is  an  incontestable  proof  of  great  antiquity, 
though,  so  far  as  we  are  aware,  no  stress  has  been  laid 
upon  it  by  Oriental  scholars. 

The  gods  mentioned  in  these  disquisitions  are  those 
of  the  Yedas,  not  those  of  any  post-Yedic  period.  The 
productive  and  destructive  energies  of  nature,  which 
appear  under  various  names  to  have  monopolized  the 
worship  of  our  unsophisticated  ancestors  of  simple 
Yedic  times,  are  the  divinities  around  which  the 
legends,  speculations,  and  reasonings  of  these  venerable 
documents  revolve.  And  their  number  is  set  forth 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


15 


therein  with  the  same  indefiniteness  which  in  the  Rig 
Veda  makes  it  impossible  for  us  to  fix  it.  In  one  of 
the  many  dialogues  embodied,  their  number  is  given  as 
no  less  than  “three  and  three  thousand.”  It,  how- 
ever, shrinks  in  the  same  dialogue  into  “three  and 
three  hundred,”  then  into  “thirty  and  three,”  then 
into  “ six,”  then  into  “three,”  and  ultimately  into 
“one.”  But,  as  in  the  Rig  Yeda,  “ thirty-three”  is 
the  number  for  which  special  partiality  is  shown  when 
the  spirit  of  philosophical  generalization  is  held  in 
abeyance  for  a moment  ; and  they  are  the  eight 
Yaslius,  or  various  forms  of  the  Fire-god,  the  eleven 
Rudras  or  forms  of  the  Storm-god,  and  the  twelve 
Adityas  or  forms  of  the  Sun-god,  besides  Indra  and 
Prajapati,  representing  perhaps  heaven  and  earth. 
The  God  Brahma  appears  in  these  treatises  either  as 
the  quintessence  of  all  essences,  or  as  in  the  Rig  Yeda, 
not  certainly  as  the  first  person  of  the  Hindu  Triad. 
The  all  but  perfect  identity  of  the  pantheon  herein  dis- 
closed with  that  of  which  glimpses  are  presented  in  the 
Yedas,  particularly  in  the  earliest  of  these  venerable 
books,  as  also  its  dissimilarity  to  that  set  up  in  post- 
Yedic  times,  cannot  but  be  regarded  as  an  incontest- 
able proof  of  great  antiquity. 

The  ceremonies  referred  to  in  these  disquisitions  are 
emphatically  Yedic  ceremonies,  not  those  which  were 
initiated  in  post-Yedic  times.  The  Aswamedha,  or  the 
sacrifice  of  the  horse,  the  crowning  sacrifice  of  the 
simple  times  pictured  in  the  Yedas,  is  not  only  alluded 
to  again  and  again,  but  graphically  described,  ex- 
plained, and  philosophized  upon,  specially  in  the  open- 
ing section  of  the  Brihad  Aranyaka,  in  which  the 
supreme  greatness  of  the  animal  sacrificed,  and  its  iden- 
tity with  Brajapati,  the  lord  of  creatures,  are  shown  by 


16 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


means  of  analogies  and  metaphors,  the  former  far- 
fetched and  the  latter  incongruous.  The  Somayajna, 
or  the  sacrifice  of  the  Soma  or  moon-plant,  which  is 
prominently  brought  forward  in  all  the  Yedas,  and 
which  is  the  stock  theme  of  one  of  them,  the  Sanaa 
Yeda,  is  the  subject  of  innumerable  allusions  and  many 
disquisitions  in  these  treatises.  The  Pasu-medha,  or 
animal  sacrifices  of- an  inferior  order,  are  also  referred 
to,  and  the  great  sacrifice  called  Purush-medha,  or  the 
sacrifice  of  the  Lord  of  creatures  for  the  good  of  those 
who  are  now  gods  but  were  once  men,  is  also  alluded 
to.  Indeed  an  attempt  is  obviously  made  in  these 
books  to  merge  the  varieties  of  the  sacrifices  enumer- 
ated in  the  Yedas  into  the  supreme  sacrifice  of  the 
supreme  Being  for  the  supreme  good  of  the  universe,  as 
well  as  to  sublimate  the  Yedic  pantheon  into  one  per- 
vasive spiritual  substance. 

The  literature  alluded  to  is,  like  the  pantheon  dis- 
closed and  the  ritual  embodied,  Yedic.  The  first  three 
Yedas,  Pig,  Yajur,  and  Sama,  have  numerous  refer- 
ences made  to  them  ; and  the  last,  Atharva,  is  also 
alluded  to,  though  rarely.  But  not  a single  hook 
extant  in  post- Yedic  times  is  referred  to.  Exception 
may  be  taken  to  this  statement,  based  on  the  two  well- 
known  passages  in  the  two  Upanishads,  in  which 
“ Phases  and  Purans”  are  mentioned  along  with  the 
Yedas,  and  the  branches  of  literature  embodied  in  or 
closely  associated  with  them.  And  certainty  if  these 
two  generic  names  were  made  to  include  the  hooks  now 
comprehended  by  them,  the  objection  would  he  both 
well-grounded  and  unanswerable.  But  these  names 
had  a meaning  in  primitive  times  very  different  indeed 
from  what  they  hear  now.  The  name  “Ithases,” 
which  now  includes  the  epic  poems,  comprehended  iu 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


17 


the  age  of  the  Upanishacls  the  legendary  lore  embodied 
in  the  Yedas  ; while  by  the  Purans  were  understood 
the  varied  cosmogonies  and  theogonies  found  in  those 
venerable  records,  not  the  obscene  literature  and  my- 
thology from  which  the  senseless  forms  of  worship  now 
prevalent  in  our  country  derive  their  sanction  and 
sanctity. 

And  lastly,  the  crude,  undeveloped  and  unsystema- 
tized form  in  which  caste  appears  in  these  treatises  is  an 
irrefragable  argument  in  favor  of  their  high  antiquity. 
The  four  original  castes  are  mentioned  distinctly  and 
emphatically,  not  merely  hinted  at,  as  in  the  Rig 
Yeda  ; but  they  do  not  appear  separated  from  one  an- 
other by  broad  and  well-defined  lines  of  demarcation, 
or  guarded  each  by  a network  of  iron  rules.  On  the 
contrary,  the  relative  position  of  the  orders,  especially 
of  the  two  higher  ones,  appears  left  in  uncertainty 
rather  than  defined  with  precision.  There  are  doubtless 
passages  which  clearly  show  that  the  Brahmins  were 
rising,  slowly  but  surely,  up  to  the  ascendency  they 
have  for  ages  and  centuries  enjoyed  ; but  passages  are 
not  wanting  fitted  to  show  that  they  were  often  beaten 
by  their  rivals,  the  Ivshetryas,  in  their  attempt  to  scale 
the  summit  of  sacerdotal  power  and  authority.  The 
opening  section  of  chap.  ii.  of  the  Brihad  Aranyaka 
presents  a dialogue  between  a proud,  self-complacent 
and  self-sufficient  Brahmin,  by  name  Gargya,  and  a 
really  learned  and  therefore  humble  Ivshetrya,  Ajata- 
satru,  the  moral  of  which  is  the  abandonment  by  the 
former  of  his  ridiculous  pretensions  to  knowledge  and 
his  enrolment  as  a pupil  of  the  latter.  Such  a thing 
would  have  been  an  impossibility  if  the  caste  system 
had  been  matured,  as  it  subsequently  was  in  the  age  of 
Manu. 


18 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


But  there  is  a dialogue  in  the  Chhandogya  eminently 
fitted  to  show  that  in  occult,  divine  knowledge  the 
Ivshetrya  was  most  decidedly  ahead  of  the  Brahmin. 
A Brahmin  lad  goes  to  Jaivali,  the  king  of  Panchala, 
of  course  a Ivshetrya,  and  has  five  test  questions  regard- 
ing the  condition  of  the  dead  and  ethereal  regions  put 
to  him.  Unable  to  answer  them,  he  returns  to  his 
father  and  teacher  chagrined,  and  solicits  instruction  on 
those  points.  The  father  confesses  his  igDorance  and 
repairs  to  the  court  of  the  learned  king  for  instruction. 
The  king  receives  him  hospitably,  but  feels  afflicted 
when  informed  of  his  motive.  However,  after  much 
hesitation,  he  expresses  his  wish  to  teach  him  in  these 
significant  words  : “ Since  you  have  thus  inquired,  and 
inasmuch  as  no  Brahmin  ever  knew  it  before,  hence  of 
all  people  in  the  world  the  Ivshetryas  alone  have  the 
right  of  imparting  instruction  on  this  subject.” 

The  high  antiquity  of  these  documents  having  been 
established,  it  remains  for  us  to  analyze  their  contents. 
A word  or  two,  however,  on  their  style  and  the  age 
they  portray  would  be  a fitting  preface  to  such  analy- 
sis. We  have  already  had  occasion  to  speak  of  the 
extravagances  of  diction  by  which  these  treatises  are, 
along  with  the  entire  body  of  Sanscrit  literature,  char- 
acterized. Transitions  of  the  harshest  kind  from  one 
pronoun  to  another,  from  one  figure  of  speech  to  an- 
other, from  one  train  of  thought  to  another,  and  from 
one  line  of  reasoning  to  another,  along  with  the  ellipti- 
cal nature  of  the  sentences  in  general,  throw  an  air  of 
obscurity  over  many  of  the  passages  on  which  the  main 
argument  hinges  ; while  metaphors  and  allegories  both 
incongruous  and  far-fetched  add  to  the  mystification. 
But  the  most  repellent  features  of  the  disquisitions 
embodied  are  tiresome  repetitions,  phonetic  analogies, 


THE  SOURCES  OP  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


19 


grotesque  flights  of  the  imagination,  and  inaccurate 
reasonings. 

Examples  of  all  these  varieties  of  defects  cannot  be 
presented  within  the  limits  which  we  must  prescribe  to 
ourselves  ; but  the  following  two  strings  of  figures,  one 
culled  from  the  Chhandogya  and  the  other  from  the 
Brihad  Aranyaka,  are  pre-eminently  fitted  to  set  forth 
the  sort  of  extravagance  we  have  to  wade  through 
while  perusing  these  books.  Of  the  great  Universal 
soul  it  is  said  that  “ The  heaven  is  the  head,  the  sun  is 
the  eye,  the  wind  is  the  breath,  the  sky  is  the  trunk, 
the  moon  is  the  fundament,  and  the  earth  is  the  feet. 
The  altar  is  his  breast,  the  sacrificial  grass  constitutes 
the  hair  of  Ins  body,  the  household  fire  forms  his  heart, 
the  Annoharyapachana  fire  forms  his  mind,  Ahavarya 
fire  his  face.”  The  exordium  of  the  Brihad  Aranyaka 
sets  forth  the  greatness  of  the  sacrificial  horse  in  these 
words  : “ The  sun  is  the  eye  ; the  wind,  the  breath  ; 
the  fire,  under  the  name  Yaiswanara,  the  open  mouth  ; 
the  year,  the  body  of  the  sacrificial  horse  ; the  heaven 
is  the  back  ; the  atmosphere,  the  belly  ; the  earth,  the 
footstool  (hoof) ; the  quarters,  the  sides ; the  seasons,  the 
members  ; the  months,  the  half  months,  the  joints  ; 
day  and  night,  the  feet  ; the  constellation,  the  bones  ; 
the  sky,  the  muscles  ; the  half-digested  food,  the  sand  ; 
the  rivers,  arteries  and  veins  ; the  liver  and  spleen,  the 
mountains  ; the  herbs  and  trees,  the  various  kinds  of 
hair.  The  sun  as  long  as  he  rises,  the  forepart  of  the 
body  ; the  sun  as  long  as  he  descends,  the  hind  part  of 
the  body.  The  lightning  is  like  yawning  ; the  shaking 
of  the  members  is  like  the  rolling  of  the  thunder.” 
Decency  leads  us  to  throw  the  veil  over  the  concluding 
portion  of  this  series  of  grotesque  metaphors  and  similes. 

The  utter  contempt  for  matters  of  fact,  associated  in 


20 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


those  treatises  with  the  wildest  flights  of  speculation,  is 
not  perhaps  a defect  confined  to  Oriental  Philosophy, 
it  being  discoverable  in  the  writings  of  philosophers 
who  in  reasoning  never  appear  egregiously  at  variance 
with  the  approved  rules  of  logic.  But  the  facility  with 
which  day-dreams  are  presented  herein  as  facts  of  phi- 
losophy, or  science  in  general,  is  peculiarly  Oriental. 
The  arteries,  for  instance,  “ of  the  heart”  are  said  in 
the  Chhandogya  to  “ exist  in  a brown  ethereal  fluid, 
yea,  in  a white,  a blue,  a yellow,  a red  ethereal  fluid.” 
They  are  in  the  other  Upanishad  divided  into  two 
classes,  the  good  and  the  bad,  and  the  number  of  the 
good  ones  given  is  72,000  ! But  we  shall  have  to  refer 
to  this  tendency  to  present  dreams  as  established  facts 
when  we  speak  of  the  eschatology  of  these  books  ; and 
so  we  need  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  detained  here  by 
this  feature  of  extravagance. 

The  age  depicted  in  the  Upanishads  has  justly  been 
called  an  age  of  inquiry,  of  incipient  rather  than 
matured  speculation.  The  gods  worshipped,  originally 
forces  of  nature,  were  many,  and  clothed  with  attri- 
butes by  no  means  godlike  ; the  forms  of  devotion  util- 
ized were  apparently  puerile  and  meaningless  ;.and  the 
ceremonies  reduced  to  practice  were  both  cumbersome 
and  absurd.  The  mind  naturally  recoiled  from  the 
surroundings  of  a pantheon  so  unworthy,  and  the  para- 
phernalia of  a worship  so  sensuous  and  degrading,  and 
the  question  was  naturally  raised,  Have  these  forms  of 
devotion  and  these  oft-recurring  ceremonies  any  mean- 
ing, or  are  they  absurdities  to  be  exploded  or  cast  over- 
board ? The  belief  in  the  current  creed  and  current 
forms  of  worship  was  too  strong  even  in  the  most 
thoughtful  minds  to  admit  of  a general  leaning  toward 
the  latter  of  these  alternatives  ; and  so  the  conviction 


THE  SOURCES  OF  IIIHDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


21 


gained  ground  that  there  was  some  occult  meaning  in 
the  system  of  faith  and  devotion  so  apparently  at  vari- 
ance with  both  reason  and  common-sense.  What  is  this 
occult  meaning  ? This  was  the  question  which  philoso- 
phy proposed  for  discussion  and  solution.  And  no 
wonder  that  far-fetched  analogies,  fanciful  etymologies, 
phonetic  resemblances,  incongruous  reasonings,  and 
extraordinary  flights  of  the  imagination  Avere  resorted 
to  for  the  purpose  of  extracting  a meaning  out  of  Avhat 
Avas  really  meaningless  ! But  the  spirit  of  generaliza- 
tion Avas  not  pressed  into  service  in  vain,  for  in  a very 
short  time  the  gods  and  goddesses  adored,  the  forms  of 
worship  resorted  to,  and  the  cumbrous  ritual  reduced 
to  practice,  Avere  all  unified  into  a primal  substance 
spiritual  on  the  Avhole,  but  spoken  of  at  times  as  mate- 
rial or  quasi-material.  But  an  age  of  Avavering  faith 
cannot  develop  the  spirit  of  unshackled  speculation  ; 
and  so  the  disquisitions  under  notice  are  characterized 
by  an  unsteadiness,  a vacillation,  a flexibility,  and  an 
inconsistency  fitted  to  render  them  enigmatical,  incon- 
clusive, and  even  puerile  and  absurd. 

A word  about  the  commentary  of  Sankar  seems  de- 
sirable - here.  That  profound  thinker,  who  flourished 
during  the  latter  part  of  the  seventh  and  the  earlier 
part  of  the  eighth  century,  falls  evidently  into  the  mis- 
take into  Avhich  modern  philosophers  fall  when  engaged 
in  deciphering  the  contents  of  hoary  documents,  such 
as  those  under  notice.  He  carries  to  the  comparatively 
simple  times  of  the  Upanishads  the  well-conducted  and 
abstruse  controversies  of  an  era  of  thought  and  specu- 
lation ten  times  more  progressive.  And  therefore  he 
may  justly  be  accused  of  importing  meaning  into  the 
text,  rather  than  bringing  meaning  out  of  it,  or  rather 
of  torturing  out  of  the  passages,  plain  or  obscure,  a sense 


22 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


fitted  to  bolster  up  bis  own  foregone  conclusions.  But 
liis  acute  exegetic  dissertations  are  of  great  use,  if  not 
in  elucidating  the  contents  of  these  treatises,  at  least  in 
exploding  a notion  which  is  now  gaining  ground  in  and 
out  of  India,  especially  among  people  who  have  a 
theory  to  advocate.  The  notion  is  that  the  form  of 
religion  inculcated  in  the  Upanishads  is  a pure  and  sub- 
lime theism.  It  may  suit  the  convenience  of  the  theo- 
rists of  the  day  to  see  nothing  but  a rational  system  of 
theism  in  these  venerable  documents  ; but  it  is  impor- 
tant to  note  that  the  learned  Pandits  of  Sankar  Acha- 
rya’s  time  saw  in  them  forms  of  religion  very  different 
indeed  from  such  a system.  Some,  with  the  great 
Sankar  at  their  head,  found  pantheism  in  them,  while 
those  with  whom  that  redoubtable  controversialist  was 
engaged  in  ceaseless  discussion,  saw  in  them  nothing 
but  the  nihilism  to  which  they  had  been  brought  by 
the  atheistic  speculations  of  Buddha.  The  position  of 
the  theorists,  who  represent  the  teaching  of  the  Upan- 
ishads as  thoroughly  theistic,  is  similar  to  that  of  the 
transcendentalists  who  pretend  to  find  pantheism  in  the 
teaching  of  our  Lord,  in  spite  of  its  obvious  drift  and 
the  concurrent  testimony  of  the  Church  from  its  foun- 
dation up  to  the  present  time. 

Having  disposed  of  the  questions  which  naturally 
arise  about  these  two  hoary  and  venerable  documents, 
let  us  endeavor  to  set  forth  what  is  in  them.  Their 
contents  are  of  a miscellaneous  nature,  and  though  the 
main  line  of  thought  by  which  they  may  be  unified 
savors  of  pantheism  of  a thoroughly  spiritual  type,  the 
varied  isms  which  flourished  in  Indian  schools,  over  and 
above  that,  in  subsequent  times  may  be  supported  or 
upheld  by  them.  The  mistake  into  which  some  Orient- 
alists have  fallen  is  that  of  representing  these  books  as 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


23 


sources  exclusively  of  that  system  of  pantheism  which 
was  subsequently  matured  by  the  profound  thinker  and 
the  versatile  writer  Vyas,  and  the  great  commentator 
Sankar  himself.  These  books  certainly  present  the 
germs  of  this  system,  which  has  swallowed  up  all  its 
rivals  and  has  maintained  an  undisputed  sway  over  the 
Indian  intellect  for  more  than  two  millenniums.  But 
it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  rival  orthodox  systems 
with  which  it  had  to  contend,  and  over  which  its  vic- 
tory was  complete  and  glorious,  also  derive  their  phrase- 
ology, their  principal  outlines  of  thought,  and  their 
salient  features  of  reasoning,  together  with  the  divine 
sanction  to  which  they  lay  claim,  from  these  treatises. 
They  may  therefore  be  justly  represented  as  the  primal 
sources  not  of  this  or  that  system  of  Indian  philosophy, 
but  of  Indian  philosophy  in  general,  or  Indian  philosophy 
in  all  its  orthodox  branches  at  least.  This  appears  from 
the  cosmogonies  embodied  in  these  books,  from  their  ac- 
counts of  the  Origin  of  Sin,  and  from  their  descriptions 
of  the  Universal  Soul,  the  individuated  Soul  or  Self, 
Elementary  Substances,  and  such  metaphysical  ideas  as 
are  conveyed  by  the  terms  Space,  Immensity,  etc. 

The  cosmogonies  embodied  in  these  Upanishads  are 
not  merely  fanciful,  puerile,  and  absurd,  but  of  a dubi- 
ous significance,  that  is  of  a nature  fitted  to  support 
nihilism  and  materialism,  as  well  as  pantheism.  Take, 
for  instance,  the  two  following  passages  from  the 
Cbhandogya  : 

1.  “ The  sun  is  described  as  Brahma — its  descrip- 
tion : Verily  at  first  all  this  was  non-existent  ; that 
non-existence  became  existent,  it  developed — it  became 
an  egg  ; it  remained  quiet  for  a period  of  one  year  ; it 
burst  into  two  ; thence  were  formed  two  halves  of  gold 
and  silver.” 


24 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


2.  “ Thereof  the  argentine  half  is  the  earth,  and  the 
golden  half  the  heaven.  The  inner  thick  membrane 
(of  the  egg)  became  mountains,  and  the  thin  one  cloudy 
fog  ; the  blood-vessels  became  rivers,  and,  lastly,  what 
was  born  therefrom  is  the  sun,  Aditya”  (chap.  iii. 
sec.  19). 

1.  “ Before,  oh  child,  this  was  sat  (being)  one  only 
without  a second.  Thereof  verily  others  say  : ‘ Before 
this  was  as  at  (non-being),  one  alone  without  a second  ; 
from  that  non-being  proceeds  being.  2.  He  (the 
teacher)  continued  : But  of  a truth,  oh  child,  how  can 
this  be  ? How  can  being  proceed  from  non-being  ? 
Before,  oh  child,  this  was  being,  one  without  a second. 
3.  It  willed,  I shall  multiply  and  be  born  ! It  created 
heat.  That  heat  willed  ! I shall  multiply  and  be 
born  ! It  created  water”  (chap.  x.  sec.  2). 

The  first  of  these  passages  traces  creation  to  non- 
existence or  nonentity,  and  the  second  leaves  it  uncer- 
tain whether  being  or  non-being  is  to  be  held  up  as  the 
Creator  of  the  universe.  The  same  spirit  of  vacillation 
is  noticeable  in  the  cosmogonies  given  in  the  other 
Upanishad,  the  Brihad  Aranyaka,  as  is  seen  in  the 
following  passages  : 

“ There  was  not  anything  here  before  : this  was  in- 
deed enveloped  by  death,  who  is  voracity  ; for  voracity 
is  death.  lie  created  this  mind  desiring  : may  I have 
a soul.  lie  went  forth  worshipping.  From  him  when 
worshipping  the  waters  were  produced,  etc.”  (chap.  i. 
Second  Brahmana). 

“ This  was  before  soul,  bearing  the  shape  of  a man. 
Looking  around  he  beheld  nothing  but  himself.  He 
said  first  : ‘This  am  L’  Hence  the  name  of  I was 
produced.  Therefore  even  now  a man,  when  called, 
says  first,  ‘ It  is  I,  ’ and  tells  afterward  any  other  name 


THE  SOURCES  OE  IIIHDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


25 


which  belongs  to  him.  And  because  he  as  the  first  of 
all  of  them  consumed  by  fire  all  the  sins,  therefore  he  is 
called  Purush.  . . . lie  did  thus  not  feel  delight. 
Therefore  no  body  when  alone  feels  delight.  lie  was 
desirous  of  a second.  He  was  in  the  same  state  as  hus- 
band and  wife  are  when  in  mutual  embrace.  He 
divided  this  self  twofold.  Hence  were  husband  and 
wife  produced.  Therefore  was  this  only  a half  of  him- 
self as  a split  pea  is  of  the  whole.  Thus  has  Yajnanal- 
kya  declared  it.  This  void  is  thus  completed  by 
woman.  He  approached  her.  Hence  men  were  born. 
She  verily  reflected,  How  can  he  approach  me  whom 
he  has  produced  from  himself  ? Alas  ! I will  conceal 
myself.  Thus  she  became  a cow,  the  other  a bull.  He 
approached  her.  Hence  kine  were  born.  The  one  be- 
came a mare  and  the  other  a stallion,  the  one  a female 
ass,  the  other  a male  ass.  ...  In  this  manner  he 
created  every  living  pair  whatsoever  down  to  the  ants” 
(chap.  i.  Third  Brahmana). 

The  first  of  these  passages  traces  creation  to  nonenti- 
ty called  death,  and  according  to  Sankar  it  was  eagerly 
seized  by  the  nihilists  of  his  day  and  held  up,  along 
with  others  of  course,  as  a justification  of  their  views. 
Sankar,  the  redoubtable  champion  of  pantheism,  enters 
of  course  into  a series  of  very  abstruse  disquisitions  to 
prove  that  the  word  death  or  voracity  or  non-existence 
in  this  and  other  passages  of  the  sort  means  a spiritual 
substance,  originally  unseen  and  unknown,  but  de- 
veloped or  evolved  in  the  course  of  time  into  the  varied 
modes  of  existence  we  notice  around  and  in  us.  But 
the  nihilists  of  his  day  had  their  reasons,  and  these  by 
no  means  weak,  for  adopting  a different-  construction. 
The  second  passage  seems  at  first  sight  fitted  to  bring 
us  to  a conclusion  the  very  antipodes  of  that  supported 


20 


JIINDV  PHILOSOPHY. 


by  the  first.  But  the"  embodied  “soul”  to  wliicli  it 
traces  creation  is  confessedly  a medial  not  the  original 
source.  The  discrepancies  in  the  accounts  of  creation 
presented  in  these  books  may  be  easily  reconciled. 
The  cosmogony  of  the  Vedas  begins  with  an  uncon- 
scious substance  spoken  of  as  It,  coming  in  the  course 
of  ages  to  consciousness,  and  led  by  a perception  of  its 
solitariness  to  wish  to  be  “ many  and  if  such  sub- 
stance were  posited  as  the  groundwork  of  the  accounts 
of  creation  presented  in  these  two  books,  their  apparent 
contrariety  or  inconsistency  would  disappear. 

"With  reference  to  the  origin  of  sin,  both  these  Upan- 
ishads  present  one  and  the  same  account,  almost  in  the 
same  words.  “ Twofold  indeed  is  the  offspring  of 
Prajapati  (the  Lord  of  Creation,  elsewhere  called 
Purush  or  Brahma),  the  gods  and  the  demons.  There- 
fore the  gods  are  thus  few  in  number,  the  demons 
many.”  The  appositeness  of  the  word  “ therefore”  in 
this  connection  is  seen  in  Sankar’s  Commentary,  in 
which  the  numeric  superiority  of  the  demons  is  attrib. 
uted,  in  of  course  a roundabout  way,  to  the  ascendency 
of  perception  and  sensation  over  thought  and  reflection. 
The  gods  and  the  demons  evolved  from  the  essence  of 
the  Creator  “ rivalled  in  these  worlds,”  or  contended 
with  each  other  for  ascendency.  The  gods  at  first 
resorted  to  speech  for  help,  but  the  demons  defeated 
their  object  by  vitiating  speech,  and  making  it  a foun- 
tain of  “ improper  words.”  Breath  was  then  resorted 
to  by  the  gods  and  contaminated  by  the  demons,  and 
made  a source  of  “improper  odors.”  The  eye,  the 
car,  and  the  mind  were  in  this  manner  contaminated 
and  made  sources  of  “improper  colors,”  “improper 
sounds,”  and  “improper  notions.”  The  last  party 
resorted  to  for  help  was  life,  and  the  demons  in  their 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  FHILOSOPHY. 


27 


attempt  to  contaminate  it  were  annihilated,  “ as  a clod 
of  earth  by  falling  upon  a rock  is  destroyed.”  Tho 
demons  being  annihilated,  speech  and  other  organs  of 
the  body  were  freed  from  the  pollution  brought  on 
them  by  contact.  This  account  sanctions  the  current 
notion  of  the  Hindus  that  sin  inheres  in  the  body,  and 
does  not  reach  the  life  or  soul. 

The  perfect  identity  of  the  Universal  with  the  indi- 
vidual or  individuated  soul  is  set  forth  in  many  pas- 
sages. A few  selected  at  random  are  given  below  : 

“ This  soul,  which  is  neither  this  nor  aught  else, 
which  is  intangible,  for  it  cannot  be  laid  hold  of  ; not 
to  be  dissipated,  for  it  cannot  be  dissipated  ; without 
contact,  for  it  cannot  come  into  contact  ; not  limited, 
not  subject  to  pain,  nor  to  destruction — this  fearless 
(soul)  0 Janaka,  is  obtained  by  thee”  (“  Brihad  Aran- 
yaka,”  chap.  iv.  Second  Brahmana). 

“ This  great  unborn  soul  is  the  same  which  abides  as 
the  intelligent  (soul)  in  all  living  creatures,  the  same 
which  abides  as  ether  in  the  heart  ; in  him  it  sleeps  ; 
it  is  the  subduer  of  all,  the  ruler  of  all,  the  sovereign 
lord  of  all  ; it  does  not  become  greater  by  good  works, 
nor  less  by  evil  works.  It  is  the  Buler  of  all,  the  sov- 
ereign Lord  of  all  beings,  the  Preserver  of  all  beings, 
the  Bridge,  the  Upholder  of  the  world,  so  that  they 
fall  not  to  ruin”  (“  Brihad  Aranyaka,”  chap.  iv.  Fourth 
Brahmana). 

“He  who  dwelling  in  the  seed  is  within  the  seed,# 
whom  the  seed  does  not  know,  whose  body  is  the  seed, 
who  from  within  rules  the  seed,  is  thy  soul,  the  Inner 
Ruler,  immortal.  Unseen,  he  sees  ; unheard,  he 
hears  ; unminded,  he  minds  ; unknown,  he  knows. 
There  is  none  that  sees  but  he,  there  is  none  that 
knows  but  he.  He  is  thy  soul,  the  Inner  Ruler,  im- 


28 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


mortal.  "Whatever  is  different  from  him  is  perishable” 
(“  Brihad  Aranyaka,”  chap.  iii.  Seventh  Brahmana). 

£<  Then  asked  him  Ushasta,  the  son  of  Chakra  : 
‘ Yajnanalkya,’  said  he,  4 do  explain  to  me  that  Brahma 
who  is  a witness  and  present,  that  soul  which  is  within 
every  (being).”  [lie  replied,]  ‘ It  is  thy  soul  which  is 
within  every  (being).’  (“  Brihad  Aranyaka,”  chap, 
iii.  Fourth  Brahmana.) 

4 4 He  became  to  every  nature  of  every  nature  ; there- 
fore to  manifest  the  nature  of  him,  Indra  appears  of 
manifold  nature  by  his  Mayas  (illusions)  ; for  his  hun- 
dred and  ten  senses  are  attached  (to  the  body  as  horses 
to  a car)  ; it  (the  soul)  is  the  senses  ; it  is  ten  ; it  is 
many  thousands,  nay  infinite  ; it  is  Brahma  who  has 
not  a Before,  nor  an  After,  nor  a Beside,  nor  a With- 
out. This  is  the  soul,  Brahma,  the  perceiver  of  all  ” 
(“  Brihad  Aranyaka,”  chap.  ii.  Fifth  Brahmana). 

44  These  rivers,  my  child,  proceed  from  the  East  tow- 
ard the  West,  thence  from  the  ocean  (they  rise  in  the 
form  of  vapor,  and  dropping  again  they  flow  toward 
the  South,  and)  merge  into  the  ocean.  Here,  as  they 
do  not  remember  what  they  were.  2.  Even  so  all 
these  created  beings,  having  proceeded  from  the  truth, 
know  not  that  they  have  issued  therefrom.  They 
therefore  become  of  the  form  they  had  before,  whether 
that  be  of  a tiger,  a lion,  a wolf,  a bear,  a worm,  an 
insect,  a gnat,  or  a mosquito.  3.  That  particle  which  is 
Hhe  soul  of  all  this  is  the  Truth  ; it  is  the  Universal 
Soul.  O Swetaketu,  thou  art  that”  (44  Chhandogya,” 
chap.  vi.  sec.  10). 

Quotations  might  be  multiplied  almost  endlessly  ; but 
these  are  enough  to  show  that  according  to  the  teach- 
ing  of  these  Upanisliads  the  Universal  Soul  is  not 
merely  identical  with  the  individual  soul  called  self,  but 


THE  SOURCES  OE  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


29 


tlie  life  of  all  that  really  is  ; and  they  may  be  brought 
forward  in  support  of  the  views  of  those  who  see  noth- 
ing; but  sublime  idealism  in  them.  But  there  are  things 
said  about  the  soul  eminently  fitted  to  militate  against 
such  a conclusion.  For  instance,  the  soul  is  said  to 
have  extension,  as  in  the  following  passage  : “ Verily 
the  sonl  extends  from  below,  the  soul  extends  from 
above,  the  soul  extends  from  behind,  the  soul  extends 
from  before,  the  soul  extends  from  the  South,  the  soul 
extends  from  the  North — of  a truth  the  soul  is  all 
this.” 

Again,  the  soul  is  identified  with  Immensity,  which  is 
said  to  extend  as  it  does,  and  to  be  “ all  this”  as  it  is. 
It  is,  moreover,  identified  with  space,  speech,  ether, 
aliment,  some  material  substances  and  some  metaphysi- 
cal ideas.  Consequently  there  is  scarcely  a system  of 
philosophy,  pantheistic,  materialistic,  and  even  nihilis- 
tic, which  cannot  find  an  array  of  evidences  in  support 
of  its  principles  among  the  heterogeneous  and  conflict- 
ing affirmations  and  disquisitions  of  these  hoary  docu- 
ments. 

It  is  desirable  before  bringing  this  paper  to  a close  to 
state  what  these  two  ancient  books  say  about  human 
duty  and  its  consequences,  especially  in  the  life  to 
come,  or  to  give  some  idea  of  the  practical  religion  and 
eschatology  embodied  in  them.  Let  it  be  observed  that 
these  two  books  were  written  at  a time  when  philoso- 
phy was  the  science  of  the  All,  not  one  branch  of 
human  knowledge,  as  in  these  days.  Philosophy  em- 
braced religion,  morality,  psychology,  medicine,  phys- 
iology— in  a word,  mathematics,  physics,  metaphysics, 
and  theology.  Whatever  the  topic  of  inquiry  might 
be,  or  of  whatever  character  the  question  raised  might 
he — mathematical,  physical,  psychological  or  metaphys- 


30 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


ical — recourse  must  be  had  to  philosophy  for  light,  set- 
tlement, or  solution.  Called  into  existence  in  such  an 
age,  these  philosophical  treatises  could  not  lay  aside  the 
great  problem  of  human  duty,  and  its  proximate  and 
ultimate  results.  The  dissertations  on  this  subject  em- 
bodied in  them  are  too  important  to  be  passed  over,  in- 
asmuch as  they  have,  along  with  the  characteristic  ideas 
on  which  they  are  based,  moulded  and  fashioned  the 
religious  life  of  our  country  for  ages  untold.  One  short 
quotation  on  human  duty  will  suffice. 

“ Threefold  is  the  division  of  Duty.  Sacrifice,  Study, 
and  Charity  constitute  the  first  ; Penance  is  the  sec- 
ond, and  Residence  by  a Bralimacharin  exclusively  in 
the  house  of  a tutor  is  the  third.  All  those  who  attend 
to  these  duties  attain  virtuous  regions  ; the  believer  in 
Brahma  alone  attains  to  immortality.  ’ ’ 

The  great  commentator,  Sankar,  enters  into  an  elab- 
orate disquisition,  in  his  own  dialectic  or  argumentative 
style,  to  set  forth  the  meaning  of  these  verses.  Ac- 
cording to  his  comments  there  were,  in  those  early 
times  as  there  have  been  in  all  subsequent  ages,  four 
orders  of  devotees,  those  of  the  householder,  the  ascetic, 
the  Brahmacharin,  or  the  student  of  the  Vedas,  and 
Brahmasanstha  or  Paramahansa,  one  wholly  devoted  to 
Brahma.  The  duty  of  the  householder  was  to  offer 
sacrifices,  or  perform  ceremonies  diurnal,  occasional, 
optional,  and  expiatory,  to  study  the  Vedas,  and  to 
bestow  “ alms  according  to  his  resources”  on  “ parties 
not  seeking  for  the  same.”  The  ascetic  fits  himself  by 
years  of  penance  (tapas)  in  sequestered  places  for  the 
acquisition  of  saving  knowledge,  or  the  knowledge  em- 
bodied in  the  philosophical  treatises  attached  to  the 
Vedas.  When  thus  fitted  by  self-inflicted  mortification 
and  the  conscientious  discharge  of  the  duties  of  the 


THE  SOURCES  OE  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


31 


liermit,  he  becomes  a Brahmacharin,  or  looks  for  an 
accredited  teacher  of  Vedantic  philosophy,  and  enrolls 
himself  as  his  pupil.  Years  of  study  and  meditation 
under  his  roof  enable  him  to  cast  off  the  bondage  of 
what  Sankar  calls  “ disjunctive  knowledge,”  or  knowl- 
edge which  recognizes  differences  between  “ agents, 
actions,  and  objects,”  acquires  “identifying  knowl- 
edge,” the  knowledge  the  watchwords  of  which  are  : 
“ The  truth  is  verily  one  without  a second,”  “ All  this  is 
the  divine  soul,”  “ All  this  is  the  Brahma” — and  thus 
attains  immortality.  The  highest  bliss,  that  of  absorp- 
tion in  the  Deity,  is  reserved  for  those  who  have  been 
liberated  from  ignorance  by  right  knowledge,  and  who 
see  their  perfect  identity  with  the  Universal  Soul. 
“ This  is  his  true  nature,  which  is  free  from  desire,  sin 
(both  sin  and  virtue),  and  fear.  As  in  the  embrace  of  a 
beloved  wife  one  is  unconscious  of  aught,  from  without 
and  within,  so  embraced  by  the  all-knowing  soul,  this 
Purush  is  unconscious  of  all,  without  or  within.  This 
is  his  (true)  nature,  where  all  desires  are  satisfied,  where 
the  (only)  desire  is  for  the  soul,  where  there  is  no  desire, 
where  there  is  no  grief.”  There  is  a verse,  however, 
which  is  fitted  to  lead  one  to  the  conclusion  that  ab- 
sorption in  the  Deity  is  reserved,  not  only  for  those 
freed  from  desire,  sin,  and  fear,  but  for  all  who  die. 
It  runs  thus  : “ When  a man  departs  (this  life)  his 
speech  merges  into  the  mind  ; the  mind  merges  into 
life  ; the  life  into  heat,  and  the  heat  into  the  supreme 
Deity.”  This  like  so  many  other  verses,  speaks  of 
speech,  life,  and  mind  as  material  substances  or  forces, 
in  the  same  category  with  heat,  and  represents  the 
supreme  Deity  as  the  ultimatum  from  which  all  things 
proceed,  and  into  which  all  things  melt.  The  vacilla- 
tion noticed  in  the  statements  regarding  the  universal 


32 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


and  the  individual  soul  is  also  noticeable  in  the  disserta- 
tions on  future  life. 

But  what  will  become  of  the  members  of  the  other 
three  orders  of  the  pious  and  the  godly,  or  of  mankind 
in  general  ? To  this  all-important  question  a reply  is 
furnished  in  the  following  passage  : 

1.  “Of  them  (men  so  created)  those  who  know  this 
(origin  of  Purush)  and  those  who  worship  God  with 
faith  and  penance  in  a desert,  repair  after  death  to  (the 
region  of)  light  ; thence  to  (that  of)  the  day,  thence  to 
(that  of)  the  light  half  of  the  moon,  thence  to  (that  of) 
the  six  months  during  which  the  sun  has  a northern 
declination. 

2.  “ Thence  to  (that  of)  the  year  ; thence  to  (that 
of)  the  sun  ; thence  to  (that  of)  the  moon  ; and  thence 
to  (that  of)  the  lightning  ; thence  an  inhuman  being 
takes  them  to  (the  region  of)  Brahma.  This  is  the  way 
to  the  gods. 

3.  “ Now  those  villagers  who  accomplish  their  relig- 
ious duties  by  the  performance  of  sacrifices,  by  the 
dedication  of  tanks,  wells,  halting-places,  etc.,  and  by 
charity  beyond  the  boundary  of  the  altar,  are  borne, 
after  death,  to  (the  region  of)  darkness.  From  (the 
region  of)  darkness  they  proceed  to  (that  of)  the  night  ; 
from  (that  of)  the  night  to  (that  of)  the  dark  fortnight  ; 
from  the  dark  fortnight  to  (that  of)  the  six  months 
during  which  the  sun  has  a southern  declination  ; from 
the  six  months  of  the  winter  solstice  they  attain  not 
the  year. 

4.  “ (But)  thence  (they  go)  to  (the  region  of)  the 
Pitris  (Fathers)  ; from  (the  region  of)  the  Pitris  (they 
go)  to  the  sky,  and  from  the  sky  to  the  moon.  That 
moon  is  the  King  Soma.  They  are  the  food  of  the 
gods.  The  gods  do  eat  them. 


THE  SOUKCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


o o 
OO 

5.  “ After  remaining-  there  for  such  tune  as  the 
effects  of  their  actions  last,  they  return  to  the  road  to 
be  prescribed,  i.e.,  thence  to  the  sky,  and  from  the  sky 
to  the  wind  ; after  becoming  wind  they  become  smoke, 
and  from  the  smoke  the  scattered  cloud  is  formed. 

6.  “ From  the  scattered  cloud  proceeds  condensed  or 
raining  cloud,  which  rains.  From  that  proceed  rice, 
corn,  annuals,  trees,  sesamum,  lentils,  and  the  like. 
Now  verily  it  is  difficult  to  descend  therefrom.  Those 
who  eat  rice  and  procreate,  become  manifold. 

7.  “ Therefore  he  whose  conduct  is  good  quickly 
attains  to  some  good  existence,  such  as  that  of  a 
Brahmana,  a Kshetriya,  Yaisya.  Next,  he  who  is  vi- 
ciously disposed  soon  assumes  the  form  of  some  inferior 
creature,  such  as  that  of  a dog,  a hog,  or  a Chandala. 

8.  “Now,  those  who  have  not  come  to  either  of 
these  two  ways  become  small  creatures  of  repeated 
birth.  They  are  born,  and  they  die.  This  is  the  third 
place  or  receptacle.  This  is  the  reason  why  the  place 
(where  men  go  to  after  death)  filleth  not.  This  is  the 
reason  why  (this  career)  should  be  detested  ; therefore 
is  the  verse  : 

9.  “ The  robber  of  gold,  the  drunkard  who  drinks 
spirits,  the  defiler  of  his  master’s  bed,  and  the  murderer 
of  a Brahmin  are  debased  and  filthy,  and  fifthly,  so  is 
he  who  associates  with  these  four”  (“  Chhandogya,” 
chap.  v.  sec.  10). 

"We  present  these  long  extracts  for  various  reasons. 
It  is  in  the  first  place  an  index  of  the  stuff  we  have  to 
wade  through  with  a view  to  glean  the  few  sporadic 
jewels  of  philosophic  thought  scattered  among  the  con- 
tents of  these  books.  It  is  one  of  the  earliest  detailed 
statements  of  the  doctrine  of  transmigration  to  be 
met  with  within  the  compass  of  Sanscrit  literature  ; 


34 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


and  it  sets  forth  the  eschatology  of  the  Upanishads  in 
general,  and  of  these  two  in  particular.  The  assurance 
with  which  dreams  are  herein  presented  as  facts  is 
peculiarly  Oriental,  and  may  put  to  shame  even  the 
coolness  with  which  modern  philosophers  and  scientists 
evolve  creation  with  all  its  glories  out  of  substances  and 
forms  posited  by  them  ! The  various  regions  of  heav- 
enly bliss  dreamt  of  are  within  reach  of  the  person  who 
knows  himself,  or  the  Universal  Soul,  which,  though 
infinite,  is  found  confined  in  a “ minute  vacuity”  within 
“ a lotus-like  chamber”  in  his  body,  called  Brahmapur 
or  habitation  of  Brahma,  insomuch  that  if  he  simply 
wishes  to  go  into  one  of  these,  say  the  region  of  the 
Fathers,  or  the  Mothers,  or  the  Brothers,  or  the 
Friends,  he  is  instantly  translated  thereto.  The  various 
heavens  of  which  so  much  was  made  by  the  followers 
of  Buddha,  arc  indicated  in  the  minor  Upanishads  with 
greater  clearness  than  in  these  ; but  the  prominence 
they  enjoy  herein  is  enough  to  throw  the  imaginative 
Hindu  into  a perennial  stream  of  feverish  delight. 

Some  form  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  more  or 
less  imaginative,  more  or  less  corrupt,  has  been  at  the 
bottom  of  the  varied  systems  of  religion  which  have 
successively  won  and  lost  ascendency  in  India,  and  even 
its  philosophical  vagaries  have  received  their  color  and 
complexion  from  one  species  or  another  of  triadism. 
These  two  treatises,  partly  legendary  and  partly  philo- 
sophical, have  their  triadism,  a triadism  fitted  to  uphold 
the  thorough-paced  phenomenalism  of  the  Yedantic 
school  of  subsequent  times  and  the  equally  thorough- 
going.nihilism  of  some  classes  of  the  Buddhists.  Their 
triad  consists  of  Ham  (name),  Rupa  (form),  and  Karma 
(action)  ; and  from  it  the  Buddhists  derived  not  only 
the  phraseology  in  which  their  philosophic  speculations 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


are  couched,  but  their  god,  the  being  or  force  by 
which,  when  one  state  of  existence  is  wound  up,  an- 
other is  forthwith  called  into  existence,  or  by  which 
when  one  soul  is  annihilated  another  is  called  into  ex- 
istence to  take  the  consequences  of  its  deeds,  good  or 
bad.  "We  see  no  tiling,  says  the  philosopher  of  what 
may  be  called  the  Upanishad  school,  but  name  and 
form  in  the  universe,  setting  aside  human  actions.  Let 
an  underlying  material  substance  be  posited,  and  we 
have  the  species  of  materialism  which  traces  creation 
to  self-evolving  matter  in  the  shape  of  atoms  or  a 
primordial  form.  Again,  let  an  underlying  spiritual 
substance,  originally  unconscious  but  coming  up  in  time 
to  consciousness,  be  assumed,  and  we  have  all  the 
varied  forms  of  pantheism  to  which  homage  has  been 
paid  both  in  and  out  of  India.  Once  more,  let  an  un- 
derlying nonentity  be  taken  for  granted,  or  let  it  be 
affirmed  that  there  is  no  underlying  substance  beneath 
the  name  and  form  we  cognize,  and  we  have  the  nihil- 
ism with  which  pantheism  had  to  wage  a war  of  ex- 
termination in  the  age  of  Sankar  Acharaya.  But  how 
is  action,  the  third  member  of  the  triad  of  the  Upan- 
ishads,  to  be  disposed  of  ? Simply  by  merging  it  in 
name  and  form,  making  it  a material  evolute  in  the 
first  case,  a phenomenon  or  mode  of  development  in 
the  second,  and  an  absolute  nonentity  in  the  third. 
And  in  this  manner  the  varied  systems  of  philosophy  or 
speculation  which  have  flourished  in  our  country,  one 
after  another  in  regular  succession  and  sometimes  simul- 
taneously, may  be  traced  to  the  statements  and  disquisi- 
tions embodied  in  the  hoary  documents  we  have  taken 
the  liberty  to  call  the  prime  sources  of  Hindu  Philoso- 


CHAPTER  II. 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 

In  our  inquiry  and  research  relative  to  the  sources  of 
Hindu  Philosophy  we  should  neither  ignore  nor  over- 
look the  minor  Upanishads,  in  which  the  crude  ger- 
minal speculations,  embodied  in  the  Chhandogya  and 
the  Briliad  Aranyaka,  are  carried  forward  to  a pretty 
advanced  stage  of  development.  The  more  important 
of  these  philosophical  treatises,  those  commented  upon 
by  the  celebrated  Sankar,  are  eight  in  number,  barring 
the  Swetaswatara  ITpanishad,  which  cannot  be  property 
represented  as  a source  of  Hindu  Philosophy,  and  of 
which,  therefore,  a detailed  notice  will  be  taken  at  the 
proper  time  and  in  the  proper  place.  These  eight 
minor  Upanishads  are  : One  belonging  to  the  Rig 
Veda,  viz.,  Aitareya  Upanishad  ; one  belonging  to  the 
Black  Yajur  Veda,  viz.,  Taittiriya  Upanishad  ; one  be- 
longing to  the  White  Yajur  Veda,  viz.,  Vaiasaneyi- 
Sanliita,  or  Isa  Upanishad  ; one  belonging  to  the  Sama 
Veda,  viz.,  Talavakara  or  Kena  Upanishad  ; and  four 
belonging  to  the  Atharva  Veda,  viz.,  Prasna,  Iuitha, 
Mundaka,  Mandukya  Upanishads. 

They  seem  to  have  been  composed  in  different 
periods,  ranging  between  the  appearance  of  the  major 
Upanishads  and  the  regular  organization  of  Indian 
schools  of  philosophy.  The  composition  of  the  last- 
four,  in  which  pantheism  appears  in  a form  much  more 
matured  than  that  in  which  it  is  presented  in  the 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  37 


others,  must  he  ascribed  to  a later  period.  As  a body 
of  literature,  all  these  treatises  show  a marked  advance 
on  the  modes  of  thought  and  reasoning,  if  not  on  the 
habits  of  life,  indicated  in  the  two  major  Upanisliads. 
They  are  written  in  a less  extravagant  style,  and  they 
are  decidedly  less  burdened,  not  merely  with  incongru- 
ous metaphors  and  far-fetched  allegories,  but  with  such 
irrelevant  matter  as  makes  it  impossible  to  see  clearly 
what  the  earlier  documents  are  in  many  places  driving 
at.  And  they  are  almost,  if  not  entirely,  free  from  the 
legendary  references,  or  rather  the  legends  in  which 
their  predecessors  abound  ; while  scarcely  any  trace  is 
seen  of  the  obscenity  which  makes  some  portions  of  the 
major  Upanisliads  untranslatable  and  unpresentable. 

There  is,  moreover,  more  method  in  their  arrange- 
ment, more  appositeness  in  their  forms  of  expression, 
more  acuteness  in  their  lines  of  thought,  more  cogency 
in  their  modes  of  reasoning,  and  more  boldness  in  the 
spirit  of  speculation  they  set  forth.  ISTor  are  they  defi- 
cient in  the  attractiveness  attached  to  dry,  philosophical 
disquisitions  by  elevation  of  sentiment  and  sublimity  of 
diction,  as  well  as  by  poetic  fervor.  Their  chief  fault, 
however,  is  the  obscurity  thrown  over  their  contents  by 
what  may  be  called  brevity  carried  to  excess,  the  brev- 
ity shown  in  short,  elliptical  sentences,  easy  to  commit 
to  memory,  but  hard  to  understand  ; necessary  indeed 
in  an  age  when  oral  tradition  was  the  only  medium 
through  which  knowledge  could  be  preserved  and  com- 
municated, but  not  the  less  vexatious  at  a time  when 
their  meaning  has  to  be  ascertained  with  the  help  of 
commentaries  ten  times  more  ponderous  and  abstruse. 

All  these  documents  have  been  translated  by  Dr. 
Doer,  whose  introductory  remarks  and  explanatory 
notes  are  of  the  most  valuable  type.  His  translations 


38 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


are  to  be  utilized  in  this  paper,  as  his  translation  of  the 
Brihad  Aranyaka  was  in  the  last,  along  with  Dr. 
Bajendra  Lall  Mitra’s  translation  of  the  Chhandogya 
Upanishad.  "With  reference  to  the  style  and  teaching 
of  the  Upanishads  in  general,  the  following  weighty 
observations  of  Professor  Cowell  are  quoted  by  Major 
Jacob  in  his  recently  published  translation  of  the 
Vedanta  Sar  : “ The  Upanishads  are  usually  in  the 
form  of  dialogue  ; they  are  generally  written  in  prose, 
with  occasional  snatches  of  verse,  but  sometimes  they 
are  in  verse  altogether.  They  have  no  system  or 
method  ; the  authors  are  poets,  who  throw  out  their 
unconnected  and  often  contradictory  rhapsodies  on  the 
impulse  of  the  moment,  and  have  no  thought  of  har- 
monizing to-day’s  feelings  with  those  of  yesterday  or 
to-morrow.  . . . Through  them  all  runs  an  unmistak- 
able spirit  of  pantheism,  often  in  its  most  offensive 
form,  as  avowedly  overriding  all  moral  considerations  ; 
and  it  is  this  which  has  produced  the  general  impression 
that  the  religion  of  the  Veda  is  monotheistic.”  These 
strictures  are  more  thoroughly  applicable  to  the  major 
than  to  the  minor  Upanishads. 

The  very  style  of  the  minor  Upanishads,  their 
strength  of  expression  and  improved  method  of  reason- 
ing, and  the  boldness  and  consistency,  comparatively 
speaking,  of  the  conclusions  they  are  fitted  to  uphold, 
conspire  to  prove  their  posteriority.  Additional  proofs 
are  scarcely  needed.  A few,  however,  noticed  by  us 
in  the  course  of  a careful  perusal  of  these  ancient  docu- 
ments, may  be  presented  in  corroboration  of  the  con- 
clusion to  which  we  are  brought  by  the  speculations 
they  embody,  and  their  style  and  diction,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  time  of  their  composition. 

And  first  let  us  observe  that  Brahminism,  which  ap- 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  39 


pears  militant  in  the  Chhandogya  and  Brikad  Aranya- 
ka,  appears  triumphant  in  these  Upanisliads.  We  do 
not  see  herein,  as  in  the  major  Upanisliads,  the  Kshet- 
riya marching  alongside  of  the  Brahman  through  the 
highway  of  philosophical  speculation,  and  even  claim- 
ing pre-eminence  in  knowledge,  especially  of  the 
esoteric  meaning  of  the  hymnology  and  ritual  of  the 
Yedas.  The  Brahmin  is  the  all-in-all  in  these  treatises, 
and  the  Kshetriya  is  scarcely  mentioned.  The  Brah- 
min appears  as  a Doctor  of  Divinity  in  theological 
seminaries,  an  officiating  Bishop  at  holy  shrines,  an 
honored  Guest  in  convivial  meetings,  and  a spiritual 
Guide  to  the  most  honored  members  of  the  inferior 
castes.  Not  only  as  a leader  of  devotees  has  he  pecul- 
iar honors  accorded  to  him  ; but  even  as  a devotee  he 
claims  special  privileges.  And  woe  be  to  the  wretch 
who  presumes  to  treat  him  as  a guest  without  proper 
respect  or  with  neglect.  “ A Brahmin  guest  enters  the 
house  like  Yaiswanara  (fire).  For  him  (the  good) 
make  this  peace  offering.  Take  the  water,  O son  of 
Yivaswat  (the  sun).  Hope,  expectation,  meeting  (with 
the  good),  friendly  words,  sacrifices,  pious  gifts,  sons 
and  cattle — all  these  loses  the  man  of  little  sense  in 
whose  house  a Brahmin  dwells  without  taking  food  ” 
(“Hatha  Upanishad,”  chap.  i.  sec.  1).  In  one  of  the 
earliest  of  these  Upanisliads,  the  Taittiriya,  the  pre- 
eminence of  the  Brahmins  is  set  forth  in  words  almost 
equally  significant.  The  Brahmin  evidently  succeeded, 
during  the  time  intervening  between  the  appearance  of 
the  major  and  that  of  the  minor  Upanishads,  in  push- 
ing back  his  rival,  the  Kshetriya,  and  raising  himself 
to  the  height  of  glory  from  which  he  now  calmly  looks 
down  on  all  outside  the  pale  of  his  favored  caste. 

The  fact  that  less  stress  is  laid  or  less  value  set  in 


40 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


these  treatises  on  the  worldly  advantages  accruing  from 
spiritual  knowledge  than  in  the  major  Upanishads,  is  a 
proof  of  their  posteriority.  The  great  teachers  of  the 
Yedic  age,  called  Rishis,  did  not  by  any  means  live  as 
ascetics,  though  they  have  had  for  ages  the  reputation 
of  having  done  so.  They  lived  in  affluence  and  ease, 
amid  the  endearments  and  pleasures  of  domestic  life, 
and  they  were  evidently  never  tired  of  praying  for 
wealth,  property,  houses,  wives,  offspring,  kine,  sheep, 
and  instruments  of  husbandry.  People  were  directed 
by  special  revelations  to  approach  them  with  gifts  and 
largesses  ; and  anathemas  were  hurled  at  the  churlish 
wretch  who  refused  to  reward  them  with  becoming 
munificence  for  their  services.  Traditions  fitted  to 
render  professorships  in  theological  seminaries  or 
teacherships  in  private  religious  schools  remunerative, 
as  well  as  honorable,  were  prevalent  when  the  major 
Upanishads  were  written,  though  the  belief  in  ascetic 
retirement  as  a necessary  preparation  for  the  study  of 
sacred  philosophy,  or  the  acquisition  of  the  right  knowl- 
edge of  Brahma,  was  gaining  ground  slowly  but  surely. 

The  minor  Upanishads  show  this  belief  in  a very 
advanced  stage  of  development,  if  not  altogether  tri- 
umphant. They  set  a very  great  value  on  ascetic 
renunciation,  mortification,  and  penance  ; and  a pro- 
portionately small  value  on  the  secular  advantages  re- 
sulting from  the  position  of  one  skilled  or  profoundly 
read  in  theological  or  Brahma  science.  These,  how- 
ever, are  not  altogether  thrown  into  the  shade,  espe- 
cially in  the  earlier  of  these  treatises.  One  skilled  in 
divine  science  is  said  in  the  Taittiriya  Upanishad  to 
have  offered  up  this  prayer,  so  well  calculated  to 
recall  the  simpler  times  of  the  Rig  Yeda  : “ The  pros- 
perity (sri)  which  simply  brings  me  clothes,  increases 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  44 

my  cows,  and  prepares  for  me  always  food  and  drink, 
this  prosperity,  rich  wool-clad  flocks  and  other  cattle, 
bring  to  me.”  But  these  and  such-like  secular  advan- 
tages are  much  more  rarely  spoken  of  than  in  the  other 
treatises  ; and  the  insignificant  place  they  take  in  these 
is  a proof  of  an  advance  of  spiritual  ideas,  or  proper 
appreciation  of  spiritual  things,  indicative,  if  not  deter- 
minative, of  their  posteriority. 

Akin  to  this  is  the  proof  given  of  the  advanced  stage 
of  asceticism  indicated  in  these  treatises.  Two  of  the 
technical  terms,  which  were  subsequently  made  the 
watchwords  of  various  sects  of  ascetics,  are  met  with 
herein,  viz.,  Dama,  or  subjugation  of  the  senses,  and 
Yoga,  or  concentration  of  the  mind.  These  are  re- 
ferred to  in  several  passages,  and  they  are  uniformly 
represented  as  essential  to  the'  acquisition  of  right 
knowledge.  Their  frequent  occurrence  in  these  docu- 
ments, coupled  with  their  entire  absence  from  the 
major  Upanishads,  coupled  moreover  with  the  more 
artificial  and  repulsive  forms  of  asceticism  they  are  an 
index  to,  might  justly  be  advanced  as  an  additional 
proof  of  their  posteriority. 

The  change  indicated  herein  in  the  triad  of  the  Yedas 
is  also  a proof  in  this  direction  not  to  be  passed  over. 
The  triad  of  the  Yedas  consists  of  Agni  (fire),  repre- 
senting things  divine  on  the  earth  ; Yayu  (air),  repre- 
senting those  in  the  atmosphere,  and  Surya  (sun), 
representing  those  in  the  heavens.  The  third  member 
of  this  triumvirate  or  triad  is  dropped,  and  another  sub- 
stituted for  it  in  the  triad  presented  in  the  Talavakara 
or  Kena  ITpanishad.  Instead  of  Agni,  Yayu,  and 
Snrya,  we  have  Agni,  Yayu,  and  Indra.  Precedence 
in  this  remodelled  triad  is  given  to  Indra,  and  the  way 
in  which  he  acquired  it  is  indicated  in  a legend  which 


42 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


does  not  place  the  divinities  concerned  in  a very  favor- 
able light.  These  gods  were  placed  above  all  others  by 
Brahma  after  a hard  fight  with  the  Asuras  (demons)  ; 
but  being  thus  raised,  they  forgot  their  benefactor  so 
far  as  to  be  induced  to  attribute  their  elevation  to  their 
own  might.  To  humble  them  Brahma  manifested  him- 
self to  them  in  an  extraordinary  manner.  “ They  did 
not  know  him  (and  asked  each  other)  : Is  this  (being) 
worthy  of  adoration  ?”  They  asked  Agni,  the  first 
member  of  the  triad,  to  make  suitable  inquiries  and 
solve  the  perplexing  question.  He  approaches  the  glo- 
rious apparition,  and  introduces  himself  as  one  who 
“ can  burn  whatsoever  there  is  on  earth.”  lie  is  told 
to  burn  a single  blade  of  grass  pointed  out  to  him;  he 
fails,  and  returns  to  his  companions  humbled  and  de- 
jected. Yayu  then,  at  their  request,  approaches  the 
manifested  god  and  introduces  himself  as  one  who 
“ can  sweep  away  whatsoever  there  is  on  earth.”  He 
being  told  to  sweep  away  a blade  of  grass,  tries,  fails, 
and  returns  humiliated.  Indra  then  advances,  continues 
wrapped  up  in  contemplation,  till  a beautiful  female, 
or,  as  Sankar  explains  it,  Knowledge  in  the  shape  of  a 
beautiful  female,  dispels  his  ignorance.  His  persever- 
ance is  rewarded,  and  he  becomes  the  head  of  the 
triad.  The  object  of  this  legend  evidently  is  to  show 
the  excellence  of  right  knowledge,  which  not  merely 
ennobles  and  elevates  men,  but  fixes  the  relative  posi- 
tion even  of  the  gods. 

Again,  the  cosmogonies  embodied  in  these  Upanishads 
are  an  advance  on  those  presented  in  the  larger  records, 
and  an  approach  to  that  of  the  Yedantic  school  con- 
fessedly organized  a long  time  after  the  era  of  incipient 
philosophical  speculation  depicted  in  these  treatises. 
These  cosmogonies,  scattered  among  the  contents  of 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  43 


these  hoary  records,  hut  presented  in  a manner  at  times 
mystical  hut  generally  methodical,  have  as  a rule  for 
their  starting  point  the  Absolute  Spirit  called  Brahma, 
a being  described  as  “ existence,  knowledge,  and  infin- 
ity.” But  though  united  in  their  origin,  the  source  of 
all  being,  the  fountain-head  of  evolution,  they  present 
in  the  development  of  what  may  be  called  their  main 
plot  elements  of  discrepancy  and  discord,  which,  how- 
ever, it  is  by  no  means  difficult  to  reconcile. 

Creation,  according  to  some  of  these  accounts,  seems 
to  have  proceeded  immediately  from  the  Absolute  Spirit 
in  a stated  order.  Take,  for  instance,  the  following 
passage  from  the  last  chapter  of  the  Taittiriya  : “ From 
that  soul  (Brahma  previously  described  ‘ as  existence, 
knowledge,  and  infinity  ’)  verily  sprang  forth  the  ether, 
from  the  ether  the  air,  from  the  air  the  fire,  from  the 
fire  the  waters,  from  the  waters  the  earth,  from  the 
earth  the  annual  herbs,  and  from  the  annual  herbs 
food,  from  food  seed,  and  from  seed  man,  and  man  is 
verily  the  essence  of  food.”  Again  : “All  creatures 
which  dwell  on  earth  spring  verily  forth  from  food. 
Again  they  live  by  food,  again  at  last  they  return  to 
the  same,  for  food  is  the  oldest  of  all  beings.” 

In  the  fifth  chapter  of  the  Ivatha  the  ubiquity  of  the 
human  soul,  identified  with  the  Supreme  Ruler,  is  thus 
described  : “As  Hansa  ( Aditya,  sun)  it  dwells  in  the 
heavens ; as  Vasu  (wind)  it  dwells  in  the  atmosphere ; as 
the  invoker  (of  the  gods)  it  dwells  within  the  earth ; as 
Soma  (moon  plant)  in  the  water  jar  ; it  dwells  in  man, 
it  dwells  in  truth,  it  dwells  in  the  ether,  it  is  born  in 
the  waters  (as  aquatic  animals),  it  is  born  in  the  earth 
(as  rice,  etc.),  it  is  born  in  the  sacrifice,  it  is  born  on 
the  mountains  (as  the  rivers,  etc.),  it  is  truth,  it  is  the 
great  one  (infinite).” 


44 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


These  passages  indisputably  propound  that  theory  of 
evolution,  the  starting-point  of  which  is  the  Divine 
Essence,  but  there  are  others  which  place  an  interme- 
diate link  of  gold  between  this  self-evolving  spiritual 
substance  and  the  chain  of  creation.  They  speak  of 
an  inferior  gold-colored  Brahma  springing  out  of  the 
Supreme  Brahma,  the  Manifested  (Vyakata)  out  of  the 
Unmanifested  (Avyakta),  the  Known  (Vijnata)  out  of 
the  Unknown  (Avijnata),  and  causing  creation  to 
evolve  out  of  his  substance  in  the  order  stated  above. 
This  omnific  principle  or  Demiurgus  is  called  by  a 
variety  of  names — Brahma,  the  creator  ; Indra,  the 
King  of  the  gods  ; Prajapati,  the  lord  of  creatures  ; 
Iliranyagarhha,  the  soul  of  creation,  or  the  universal 
soul  in  contradistinction  to  the  Supreme,  Unmanifested, 
Unknown  Spirit. 

In  the  Aitareya,  evidently  the  earliest  of  these  trea- 
tises, a different  order  of  creation  is  presented,  and  a 
regular  theogony  comes  between  its  incipient  and  con- 
cluding processes,  between  the  creation  of  the  spheres 
— the  sphere  of  waters  ‘ ‘ above  the  heavens,  ’ ’ the 
sphere  of  the  sunbeams,  the  “ atmosphere,”  the  sphere 
of  death,  the  earth,  and  the  sphere  of  waters  “ which 
are  beneath  it,”  and  the  creation  of  man  in  whom  the 
gods  entered  through  the  various  openings  of  his  body, 
not  excluding  its  innumerable  and  imperceptible  pores. 
The  fanciful  and  grotesque  character  of  this  cosmogony 
and  its  advancement  of  what  may  at  first  sight  be 
called  an  ex-nihilo  theory  of  creation,  stamps  it  as  the 
production  of  an  intermediate  era,  an  age  intervening 
between  the  appearance  of  the  major  and  that  of  most 
of  the  minor  Upanishads. 

The  cosmogonies  presented  in  these  books,  indicat- 
ing, as  they  do,  a gradual  progress  from  the  ludicrous 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  45 


fancies  of  the  larger  Upanishads  toward  what  was  sub- 
sequently elaborated  in  the  Yedantic  school,  are  an  in- 
disputable proof  of  their  posteriority. 

Apropos  of  our  remarks  on  the  evidential  value  of 
the  cosmogonies  embodied  in  these  records,  we  may 
observe  that  the  idea  of  creation  springing  out  of 
matter  and  force,  made  so  much  of  by  the  so-called 
advanced  science  of  the  day,  is  one  of  the  oldest  we 
come  across  in  the  world.  It  was  found  as  a dominat- 
ing principle  in  the  oldest  schools  of  Greek  philosophy, 
and  it  was  elaborated  into  a consistent  system  in  India 
in  the  age  immediately  following  that  of  the  Upani- 
shads. Hay,  it  is  found  in  some  of  the  declarations  of 
the  Upanishads  themselves,  standing  on  a background 
of  an  all-dilfusive  and  self-evolving  divine  substance,  or 
absolute  existence,  manifested  or  embodied  in  an 
omnific  principle  or  personality.  The  Prasna  Upani- 
shad,  which  consists  of  answers  to  a series  of  philo- 
sophical questions  propounded  one  after  another  by 
anxious  inquirers,  opens  with  a cosmogony  which  pre- 
sents the  dualism  of  an  active  and  a passive  principle, 
both  springing  from  Prajapati,  the  inferior  divinity 
through  whom  derived  existence  in  its  multifarious 
forms  is  to  be  traced  to  the  Absolute  and  the  Uncondi- 
tioned. “ Prajapati,”  it  says,  “ was  desirous  of  off- 
spring. lie  performed  austerity.  Having  performed 
austerity,  he  produced  a couple,  matter  and  life  or  fire 
or  energy  (with  the  intention)  ; they  shall  in  manifold 
ways  produce  offspring  for  me.  ’ ’ 

Another  important  question  has  to  be  raised  and  set 
at  rest  with  reference  to  these  cosmogonies.  Do  they 
imply  a real  or  an  illusory  change  in  the  substance  of 
Brahma  ? Does  that  substance  actually  become  the 
elements  to  which  material  creation  is  traced  ? Or  is 


46 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


it  merely  the  substratum  concealed  beneath  varieties  of 
deceptive  phenomena  ? Now  no  one  can  study  the 
Upanishads  carefully  without  being  induced  to  indorse 
the  opinion  expressed  by  authorities  like  Cowell,  viz., 
that  an  actual  change  of  substance,  not  merely  an  illu- 
sory transformation,  is  indicated  in  the  cosmogonies  of 
the  Upanishads,  though  the  illusion  theory  is  in  a few 
solitary  passages  alluded  to.  The  writers  were  Parina- 
mavadins  or  Vikarvadins,  or  those  who  insisted  upon 
an  actual  metamorphosis  of  substance — not  Mayavadins, 
or  those  who  maintained  an  illusory  change  to  uphold 
the  doctrine  of  non-dualism  in  all  its  integrity.  This 
subject  will  have  to  be  enlarged  upon  when  we  treat  of 
the  Vedanta  system  ; and  it  need  not  be  allowed  to 
detain  us  here. 

Let  us  adduce  one  more  proof  of  the  posteriority  of 
these  records,  a proof  insignificant  indeed  at  first  sight, 
but  one  better  adapted  in  our  humble  opinion  to  pro- 
duce conviction  than  many  ostensibly  more  important. 
The  proof  is  indicated  in  the  well-known  words  of 
Jacob  : “Few  and  evil  have  the  days  of  the  years  of 
my  life  been,  and  have  not  attained  unto  the  days  of 
the  years  of  the  life  of  my  fathers.”  The  longevity 
indicated  in  the  smaller  Upanishads  is  by  no  means  so 
marked  as  that  shown  in  the  larger,  the  length  of  life 
having  come  down  from  one  hundred  and  forty  in  the 
latter  to  one  hundred  in  the  former.  And  less  earnest- 
ness in  religious  matters  stamps  these  records  of  a 
period  when  tricks,  such  as  that  set  forth  in  the  follow- 
ingsentence,  were  unhappily  becoming  common  : (“A 
sacrifice!')  who  bestows  (cows)  which  have  drunk  their 
water,  eaten  their  grass,  given  their  milk,  and  which 
arc  barren,  goes  verily  to  the  worlds  of  unhappiness.” 
But  the  best  proof  decidedly  of  the  posteriority  of  these 


THE  SOUECES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  47 


treatises  is  to  be  found,  as  has  already  been  said,  in  the 
terseness  of  their  style,  in  the  method  and  logical  pre- 
cision by  which  they  are,  comparatively  speaking, 
characterized,  and  in  the  progress  of  speculative  acute- 
ness and  analytic  thought  shown  in  the  disquisitions 
they  embody.  Their  object  is  to  teach  the  science  of 
Brahma,  the  absolute  spirit  ; and  its  superiority  to 
every  other  species  of  knowledge  is  shown  by  a dis- 
closure of  its  inherent  excellence,  by  the  eulogy  lav- 
ished on  those  devotees  who  make  it  the  sole  object  of 
their  search,  and  by  the  insight  presented  into  its  glo- 
rious consequences. 

It  is  said  to  be  “ the  foundation  of  all  sciences,”  “ the 
highest  science,”  the  “supreme  path”  to  felicity, 
“the  last  object  of  man,”  and  high-sounding  adjec- 
tives, or  adjecti  ves  of  the  most  imposing  kind,  are  pressed 
into  service  to  set  forth  its  excellence.  It  is,  properly 
speaking,  the  only  correct  science,  the  knowledge  de- 
rived through  perception  and  inference  being  sheer 
ignorance.  All  persons  in  this  world  under  the  guid- 
ance of  the  senses  are  spoken  of  in  terms  by  no  means 
complimentary.  “In  the  midst  of  ignorance,  fools 
fancying  themselves  wise  and  learned  go  round  and 
round,  oppressed  by  misery  as  blind  people  led  by  a 
( blind.”  The  few  who  liberate  themselves  from  the  cob- 
webs of  this  sense-produced  ignorance  and  eagerly  run 
after  right  knowledge,  are  praised  in  extravagant  terms. 

The  legend  with  which  the  Katha  Upanishad  opens 
is  eminently  fitted  to  show  this.  Xachikotas,  being 
devoted  by  his  exasperated  father  to  Death  (Yama), 
conciliates  the  monster  by  fasts  and  vigils,  and  is 
offered  “ three  boons.”  "With  true  filial  piety  he  first 
solicits  a change  in  his  father’s  heart  favorable  to  his 
hope  of  reconciliation  to  him,  then  requests  some  knowl- 


48 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


edge  about  “the  heavenly  fire”  or  the  fire  by  which 
heaven  is  gained,  and  lastly  propounds  a question  in 
these  words  : “ Some  say  the  soul  exists  after  the 
death  of  man,  others  say  it  does  not  exist.  This  I 
should  like  to  know,  instructed  by  thee.  Such  is  the 
third  of  the  boons.”  Death,  unwilling  to  communicate 
the  precious  knowledge  to  him,  asks  him  to  choose 
other  gifts,  such  as  “ sons  and  grandsons  who  may  live 
a hundred  years,”  “ herds  of  cattle,”  “elephants,” 
“ gold  and  horses,”  “wealth  and  far-extending  life.  ” 
lie,  however,  continues  stubborn,  although  pleasures 
unattainable  by  man,  such  as  may  be  brought  to  him 
by  ‘ ‘ the  fair  ones  of  heaven  with  their  cars  and  musical 
instruments,”  are  offered  him.  Death  ultimately 
grants  him  the  boon  requested,  with  these  words  of 
encouragement  : “ One  thing  is  what  is  good,  another 
what  is  pleasant.  Both  having  different  objects  chain 
man.  Blessed  is  he  who  between  them  takes  the  good 
(alone),  but  be  who  chooses  what  is  pleasant  loses  the 
last  object  of  man.”  The  results  of  this  knowledge 
will  have  to  be  displayed  after  its  object  has  been  set 
forth  ; and  they  need  not  detain  us  here.  Suffice  it  to 
say  that  it  is  represented  as  that  by  virtue  of  which 
“ all  is  manifested,”  “ man  is  delivered  from  the  mouth 
of  death,”  and  even  the  status  of  the  gods  is  raised. 

The  excellency,  moreover,  of  this  science,  the  knowl- 
edge of  Brahma,  is  set  forth  in  the  very  difficult  man- 
ner in  which  it  is  acquired.  The  path  to  it  is  not  a 
path  strewn  with  roses,  but  a path  of  thorns,  the  path 
of  duty,  renunciation,  privation,  study,  meditation,  and 
austerity  in  its  most  appalling  forms  ; and  it  is  justly 
called  “ the  sharp  edge  of  a razor.”  One  cannot  group 
and  carefully  study  the  many  passages  and  texts  in 
which  this  path  is  indicated,  without  noticing  much 


'HE  SOURCES  OP  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  49 


confusion  of  thought,  if  not  glaring  contradiction  ; hut 
order  can,  we  believe,  be  evolved  out  of  the  chaotic 
mass.  There  are  passages  in  which  performance  of  the 
duties  of  life,  study  of  the  Yedas  under  an  accredited 
teacher,  austerity  and  penance  are  represented  as  indis- 
pensable requisites  for  the  attainment  of  supreme  knowl- 
edge, and  there  are  others  in  which  these  are  spoken 
of  in  disparaging  terms,  and  the  mystic  notion  of  a 
beatific  or  tranquil  vision  is  prominently  brought  for- 
ward. And  these  two  classes  of  texts  are  apparently 
at  variance,  but  in  reality  there  is  no  contradiction. 

The  utilization  of  the  means  is  necessary  to  the  at- 
tainment of  the  end  ; and  such  exercises  as  worship, 
study,  and  penance  are  the  prescribed  means,  and  as 
such  they  should  be  earnestly  resorted  to  ; but  when 
this  preliminary  process  has  been  completed,  it  should 
be  entirely  lost  sight  of,  and  nothing  thought  or  even 
dreamt  of  but  sublime  contemplation  leading  to  beatific 
vision,  or  rather  a calm  recognition  of  the  real  under 
the  phenomenal,  the  permanent  under  the  imperma- 
nent, the  changeless  under  the  fitful  and  the  changeable. 

The  first  thing  the  Brahma  student  must  do  is  to 
perform  the  duties  of  life  called  inferior  in  contradis- 
tinction to  those  which  bring  him  where  the  great 
object  of  his  career  is  gained,  and  he  becomes  liberated 
from  sense-bred  ignorance.  He  must  as  a “ house- 
holder” perform  his  duties  “ toward  the  gods  and  the 
forefathers”  and  all  classes  of  people,  not  forgetting 
even  “ the  beggars.  ” He  must  conscientiously  do  the 
threefold  work  of  “ offering,  reading  of  the  Yedas,  and 
liberality,”  and  then  “ renounce  the  world  ” and  “ ap- 
proach, sacred  wood  in  his  hand,  a teacher  who  knows 
the  Yedas  and  who  is  solely  devoted  to  Brahma.”  But 
the  question  arises,  Who  is  the  accredited  teacher  to 


50 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


whose  guidance  he  must  implicitly  and  unreservedly 
commit  himself  ? To  be  able  to  answer  this  question 
an  insight  into  the  Hindu  theory  of  apostolic  succession 
is  needed.  The  accredited  teacher  of  the  hour  is  the 
legitimate  successor,  through  a bright  line  of  inspired 
teachers,  of  him  who  first  learned  the  science  of  Brahma 
from  the  Creator  himself,  the  emergent  Deity  who 
stands  as  a connecting  link  between  the  unmanifested 
substance  and  the  manifested  forms  in  which  it  appears 
in  creation.  “ Brahma,  the  Creator  of  the  universe, 
the  preserver  of  the  world,  was  first  produced  among 
the  gods.  He  taught  the  science  of  Brahma,  the  foun- 
dation of  all  sciences,  to  Atharvan,  his  eldest  son. 
Atharvan  revealed  of  old  the  science  of  Brahma,  which 
Brahma  had  explained  to  him,  to  Angis  ; he  explained 
it  to  Satyavaha  of  the  family  of  Bharadnaja,  who 
revealed  the  science  traditionally  obtained  by  the  suc- 
cession of  teachers  to  Angiras”  ( mundaka ).  In  this 
manner  “ the  highest  science” — in  contradistinction  to 
the  “ baser”  which  comprehends  the  Rig,  the  Yajur, 
the  Sama,  and  the  Atharvan  Yedas,  accentuation,  rit- 
ual, grammar,  glossary,  prosody,  and  astronomy,  the 
Yedas  and  the  Yedangas — has  come  down,  through  oral 
tradition,  to  the  teacher  of  the  hour. 

The  necessity  of  resort  to  him  is  shown  in  almost  in- 
numerable passages,  such  as  the  following  : 

“ A wonderful  teacher  is  required.  Of  the  soul  is 
wonderful  the  speaker,  ingenious  the  receiver,  wonder- 
ful the  loiower,  instructed  by  an  ingenious  teacher.” 

“ Arise,  awake,  get  to  tlie  teachers  and  attend.” 

But  the  Brahma  student  must  separate  himself  from 
his  teacher  when  thoroughly  instructed,  and  have  re- 
course to  hermit  solitude,  restraint  of  the  senses  and 


THE  SOUIICES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  51 


'concentration  of  the  mind  before  his  object  can  be 
gained.  He  must  remember  that  the  occult  knowledge 
he  is  in  quest  of  cannot  be  acquired  through  the  senses, 
or  through  instruction  of  any  kind,  or  even  through 
revelation.  “ The  soul’s  nature  is  not  placed  in  what  is 
visible.  Hone  beholds  it  by  the  eye.”  “ With  regard 
to  him  (Brahma)  the  sun  does  not  manifest,  not  the 
moon,  not  the  stars.”  “ The  soul  cannot  be  gained  by 
the  knowledge  of  the  Veda,  not  by  understanding  its 
meaning,  not  by  manifold  science.”  “By  the  soul, 
which  is  chosen,  it  (the  soul)  can  be  gained.” 

Direct  vision  of  the  universal  soul  by  the  individual 
soul,  calm  rather  than  beatific,  is  the  sitmmum  lonum , to 
which  he  is  to  rise,  in  consequence,  not  so  much  of  the 
preparatory  exercises  he  has  gone  through,  as  of  ascetic 
self-mortification  and  serene  contemplation.  “ It  is  not 
apprehended  by  the  eye,  not  by  speech,  not  by  the  other 
senses,  not  by  devotion  or  rites  ; but  he,  whose  intellect 
is  purified  by  the  fight  of  knowledge,  beholds  him,  who 
is  without  parts,  through  mediation”  (Mundaka). 

The  important  questions  discussed  in  these  venerable 
records  have  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  Universal 
Soul;  called  Brahma,  and  his  relation  to  the  individual 
soul,  and  to  the  external  world.  They  may  be  categor- 
ically stated  thus  : (!)  What  is  Brahma  ? (2)  How  is 

Brahma  related  to  the  human  soul,  mine  or  yours  ? 
(3)  How  is  Brahma  related  to  what  in  ordinary  human 
parlance  is  called  the  material  world  ? We  cannot 
better  dive  into  the  philosophy  of  these  treatises  than 
by  grouping  the  replies  embodied  in  them  to  these  im- 
portant questions. 

1.  What  is  Brahma  ? What  do  these  books  say 
regarding  his  nature  ? The  answer  is  embodied  in  the 
following  passages  : 


52 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


‘ 1 lie  who  is  the  ear  of  the  ear,  the  raincl  of  the  mind, 
speech  of  speech,  is  verily  the  life  of  life,  the  eye  of  the 
eye.  The  wise,  who  have  abandoned  (those  individual 
existences)  when  departing  from  this  world  become  im- 
mortal. Him  (the  Supreme  Brahma)  does  not  approach 
the  eye  or  speech  or  mind.  We  do  not  recognize 
(Brahma  as  anything  perceptible,  therefore)  we  do  not 
know  how  to  teach  him  (his  nature  to  a disciple).  It  is 
even  different  from  what  is  known  (from  the  unmani- 
fested universe  ; if  you  then  say  it  must  be  the  unmani- 
fested universe,  no)  it  is  also  beyond  what  is  known  (to 
the  senses,  it  is  beyond  the  unmanifested  universe). 
Thus  we  heard  from  the  former  teachers  who  explained 
it  to  us”  (“  Talavakara,”  sec.  1). 

“ Whoever  has  understood  (the  nature  of  Brahma), 
which  is  without  sound,  without  touch,  without  form, 
which  does  not  waste,  which  is  without  taste,  which  is 
eternal,  without  smell,  without  beginning,  and  without 
end,  higher  than  the  great  one  (intellect),  which  is 
firmly  based,  escapes  from  the  mouth  of  death” 
(“  Ivatha,”  sec.  3). 

£ ‘ Higher  than  the  senses  (and  their  objects)  is  the 
mind,  more  excellent  than  the  mind  the  intellect  ; 
above  the  intellect  soars  the  great  soul,  more  excellent 
than  the  great  one  is  the  unmanifested.  But  higher 
than  the  unmanifested  is  the  soul  which  is  all-pervad- 
ing and  without  cause.  Knowing  this  one  gets  liber- 
ated and  gains  immortality”  (“  Ivatha,”  sec.  6). 

“ Whoever,  O beloved  one,  knows  the  indestructible 
(soul),  on  which  (the  being)  whose  nature  is  knowledge, 
and  together  with  all  the  gods,  the  vital  airs,  and  the 
elements  are  formed,  gets  omniscient,  penetrates  all” 
(“  Prasna,”  sec.  4). 

“ lie  (Brahma)  is  verily  luminous,  without  form,  a 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  53 


spirit,  he  is  without  and  within  ; without  origin,  with- 
out life,  without  mind,  he  is  pure  and  greater  than  the 
great  indestructible  one.  From  this  Brahma  are  pro- 
duced life,  mind,  and  all  the  organs,  ether,  air,  light, 
the  water  (and),  the  earth,  the  support  of  all  ’ ’ (Second 
Mundaka). 

“ I am  the  spirit  (mover)  of  the  tree  (viz.,  of  the  tree 
of  the  world  which  is  to  be  cut  down).  (Thy)  fame 
(rises)  like  the  top  of  the  mountain.  I am  purified  in 
my  root,  as  immortality  is  glorious  in  the  nourisher 
(viz.,  the  sun).  I am  brilliant  wealth,  I am  intelligent, 
I am  immortal,  and  without  decay.  (Or  I am  sprinkled 
with  immortality)”  (“  Taittariya,”  chap.  i.  sec.  10). 

These  passages  present  a confusion  of  nomenclature 
which  must  be  cleared  up  before  the  prominent  idea  set 
forth  can  be  grasped.  Brahma  is  in  many  passages 
called  the  Unmanifested  (Avyakta)  ; but  in  one  of 
these  passages  he  is  distinguished  from  and  placed 
above  the  unmanifested,  and  in  another  the  unmani- 
fested from  which  he  is  distinguished  is  called  the  un- 
manifested universe.  To  set  forth  the  distinction,  wo 
must  ascertain  what  is  meant  by  the  manifested  uni- 
verse, and  what  by  the  unmanifested.  By  the  mani- 
fested universe  we  are  to  understand  the  various  objects 
of  nature,  the  knowledge  of  which  we  derive  through 
perception.  The  material,  perceptible  world,  that  of 
the  existence  of  which  we  are  assured  by  the  varied 
impressions  made  upon  the  senses,  or  the  sensations 
caused  by  it,  is  the  manifested  universe.  The  unmani- 
fested universe  is  the  world  of  tenuous  substances,  the 
world  in  modern  phraseology  of  causes  and  forces,  of 
the  existence  of  which  we  are  assured  by  inference,  not 
perception.  Beyond  the  world  of  shifting  phenomena, 
beyond  the  world  of  imperceptible  substances  and 


54 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY, 


occult  forces,  is  Brahma,  “ the  foundation”  of  all  we 
perceive,  and  of  all  we  cannot  perceive,  but  legitimately 
deduce  from  the  coincidences,  the  successions,  and  the 
transmutations  of  the  phenomena  perceived. 

Again,  Brahma  is  in  one  of  these  passages  called 
“the  indestructible  soul,”  on  which  all  forms  of  life, 
all  forms  of  organized  and  unorganized  material  and 
mental  existence  are  “ founded  while  in  another  he 
is  represented  as  “ greater  than  the  great  indestructible 
one.  ’ ’ Who  is  this  being  described  as  ‘ ‘ greater  than 
the  great  indestructible  one”  ? Sankar’s  reply  is, 
“ Brahma  in  his  unmanifested  state.”  The  phrase, 
however,  is  ambiguous,  being  applicable  both  to  the 
being  described  “ as  greater  than  the  great  indestructi- 
ble one,”  and  the  being  described  as  “ the  indestructible 
one.”  The  distinction  set  fortli  is  perhaps  that  be- 
tween the  Absolute,  Unmanifested  Spirit,  and  the 
emanent  or  emergent  Deity  called  Brahma,  Prajapati, 
Hiranyagarbha  or  Virat  ; or  simply  that  between  the 
human  soul  called  “great”  and  the  Supreme  Spirit 
called  “ greater,”  because  of  its  freedom  from  the 
bondage  under  which  it  groans. 

It  ought  not  to  be  forgotten  that  according  to  the 
later  speculations  of  the  Yedantic  school,  a portion  of 
Brahma  called  the  “The  Fourth”  always  remains  un- 
connected with  the  detached  portion  manifested  in  the 
phenomena  of  nature. 

The  last  of  these  quotations  presents  a figure  of 
speech  with  which  our  countrymen  are  familiar.  The 
world  is  often  in  their  sacred  literature  compared  to 
“an  eternal,  holy  fig-tree,  whose  root  is  upward  and 
whose  branches  go  downward,”  and  the  very  sap 
which  is  the  life  thereof  is  Brahma,  who  may  justly  be 
called  the  anima  mundi,  the  life  of  the  world.  This 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  55 


image  shows  in  what  respect  the  Hindu  theory  of  evo- 
lution differs  from  what  is  propounded  in  these  days. 
It  is  a downward  progression  from  spirit  to  matter,  not 
an  upward  progression  from  matter  to  spirit. 

It  is  further  to  be  observed  that  these  passages  merely 
show  the  relative  position  of  Brahma,  or  the  position  he 
occupies  in  the  scale  of  being,  and  what  he  is  not. 
They  do  not  show  what  he  is. 

Brahma  is,  according  to  the  philosophy  of  these 
records,  illimitable,  and  therefore  undeterminable  and 
undefinable.  The  quibbles  and  puzzles,  the  riddles  and 
enigmas,  to  which  the  modern  doctrine  of  the  Absolute 
and  the  Infinite  has  given  rise,  are  found  in  these 
hoary  records  and  disposed  of  beautifully.  To  define 
the  infinite  is  tantamount  to  reducing  the  infinite  to  the 
category  of  the  finite,  and  therefore  all  definitions  given 
of  the  Supreme  Brahma  must  be  accepted  with  reserva- 
tion. When,  for  instance,  he  is  called  a spirit,  no  line 
of  demarcation  between  spirit  and  matter  should  be 
drawn,  and  no  attempt  made  to  limit  him,  either  by 
assuming  the  existence  of  matter  apart  from  him,  or  by 
positing  various  orders  of  spirits  essentially  different 
from  him.  He  is,  properly  speaking,  the  all-absorbing 
existence,  and  no  form  of  being  can  be  conceived  of  as 
existing  apart  from  him.  Again,  when  he  is  said  to  be 
“ without  form,”  “ without  fife,”  or  “ without  mind,” 
we  are  not  to  posit  existences,  such  as  that  of  “ form” 
or  “ life”  (mundane)  or  “ mind  ” apart  from  him,  and 
thereby  reduce  him  to  the  category  of  the  finite.  He 
is,  properly  speaking,  form,  life,  and  mind,  and  no 
entity  exists  apart  from  him.  Again,  when  he  is  rep- 
resented as  the  creator  or  the  foundation  of  the  world, 
we  are  not  to  limit  him  by  recognizing  an  essential,  or 
any  but  mere  nominal  distinction  between  the  creator 


56 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


and  the  objects  of  creation.  He  is,  to  adopt  the  well- 
known  phrase  of  Spinoza,  the  natura  naturans  ; and 
there  is,  properly  speaking,  no  difference  between  him 
and  the  universe,  which  is  natura  natureta.  He  is 
therefore  above  the  region  of  definitions  and  deter- 
minations ; and  the  only  thing  that  can  be  predicated 
of  him  is  existence,  absolute  and  unconditioned.  And 
this  existence,  moreover,  ought  not  to  be  separated 
by  a broad  line  of  demarcation  from  non-existence,  as 
the  infinite  must  embrace  all  states,  that  of  existence 
and  that  of  non-existence.  Such  at  least  is  the  modern 
dictum  ! 

Brahma  is  called  Sacchitananda,  which  is,  being  in- 
terpreted, Existence,  Knowledge,  and  Bliss.  But  when 
the  meaning  attached  to  either  of  the  two  terms,  knowl- 
edge and  bliss,  in  this  connection  is  looked  into,  the 
triad  resolves  itself  into  a monad.  To  this  technical 
phrase,  made  so  much  of  in  subsequent  times,  we  shall 
return  after  we  have  shown  the  perfect  identity  of  the 
universal  with  the  individual  soul  and  the  material 
world. 

2.  What  is  the  human  soul,  and  what  its  relation  to 
the  universal  spirit  ? The  following  quotations  will 
furnish  a reply  to  this  question  : 

“ The  knowing  (soul)  is  not  born,  nor  does  it  die  ; it 
was  not  produced  from  any  one,  nor  was  any  produced 
from  it  ; unborn,  eternal,  without  decay,  ancient  as  it 
is,  it  is  not  slain,  although  the  body  is  slain ” (“  Katha,” 
sec.  2). 

“ The  perfect  one  (Purush)  who,  building  desire  after 
desire,  is  awake  in  those  that  are  asleej),  is  called  even 
pure,  is  called  Brahma,  is  called  even  eternal.  . . . 
As  the  one  fire,  when  entering  the  world,  becomes  to 
every  nature  of  every  nature,  so  the  one  soul  being  of 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  57 


every  nature  to  every  nature  is  the  internal  soul  of  all 
bemg ” (“  Katka  ” sec.  5). 

“ As  from  blazing  fire  in  a thousand  YvTays  similar 
sparks  proceed,  so,  O beloved,  are  produced  living  souls 
of  various  lcinds  from-  the  indestructible  Brahma , and 
they  also  return  to  him”  (Second  Mundaka,  sec.  1). 

“ Within  (the  heart)  which  the  arteries  enter  as  the 
spokes  the  nave  of  the  wheel,  he  (Brahma)  moves,  be- 
coming manifold  ” (Second  Mundaka,  sec.  2). 

“For  this  all  (represented  by  ‘ Om  ’)  is  Brahma, 
this  soul  is  Brahma.  This  soul  has  four  conditions — 
viz.,  waking,  dreaming,  profound  sleep,  and  a state 
different  from  any  of  the  former”  (Mandukya). 

The  italics  are  our  own.  It  is  impossible  to  find 
words  more  adequate  than  these  to  set  forth  the  perfect 
identity  of  the  universal  with  the  individual  ego.  The 
cosmogonies  alluded  to  dwell,  not  merely  on  this  iden- 
tity, but  on  the  method  in  which  the  Supreme  Spirit 
entered  the  human  body  previously  created,  and  ani- 
mated it.  Its  dwelling-place  within  the  body  is  ‘ £ the 
ether  of  the  heart,”  and  it  is  incased  within  five 
sheaths.  The  outer  sheath  is  called  the  essence  of  food 
( annam ),  which  is  also  called  Brahma,  and  is  repre- 
sented as  an  object  of  worship.  The  sheath  immedi- 
ately beneath  this  is  called  “vital  air,”  and  is  said 
to  be  the  embodied  soul  of  the  nutritious  sheath,  or  the 
outer  garb.  Beneath  the  vital  sheath  there  is  the 
mental  sheath  or  “the  mind,”  which  has  the  Yajur 
Veda  for  its  head,  the  Rig  for  its  right  arm,  and  the 
Sama  for  its  left.  Beneath  that  lies  that  of  knowledge, 
and  beneath  that  is  that  of  bliss,  which  covers  the  spirit 
dwelling  in  its  “ cavity”  in  the  heart,  the  spirit  which 
is  at  one  and  the  same  time  greater  than  space  and 
smaller  than  a grain  of  mustard  seed.  The  body  in 


58 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


which  it  dwells  is  called  the  Brahmapura,  or  the  town 
of  Brama,  and  it  is  said  to  have  eleven  gates,  the  seven 
openings  in  the  face,  the  navel,  the  two  openings  below, 
and  the  opening  on  the  middle  of  the  head.  This  last 
opening  needs  an  explanation,  it  being,  according  to 
some  of  the  Upanishads,  the  entrance  through  which 
the  ingress  and  egress  of  the  soul  are  effected.  The 
explanation  needed  is  offered  in  these  two  extracts,  the 
first  from  the  Taittiriya,  and  the  second  from  the 
Aitariya. 

“ In  the  ether,  abiding  within  the  heart,  is  placed 
the  Purush  (soul),  whose  nature  is  knowledge — who  is 
immortal,  radiant  like  gold.  The  artery,  Sushumna  by 
name  (the  coronal  artery),  which  springs  forth  from  the 
upper  part  of  the  heart,  and  proceeds  between  the  two 
arteries  of  the  palate,  and  (within  the  piece  of  flesh) 
which  like  a breast  is  hanging  down,  then,  after  having 
made  its  way  through  the  head  and  skull  (terminates) 
where  the  root  of  the  hair  is  distributed — this  (artery) 
is  the  birthplace  (road)  of  Brahma.” 

“ Making  an  opening,  where  the  hairs  (of  the  head) 
divide,  he  penetrated  by  that  door.  This  is  called  the 
door  of  division.  This  is  the  door  of  rejoicing  (because 
it  is  the  road  to  the  Supreme  Brahma). 5 ’ 

There  is  also  a passage  in  one  of  the  Upanishads 
which  distinctly  affirms  that  when  a man  dies  the 
Brahma,  dwelling  in  the  ether  of  his  heart,  goes  out  of 
his  body  through  the  coronal  artery,  or  the  artery 
which  is  said  to  terminate  where  the  hairs  of  his  head 
divide.  The  ether  of  the  heart,  whatever  it  may  be, 
is  generally  represented  as  the  dwelling-place  of  the 
Supreme  Spirit,  though  at  times  Brahma  is  identified 
with  it.  The  following  text  from  the  third  Prasna  is 
fitted  in  the  first  place  to  corroborate  this  assertion,  and 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  59 


in  the  second  to  show  the  ease  with  which  physiological 
facts  are  manufactured  and  retailed  : “ For  the  ether 
(of  the  heart)  is  verily  that  soul  (Brahma).  There  arise 
the  one  hundred  and  one  principal  arteries  ; each  of 
them  is  a hundred  times  divided  ; 72,000  are  the 
branches  of  every  branch  artery  ; within  them  moves 
the  circulating  air.”  According  to  this  calculation,  the 
number  of  arteries  in  the  human  body  is  727,210,201  ; 
and  when  these  and  the  five  vital  airs,  the  circulating 
air,  the  equalizing  air  in  the  navel,  which  results  in  the 
digestion  of  food  and  its  assimilation,  the  air  of  respira- 
tion, the  ascending  air,  which  rises  up  through  the 
coronal  artery,  and  the  descending  air,  are  all  coolly 
manufactured,  we  need  not  be  surprised  at  the  physio- 
logical “ consciousness,”  which  in  its  anxiety  to  find  a 
dwelling-place  for  the  soul  (which  combines  the  oppo- 
site extremes  of  immensity  and  exiguity),  posits  a little 
ether  in  the  heart  ! 

It  may,  however,  bo  said  that  all  these  physiological 
speculations  on  the  constitution  of  the  body,  the 
entrance  of  Brahma  into  its  inmost  recess  through  an 
arterial  pathway,  and  the  varied  sheaths  or  cases  in 
which  he  lies  enveloped,  presuppose  a distinction  be- 
tween the  body  and  the  indwelling  spirit,  and  savor  of 
dualism.  But  the  distinction  indicated  is,  according  to 
the  uniform  teaching  of  these  records,  apparent  rather 
than  real,  or  if  real,  derived  rather  than  original — a 
distinction,  strictly  speaking,  modal.  This  will  appear 
when  we  look  into 

3.  The  relation  of  the  Supreme  Spirit  to  the  material 
world.  It  has  already  been  shown  that  the  cosmogo- 
nies embodied  in  these  records  develop  the  theory  of 
evolution,  which  brings  creation  in  all  its  diversified 
forms,  matter  organized  and  unorganized,  and  mind 


CO 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


with  its  thoughts,  feelings,  and  volitions,  out  of  an  all- 
diffusive  divine  substance.  Additional  proof  is  scarcely 
needed.  We  shall  content  ourselves  with  one  or  two 
quotations  under  this  head  : “As  the  spider  casts  out 
and  draws  in  (its  web),  as  on  the  earth  the  annual  herbs 
are  produced,  as  from  the  living  man  the  hairs  of  the 
body  spring  forth,  so  is  produced  the  universe  from  the 
indestructible  (Brahma).”  “ From  him  also  were  pro- 
duced in  many  ways  the  gods,  the  Sadhyas  (a  kind  of 
gods),  men,  quadrupeds,  birds,  and  vital  airs  that  go 
forward  and  descend,  rice  and  barley,  devotion,  faith, 
truth,  the  duties  of  a Brahma  student,  and  observ- 
ance. ” Here  is  the  theory  of  the  consubstantiality  of 
the  material  world  with  the  Creator  set  forth  with  the 
greatest  perspicuity  and  force. 

Contradictory  statements  cannot  but  abound  in  trea- 
tises which  confessedly  present  a few  grains  of  philo- 
sophical thought  amid  a heap  of  irrelevant  matter,  and 
which,  though  comparatively  speaking  well  written, 
bristle  with  extravagances  of  thought  and  expression, 
as  well  as  with  tiresome  repetitions.  But  the  line  of 
thought  which  underlies  the  wild  and  grotesque  specu- 
lations in  which  they  abound  is  thoroughly  pantheistic, 
opposed  to  dualism,  opposed  to  the  universally  recog- 
nized distinction  between  the  Creator  and  creation,  and 
consequently  between  the  soul  and  the  body,  mind  and 
matter. 

The  solution,  then,  of  the  problems  discussed  in  these 
treatises  is  that  there  is  one  divine  being,  Brahma, 
manifested  in  various  forms  or  modes,  both  spiritual 
and  material.  This  being  is  represented  as  Sat  (Exist- 
ence), Chit  (Intelligence  or  Knowledge),  and  Ananda 
(Happiness).  The  following  quotations  will  establish 
this  : 


THE  SOURCES  OE  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  G1 


“ Whoever  knows  Brahma,  who  is  existence,  knowl- 
edge, and  infinity,  . . . enjoys  all  desires  at  one  and 
the  same  time,  together  with  the  omniscient  Brahma” 
(“  Taittiriya,”  chap.  ii.). 

“ The  soul  is  to  be  perceived  by  (the  notion  of)  exist- 
ence, it  is  to  be  perceived  by  its  true  notion  (that  is  to 
say)  by  both  of  them  ; the  true  nature  of  soul  becomes 
manifest  when  (first)  it  has  been  perceived  by  the 
notion  of  existence”  (£t  Katha,”  chap.  vi.). 

“ For  he  is  the  beholder,  the  toucher,  the  hearer,  the 
smeller,  the  taster,  the  minder,  the  intelligent,  the 
agent,  the  being  whose  nature  is  knowledge,  the  spirit 
(Purush).  He  is  founded  on  the  supreme  indestructible 
soul  (Fourth  Prasna). 

“ They  think  the  fourth  him  whose  knowledge  are 
not  internal  objects,  nor  external,  nor  both,  who  has 
not  uniform  knowledge,  who  is  not  intelligent  and  not 
unintelligent,  who  is  invisible,  imperceptible,  unseiz- 
able,  incapable  of  proof,  beyond  thought,  not  to  be 
defined,  whose  only  proof  is  the  belief  in  the  soul,  in 
whom  all  the  spheres  have  ceased,  who  is  tranquil,  bliss- 
ful, and  without  duality”  (Mandukya). 

The  third  of  these  extracts  speaks  evidently  of  the 
individual  soul,  but  its  identity  with  the  universal  soul 
being  established,  the  predicate  knowledge  reveals,  not 
only  its  own  nature,  but  that  of  the  Supreme  Spirit  on 
which  it  is  found.  These  and  such  like  declarations  we 
cannot  collate  without  being  led  to  grasp  the  character- 
istic idea  embodied  in  the  compound  word  Sacchita- 
nanda,  formally  applied  to  the  Supreme  Brahma,  and 
made  capital  of  in  post-Vedic  times.  What  is  this 
idea  ? When  God  is  represented  as  Existence,  Knowl- 
edge, and  Bliss,  have  we  not  an  idea  as  accurate,  as 
well  as  lofty,  as  that  presented  in  the  Bible  ; God  the 


02 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


Father  representing  Existence,  God  the  Son  represent- 
ing Knowledge,  and  God  the  Holy  Spirit  representing 
Bliss  ? Our  answer  would  be  “ Yes,”  if  the  terms 
knowledge  and  bliss  were  taken  in  the  acceptation  or 
sense  attached  to  them  when  they  are  applied  to  God. 
But  we  have  reason  to  conclude  that  they  are  not  em- 
ployed to  mean  what  they  ordinarily  signify,  either  in 
the  Upanishads  or  in  the  philosophical  discussions  car- 
ried on  in  ages  subsequent  to  that  of  the  Upanishads. 
The  last  of  the  above  extracts,  which  represents  Brahma 
as  at  one  and  the  same  time  intelligent  and  unintelli- 
gent, shows  that  the  word  knowledge  at  least  is  used  in 
this  connection  in  a sense  different  from  what,  in  com- 
mon parlance,  or  even  in  schools  of  philosophy  (barring 
of  course  those  of  our  own  country),  it  bears. 

Properly  speaking,  God,  according  to  the  teaching 
of  these  books  and  the  system  of  pantheism  subse- 
quently borrowed  from  them,  is  existence  and  nothing 
more,  the  pure  Being  of  some  schools  of  Greek  philoso- 
phy, the  unmanifested  essence  beneath  manifested  acci- 
dents, the  only  noumenon  beneath  shifting  phenomena. 
Like  many  Greek  philosophers,  the  authors  of  the 
Upanishads  strove  to  find  something  permanent  be- 
neath the  ceaseless  mutations  of  natural  phenomena. 
All  nature  appeared  to  them  in  a flux,  earth  melting 
into  water,  water  into  heat,  heat  into  air,  air  into  ether, 
and  ether  becoming  earth  by  a process  of  solidification 
embracing  the  other  elements  in  a reverse  order.  Kor 
did  they  see  anything  but  ceaseless  change  in  the  vary- 
ing moods  of  the  mind,  the  shifting  states  of  conscious- 
ness,  thoughts,  emotions,  and  volitions.  The  question 
naturally  presented  itself  to  their  minds,  Is  there  noth- 
ing permanent  beneath  this  ceaseless  flow  of  change, 
etxernal  and  internal  ? And  they  solved  this  vexed 


THE  SOURCES  OE  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  03 


question  by  positing  a substance,  absolute  and  un- 
changeable, behind  the  transmutations  of  the  material 
and  the  changes  of  the  mental  world. 

This  existence,  however,  could  not  be  an  object  of 
knowledge  without  implying  distinctions  fitted  to  mar 
its  absoluteness  ; nor  could  it  be  a subject  of  knowledge 
without  giving  birth  to  a similar  contradiction.  The 
knowledge,  therefore,  ascribed  to  this  existence,  is  a 
knowledge  without  distinction  of  subject  and  object, 
and  therefore  essentially  different  from  what  we  call 
knowledge.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  predicate 
lliss  as  applied  to  this  existence,  it  being  happiness 
without  such  consciousness  or  feeling  as  may  cripple  the 
absoluteness  of  the  absolute  ! Besides,  these  three  ex- 
pressions are  not  used  as  predicates  at  all  ; they  form 
the  trinitarian  essence  of  the  Supreme  Brahma,  not  his 
attributes. 

All,  therefore,  that  is  predicable  of  the  God  of  the 
Upanishads  is  infinite,  unconditioned,  absolute  exist- 
ence, which  again  should  not  be  separated  by  a sharp 
line  of  distinction  from  non-existence.  This  will  ex- 
plain the  paradoxes  in  which  the  Upanishads  abound  ; 
such,  for  instance,  as  are  set  forth  when  God  is  said  to 
be  “ with  knowledge  and  void  of  knowledge,”  to  “ re- 
joice and  not  rejoice.  ” Modern  pantheism  has  made  us 
familiar  with  such  paradoxes  as  Ego -nonego,  Subject- 
object,  One-all,  All-one  ; but  it  will  find  itself  distanced 
by  those  in  which  the  Hindu  mind  loves  to  indulge 
when  thinking  and  speaking  of  God,  whom  it  loves  to 
represent  as  £ £ with  form  and  without  form,  ” “ defined 
and  undefinable,”  “ a foundation  and  without  a foun- 
dation,” as  “ true  and  not  true,”  as  one  who  “ moves” 
and  “ does  not  move,”  “ who  is  far  and  also  near,” 
“ within  this  all,”  and  “out  of  this  all.”  Some  of 


64 


niKDtr  PHILOSOPHY. 


these  contradictions  are  set  forth  in  the  following  free 
metrical  version  of  a Well-known  passage  by  Monier 
Williams  : 

“ The  slaver  thinks  he  slays  ; the  slain 

Believes  himself  destroyed  ; the  thoughts  of  both 
Are  false,  the  soul  survives,  nor  kills,  nor  dies  ; 

’Tis  subtler  than  the  smallest,  greater  than 
The  greatest,  infinitely  small,  yet  vast ; 

Asleep,  yet  restless,  moving  everywhere 
Among  the  bodies — ever  bodiless — 

Think  not  to  grasp  it  by  the  reasoning  mind, 

The  wicked  ne’er  can  know  it  ; soul  alone 

Knows  soul,  to  none  but  soul  is  soul  revealed.” 

The  eschatology  of  the  minor  Upanishads  is  of  a 
piece  with  that  of  the  major,  and  an  additional  disquisi- 
tion is  not  needed  to  set  it  forth.  Suffice  it  to  say  that 
the  two  doctrines  of  the  impeccability  of  the  soul  and 
its  final  absorption  into  the  Deity  are  much  more  cate- 
gorically stated  in  these  treatises.  Sin  inheres  in  tho 
body,  and  may  pollute  the  internal  organs,  and  specially 
the  mind  ; but  it  cannot  possibly  taint  the  pure  spirit 
that  abides  in  the  ether  of  the  heart,  guarded  by  the 
fivefold  sheath  of  bliss,  knowledge,  mind,  vital  air,  and 
nutrition.  And  because  incapable  of  being  polluted  by 
sin,  the  soul  is  impassible.  “ As  the  one  sun,  the  eye 
of  the  whole  world,  is  not  sullied  by  the  defects  of  the 
eye  or  of  external  things,  so  the  soul,  as  the  inner  soul 
of  all  beings,  is  not  sullied  by  the  unhappiness  of  the 
world,  because  it  is  also  without  it.” 

The  question,  however  may  be  asked,  If  the  soul  is  as 
tranquil  and  blissful  in  the  body  as  out  of  it,  where  lies 
the  necessity  of  its  liberation  ? Why  should  a sensible 
man  spend  years  in  sequestered  places  amid  mollifica- 
tions and  penances  to  insure  the  emancipation  of  that 
spirit  which  is  so  calm  and  imperturbable,  if  not  happy 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  65 


in  tlie  ordinary  sense  of  the  term,  in  bondage  as  out  of 
it  ? This  question  is  not  discussed  properly  in  the 
Upanishads  ; but  its  solution  was  attempted  in  subse- 
quent times,  when  the  theory  of  illusion  was  elaborated, 
and  both  bondage  and  liberation  were  represented  as 
fictitious. 

The  individuated  souls  are  represented  in  almost  in- 
numerable passages  as  taking  the  consequences  of  their 
actions  in  this  life,  or  in  the  series  of  lives,  which  com- 
pose the  long  ch&in  of  transmigration,  and  they  even 
drag  the  Supreme  Spirit  into  the  happiness  and  misery 
in  which  they  are  involved.  “ (The  supreme  and  in- 
ferior souls)  drinking  the  due  reward  of  their  works  in 
this  world,  entered  both  the  cave,  the  highest  place  of 
the  supreme  soul.”  The  soul  must  consume  the  fruits, 
good  or  bad,  of  its  works,  know  itself,  and  then  be  lib- 
erated from  sense-bred  ignorance.  “ Whoever  knows 
the  origin,  the  entrance,  the  locality,  and  the  fivefold 
power  of  fife  (soul)  enjoys  immortality  ; whoever  knows 
this  enjoys  immortality.” 

The  doctrine  of  absorption  is  set  forth  in  the  follow- 
ing passages  : 

“As  the  flowing,  sea-going  rivers,  when  they  have 
reached  the  sea,  are  annihilated,  as  their  names  and 
forms  perish,  and  only  the  name  of  sea  remains,  so  the 
sixteen  parts  of  the  witness  (soul)  which  are  going  to 
the  soul  (as  the  rivers  to  the  sea)  when  they  have 
reached  the  soul,  are  annihilated,  their  names  and  forms 
perish,  and  only  the  name  of  soul  remains  ; it  is  then 
without  parts,  it  is  immortal  ” (“  Prasna,”  sec.  4). 

“ As  the  flowing  rivers  come  to  their  end  in  the  sea, 
losing  name  and  form,  so,  liberated  from  name  and 
form,  proceeds  the  wise  to  the  divine  soul,  which  is 
greater  than  the  great.  Whoever  knows  this  Supreme 


CG 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


Brahma,  becomes  even  Brahma.  In  his  family  there 
will  be  none  ignorant  of  Brahma  ; he  overcomes  grief, 
lie  overcomes  sin,  he  becomes  immortal,  liberated  from 
the  bonds  of  the  cave  (heart)”  (“  Mandaka,”  sec.  3). 

The  sixteen  parts  of  the  witness,  soul,  are  the  five 
organs  of  knowledge,  the  five  organs  of  action,  the 
eleventh  organ,  the  mind,  and  the  five  gross  elements 
of  which  the  body  is  composed,  or  perhaps  the  five  vital 
airs.  Some  of  the  categories  of  the  Sankya  school  are 
referred  to  in  many  parts  of  these  books,  and  they  may 
at  first  sight  lead  us  to  the  conclusion  that  some  of 
them  at  least  were  composed  after  its  organization  or 
development.  But  it  is  just  as  reasonable  to  conclude 
that  the  characteristic  ideas  of  that  school  had  existed, 
and  been,  to  some  extent,  matured  before  the  appear- 
ance of  the  Sankliya  philosophy  as  an  organized  system. 

Salvation  is  made  dependent  on  knowledge  of 
Brahma,  and  when  this  is  attained  in  all  its  fulness  a 
metamorphosis  of  the  devotee  takes  place.  lie  himself 
becomes  Brahma,  blissful,  impassible,  above  the  pollut- 
ing touch  of  sin,  for  even  when  in  this  blessed  condition 
he  does  commit  gross  sins,  such  as  adultery  and  murder, 
he  is  left  unpolluted,  and  therefore  perfectly  pure.  Let 
us  conclude  with  an  extract  from  one  of  Professor 
Gough’s  scholarly  papers  on  the  Upanishads,  originally 
published  in  the  Calcutta  Review , and  since  republished 
in  the  form  of  a book,  presented  by  Major  Jacob  in  the 
book  already  alluded  to  : 

“ The  theosophist  liberated  from  metempsjmhosis, 
but  still  in  the  body,  is  untouched  by  merit  or  demerit, 
absolved  from  all  works,  good  and  evil,  unsoiled  by 
sinful  works,  uninjured  by  what  he  has  done  and  what 
he  has  left  undone.  Good  works,  like  evil  works,  and 
like  the  God  that  recompenses  them,  belong  to  the  un- 


THE  SOURCES  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED.  67 


real,  to  the  fictitious  duality,  the  world  of  semblances. 

. . . Anandagiri  : ‘ The  theosophist,  as  long  as  he 
lives,  may  do  good  and  evil  as  he  chooses,  and  incur  no 
stain,  such  is  the  efficiency  of  gnosis  ? ’ And  so  in  the 
Taittiriya  Upanishad  (ii.  9)  we  read  : ‘ The  thought 
afflicts  not  him  ; what  have  I left  undone  ; what  evil 
done  ? ’ And  in  the  Buhadaranyaka  : ‘ Here  the  thief 
is  no  more  a thief,  the  Chandala  no  more  a Chandala, 
the  Paulkasa  no  more  a Paulkasa,  the  sacred  mendicant 
no  more  a sacred  mendicant  : they  are  not  followed  by 
good  works,  they  are  not  followed  by  evil  works.  For 
at  last  the  sage  has  passed  beyond  all  the  sorrows  of  his 
heart.’  Immoral  inferences  from  this  doctrine — the 
quietists  of  all  ages  have  been  taxed  with  immorality — 
are  thus  reargued  by  Nrisimhasaraswati  : ‘ Some  one 
may  say,  It  will  follow  from  this  the  theosophist  may 
act  as  he  chooses.  That  he  can  act  as  he  pleases  cannot 
be  denied  in  the  presence  of  texts  of  revelation,  tradi- 
tionary texts,  and  arguments  such  as  the  following  : 
‘ Hot  by  matricide,  not  by  parricide.’  ‘ Tie  that  does 
not  identify  not-self  with  self,  whose  inner  faculty  is 
unsullied  though  he  slay  these  people,  neither  slays 
them,  nor  is  slain.  He  that  knows  the  truth  is  sullied 
neither  by  good  actions  nor  by  evil  actions.  In  answer 
to  all  this  we  reply  : True  ; but  as  these  texts  are  only 
eulogistic  of  the  theosophist,  it  is  not  intended  that  he 
should  thus  act.’  ” 

Does  not  this  extract  justify  the  assertion  made  by  a 
great  thinker  that  pantheism  is  pan-diabolism  ? It  will 
be  shown,  when  V edanfem  is  treated  of,  that  our 
recognition  of  all  distinctions,  moral  or  material,  is  ac- 
cording to  the  teaching  of  these  records,  and  the  great 
system  evolved  from  it  in  subsequent  times,  illusory  ; 
and  the  chief  of  those  items  of  ignorance  from  the 


GS 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


trammels  of  which  we  have  to  free  ourselves  by  right 
knowledge.  What  we  call  good  and  what  we  call  evil, 
virtue  and  vice,  holiness  and  sin,  both  emanate  from  the 
diffusive  Spirit  from  which  we  have  sprung  along  with 
the  objects  of  creation  around  us,  and  into  which  we 
shall  be  merged  along  with  them  when  the  season  of 
divine  hibernation  once  more  makes  its  appearance,  to 
be  followed  in  due  course  by  fresh  acts  of  development 
and  reabsorption. 


CHAPTER  III. 


THE  AGE  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  our  analysis  of  the  contents  of  the  Upanishads, 
commented  upon  by  Sankar,  we  purposely  left  out  one 
as  not  entitled  to  a place  among  the  Sources  of  Hindu 
Philosophy.  This  is  the  Swetaswatara  Upanishad,  a 
document  which  in  bulk  may  justly  be  represented  as 
an  intermediate  link  between  the  major  and  the  minor 
Upanishads,  but  which  in  chronological  order  leaves 
them  all  very  far  indeed  behind  it.  The  Swetaswatara 
is  the  most  modern  of  the  Upanishads,  and  its  composi- 
tion must  be  traced  to  a period  posterior  to  the  organi- 
zation of  the  principal  schools  of  Indian  Philosophy, 
and  therefore  to  the  era  when  the  incipient  speculations 
embodied  in  these  documents  generally  were  systema- 
tized and  matured  into  permanent  and  conflicting  types 
of  philosophic  thought. 

Unmistakable  traces  of  its  late  origin  are  discoverable 
among  its  miscellaneous  contents.  The  mythology,  for 
instance,  of  which  glimpses  are  presented  in  its  pages, 
is  not  that  either  of  the  Yedic  or  of  the  Heroic  age  of 
Indian  History  ; but  that  spun  out  into  grotesque  forms 
when  the  spirit  of  sectarianism  gave  birth  to  numerous 
factions  within  the  precincts  of  Hindu  society.  The 
well-known  triad,  Brahma,  Vishnu,  and  Maheshwar, 
shrinks  into  what  may  be  called  the  monad,  Siva,  who 
again  is  identified  with  the  Supreme  Brahma,  the 
Source  of  all  Being.  This  deity,  Siva,  and  the  energies 


TO 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


associated  with  him,  each  in  the  shape  of  a female 
divinity,  are  set  forth  as  objects  of  worship  rather  than 
the  gods  and  goddesses  of  the  Yedic,  or  even  of  the 
Heroic  age.  Besides  three  of  the  six  schools  of  Hindu 
Philosophy  are  referred  toby  name — viz.,  the  Sankhya, 
the  Yoga,  and  the  Vedant  — and  references  to  the 
others,  as  well  as  citations  from  the  minor  Hpanishads, 
are  by  no  means  few  and  far  between. 

But  the  object  of  the  document  itself  sets  forth,  more 
than  the  traces  of  its  late  origin  already  referred  to,  its 
posteriority,  or  its  composition  in  an  age  subsequent  to 
that,  not  only  of  the  major,  but  of  the  minor  Upani- 
shads.  That  object  is  similar  to,  if  not  identical  with, 
that  of  the  Bhagvada  Gita — viz.,  to  effect  a reconcilia- 
tion between  the  varied  lines  of  philosophic  thought 
represented  by  the  varied  schools,  especially  between 
the  rank  materialism  of  the  Sankhya  and  the  equally 
rank  pantheism  of  the  Yedantic  system.  Its  composi- 
tion, therefore,  should  be  traced  to  the  time  when  prac- 
tical difficulties  arose  from  the  ceaseless  struggles  of  the 
schools  ; and  when  an  attempt  to  obviate  them  by 
means  of  a compromise,  a truce,  if  not  a lasting  peace, 
was  peremptorily  demanded.  It  must  at  the  same  time 
be  admitted  that  internal  evidence  does  not  warrant 
the  conclusion  which  sets  forth  the  contemporaneity  of 
the  Upanishad  under  review  with  the  Bhagvada  Gita. 
The  Krishna  Cultus,  which  appears  full}7  developed  in 
the  latter  document,  is  not  even  referred  to  in  the 
former  ; while  the  differences  noticeable  in  the  modes 
of  reconciliation  proposed  in  the  two  documents  presup- 
pose an  interval  of  several  generations  between  the 
composition  of  the  one  and  that  of  the  other. 

The  Swetaswatara  Upanishad,  though  not  entitled  to 
a place  among  the  Sources  of  Hindu  Philosophy,  is  a 


THE  ACIE  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


71 


very  valuable  document,  presenting,  as  it  does,  a cor- 
rect picture  of  what  may  emphatically  be  called  the 
Age  of  Hindu  Philosophy.  It  may  be  regarded  as  an 
index  to  the  thoughts  and  struggles,  the  longings  and 
yearnings  of  an  era,  which  in  intellectual  activity  and 
moral  grandeur  has  scarcely  been  surpassed  in  the  his- 
tory of  non-Christian  lands,  certainly  never  in  the  his- 
tory of  our  own  country.  Let  us  give  it  prominence  as 
indicating  : 

1.  The  knotty  problems  which  exercised  the  acute 
and  penetrating  intellects  of  the  great  Schoolmen  of 
Ancient  India  ; 

2.  The  varieties  of  expedients  to  which  recourse  was 
had  by  these  extraordinary  thinkers  for  their  solution  ; 

3.  The  temporal  benefits  to  which  they  looked  for- 
ward as  the  reward  of  their  toil  ; 

4.  The  conclusions  at  which  they  arrived  ; 

5.  The  controversies  to  which  these  gave  rise  ; and 

G.  The  compromises  by  which  these  conclusions  were, 

when  obviously  at  war  with  each  other,  reconciled. 

In  elucidating  the  contents  of  this  Upanishad,  we 
shall  have  to  go  over  the  whole  ground  of  Hindu  Phi- 
losophy, to  repeat  not  a little  of  what  we  have  already 
said,  and  to  anticipate  much  of  what  we  shall  have  to 
say,  when  we  treat  separately  of  each  of  the  systems 
matured  in  the  schools.  But  as  an  apology  for  such 
repetition  and  such  anticipation  we  have  to  say  that 
careful  study  of  this  venerable  document  is  a very  good 
preparation  for  an  intelligent  examination  and  apprecia- 
tion of  the  great  fines  of  thought  enshrined  in  Hindu 
Philosophy,  and  also  to  some  extent  that  of  ancient 
Greece. 

1.  The  problems  which  Hindu  Philosophy  strove  to 
I solve  are  indicated  in  the  opening  verses  of  this  Hpani-' 


HINDU  PHILO  SO  TOY. 


sliatl  : “ The  inquirers  after  Brahma  converse  (among 
themselves).  What  cause  is  Brahma  ? Whence  are 
we  produced  ? By  whom  do  we  live,  and  where  do  we 
(ultimately)  abide  ? By  whom  governed  ? Do  we 
walk  after  a rule  in  happiness  and  unhappiness,  0 ye 
knowers  of  Brahma  ? Is  time  Brahma  (as  cause),  or  the 
own  nature  of  the  things,  or  the  necessary  consequences 
of  work,  or  accident,  or  the  elements,  or  nature  (yone), 
or  the  soul  ? This  must  be  considered  : It  is  not  the 
union  of  them,  because  the  soul  remains  ; the  soul  (in- 
dividual soul)  also  is  not  powerful  (to  be  the  author  of 
the  creation  (since  there  is  (independent  of  it)  a cause 
of  happiness  and  unhappiness  (viz.,  work).” 

These  are  the  Hindu  versions  of  the  problems  of  ex- 
istence, and  they  indicate  the  path  of  inquiry  fearlessly 
trodden  by  great  thinkers  in  ancient  India.  Trans- 
lated into  modern  phraseology,  they  are  : What  is  the 
ultimate  ground  of  existence  in  general  ? What  is  the 
ground  of  our  own  existence  ? By  what  power  are  we 
sustained  in  life,  and  where  do  we  permanently  abide 
after  death — in  conscious  existence,  or  in  an  endless 
chain  of  atomic  or  molecular  movements  and  changes  ? 
Why  are  we  guided  by  desire  and  aversion,  a natural 
longing  for  pleasure  and  an  instinctive  shrinking  from 
pain  ? What  inflexible  law  leads  to  the  apportionment 
of  the  measure  of  pleasure  we  secure  and  the  measure 
of  pain  we  groan  under  ? 

It  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  repeat  that  these  are  the 
abstruse  problems  that  have,  from  time  immemorial, 
exercised,  puzzled,  and  wasted  some  of  the  loftiest  in- 
tellects the  world  has  seen,  and  they  are  to-day  as  far 
from  solution  in  the  region  of  boasted  philosophy  as 
they  were  when  the  Upanishads,  major  and  minor, 
were  composed.  In  one  and  all  the  important  centres 


THE  AGE  OE  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


73 


of  ancient  civilization,  in  India,  in  China,  in  Egypt, 
and  in  Greece,  they  were  deeply  meditated  upon  in 
solitudes  ; earnestly  discussed  in  schools  frequently, 
and  the  agora  and  forum  at  times  ; patiently  elaborated 
into  complicated  though  imposing  theories  ; and  labori- 
ously propagated  in  the  shape  of  practical  lessons  among 
people  too  busil}r  engaged  to  recognize  the  vapory  char- 
acter of  the  speculations  to  which  they  were  inseparably 
linked.  And  in  the  most  favored  abodes  of  modern 
civilization  these  very  problems  are  once  more  passing 
through  a similar  elaborative  and  transforming  process 
in  the  mental  laboratory  of  some  of  the  greatest  think- 
ers of  the  age.  And  it  is  a noteworthy  fact  that  the 
results  arrived  at,  or  attained  now,  are  not  essentially 
different  from  those  realized  in  the  primitive  age  of 
which  we  wish  to  present  a picture  in  this  and  the  fol- 
lowing papers.  The  word  failure  might  justly  lie 
inscribed  on  the  lofty  banner  raised  by  ancient  philoso- 
phy ; and  the  same  humiliating  issue  is  what  modern 
philosophy  can  legitimately  boast  of  ! 

It  is  worthy  of  special  notice  tJiat  the  civilized  world 
seems  to  have  been  roused,  at  one  and  the  same  time, 
from  the  slumber  of  ages,  to  take  these  important  prob- 
lems into  consideration.  The  age  of  Indian  philosophy 
is  not  to  be  looked  upon  or  represented  as  one  of  the 
ordinary  periods  of  human  history.  It  was  indeed  an 
extraordinary  era,  an  era  of  giants  both  in  the  region 
of  philosophic  thought  and  in  that  of  practical  moral 
earnestness  ; the  age  of  Buddha,  Zoroaster,  Confucius, 
and  Pythagoras  ; the  age  which,  as  regards  the  great- 
ness of  the  men  whose  speculations  and  deeds  rendered 
it  conspicuous,  and  the  imposing  nature,  if  not  practical 
efficacy,  of  the  theoretical  results  attained,  has  scarcely 
had  its  parallel  in  the  history  of  the  world.  It  saw  the 


74 


nixDu  pniLosopnT. 


loft}7-  spirit  of  philosophic  investigation  roused  from 
dormancy  and  called  into  vigorous  play,  not  in  one  or 
two  solitary  localities,  but  in  the  most  conspicuous 
centres  of  civilization  ; and,  barring  the  disclosures  of 
revelation,  the  world  has  not  been  able  to  improve  upon 
the  solutions  of  the  problems  of  existence  then  pro- 
posed, except  in  outward  form  and  drapery.  In  phi- 
losophy the  interval  between  the  sixth  or  seventh 
century  before  the  Christian  era  and  the  vaunted  nine- 
teenth century  is  almost  nil  ! 

We  cannot  look  upon  what  may  in  one  sense  be  called 
the  universally  developed  mental  activity  of  the  period 
in  question  without  being  led  instinctively  to  ascertain 
its  cause.  And  the  cause  happily  is  not  one  of  those 
which,  the  more  we  are  dazzled  by  their  effects,  retire 
the  more  thoroughly  from  the  narrow  horizon  of  our 
intellectual  vision.  It  stands  out  in  bold  relief  from  the 
history  of  the  development  of  the  human  mind. 

The  problems  of  existence  are  among  those  which  we 
are  naturally  and  instinctively  led  to  take  into  our  seri- 
ous consideration  ; and  they  have  from  the  beginning 
engaged  the  attention  and  exercised  the  brains  of  the 
thoughtful  members  of  the  human  family,  if  not  of 
mankind  at  large.  In  what  may  be  called  the  twilight 
period  of  human  history,  solutions  were  proposed,  such 
as  failed  to  satisfy  the  world  after  it  had  made  some 
progress  in  knowledge  and  thought.  The  energies  of 
nature,  originally  represented  as  its  creative  and  sus- 
taining forces,  gradually  assumed  gross  and  fetich 
forms  ; and  a host  of  gods  and  goddesses  of  limited 
potency  and  like  passions  with  human  beings,  who 
wasted  a great  deal  of  their  strength  in  fighting  with 
one  another,  appeared  on  the  stage  and  claimed  human 
homage.  Here  the  blazing  sun-god,  there  the  terrific 


THE  AGE  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


VO 


being  concealed  within  the  dark  folds  of  the  lowering 
clouds,  and  yonder  the  spirit  of  howling  storms  and 
sweeping  whirlwinds  appeared  in  tangible  and  what 
might  be  called  stereotyped  forms,  clothed  in  the  popu- 
lar imagination  with  authority  and  power,  such  as  made 
it  necessary  for  men  to  secure  their  favor  by  prayer  and 
supplication,  and  avert  their  wrath  by  bloody  sacrifices. 
But  as  knowledge  advanced  these  causes  appeared 
utterly  inadequate  to  minds  freed  from  the  trammels  of 
popular  prejudice,  and  thereby  trained  to  think  and 
judge  for  themselves. 

Again,  the  multiplicity  of  the  causes  assigned  could 
not  but  repel  minds  bent  on  discovering  a unity  beneath 
the  complexity  of  natural  phenomena,  a something  uni- 
versal, permanent,  and  immutable  beneath  their  ever- 
shifting  phases.  An  endless  variety  of  finite  or  limited 
forces,  or  an  endless  variety  of  local  gods  and  goddesses 
of  circumscribed  power  cannot  be  held  by  thinking  men 
as  fitted  to  constitute  an  omnific  agency  of  boundless 
potency,  and  so  some  unity  of  being  or  principle  sup- 
posed to  be  behind  them  became  an  object  of  anxious 
inquiry  as  soon  as  current  forms  of  thought  appeared 
unsatisfactory.  An  attempt  to  make  the  numerous 
heroes  of  popular  mythology  coalesce  into  a single 
Being  of  unerring  wisdom  and  limitless  power,  or  to 
weld  the  jarring  forces  of  nature  into  one  primordial 
force,  was  necessitated  by  a reaction  against  palpable 
grossness  of  conception. 

But  are  there  not  solutions  of  these  problems  which 
may  be  called  intuitive,  or  which  are  offered  to  our  ac- 
ceptance on  the  strength,  either  of  the  primary  beliefs 
of  humanity,  or  of  that  primeval  revelation  which  we 
see  imbedded  in  the  varied  religions  of  the  world  ? 
The  moment  these  solutions  are  accepted  all  difficulties 


7G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


vanish  into  thin  air,  and  the  necessity  of  hatching  the- 
ory after  theory  in  dark  solitudes  is  obviated.  Such 
solutions  were  certainly  within  the  reach  of  the  philoso- 
phers, who  allowed  themselves  to  be  puzzled  and  bewil- 
dered by  speculations  of  a recondite  character.  But 
they  were  too  simple  to  commend  themselves  to  their 
ambitious  minds  ; and  they  were  in  consequence  cast 
overboard  along  with  those  embodied  in  popular  song  or 
mythology.  The  explanations  furnished  by  popular 
literature  were  too  gross,  and  those  offered  by  intuition 
were  too  simple  to  suit  their  taste,  and  therefore  they 
allowed  themselves  with  all  conceivable  eagerness  to  be 
entangled  in  the  mazes  of  plausible  error. 

We  have  elsewhere  shown  that  the  rationalistic  ten- 
dencies of  the  period  under  consideration  might  be 
traced  to  a reaction  against  ritualism.  The  age  of  phi- 
losophy in  India  was  ushered  in  by  the  age  of  external- 
ism  pictured  in  the  Brahmanas  ; and  this  was  most  un- 
doubtedly true  of  all  the  other  centres  of  civilization, 
which  felt  the  dominating  influence  of  the  spirit  of 
philosophic  inquiry  so  simultaneously  roused  in  so  many 
localities.  The  argument  need  not  be  reproduced  here  ; 
but  a reference  to  the  solutions  of  the  problems  of  ex- 
istence, which  were  looked  upon  as  heretical  in  India, 
will  not  be  deemed  uncalled  for. 

The  passage  quoted  above  shows  that  an  attempt  was 
made  to  trace  existence  in  its  multifarious  forms  to 
Time,  the  Cronos  of  Greek  mythology.  Time  has 
always  been  represented,  by  a bold  figure  of  speech,  as 
the  beginner  and  the  ender,  the  creator  and  destroyer 
of  things.  Forms  of  existence  in  a state  of  nonentity, 
or  in  an  embryonic  state  are  said  to  be  in  the  womb  of 
time  ; when  they  make  themselves  manifest  among  the 
phenomena  of  life,  they  are  its  offspring  ; and  when 


THE  AGE  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


77 


they  finally  disappear  from  the  stage,  their  disappear- 
ance is  traced  to  the  sweeping  action  of  its  all-mowing 
scythe.  But  tropes  and  metaphors  are,  in  course  of 
time,  or  when  the  spirit  of  mythopoeic  invention  is 
evoked  .by  what  Grote  calls  retrospective  veneration, 
clothed  with  flesh,  and  become  living  realities.  The 
fast-moving  old  man,  with  the  hour-glass  in  one  hand 
and  scythe  in  the  other,  became  in  time  the  Ancient  of 
Days  ; and  the  threefold  work  of  creation,  preserva- 
tion, and  destruction  of  the  world  was  attributed  to 
him.  Besides,  how  soothing  is  the  thought  that  time 
will  itself  remedy  the  evils  of  time  ! The  soul  is  entan- 
gled by  time  in  the  meshes  of  mundane  misery,  but  it 
need  not  despair  ; time  itself  will  destroy  the  net  and 
bring  the  relief  ! Is  it  a wonder  that  time  was  repre- 
sented as  the  Creator  of  all  things,  and  the  incarcerator 
and  emancipator  of  the  soul  ? This  theory,  however, 
was  regarded  as  heretical  by  the  learned  in  India  when 
they  halted  between  materialism  and  pantheism,  and 
when  therefore  they  could  not  brook  the  idea  of  a 
mythological  phantom  rising  up  to  claim  the  honor 
conferred  on  a self-evolving  material  form  or  a self- 
developing  spiritual  substance. 

Another  of  the  heretical  opinions  condemned  merci- 
lessly, revolved  around  what  was  called  “the  own 
nature  of  things.”  Every  form  of  existence  has  its 
vitality,  the  ground  of  its  being  concealed  in  itself  ; 
and  it  is  absurd,  as  well  as  useless,  to  look  for  its  creator 
and  preserver  apart  from  it.  The  ground  of  man’s  ex- 
istence is  man  himself  ; he  is  the  author  and  sustainer 
of  his  being,  the  tormentor  of  his  own  pure  spirit,  and 
ultimately  its  glorious  liberator.  Man  has  no  business 
to  look  beyond  himself,  in  the  depths  of  his  misery,  for 
help,  his  own  recuperative  power  being  enough  to 


78 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


work  out  his  deliverance  in  process  of  time.  Manliness 
and  independence  cannot  go  further  ! 

Then  comes  in  the  god  of  Buddhism,  Karma,  for  his 
share  of  condemnation.  Karma,  work,  occupies  a 
prominent  place  in  Hindu  Philosophy.  It  is  the  great 
incarcerator  and  tormentor  of  the  passive  soul.  Its 
causes  are  desire  and  aversion,  which  lead  men  to  prac- 
tise virtue  or  vice,  and  thus  become  recipients  of  re- 
wards or  punishments.  It  sends  them  up  to  heaven  or 
down  to  hell  to  take  the  consequences  of  their  own 
actions  ; brings  them  back  into  mundane  existence  or 
existence  in  corporeal  frames  to  be  once  more  tor- 
mented by  fresh  desires  and  fresh  actions  ; hurls  them 
back  to  regions  of  reward  and  punishment  ; and  so  on 
through  long,  long  series  of  births  and  deaths,  till  its 
own  power  being  consumed  and  itself  annihilated,  they 
are  liberated  from  its  thraldom,  and  lost,  either  in  the 
material  essence  of  nature  to  pass  through  an  endless 
series  of  such  experiences  after  lengthened  periods  of 
hibernation,  or  in  the  divine  spiritual  substance  to  be 
compelled  by  the  imperious  law  of  development  to  reap- 
pear, after  long  periods  of  quiescence,  on  the  stage  of 
history  with  similarly  gloomy  prospects  before  them  ! 
But  though  conspicuous  for  its  malignant  activity,  in 
Hindu  Philosophy,  it  is  at  first  sight  neither  the  start- 
ing-point nor  the  terminus  of  creation.  The  Buddhists, 
however,  tried  to  make  it  such  ; and  so  they  drew  upon 
themselves  the  awful  sentence  of  schism  and  heresy. 

The  Bible  of  the  fool,  the  chapter  of  accidents,  was 
not  unknown  to  our  ancestors  of  the  age  of  Hindu  Phi- 
losophy. Chance  was  represented  as  the  creator  and 
preserver  of  the  world,  and  all  talk  of  teleology,  or  the 
doctrine  of  final  causes,  was  pronounced  unmitigated 
nonsense.  Do  not  some  of  our  redoubtable  champions 


THE  AGE  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


79 


of  science  see  their  prototypes  in  ages  which  they  are 
apt  to  mention  with  contempt  as  eras  of  ignorance  ancl 
darkness  ? Teleology,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term, 
Hindu  theologians  of  the  most  orthodox  school  were  by 
no  means  averse  to  ; and  chance  appeared  to  them  as 
absolutely  nothing,  and  the  idea  of  bringing  an  entity 
out  of  nonentity  they  could  not  possibly  entertain  for  a 
moment  ; and  therefore  this  theory  also  received  the 
brand  of  heresy. 

The  elements  were  by  another  class  of  heretics  repre- 
sented as  the  ultimate  ground  of  existence.  AY  ho  is  not 
reminded  by  this  of  the  tendency  in  modern  philosophy 
to  trace  the  universe  to  the  evolution  of  what  are 
called  the  ultimate  powers  of  nature  ? The  ultimate 
powers,  held  up  in  these  days  as  creative  or  self-evolv- 
ing potencies,  arc  very  different  indeed  from  what  were 
represented  as  such  in  the  primitive  age  of  Indian  phi- 
losophy. Then  the  earth,  water,  fire,  and  air,  with  the 
addition  of  ether  in  some  quarters,  were  looked  upon  as 
simple,  uncompounded  substances  ; and  to  the  action, 
individual  as  well  as  collective,  of  these  elements  exist- 
ence in  its  diversified  forms  of  beauty  and  proportion 
was  not  very  unnaturally  traced.  But  to  the  philo- 
sophic mind  of  India,  fond  of  subtle  distinctions  and 
averse  to  grossness  of  conception,  these  substances, 
though  regarded  as  simple  and  uncompounded,  ap- 
peared too  gross  to  deserve  the  place  assigned  them  as 
the  productive  causes  of  material  and  mental  phe- 
nomena. And  therefore  those  who  represented  them 
as  the  omnific  powers  of  nature  were  regarded  as  a 
body  of  heretics  fit  to  be  burned  alive  ! 

Again  Nature  (Yoni)  had  also  the  honor,  as  it  has 
always  had,  of  being  pointed  out  as  the  ultimate  ground 
of  existence.  There  is  some  doubt  about  the  meaning 


80 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


of  the  word  yoni  in  this  connection,  but  if  it  be  taken 
as  meaning  nature , a broad  line  of  demarcation  ought 
to  be  drawn  between  it  and  Prakriti  of  the  Sankhya 
school,  generally  translated  nature.  Prakriti  is  a prin- 
ciple of  extreme  tenuity,  more  spiritual  than  material, 
a sort  of  primordial,  self-evolving  essence  or  form  ; but 
Yoni  represents  either  all  the  phenomena  of  nature  put 
together,  or  the  aggregate  of  all  its  forces  and  powers. 
The  theory  which  traces  creation  to  Prakriti  has  always 
been  held  as  orthodox  ; while  that  which  makes  Yoni 
the  ultimate  ground  of  existence  has  always  been  repro- 
bated as  heterodox.  In  whatever  sense  the  word  nature 
is  used  in  this  connection,  the  speculation  which  evolves 
creation  from  it  and  thrusts  the  Creator,  not  merely 
into  the  background,  but  out  of  existence,  cannot  but 
appear  fascinating  to  the  materialists  of  the  day  ! 

And  lastly,  a species  of  egoism,  not  unknown  in  these 
days,  was  upheld  in  one  of  the  numerous  schools  of 
heresy  which  flourished  side  by  side  with  elaborate  sys- 
tems of  orthodox  philosophy.  The  soul,  the  individual  in 
contradistinction  to  the  universal  soul,  was  represented 
as  the  ultimate  ground  of  existence  ; but  the  spirit  of 
Hindu  orthodoxy  recoiled  in  horror  from  such  repre- 
sentation. The  soul  or  the  ego,  both  universal  and  in- 
dividual, is,  according  to  its  champions,  perfectly  quies- 
cent, and  cannot  therefore  be  an  efficient  cause.  To 
attribute  to  it  the  slightest  degree  of  activity  is  to  rob 
it  of  its  happiness,  which  in  their  opinion  is  synonymous 
with  the  complete  extinction  of  thought  and  desire,  or 
of  mental  and  spiritual  activity. 

All  these  principles  form,  according  to  Hindu  Philos- 
ophy, a chain  of  second  causes  ; and  if  the  series  were 
to  terminate  in  a proper  top  or  head  principle,  nothing 
could  lie  said  against  them.  Such  a principle  is  indi- 


THE  AGE  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


81 


cated  in  this  verse  : “ They,  who  followed  abstract 
meditation  (Dhyan)  and  concentration  (Yoga)  beheld 
(as  the  cause  of  the  creation)  the  power  (Sakti)  of  the 
divine  soul  concealed  in  its  qualities,  which  alone  super- 
intends all  these  causes,  of  which  time  was  the  first, 
and  soul  (the  individual  soul)  the  last.  ’ ’ This  and  the 
verses  following  set  forth  the  attempt  made  in  this 
treatise  to  reconcile  materialism  to  pantheism. 

2.  The  verse  quoted  in  the  paragraph  indicates  also 
the  way  in  which  solution  of  the  great  problems  of  fife 
was  sought  ; and  to  it  let  us  in  the  second  place  advert. 
It  is  scarcely  worth  our  while  to  observe  that  the  expe- 
dients resorted  to  in  those  primitive  times  are  very 
different  indeed  from  those  utilized  in  these  days.  A 
well-filled  library,  a cushioned  chair,  reading,  study, 
and  meditation,  prolonged  till  what  is  called  the  mid- 
night oil  is  consumed — these,  with  perhaps  a pipe  con- 
cealed amid  volumes  of  smoke,  are  the  expedients 
resorted  to  in  these  days  for  such  a purpose.  But  books 
were  unknown,  or,  if  not  unknown,  very  rare  in  those 
days,  and  midnight  oil  was  never  consumed,  except  in 
religious  and  social  festivities.  The  man  of  intellect, 
determined  to  set  the  problems  of  existence  at  rest,  had 
to  pass  through  a painful  course  of  preparation.  He 
had  to  prepare  himself  for  his  proper  study  by  perform- 
ing the  ordinary  duties  of  life  as  well  as  going  the 
round  of  religious  observances  with  punctilious  care. 
He  had  then  to  place  himself  under  the  guidance  of  an 
accredited  teacher,  and  spend  years  in  listening  to  the 
Yedas  chanted  by  him  ; he  had,  moreover,  to  propiti- 
ate the  teacher  as  well  as  the  gods,  by  varied  acts  of 
self-sacrifice,  and  by  services  of  a menial  nature.  And 
when  by  such  sacrifices  and  such  services  he  had  ob- 
tained what  in  modern  phraseology  would  be  called  a 


82 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


pass-certificate,  lie  had  to  look  for  a proper  place  where, 
wrapped  up  in  intense  meditation,  he  might  seek  un- 
molested the  right  solution  of  the  problems  of  life. 

The  Swetaswatara  Upanisliad  points  out  the  sort  of 
place  he  must  select  as  his  rendezvous  in  the  tenth  verse 
of  the  second  chapter  : “ At  a level  place,  free  from 
pebbles  and  gravel,  pleasant  to  the  mind  by  its  sounds, 
water,  and  bowers,  not  painful  to  the  eye,  and  repair- 
ing to  a cave,  protected  from  the  wind,  let  a person 
apply  (his  mind  to  Clod).”  He  must  sit  down,  not 

“ . . . wander  where  the  Muses  haunt 
Clear  spring,  or  shady  grove  or  sunny  hill.” 

The  necessity  of  his  retiring  to  a sequestered  spot, 
“pleasant  to  the  mind  by  its  sounds,  water,  and 
bowers,”  is  obvious  enough  ; but  why  should  the  place 
selected  be  “free  from  pebble  and  gravel”?  Be- 
cause “ bodily  exercises”  must  be  combined  with  those 
of  the  mind  and  the  spirit  ; and  a level,  smooth  piece 
of  ground  was  needed  to  render  these  practicable. 

What  was  he  to  do  in  such  a solitary  place  ? Let  the 
following  verses,  quoted  from  the  same  chapter,  furnish 
the  reply  : 

“ Keeping  the  upper  part  (the  chest,  the  neck,  and 
the  head)  erect,  and  equal  to  (the  other  parts  of)  the 
body,  subduing  within  the  heart  the  senses  together 
with  the  mind,  let  the  sense  by  the  raft  of  Brahma 
(Om)  cross  over  all  the  fearful  torrents  (of  the  world).” 
“ Keeping  down  the  senses,  subduing  his  desires,  and 
gently  respiring  by  the  nostrils,  let  the  wise  diligently 
attend  to  the  mind  as  (the  charioteer)  to  a car  drawn 
by  vicious  horses.” 

In  plain  English,  the  man  anxious  to  have  the  prob- 
lems of  life  solved  must,  in  a solitary  place,  strive  by 


THE  AGE  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


83 


varieties  of  bodily  as  well  as  mental  exercises,  to  obtain 
a thorough  mastery  over  his  passions  and  appetites,  and 
to  subdue  the  restlessness  or  the  vagrant  tendency  of 
the  mind. 

When  he  has  succeeded  in  doing  this  preliminary 
work,  he  has  to  pass  through  various  degrees  of  that 
concentration  which  is  to  culminate  in  the  direct  vision 
of  God  by  his  soul  in  itself,  as  well  as  in  the  varied 
objects  of  Nature.  The  premonitory  symptoms  are 
thus  set  forth  : “ These  appearances  precede  the  con- 
centration by  which  the  manifestation  of  Brahma  is 
effected  ; it  (Brahma)  assumes  the  form  of  frost,  of 
smoke,  of  hot  air,  of  wind,  of  fire,  of  fire-flies,  of  light- 
ning, of  crystal,  and  of  the  moon.”  The  idea  perhaps 
is  that  the  inquirer  first  sees  the  Divinity  somewhat 
veiled  in  the  objects  of  Nature,  and  then  in  the  fulness 
of  His  unclouded  glory  in  his  own  spirit. 

This  vision  indicates  the  last  degree  of  concentration. 
“ When  absorbed  in  this  concentration  (the  Yogi)  sees 
by  the  true  nature  of  his  own  self,  which  manifests  like 
a light  the  true  nature  of  Brahma,  which  is  not  born, 
eternal  and  free  from  all  effects  of  Nature  ; he  gets 
released  from  all  bonds.  For  he  (the  Yogi)  is  the  god 
who  is  born  before  all  the  quarter,  and  intermediate 
quarters  (Hiranyagarbha) ; he  is  indeed  within  the 
womb,  he  is  born,  he  will  be  born  ; in  the  shape  of  all 
he  dwells  in  every  creature.”  Words  cannot  more 
clearly  set  forth  the  perfect  identity  of  the  individual 
with  the  universal  soul,  or  the  fact  that  the  Yogi’s  de- 
liverance means  in  reality  the  emancipation  of  the  Deity 
from  the  trammels  of  Nature. 

The  first  degree  of  concentration  is  thus  indicated  : 
“ When  (in  the  Yogi’s  body)  composed  of  earth,  water, 
light,  air,  and  ether,  the  fivefold  qualities,  which  make 


84 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


concentration,  are  manifest,  then  there  is  no  disease  or 
age  or  pain  for  him,  who  has  obtained  the  body  burn- 
ing with  the  fire  of  concentration.  When  the  body  is 
light,  and  without  disease,  the  mind  without  desire,  the 
color  is  shining,  sweet  the  voice,  and  pleasant  the  smell, 
when  the  excrements  are  few,  they  say  the  first  degree 
of  concentration  is  gained.”  The  intermediate  degrees 
between  this  and  the  stage  associated  with  the  direct 
vision  of  Brahma  are  not  indicated  in  this  treatise  ; but 
we  obtain  an  insight  into  their  exalted  character  when 
avc  note  that  the  very  first  landmark  indicates  a body 
free  from  “ disease,  age,  or  pain,”  and  a mind  “ with- 
out desire.” 

But  all  this  may  justly  be  represented  as  a picture  of 
the  age  of  the  Upanishads  as  well  as  of  that  of  the  sys- 
tems or  schools  of  philosophy,  of  the  age  of  inquiry  as 
Avell  as  that  of  mature  thought  and  bold  speculation. 
Is  there  nothing  to  differentiate  the  one  from  the  other 
as  regards  the  ATarieties  of  expedients  resorted  to  with  a 
view  to  a proper  solution  of  the  knotty  problems  of  ex- 
istence ? Our  decided  reply  is,  Xot  much.  The  pi’ob- 
lems  were  the  same,  and  the  means  utilized  to  insure 
their  solution  Avere  nearly  the  same.  But  there  Avas  a 
manifest  difference  between  the  two  periods  in  the 
numbers  of  the  persons  by  Avhom  these  problems  were 
handled  and  these  means  utilized.  In  the  preparatory 
period,  or  the  age  of  inquiry,  these  Avere  units  scattered 
here  and  there,  each  pursuing  his  oavh  line  of  investiga- 
tion  in  solitary  grandeur,  and  the  whole  presenting  the 
appearance  of  an  assemblage  of  inchoative  particles 
rather  than  a regularly  organized  body.  But  in  the 
age  of  philosophy,  properly  so  called,  these  units  de- 
veloped into  communities,  and  a series  of  sporadic  and 
unconnected  attempts  at  philosophic  thought  Avere  sys- 


THE  AGE  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


85 


tematized  into  well-organized  schools.  Another  differ- 
ence arose  from  the  spirit  of  controversial  wrangling, 
which  was  called  into  vigorous  activity,  when  school 
was  opposed  to  school,  and  system  fought  with  system 
for  triumph  and  ascendency.  In  the  simpler  and  purer 
times  of  the  Upanisliads,  love  of  truth  seems  to  have 
been  the  reigning  principle  ; hut  in  those  of  the  sys- 
tems this  amiable  passion  was  all  but  annihilated  by  an 
irrepressible  love  of  controversy.  And  when  the  spirit 
of  wrangling  had  done  its  work  and  created  dissensions 
and  discords  of  a fearful  type,  concessions  and  compro- 
mises were  resorted  to,  and  hybrids  in  the  region  of 
philosophy,  such  as  those  we  notice  in  the  Swetaswa- 
tara  Upanishad  and  the  Bhagavada  Gita,  were  called 
into  being.  It  should,  moreover,  be  borne  in  mind  that 
motives  of  an  earthly  character  played  a more  conspic- 
uous part  in  the  age  of  philosophy  ; but  these  bring  us 
to  our  next  point. 

3.  The  advantages  these  devout  inquirers  looked  for, 
and  for  which  they  betook  themselves  to  a life  of 
singular  austerity  and  penance,  were  partly  secular  and 
partly  spiritual.  The  secular  advantages  were  the  ex- 
traordinary powers  attained  by  complete  self-control 
and  intense  meditation.  These  are,  in  the  words  of 
Roer,  whose  translation  we  have  utilized,  “ assumption 
of  the  smallest  possible  shape,  of  the  greatest  possible 
shape,  of  the  heaviest  form,  of  the  lightest  form,  the 
power  of  obtaining  everything,  irresistible  will,  ruling 
of  all,  and  independency  of  all.”  Furnished  with  such 
powers,  the  devotee  could  dazzle  the  world  by  miracu- 
lous feats,  die  could  make  himself  at  times  visible  and 
at  times  invisible  ; could  move  in  the  water  as  fishes 
and  fly  in  the  air  as  birds  ; could  remain  buried  under 
the  earth  for  days  and  months  and  years  ; could  com- 


SG 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


mand  a luscious  fruit  on  the  topmost  branch  of  a giant 
tree  to  fall  down  on  his  outspread  hands,  or  call  into 
his  clenched  fist  the  diamond  ring  concealed  beneath 
the  stony  floor  of  the  darkest  chamber  of  a castellated 
palace  ; could  make  the  strongest  man  weep  as  a child 
or  fall  prostrate  upon  the  earth  by  the  simple  force  of 
his  indomitable  will  ; could  bring  the  whole  world 
under  his  irresistible  sway  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye, 
or  hurl  defiance  at  the  powers  that  be  with  perfect  im- 
punity. And  who  can  measure  the  influence  he  might 
exert  over  a superstitious  people  by  such  dazzling  dis- 
plays of  superhuman  power  ? Nor  were  immensity, 
exiguity,  gravity,  levitation,  irresistible  will-power, 
dominating  influence,  and  perfect  independence  the 
only  powers  by  which  he  could  dazzle  the  world  into 
admiration  and  reverence.  He  could  by  intense  medi- 
tation make  himself  omniscient,  and  work  all  the  won- 
ders connected  with  the  powers  known,  in  the  phrase- 
ology of  Mesmerism,  as  prevision,  intro  vision,  and 
retrovision.  lie  could  look  back,  as  Buddha  is  re- 
ported to  have  done,  to  the  varied  stages  of  existence 
through  which  he  had  passed,  before  his  migration  into 
his  present  body,  and  report  varieties  of  incidents  con- 
nected with  each.  He  could  foretell  future  events  with 
prophetic  minuteness  and  particularity  ; and  read  and 
make  bare,  so  to  speak,  the  inmost  thoughts  of  his 
neighbors.  How  much  awe  and  reverence  might  he 
not  inspire  by  a display  of  such  superhuman  knowl- 
edge ! His  toil  did  not  go  unrewarded  even  in  this 
world. 

But  it  must  be  observed  that  these  powers,  though 
prized,  should  be  looked  upon  as  merely  the  subsidiary 
advantages  of  his  austere  course  of  life.  His  main  ob- 
ject was  knowledge  of  Brahma  and  the  liberation  con- 


THE  AGE  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


87 


sequent  upon  it.  lie  looked  upon  liimself  as  a slave  to 
desire,  which  led  him  to  acts,  good  and  bad,  and  these 
to  periods  of  rewards  and  punishment,  and  consequently 
through  an  almost  endless  chain  of  transmigrations. 
To  deliver  himself  from  the  trammels  of  corporeal  or 
conscious  existence,  not  the  acquisition  of  extraordinary 
powers,  was  the  great  object  he  had  in  view  in  forsak- 
ing the  occupation  and  pleasures  of  the  world,  and  mak- 
ing meditation  the  sole  business  of  his  life.  He  looked 
for  liberation,  and  he  believed  that  he  could  not  reach 
the  summit  of  his  wishes  except  through  what  may  be 
called  the  ladder  of  right  knowledge.  For  this  knowl- 
edge, therefore,  he  was  willing  to  make  all  sacrifices, 
undergo  all  privations,  practise  all  austerities,  and  go 
through,  in  a word , a long  course  of  self-renunciation 
and  self-mortification.  How  he  could  reach  the  goal 
he  looked  forward  to  is  indicated  in  the  following 
extract  from  the  third  chapter  of  the  Swetaswatara 
Hpanishad  : 

“ Those  who  know  Brahma,  who  is  greater  than  the 
universe,  the  great  one,  the  infinite,  who  is  concealed 
within  all  beings  according  to  their  bodies,  the  only 
pervader  of  the  universe,  the  ruler  become  immortal.  ’ ’ 

“ I know  that  perfect,  infinite  spirit,  who  is  like  the 
sun  after  darkness.  Thus  knowing  him,  a person  over- 
comes death,  there  is  no  other  road  for  obtaining  (libera- 
tion).” 

Extraordinary  influence  in  this  world  and  emancipa- 
tion from  the  fetters  of  existence  were  the  motives 
which  induced  the  devotee  of  these  primitive  times  to 
exchange  the  comforts  of  domestic  life  for  the  priva- 
tions of  that  of  an  anchorite.  It  was  not,  therefore,  to 
gratify  an  idle  curiosity  of  the  mind,  but  to  satisfy  an 
intense  and  irrepressible  longing  of  the  heart,  that  he 


88 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


betook  himself  to  hermit  solitude.  Our  modern  phi- 
losophers lack  his  earnestness  because  they  are  led 
on  by  an  intellectual  rather  than  a moral  impulse  or 
force. 

The  following  extract  from  Dr.  Geikie’s  “ Life  of 
Christ”  shows  that  the  possibility  of  attaining  super- 
human knowledge  and  superhuman  power  by  ascetic 
self-denial  and  concentrated  meditation  was  recognized 
among  the  chosen  people  of  God  : “ The  grand  aim  of 
this  amazing  system  of  self  denial  and  ascetic  endurance 
is  told  by  Josephus  in  a brief  sentence.  4 Consecrated 
from  childhood  by  many  purifications,  and  familiar  be- 
yond thought  with  the  Holy  Books  and  the  utterances 
of  the  prophets,  they  (the  Essenes)  claim  to  see  into  the 
future,  and  in  truth  there  is  scarcely  an  instance  in 
which  their  prophecies  have  been  found  false.’  The 
belief  that  they  could  attain  direct  communion  with 
God  by  intense  legal  purification  and  mystic  contem- 
plation, and  even  pass,  in  the  end,  to  such  transcen- 
dental vision  as  would  reveal  to  them  the  secrets  of  the 
future,  was  the  supreme  motive  to  endure  a life  of  so 
much  privation  and  self-denial.  A similar  course  had 
been  followed  before  their  day  as  a means  of  prepara- 
tion for  divine  visions  and  communion  with  high 
powers.  “ In  those  days,”  says  Daniel,  “ I was 
mourning  three  full  weeks.  I ate  no  pleasant  bread, 
neither  came  flesh  nor  wine  in  my  mouth,  neither  did  I 
anoint  myself  at  all  till  three  whole  weeks  were  ful- 
filled. And  on  the  four  and  twentieth  day  of  the 
month,  as  I was  by  the  side  of  the  great  river,  which 
is  Hiddekel,  then  I lifted  up  mine  eyes,  and  looked,  and 
behold  a certain  man  clothed  in  linen,  whose  loins  were 
girded  with  fine  gold  of  Uphaz.  ” In  the  same  way 
Esdras  prepared  himself  for  his  visions  : “ Go  to  the 


THE  AGE  OP  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


89 


flowery  open,  where  there  is  no  house,”  said  the  angel 
to  him,  “ and  eat  only  the  herbs  of  the  field  ; taste  no 
flesh  and  drink  no  wine,  but  eat  herbs  only,  and  pray 
unto  the  Highest  continually  ; then  will  I come  and 
talk  with  thee.”  That  the  devotees  in  the  promised 
land  were  not  so  wild  in  their  expectations  as  their 
brethren  in  India  is  a proof  of  the  decidedly  better  in- 
fluence exerted  over  them  by  their  sacred  scriptures. 

4.  How  let  us  advert  to  the  conclusions  at  which  the 
inquirers  arrived.  These  may  be  classed  under  two 
heads,  materialism  and  pantheism,  the  two  poles  around 
which  all  speculations  on  the  problems  of  existence  have 
revolved  from  the  beginning  of  days.  The  Sankhya 
philosophy  was  evidently  the  earliest  outcome  ; and  it 
traced  creation  through  a succession  of  evolutes  and 
evolvent  principles  to  a quasi-material,  if  not  material 
form,  called  Prakriti.  The  Upanishads  had  recognized 
a principle  called  Unmanifested  (Avyakta)  behind  the 
perceptible  universe,  and  the  manifested  (Yyakta)  deity, 
its  reputed,  and  in  some  respects  its  real,  creator.  This 
unmanifested  principle  was  identified  by  the  Sankhya 
school  with  its  Prakriti,  and  a process  of  evolution  was 
disclosed  fitted  to  connect  it,  through  the  media  of  sub- 
stances of  extreme  tenuity,  with  the  gross,  material 
universe.  But  this  solution  was  a little  too  atheistic  to 
suit  the  irrepressible  religious  tendencies  of  the  Hindu 
mind,  and  therefore  a reaction  in  favor  of  pantheism 
was  realized  not  long  after  its  appearance  and  prev- 
alence. The  apparent,  if  not  real,  dualism  of  the 
Sankhya  philosophy  did  therefore  in  time  shrink  into 
the  monism  of  the  Vedantic  school.  The  ultimate 
ground  of  existence  was  declared  to  be,  not  a material 
or  quasi-material  form,  primordial  and  self-evolving, 
but  a divine  substance  or  the  Divinity  acting  under  an 


90 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


automatic  impulse.  Such  were  the  boasted  results  of 
philosophic  thought  in  India,  and  such  have  been  the 
boasted  results  of  philosophic  thought  wheresoever  and 
whensoever  it  has  been  vigorously  applied  to  the  prob- 
lems of  existence  both  in  ancient  and  modern  times. 
And  their  unsatisfactory  character  is  fitted  to  set  forth, 
in  an  unmistakable  manner,  his  inability  to  solve  them 
by  dint  of  thought  and  speculation.  Ilis  business  is  to 
accept,  with  childlike  simplicity,  the  solution  placed 
within  his  reach  by  his  subjective  consciousness,  as  well 
as  by  objective  revelation.  And  when  he  so  far  forgets 
himself  as  to  shut  his  eye  presumptuously  to  the  dim 
light  of  the  one  source  and  the  meridian  lustre  of  the 
other,  he  cannot  but  get  entangled  in  the  mazes  of  gro- 
tesque fancies  and  ludicrous  errors  ! 

5.  But  these  conclusions,  antipodal  as  they  are,  could 
not  but  give  rise  to  fierce  controversies.  The  opposite 
schools  of  philosophy  had  themselves  ranged  under 
different  standards,  and  fought  with  might  and  main 
for  their  respective  shibboleths.  The  questions  which 
were  hotly  debated  in  those  days  have  lost  much  of 
their  importance  and  exciting  power  ; the  arguments 
which  were  plied  with  extraordinary  skill  and  pro- 
fundity have  lost  much  of  their  appositeness  and 
cogency  ; and  even  the  technical  phrases  bandied  back- 
ward and  forward  have  lost  much  of  their  significance. 
But  the  spirit  of  controversy,  evoked  when  the  jarring 
systems  fought  for  victory  and  ascendency,  has  not 
died  out  ; and  racy  anecdotes  fitted  to  set  forth  its 
ardor  and  irrepressibility  form  a prominent  and  per- 
haps the  most  amusing  element  of  table-talk  in  India. 
We  are  tempted  to  relate  one  of  these  to  show  what 
controversy  means  in  India  now,  and  what  it  must  have 
meant  when  the  champions  of  philosophy  were  arrayed 


THE  AGE  OE  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


91 


under  hostile  banners  to  fight  to  the  death  for  their  re- 
spective theories. 

Two  learned  Pundits,  who  were  bosom  friends,  sallied 
out  of  a place  of  learning  and  walked  on,  engaged  in 
pleasant  chit-chat.  Unfortunately,  they  allowed  them- 
selves, in  perhaps  an  unguarded  moment,  to  be  drawn 
into  a philosophic  controversy,  and  then  the  cheerful 
countenance,  the  bright  smile,  the  musical  voice,  and 
the  entertaining  talk  vanished  into  thin  air.  Their 
faces  presented  a gloomy  aspect,  their  eyes  flashed  with 
animation,  their  voices  became  agitated  and  loud,  and 
their  attitude  was  that  of  men  engaged  in  fierce  con- 
test. They  went  on  adding  fuel  to  the  flame  till  they 
reached  the  lofty  mound  of  a spacious  tank.  Here 
they  came  from  words  to  blows,  and  a scuffle  ensued, 
the  consequence  of  which  was,  they  moved  to  the  edge, 
lost  their  footing,  and  fell  down  into  the  waters  below. 
Thus  cooled,  they  returned  to  their  respective  homes  by 
different  roads,  ashamed  perhaps  of  the  controversial 
ardor  they  had  allowed  to  get  the  better  of  their  reason 
and  sober  sense  ! 

Hor  were  these  controversies  merely  intellectual  con- 
tests. They  received  the  greater  portion  of  their  ardor, 
their  vehemence,  their  rancor,  and  their  virulence  from 
religion.  The  schools  were  schools  of  religion  as  well 
as  philosophy,  for  philosophy  was  in  those  primitive 
times  polymathy,  the  science  of  the  All,  the  omnivorous 
science  in  which  were  included  physiology,  psychology, 
and  theology.  Again  the  schools  were  hopelessly  at 
war  with  popular  superstitions,  and  the  champions  of 
these,  those  who  derived  their  position,  wealth,  and 
honor  from  them,  could  not  but  stand  up  against  specu- 
lations so^ obviously  subversive  of  them.  So  that  there 
was  what  might  be  called  a double  contest  in  progress, 


92 


Hindu  rniLOsoriiY. 


the  schools  at  war  with  one  another,  and  popular  super- 
stitions at  war  with  them  all.  The  materialistic  schools 
hurled  anathemas  at  the  pantheistic,  and  the  champions 
of  the  popular  religion  prayed  down  imprecations  on 
both  the  classes  of  schools  with  perfect  impartiality  ! 

But  this  state  of  tlmms  could  not  last  lonm  The 

O O 

very  fierceness  with  which  the  spirit  of  wrangling  oper- 
ated brought  on  a reaction,  and  the  result  was  a decay 
of  earnestness  in  combination  with  a supple,  vacillating 
spirit  of  compromise.  No  wonder  ! A compromise 
was  demanded  commensurate  to  the  requirements  of 
the  hot  controversy  that  was  raging.  A double  com- 
promise was  needed  because  a double  controversy  was 
raging.  The  schools  must  be  reconciled  with  one  an- 
other, and  a reconciliation  must  be  effected  between 
them  on  one  side,  and  the  superstitions  they  despised 
on  the  other.  This  was  by  no  means  an  easy  task,  but 
it  was  effected  with  an  ingenuity  which  we  cannot  but 
commend.  It  is  not  at  all  difficult  to  show  how,  just 
as  it  was  not  at  all  difficult  to  show  how  the  egg  might 
be  able  to  stand  on  the  table,  after  the  successful  effort 
had  been  put  forth. 

The  Sankhya  philosophy,  the  philosophy  around 
which  all  materialistic  views  revolved,  traced  creation 
through  a succession  of  principles,  productive  and  non- 
productive, to  Prakriti.  Its  cosmogony  was  admitted, 
and  its  founder,  Kapila,  was  praised  and  honored  as  a 
favored  child  of  heaven,  nay,  even  as  an  incarnation. 
“ He  who  alone  superintends  every  source  of  produc- 
tion, every  form,  and  all  the  sources  of  production,  who 
endowed  his  son,  the  Rishi  Kapila,  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  creation  with  every  kind  of  knowledge, 
and  who  looked  at  him  when  he  was  born.”  _.  . . The 
Vedantic  system,  the  system  around  which  all  panthe- 


THE  AGE  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


93 


istio  notions  revolved,  presented  a cosmogony  which,  in 
its  broad  features  as  well  as  in  almost  all  its  details, 
was  a facsimile  of  that  of  the  Sanlchya  schools.  The 
starting  point,  however,  of  the  Yedantic  cosmogony 
was  Maya,  not  Prakriti.  But  if  Maya  could  be  made 
identical  with  Prakriti,  and  an  all-comprehensive,  all- 
diffusive  divine  substance  posited  behind  it,  the  inter- 
necine warfare  between  the  two  jarring  schools  of 
thought  might  cease.  And  this  was  precisely  the  ex- 
pedient resorted  to.  “ Know  delusion  (Maya)  as  nature 
(Prakriti),  him  who  is  united  with  her  as  the  great 
ruler  (Maheswar)  ; this  whole  world  in  truth  is  per- 
vaded by  (powers  which  are)  his  parts.” 

This  verse  of  chap.  iv.  of  the  Upanishad  under  review 
not  only  sets  forth  the  way  in  which  rank  materialism 
was  reconciled  to  rank  pantheism,  but  shows  the 
manner  in  which  transcendental  philosophy  was  recon- 
ciled to  grovelling  superstition.  The  diffusive  sub- 
stance back  of  the  demiurgic  principle,  Maya  or  Pra- 
kriti, was  represented  as  no  other  than  the  third  person 
of  the  Hindu  Triad,  Maheswar  or  Rudra.  In  the  third 
chapter  we  have  this  prayer  : “ May  Rudra,  the  Lord 
of  the  universe,  the  all-wise  (Maharshi)  who  produced 
the  gods  and  gave  them  majesty,  and  who  created  at 
first  Hiranyagarhlia,  strengthen  us  with  auspicious  in- 
tellect !”  The  prayer  is  repeated  in  chap.  iv.  : “ May 
Rudra,  the  Lord  of  the  universe,  the  all- wise  who  pro- 
duced the  gods  and  gave  them  majesty,  (and)  who  be- 
held the  birth  of  Hiranyagarhlia,  strengthen  us  with 
auspicious  intellect  !”  In  these  and  such  passages  the 
triad  is  looked  upon  as  a monad,  concentrated,  as  it 
were,  in  the  third  person  ; and  therefore  the  creator  is 
sometimes  called  Brahma,  and  sometimes  Rudra  ; and 
Hiranyagarhlia  is  no  other  than  Maya  or  Prakriti. 


94 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


Iiow  ingeniously  is  peace  restored.  Rudra  identified 
with  the  unmanifested  divine  substance  is  not  merely 
the  Creator,  but  the  Preserver  and  Destroyer  of  the 
universe.  In  chap.  iii.  verse  2 we  have  these  words  : 
“ For  it  is  one  Rudra  only — (the  lcnowers  of  Brahma) 
acknowledge  not  a second — who  rules  these  worlds  with 
his  ruling  powers,  who  dwells  within  every  man,  and 
who,  having  created  all  the  worlds,  (and  being  their) 
protector,  gets  wrathful  at  the  time  of  the  end  (destroys 
them).”  It  must  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  august 
being  cannot  act  except  through  an  emanation  called 
Sakti  (energy),  and  to  this  power  the  varied  names  of 
Prakriti,  Maya,  and  lliranyagarhha  are  applied. 

The  chronological  order  in  which  the  six  systems  of 
Indian  Philosophy  were  developed  cannot  possibly  be 
set  forth  ; and  the  age  in  which  they  flourished  can  be 
indicated  only  by  means  of  shrewd  guesses,  not  by 
means  of  well-founded  and  therefore  thoroughly  reliable 
calculations.  The  starting  and  the  terminal  links  of  the 
chain  may,  however,  be  fixed  with  almost  indisputable 
accuracy.  The  varied  systems  of  philosophic  thought, 
to  which  the  homage  of  the  country  has  been  paid  at 
different  times,  if  not  simultaneously,  and  by  which  the 
peculiar  phases  of  our  national  life  have  been  moulded, 
have  a clearly  discernible  vein  of  Sankhya  speculation 
running  through  it  ; and  therefore  the  Sankhya  system 
may  justly  be  represented  as  the  first  outcome  of  sys- 
tematized philosophy  in  India.  And  as  these  systems 
appear  swallowed  up,  assimilated,  and  incorporated  in 
Yedantism,  it  ought  to  be  represented  as  the  last  link 
of  the  chain.  The  Sankhya  system,  therefore,  ought  to 
be  treated  of  first  in  an  attempt  to  trace  the  history  of 
Indian  Philosophy  from  the  time  when  the  work  of  its 
systematization  was  commenced  to  that  when  that 


THE  AGE  OF  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


S5 


work  was  consummated.  The  Yoga  Philosophy,  which 
is  its  counterpart,  must  next  claim  attention.  The  two 
Logical  or  Analytical  systems,  the  Myaiyaika  and 
Vaiseshika,  should  be  disposed  of  before  the  two  Yedic 
systems  are  sifted  and  analyzed.  Such  a treatment  of 
this  many-sided  theme  appears  to  be  the  best  fitted  to 
do  it  justice,  though  arguments  may  be  advanced,  espe- 
cially by  people  disposed  to  carp  at  it  as  against  any 
conceivable  thing,  from  a plenum  to  a vacuum. 

These  six  systems — called  orthodox — are  thus  speci- 
fied : 

1.  Sankhya,  founded  by  Kapila. 

2.  Yoga,  founded  by  Patanjali. 

3.  ISTyaiyaika,  founded  by  Gautama  or  Gotama. 

4.  Vaiseshika,  founded  by  Kanada. 

5.  The  Purva  Mimansa,  founded  by  Jaimini. 

6.  The  Uttra  Mimansa  or  Vedanta,  founded  by  Bada- 
ray-una  or  Vyas. 

They  will  be  treated  of  in  the  following  papers,  one 
after  another,  in  the  order  in  which  they  appear  in  this 
enumeration. 


/ 


CHAPTER  IV. 


TIIE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  HINDU  THEORY  OF 
EVOLUTION. 

The  Sankhya  Philosophy  and  its  counterpart,  the 
Yoga,  have  lately  been  invested  with  a peculiar  interest 
in  the  writings  and  peripatetic  discourses  of  the  cham- 
pions of  Theosophy  in  India.  The  speculations  formu- 
lated in  the  one,  and  developed  in  a series  of  practical 
rules  of  the  most  stringent  type  in  the  other,  have  been 
placed  above  the  most  improved  science  of  the  day  ; 
and  results  are  anticipated,  compared  with  which  those 
by  which  the  comforts  and  conveniences  of  life  are 
being  multiplied  are  as  trifles.  It  is  proposed  in  this 
paper  to  show,  by  a careful  analysis  of  the  contents  of 
one  of  the  two  original  documents  from  which  our 
knowledge  of  the  Sankhya  Philosophy  is  derived,  how 
far  the  glowing  eulogy  bestowed  upon  it  by  Indian 
theosophists  is  well  merited. 

The  founder  of  the  Sankhya,  the  first  of  the  six 
schools  of  Indian  Philosophy,  was  Kapila,.one  of  the 
great  thinkers  whose  speculations  in  the  region  of  pure 
thought  have  not  merely  left  an  indelible  mark  in  the 
literature  of  our  country,  but  exercised  a mighty  influ- 
ence on  our  national  life.  Nothing  certain  or  reliable 
is  known  about  this  great  man  ; and  he  must  therefore 
be  held  up  as  a mythic  rather  than  a historical  charac- 
ter. The  traditions  current  about  him  are  such  as  are 
manufactured,  in  an  age  of  superstition,  by  what  Grote 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


97 


calls  the  retrospective  veneration  of  a few  devoted  fol- 
lowers, and  accepted  as  invested  with  peculiar  sacred- 
ness, if  not  as  positively  and  indisputably  unexception- 
able, by  the  unthinking  masses.  He  is  said  by  some 
champions  of  his  school  to  have  been  one  of  the  seven 
great  sons  of  Brahma,  who  cut  a figure  in  the  theogo- 
nies  of  the  Purans  ; while  by  others  he  is  held  up  as  an 
incarnation  of  Yishnu  himself.  Others,  again,  led  by 
the  etymology  of  the  word  Kapila,  which  means  a 
tawny  brown  color , as  well  as  fire,  look  up  to  him  as  the 
great  Yedic  god,  Agni  himself,  in  a human  form.  He 
is,  moreover,  said  to  have  been  a descendant  of  the 
celebrated  Indian  lawgiver,  Manu,  to  have  lived  in 
retirement  as  a recluse,  to  have  successfully  controlled 
his  appetites  and  passions,  and  to  have  been  invested  on 
that  account  with  various  kinds  of  supernatural  powers. 
But  if  he  is  identified,  as  he  has  been,  with  the  irascible 
sage  in  the  Ramayana,  who  destroyed  the  sixty  thou- 
sand sons  of  King  Sagara  of  Ayodhya  (Oudli)  in  a fit  of 
rage,  consequent  on  their  impudence  in  accusing  him  of 
the  great  crime  of  having  stolen  their  father’s  sacrificial 
horse,  the  complete  self-control  he  is  said  to  have 
attained  becomes  problematical  ! 

Various  other  stories  are  told  about  him  of  a piece 
with  these  ; and  the  best  thing  the  inquirer  can  do  is  to 
be  content  with  the  bare  fact  that  Kapila  was  a Brah- 
min and  the  founder  of  the  school  of  philosophy  the 
speculations  of  which  may  be  found  as  an  underlying 
vein  of  thought  in  the  most  advanced  of  the  sj^stems 
elaborated  in  ancient  India.  Kor  are  we  in  possession 
of  the  writings  of  this  great  sage,  the  works  ascribed 
to  him — viz.,  the  Sankhya-Pravachana,  or  Sankhya- 
Aphorisms  and  the  Tattwa  Samasa,  or  compendium  of 
principles — being  decidedly  more  modern.  The  former, 


08 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


translated  by  Dr.  Ballantyne  years  ago,  is  not  even 
mentioned  by  Sankara  Ackarya,  the  great  Vedantist 
commentator,  who  lived  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
seventh  and  the  earlier  part  of  the  eighth  century  ; 
and  it  is  not  even  referred  to  in  the  Sarva-Darsana- 
Sangraha,  a philosophical  treatise  evidently  composed 
in  the  fourteenth  century.  The  Sankhya-Pravachana, 
however,  is  a standard  document  of  the  Sankhya 
school  ; and  in  our  attempts  to  expound  the  principles 
of  the  philosophy  associated  with  this  school  we  cannot 
hut  give  it  a prominent  place.  We  shall,  therefore, 
present  a synopsis  of  the  contents  of  this  work  before 
proceeding  to  an  examination,  in  another  paper,  of 
those  of  a treatise  which  is  decidedly  more  ancient — 
viz.,  the  Sankhya  Jvarika,  or  exposition  of  the  Sankhya 
Philosophy,  recently  translated  by  Mr.  Davies,  of  the 
Royal  Asiatic  Socict\r.  Another  treatise,  also  recently 
translated,  we  shall  refer  to,  the  treatise  already 
named,  the  Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha,  or  review  of  the 
different  systems  of  Hindu  Philosophy,  a work  of  very 
great  importance,  which  the  student  of  our  national 
philosophy  will  do  well  to  master  with  a view  to  an 
intimate  acquaintance  with  the  lines  of  thought  and 
reasoning  embodied  in  it. 

The  Sankhya-Pravachana  consists  of  six  books  and 
five  hundred  and  twenty-six  Sutras  or  Aphorisms. 
The  first  four  books  present  the  principles  of  Kapila’s 
philosophy,  without,  it  must  be  confessed,  much  regard 
to  the  advantage  of  a perspicuous  or  luminous  arrange- 
ment, but  with  considerable  acuteness  and  force.  The 
fifth  book  grapples  with  and  refutes  some  of  the  objec- 
tions to  his  system  current,  if  not  in  his  age,  at  least  in 
subsequent  times  ; and  the  sixth,  being  a recapitulation 
of  the  principles  enunciated  in  the  first  four,  hears  to 


THE  SANEHTA  PHILOSOPHY. 


9.9 


the  whole  the  same  relation  which  the  book  of  Deuter- 
onomy bears  to  the  Pentateuch.  Several  commentaries 
fitted  to  elucidate  the  contents  of  this  hoary  document, 
and  demanded  peremptorily  by  its  studied  brevity  and 
sententiousness,  exist  ; and  a recourse  to  them  is  abso- 
lutely needed  to  clear  up  its  obscure  passages  and  make 
its  many  legendary  and  other  references  intelligible. 
But  great  caution  must  be  exercised  in  their  use  to 
avoid  the  common  fault  of  transferring  the  traditions 
and  associations  among  which  the  commentators  were 
brought  up,  to  the  age  when  the  passages  elucidated 
were  penned.  The  best  of  these  commentaries  is 
Sankhya-Pravachana  Bhashya,  by  Yijnana  Bhikshu, 
who  seems  to  have  been  an  ardent  admirer  and  a re- 
doubtable champion  of  the  system,  at  a time  when  it 
was  attacked  by  certain  phases  of  pantheistic  and  nihil- 
istic thought,  as  well  as  by  persons  r~ho  derived  their 
inspiration  from  prevalent  fonxio  of  theistic  belief. 
The  Sankhya  Aphorisms,  together  with  valuable  por- 
tions of  this  commentary,  were  translated  into  English 
by  Dr.  Ballantyne,  whose  accuracy  as  an  interpreter  or 
expounder  of  Hindu  Philosophy  has  been  generally 
acknowledged  by  Sanscrit  scholars.  These  translations 
are  to  be  utilized  in  the  following  synopsis  of  the  con- 
tents of  this  memorable  work. 

The  grand  object  of  this  philosophy  is  set  forth  in 
the  very  first  of  the  five  hundred  and  twenty-six  Apho- 
risms of  which  the  book  consists  : “ Well,  the  complete 
cessation  of  pain,  (which  is)  of  three  kinds,  is  the  com- 
plete end  (summum,  bonum)  of  man.”  The  three  kinds 
of  pain  are  particularized,  not  so  much  by  the  author 
of  the  book  as  by  his  commentators.  Pain  ‘ ‘ natural 
and  intrinsic,”  or  pain  arising  from  bodily  and  mental 
infirmities  and  weaknesses,  is  comprehended  in  the  first 


100 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


class  ; ancl  that  “ natural  and  extrinsic,”  or  pain  aris- 
ing from  such  external  causes  as  “ cold,  heat,  wind, 
rain,  thunderbolts,”  is  included  in  the  second  class. 
The  third  class  comprehends,  according  to  the  com- 
mentator Yachaspati  Misra,  pains  proceeding  from  the 
influence  of  planetary  bodies,  or  from  the  malice  of  im- 
pure spirits,  such  as  Yackshases,  Rakshases,  etc.  The 
subjection  of  the  soul  to  this  threefold  pain,  or  to  pain 
in  its  threefold  aspect,  is  its  bondage,  and  liberation 
from  it  should  be,  if  it  is  not,  the  sole  object  of  earthly 
and  even  heavenly  existence.  The  object  of  Sankhya 
and  eveiy  other  system  of  Indian  Philosophy  is  to  show 
how  this  consummation  is  to  be  brought  about,  or  how 
the  final  emancipation  of  the  soul  from  the  bondage  of 
pain  in  its  threefold  aspect  is  to  be  effected. 

The  diagnosis  of  a disease  is  the  first  step  toward  its 
cure  ; and,  therefore,  an  attempt  is  made  to  set  forth 
the  cause  of  this  universal  bondage  before  the  sources 
of  emancipation  are  pointed  out.  The  disquisition  on 
this  cause  is  worthy  of  a detailed  notice,  inasmuch  as  it 
points  to  the  varied  antagonistic  forces  witli  which  the 
system  had  to  contend  in  its  advanced,  if  not  in  its  in- 
cipient stages  of  development. 

The  great  Napoleon  developed  a principle  of  universal 
applicability  when,  immediately  after  his  coronation,  he 
said  : “A  new  dynasty  must  be  baptized  with  blood.” 
A new  school  of  philosophy,  as  well  as  a new  empire  or 
a new  dynasty,  has  to  pass  through  a season  of  almost 
ceaseless  struggle  for  life  ; and  it  is  not  established  till 
it  has  proved  its  right  to  live  according  to  a law  now 
said  to  be  universally  operative,  the  law  of  the  survival 
of  th.6  fittest.  And  it  cannot  but  be  very  interesting 
to  notice  the  phalanx  of  antagonistic  forces  through 
which  it  has,  in  its  inception  and  development,  to  force 


THE  SAJfKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


101 


its  way  to  maturity,  renown,  and  far-extending-  and 
triumphant  influence,  if  not  to  universal  ascendency. 
But  this  cannot  be  done  in  the  case  of  the  system  of 
philosophy  under  review,  inasmuch  as  we  are  not  in 
possession  of  documents  fitted  to  throw  light  on  its 
early  development.  But  we  can  indicate  the  varied 
hostile  theories  with  which  it  had  to  contend  when  the 
Sankhya-Pravachana  was  composed. 

"What,  then,  is  the  cause  of  the  universally  admitted 
bondage  of  the  soul,  or  its  subjection  to  the  varied 
kinds  of  pain,  the  complete  cessation  of  which  is  the 
object  of  philosophy  or  right  knowledge  ? Various 
parties  come  forward  with  varied  answers,  which  are 
plausible  enough  at  first  sight,  but  which,  when  prop- 
erly weighed  in  the  balance  of  reason,  are  found  want- 
ing. The  ordinary  thinker,  or  one  not  far  advanced  in 
philosophy,  comes  forward  and  points  to  time  and place 
as  the  cause,  jointly  and  separately,  of  the  bondage  of 
the  soul.  But  his  theory  is  very  easily  exploded,  as, 
both  time  and  place  being  associated  with  all  souls, 
those  which  are  in  bondage  and  those  which  are  beati- 
fied, if  they  were  the  obnoxious  cause,  release  or  libera- 
tion would  be  an  impossibility.  But  liberation  is  a 
fact,  and  souls  released  exist  free  from  all  pain,  and 
beatified.  Time  and  place , therefore,  cannot  be  the 
cause  we  are  in  quest  of.  The  metaphysician  steps  for- 
ward and  affirms  that  the  bondage  of  the  soul  arises 
from  its  being  conditioned  and  therefore  necessarily 
defective.  The  reply  to  this  is  plain.  The  premises 
are  incorrect,  and  therefore  the  conclusion  is  faulty. 
The  soul  is  absolute  and  unconditioned  ; a position 
established  both  by  Scripture  and  common-sense."  But 
this  reply  elicits  the  rejoinder,  “ If  the  soul  is  absolute 
and  unconditioned,  why  talk  of  its  bondage  and  subse- 


102 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


quent  liberation  ?”  It  is  not  at  all  difficult  to  dispose 
of  this  demurrer.  Forms  of  expression,  conventional, 
though  not  scientifically  accurate,  cannot  be  very  well 
avoided.  When  the  bondage  of  the  soul  and  its  libera- 
tion are  talked  of,  the  real  meaning  is  not  hidden, 
though  some  homage  is  paid  to  usage.  The  body,  with 
its  internal  organ,  the  mind,  is  really  in  pain,  the  soul's 
bondage  is  only  reflectional,  as  the  red  color  in  a crystal 
vase  containing  a China  rose. 

The  metaphysician  retires,  giving  place  to  the  priest 
or  the  champion  of  current  orthodoxy,  who  holds  up 
works  as  the  cause  of  the  bondage  of  the  soul.  But 
works  cannot  "weave  a net  for  that  to  which  they  do 
not  appertain.  Works  belong  to  the  mind,  and  their 
influence,  good  or  bad,  does  not  and  cannot  extend  to 
the  soul,  to  which  they  do  not  in  the  slightest  degree 
appertain.  The  Vedantin,  or  the  pantheist  of  the 
Vedantio  school,  then  comes  forward,  and  with  an  air 
of  triumph  insists  upon  Avidya,  or  ignorance,  as  the 
cause  of  this  bondage.  But  ignorance,  look  upon  it  as 
you  will,  or  from  whatever  standpoint  it  may  please 
you  to  do  so,  cannot  cause  bondage.  Ignorance,  ac- 
cording to  the  Yedantins,  is  unreal  ; and  that  which  is 
merely  a phantom  cannot  be  the  cause  of  that  which, 
like  bondage,  is  a reality.  If,  however,  it  is  affirmed  that 
ignorance  is  real  and  not  phantom-like,  the  very  founda- 
tion of  monism,  or  exclusive  belief  in  or  affirmation  of 
one  entity,  is  shaken.  But  suppose  ignorance  is  repre- 
sented as  both  real  and  unreal,  what  then  ? Such  a 
reconciliation  of  opposites,  such  a naked  paradox,  is 
almost  unthinkable,  and  cannot  be  accepted  by  any 
but  “children  and  madmen.”  Such  a thing,  more- 
over, which  at  one  and  the  same  time  is  both  real  and 
unreal,  is  not  included  in  the  six  all-embracing  catego- 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


103 


ries  of  the  Vaiseshikas— viz.,  substance,  quality,  action, 
generality,  particularity,  and  inhesion.  How,  then, 
can  its  existence  be  admitted  ? 

The  idealist  then  advances  and  affirms  that,  as  noth- 
ing but  thought  exists,  bondage  is  unreal  and  dreamy. 
But  here,  again,  the  premises  are  not  correct.  Our 
intuition  of  the  external  world  proves  its  reality  as  de- 
cidedly as  our  intuitive  knowledge  of  thought  proves 
its  reality.  If  intuition  is  to  be  set  aside  as  fallacious 
or  unreliable  in  the  one  case,  it  ought  to  be  cast  over- 
board in  the  other  also.  The  believer  in  momentary 
existences,  or  lie  who  believes  that  existence,  instead  of 
being  a continuous,  connected  chain,  consists  of  distinct 
and  separate  parts,  each  leaping  into  momentary  exist- 
ence only  to  be  replaced  immediately  by  its  successor, 
steps  forward  or  walks  into  the  arena  with  his  theory, 
which,  but  for  the  fact  that  nothing  is  too  absurd  in 
the  region  of  metaphysics  or  speculative  science,  might 
be  looked  upon  as  too  odd  to  be  entertained  by  sensible 
men  even  for  a moment.  He  affirms  that  the  bondage 
of  the  soul  is  occasioned  by  the  influence  of  external 
objects  of  momentary  duration.  He,  however,  does 
not  clearly  see  that  external  objects,  being  locally  sepa- 
rate from  the  soul,  cannot  weave  a net  of  bondage  for 
it,  and  that  things  ephemeral,  which  make  their  ap- 
pearance one  after  another  only  to  die,  cannot  have  a 
permanent  effect,  as  the  bondage  of  the  soul  confessedly 
is.  And  the  last  gentleman  whose  opinions  are 
weighed  and  found  wanting  is  the  nihilist,  who  main- 
tains that,  as  nothing  exists  but  an  eternal  and  unutter- 
able void,  bondage  is  supposititious,  a myth,  or  a non- 
entity. This  gentleman  has  directed  against  him  the 
very  weapons  by  which  his  brother  champion,  the 
idealist,  is  chased  out  of  the  arena. 


104 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


Some  of  these  opponents  are  regarded  as  brethren 
with  mistaken  notions,  but  the  opprobrious  epithet  of 
heretic  is  applied  to  the  rest,  especially  to  those  who 
uphold  nihilism  in  one  form  or  another. 

The  varied  theories  of  the  bondage  of  the  soul  which 
Kapila’s  system  had  to  combat  and  overcome  indicate 
the  forms  of  thought  and  belief  current  in  what  might 
emphatically  be  called  the  Age  of  Indian  Philosophy, 
and  in  times  immediately  subsequent  to  it.  There  was 
the  tendency  to  reduce  all  forms  of  existence  to  space 
and  time,  or  to  merge  the  sensuous  objects  of  nature 
into  the  supersensuous  forms  of  thought.  There  were 
the  theories  of  the  absolute  and  the  relative,  the  un- 
conditioned and  the  conditioned,  propounded,  matured, 
held  as  life,  and  fought  for,  as  well  as  forms  of  thought 
arising  from  current  superstition.  There  was,  more- 
over, the  transcendental  type  of  monism  which,  origi- 
nating in  pure  Vedantic  times,  was  being  gradually 
fitted,  by  an  inflexible  and  uncompromising  logic,  for 
that  ascendency  which  it  has  enjoyed  in  our  country  for 
ages  untold.  There  was  idealism  ready  to  affirm  the 
existence  of  nothing  but  pure  thought,  side  by  side 
with  nihilism  proclaiming  an  interminable  and  absolute 
void  under  diversified  forms  of  fictitious  and  deceptive 
existence.  And  finally  there  was  the  strange  and  par- 
adoxical theory  of  an  endless  chain  of  unconnected  ex- 
istences, an  infinite  concatenation  of  finite  links  with- 
out anything  like  an  interdependence  or  correlation  of 
parts.  Do  not  our  modern  philosophers  find  some  of 
their  most  favorite  whims  anticipated  in  these  forms  of 
thought  ? 

It  is  desirable  to  state  here  that  Kapila’s  system, 
though  thrown  into  the  shade  by  the  ascendant  star  of 
Yedantism,  has  maintained  its  influence,  in  spite  of 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


105 


these  forms  of  thought,  so  far  as  to  give  rise  to  the 
saying,  quoted  by  Monier  Williams  in  his  excellent 
treatise,  “ Indian  Wisdom” — viz.,  “ there  is  no  knowl- 
edge like  Sankhya,  and  no  power  like  Yoga.”  Let  it 
not,  moreover,  be  forgotten  that  the  ascendency  of  the 
Yedanta  has  been  secured  and  maintained  by  an  assim- 
ilative process — that  is,  in  consequence  of  its  adoption 
and  assimilation  to  itself  of  some  of  the  characteristic 
ideas  of  the  Sankhya  philosophy.  The  Sankhya  philos- 
ophy would  exist  in  Yedantism  in  a noticeable  form 
even  if  its  existence  as  a separate  system  were  utterly 
extinguished  or  thrown  beyond  the  confines  of  possi- 
bility. 

The  question  must  once  more  be  raised,  “ What  is 
the  cause  of  the  universally  admitted  bondage  of  the 
soul  ?”  Two  Aphorisms  in  Book  I.  are  calculated  to 
bring  us  to  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  commenta- 
tor Yijnana  Bhikshu,  who  lived  and  flourished  about 
three  hundred  years  ago — viz.,  that  “the  immediate 
cause  of  the  bondage  of  the  soul  is  the  conjunction  of 
Prakriti  and  of  the  soul.”  But  the  commentator  is  of 
course  aware,  as  all  students  of  Sankhya  philosophy 
are,  that  the  real  cause  lies  beyond  this  conjunction, 
which,  as  Prakriti  and  soul  are  both  pervasive  and 
fitted  to  attract  each  oilier  by  inherent  laws,  is  inevita- 
ble, and  from  which,  therefore,  there  is  no  exemption 
even  for  beatified  souls.  The  true  cause  of  the  bond- 
age of  the  soul  is  “non-discrimination.”  The  soul  is 
really  different  from  Prakriti  and  its  products — viz., 
intelligence,  egoism,  mind,  etc.  ; but  it  is  led  by  non- 
discrimination to  identify  itself  with  them.  Hence  its 
bondage  ! 

But  the  problem  is  not  solved  here.  Another  ques- 
tion arises.  If  the  earth  stands  upon  the  elephant, 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


106 

wlaat  does  the  elephant  stand  upon  ? If  non-discrimi- 
nation is  the  cause  of  the  bondage  of  the  soul,  what  is 
the  cause  of  non-discrimination  ? Some  persons  may 
be  prone  to  maintain  that  merit  or  demerit  is  the  cause 
of  non-discrimination.  But  merit  or  demerit,  desert, 
good  or  bad,  springs  from  non-discrimination  ; and 
therefore  we  must  posit  one  non-discrimination  to 
explain  another  ; and  there  will  in  consequence  be  a 
regressus  ad  infinitum.  But  suppose  we  have  recourse 
to  the  theory  of  spontaneity  and  affirm  that  non-dis- 
crimination comes  naturally  and  spontaneously  into 
being,  will  not  such  a hypothesis  be  enough  ? No  ; for 
in  that  case  there  can  be  no  guarantee  that  liberated 
souls  shall  be  freed  from  its  molestation.  Non-discrim- 
ination is  really  “ beginningless.”  But  that  which  is 
beginningless  is  really  everlasting  or  endless,  and  there- 
fore the  emancipation  of  the  soul,  consequent  on  the 
annihilation  of  non-discrimination,  is  an  impossibility. 
It  is  not,  however,  beginningless,  indivisible,  and  end- 
less in  the  sense  in  which  the  soul  is  ; but  it  is  begin- 
ningless “ like  an  onflow  (which  may  be  stopped).” 
Nor  is  this  to  be  wondered  at,  considering  the  fact  that 
the  beginningless,  antecedent  nonentity  of  a jar  termi- 
nates as  soon  as  it  is  made.  Non-discrimination,  though 
without  beginning,  is  happily  annihilable  ; and  the 
question  how  it  may  be  annihilated  is,  properly  speak- 
in  the  burden  of  the  book  under  review. 

But  before  pointing  out  the  means  prescribed  for 
bringing  about  this  happy  consummation,  the  annihila- 
tion of  non-discrimination  and  the  liberation  of  the  soul 
under  its  bondage,  let  us  ascertain  what  is  said  in  these 
Aphorisms  about  the  soul,  and  what  about  Prakriti, 
or,  in  other  words,  let  us  look  into  the  psychology  and 
physiology  of  this  ancient  document. 


THE  SASKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


107 


Let  us,  in  the  first  place,  group  a number  of  its 
declarations  about  the  soul  (Punish)  : 

“ But  not  without  the  conjunction  thereof  (i.e.  of 
Prakriti)  is  there  the  connection  of  that  (i.e.  of  pain) 
with  that  (viz.,  the  soul),  which  is  now  essentially  a 
pure  and  free  intelligence”  (Book  I.  Aph.  19). 

“ Because  this  is  impossible  for  what  is  inactive  (or, 
in  other  words,  without  motion,  as  the  soul  is,  because 
all-pervading  and  therefore  incapable  of  changing  its 
place)”  (Book  I.  Aph.  49). 

“ Soul  is  something  else  than  body,  etc.  Because 
that  which  is  combined  (and  is  therefore  discerptible) 
is  for  the  sake  of  some  other  (not  discerptible)”  (Book 
I.  Aph.  139-140). 

“ And  (the  soul  is  not  material)  because  of  its  super- 
intendence (over  Prakriti).  And  (the  soul  is  not  mate- 
rial) because  of  its  being  an  experience’  ’ (Book  I.  Aph. 
142-143). 

“ From  the  several  allotment  of  births,  a multiplicity 
of  souls  (is  to  be  inferred)”  (Book  I.  Aph.  149). 

“ It  (soul)  is  altogether  free,  (but  seemingly)  multi- 
form (or  different  in  appearance  from  a free  thing) 
through  a delusive  resemblance  of  being  bound.  It 
(soul)  is  a witness  through  its  sense-organs  (which  quit 
it  on  liberation).  The  nature  of  soul  is  constant  free- 
dom. And  finally  (the  nature  of  the  soul  is)  indiffer- 
ence (to  pain  and  pleasure  alike).  Its  (soul’s)  fancy  of 
being  an  agent  is  from  the  proximity  of  intelligence” 
(Book  I.  Aph.  160-164). 

“ It  cannot  be  of  its  own  nature,  (that  is  to  say) 
meditation  cannot  belong  to  soul  essentially,  because  of 
the  immobility  of  the  soul  ” (Book  II.  Aph.  44). 

“ Bondage  and  liberation  do  not  belong  naturally  to 


108 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


soul  (and  would  not  even  appear  to  be)  but  for  non- 
discrimination”  (Book  III.  Aph.  Tl). 

“ Soul  is,  for  there  is  no  proof  that  it  is  not.  This 
(soul)  is  different  from  the  body,  etc.,  because  of 
heterogeneousness  (or  complete  difference  between  the 
two)”  (Book  YI.  Aph.  102). 

“ The  plurality  of  soul  is  proved  by  the  distribution 
(announced  by  the  Yeda  itself  in  such  texts  as  whoso 
understand  this,  these  are  immortal,  while  others  ex- 
perience sorrow'  ’ (Book  Y.  Aph.  45). 

These  texts  are  fitted  to  prove  that,  according  to  the 
Sankhya  system,  souls  are  multitudinous,  immaterial, 
uncompounded,  undiscerptible,  all-pervading,  immo- 
bile, and  inactive.  They  are  uncreate  and  essentially 
intelligence  and  freedom.  They  superintend  or  guide 
the  evolutions  of  Prakriti,  and  experience  pleasure  and 
pain,  but  in  a unique  sense. 

As  regards  the  origin  of  souls,  the  theory  of  creation- 
ism cannot  but  be  discarded  in  a system  which  is  essen- 
tially atheistic,  and  which  at  the  same  time  cannot 
homologate  so  incongruous  an  idea  as  that  of  a pure 
spirit  emanating  from  impure  matter  or  from  non- 
entity. Its  great  principle,  ex  nihilo  nihil  Jit , is  em- 
phatically stated  in  Aphorism  78  of  the  very  first 
Book  : “A  thing  is  not  made  out  of  nothing  (that  is 
to  say,  it  is  not  possible  that  out  of  nothing — i.e.  out 
of  a nonentity — a thing  should  be  made,  i.e.  an  entity 
should  arise.” 

The  theory  of  what  in  theological  parlance  or  phrase- 
ology is  called  traducianism,  or  that  of  souls  propagat- 
ing souls  by  the  laws  of  generation,  is  also  repulsive  to 
a system  which  looks  upon  the  absence  of  all  desire  and 
all  activity,  voluntary  if  not  automatic,  as  essential  to 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


109 


their  perfect  freedom  from  misery.  And,  therefore, 
the  remaining  theory  of  the  pre-existence  of  souls, 
maintained  by  so  many  philosophers  of  so  many  differ- 
ent schools  in  ancient  times  and  in  the  church  by  no 
less  a man  than  Origen,  is  the  only  theory  that  can  be 
propounded  in  consistence  with  the  principles  of  the 
Sankhya  school.  Souls  are,  therefore,  represented  as 
inereate  ; but  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  g'lory  of 
being  so  does  not  belong  to  them  exclusively. 

Again,  they  are  said  to  be  multitudinous,  or  rather 
innumerable,  to  avoid  another  difficulty.  The  object 
of  creation  or  rather  evolution  being  to  effect  the 
liberation  of  souls  from  the  power  or  influence  of  non- 
discrimination,  these  must  be  numerous  or  innumerable 
to  prevent  the  premature  collapse  or  cessation  of  omnific 
work.  The  greater  the  number  of  souls,  the  longer  is 
the  process  which  first  enslaves  them  one  after  another, 
and  then  effects  their  liberation  singly,  not  en  masse. 
The  idea  of  the  diffusiveness  of  souls  is  but  a corollary 
deducible  from  their  numerousness.  It  ought  not  to  be 
forgotten  that  the  Hindu  philosopher,  like  his  brother 
philosophers  of  other  ancient  schools,  had  at  best  but 
gross  ideas  of  spiritual  substances,  and  was  therefore 
prone  to  confound  them  with  material  substances  of  a 
tenuous  nature,  such  as  ether,  etc.  Souls  could  not 
therefore  be,  according  to  him,  multitudinous  without 
being  all-diffusive  and  all-nervasive.  But  is  not  each 
soul  in  itself,  or  apart  from  the  congeries  or  mass  of 
souls,  diffusive  and  pervasive  ? To  some  extent  it  is  ; 
but  perhaps  not  ail-diffusive  and  all -pervasive  ; though 
all  that  is  said  of  souls  and  Prakrit!  may  lead  one  to  the 
conclusion  that  they  overlap  and  interpenetrate  one 
another,  and  are,  moreover,  overlapped  and  interpene- 
trated by  Prakriti.  The  predications  with  reference 


110 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


either  to  the  soul  or  Prakriti  are  by  no  means  marked 
by  perfect  consistency  and  harmony. 

Activity,  as  has  already  been  indicated,  can  on  no 
account  be  attributed  to  souls,  it  being  invariably  asso- 
ciated with  pain  and  misery  through  desire  and  aver- 
sion. Souls,  therefore,  are  passionless  and  perfectly 
quiescent.  But  intelligence  is  certainly  ascribed  to 
souls — they  are  said  to  be  intelligence  itself.  It  may 
be  said  that  intelligence  and  perfect  quiescence  cannot 
coexist,  and  that,  souls  being  subjects  of  knowledge, 
they  must  pass  through  various  states  of  consciousness, 
such  as  sensations,  intellections,  emotions,  and  voli- 
tions ; especially  as  omniscience,  implying  unchange- 
able thought  and  feeling,  is  not  ascribed  to  them.  But 
intelligence  in  this  case,  as  in  that  of  the  Supreme 
Spirit  of  the  Upanishads,  is  tantamount  to  non-intelli- 
gence, inasmuch  as  it  makes  or  implies  no  distinction 
between  self  and  not-self,  subject  and  object.  The 
Hindu  philosopher  is  prone  to  look  upon  the  pure  spirit 
as  a material  entity  of  extreme  tenuity,  and  he  speaks 
of  its  intelligence  as  he  speaks  of  the  color  of  a colored 
substance,  as  a material  attribute  inherent  rather  than 
accidental.  According  to  him,  the  intelligence  of  the 
soul  is  its  golden  color,  its  transparency,  its  luminous- 
ness. Its  inherence  in  the  soul  can  no  more  be  the 
cause  of  intellectual,  emotional,  and  volitional  activity 
than  the  color  of  a colored  substance,  say  the  rosy  hue 
of  a rose,  can  be  the  cause  of  any  display  of  activity  on 
its  part.  Hor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  intelligence  in 
the  proper  sense  of  the  term  is,  according  to  this 
system,  a product  of  Prakriti,  the  root -principle  of 
nature,  not  an  attribute  or  predicate  of  the  soul. 

The  soul’s  essence  is  not  merely  intelligence,  but  free- 
dom. Then  why  talk  of  its  bondage,  a thing  which, 


THE  SANKHTA  PHILOSOPHY. 


Ill 


as  contradictory  to  its  nature,  cannot  exist  in  it  without 
annihilating  it.  Here  the  Sankhya  philosopher  seems 
to  falter  for  a moment,  but  gets  rid  of  the  difficulty 
with  an  ingenuity  which  may  be  commended.  The 
soul’s  bondage  is  reflectional,  not  real.  Its  proximate 
cause  is  contact  with  Prakriti,  the  root-principle  of 
nature,  called  the  anmulam  mulam , the  rootless  root, 
or,  in  modern  phraseology,  the  cause  uncaused.  This 
principle  attracts  the  soul  just  as  loadstone  attracts 
iron  ; or  it  is  attracted  by  the  soul  which  is  represented 
as  thoroughly  immobile. 

In  this  description,  however,  our  philosopher  loses 
the  balance  of  his  logic  and  gets  entangled  between  the 
horns  of  a dilemma.  If  he  maintains  that  the  soul  is 
attracted  by  Prakriti  into  juxtaposition  with  itself,  the 
doctrine  of  its  immobility  is  neutralized  ; while  if  the 
conjunction  of  the  two  is  attributed  to  the  attractive 
power  of  the  soul,  its  complete  passivity  or  quiescence 
is  made  problematical.  The  Sankhya  philosopher  gets 
out  of  the  horns  by  ascribing  to  the  soul  some  kind  of 
automatic  influence  or  attractive  power.  Voluntary 
activity  is  most  emphatically  thrown  out  of  the  circle 
of  the  soul’s  predicates  ; but  some  irresistible  influence 
or  virtue  emanates  from  it  in  the  same  manner  in  which 
some  mysterious  influence  is  exerted  automatically  by 
the  loadstone  over  a piece  of  iron.  But  our  philoso- 
pher does  not  see  that  there  is  absolutely  no  necessity 
of  his  positing  an  attractive  force  either  in  the  soul  or 
in  Prakriti  to  account  for  their  conjunction.  Both  the 
substances  are,  in  his  opinion,  all-pervasive  ; and  there- 
fore their  conjunction  is  inevitable.  But  here  a fresh 
difficulty  of  an  appalling  nature  makes  its  appearance. 
If  Prakriti  and  souls  are  so  universally  diffusive  that 
their  union,  or  rather  interpenetration,  is  inevitable, 


112 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


why  are  not  souls  simultaneously  brought  into  bondage, 
and  where  are  the  beatified  souls  lodged  ? 

Leaving  this  difficulty  unremoved,  as  the  Sankhya 
philosopher  leaves  it,  1st  us  advert  to  the  lamentable 
fruits  of  the  inevitable  contact  of  souls  with  Prakriti. 
From  it  proceed  all  the  troubles  of  the  mind  ( manas ), 
which  is  a product  of  Prakriti,  and  therefore  no  portion 
of  the  soul  ; and  its  sufferings  are  only  reflected  in  the 
luminous  and  quiescent  soul,  and  in  this  reflection  con- 
sists its  fictitious  bondage.  The  soul  is,  therefore,  in  a 
very  loose  sense  called  an  experiencer  ; and  all  that 
can  properly  be  predicated  of  it  is  that  the  ephemeral 
pleasures  and  pains  brought  upon  the  mind  by  its  own 
malignant  activity  are  reflected  in  its  tranquil  sub- 
stance. In  a sense  still  looser,  as  we  shall  see,  the  soul 
is  called  the  ruler  of  Prakriti,  and  the  witness  and  reg- 
ulator of  its  evolutions. 

But  does  not  the  Sankhya  philosopher  assume  the 
reality  of  the  bondage  of  the  soul  in  his  argument  with 
the  Vedanta  and  other  philosophers  of  the  phenomenal 
school  ? But  by  the  bondage  of  the  soul  he  means  in 
reality  the  bondage  of  the  mind  ; but  as  the  mind  is 
only  a material  evolute,  its  bondage  cannot  be  real,  at 
least  in  a spiritual  sense.  This  is  one  of  the  glaring  in- 
consistencies into  which  our  philosopher  is  betrayed  in 
spite  of  his  logical  acumen  and  philosophic  penetration. 

The  existence  of  a soul  distinct  or  different  from  the 
innumerable  souls  posited  by  Sankhya  philosophy, 
bearing  relation  to  them  as  that  which  the  creator 
bears  to  the  creature,  or  the  ruler  to  the  subject,  or  the 
benefactor  to  the  dependent,  or  even  the  superior  to 
the  inferior,  is  peremptorily  denied.  But  is  something 
like  realism  maintained  in  the  Aphorisms  ascribed  to 
Kapila,  such  as  may  justify  our  looking  upon  multi- 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


113 


tudinous  souls  as  modifications  of  one  primal  soul,  their 
generic  head  ? Such  an  idea  is  not  discoverable  in 
them,  though  it  might  have  been,  and  perhaps  was, 
originated  in  his  school  in  subsequent  times.  The  idea 
appears  in  Vijnana  Bhikshu’s  commentary  in  a connec- 
tion, however,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  ascertain 
whether  the  primal  soul  spoken  of  is  the  generic  soul, 
the  pattern  and  exemplar  of  all,  or  whether  it  is  noth- 
ing less  than  the  pervasive,  all-embracing  Spirit  of  God 
Himself. 

In  the  Sankhya  Aphorisms  are  posited  two,  and  only 
two,  entities,  souls  which  are  neither  evolutes  nor 
evolvent,  and  Prakriti,  the  evolvent  root-principle  of 
nature,  and  therefore  not  an  evolute.  Is  there  not  a 
third  entity  spoken  of  as  eternal  in  the  sense  of  having 
existed  throughout  past  eternity,  but  not  everlasting  in 
the  sense  of  being  inherently  fitted  to  exist  throughout 
future  eternity  ? Is  not  non-discrimination  represented 
as  having  existed  throughout  past  eternity,  though  ter- 
minable, or  rather  destined  to  pass  into  non-existence 
and  continue  therein  for  an  almost  incalculable  cycle  of 
ages  ? Is  non-discrimination  real  or  non-real  ? If 
real,  the  dualism  assumed  vanishes  into  thin  air,  or 
gives  place  to  triadism.  If  unreal,  how  can  it  hold  in 
bondage  realities  like  living  souls  ? Are  we  to  look 
upon  it  as  the  Vedantins  look  upon  their  Ignorance  or 
Nescience,  or  Maya,  as  both  real  and  unreal  ? But 
such  contraries  cannot  meet  in  an  entity  ; such  union 
in  one  substance  is  unthinkable.  The  very  argument 
which  the  Sankhya  philosopher  sets  in  battle  array 
against  the  Vedantic  notion  of  the  soul  being  held  in 
bondage  by  ignorance,  may  be  marshalled  in  all  its 
entirety  against  his  favorite  non-discrimination.  But 
this  he  does  not  pause  to  consider. 


114 


niNDIT  PHILOSOPHY. 


How  let  ns  see  what  the  Aphorisms  say  of  the  second 
entity,  Prakriti,  the  self-evolvent  principle,  to  which 
creation,  or  existence,  in  all  its  proteus-like  forms,  is  to 
he  traced,  as  well  as  the  temporary  bondage  and  ulti- 
mate emancipation  of  souls.  The  word  Prakriti,  we 
may  mention,  by  the  way,  has  been,  as  a rule,  trans- 
lated “nature,”  but  by  no  means  with  accuracy.  It 
may  be  rendered,  in  deference  to  the  scientific  phrase- 
ology of  the  day,  “the  primordial  form  but  the 
better  word  is  “ the  self-evolving  principle,  ” the  root  of 
nature,  called  anmulam  mulam , the  rootless  root. 

The  passages  to  be  extracted  in  illustration  of  the 
nature  of  Prakriti  are  these  : 

“ Prakriti  is  the  state  of  equipoise  of  goodness 
(sattwa),  passion  (rajas),  and  darkness  (i tamas )”  (Book 
I.  Aph.  61). 

“ Since  the  root  has  no  root,  the  root  (of  all)  is  root- 
less (that  is  to  say,  there  is  no  other  cause  of  Prakriti, 
because  there  would  be  a regressus  ad  infinitum , if  we 
were  to  suppose  another  cause,  which  by  parity  of  rea- 
soning would  require  another  cause,  and  so  on,  without 
end).  Even  if  there  be  a succession,  there  is  a halt  at 
some  one  point,  and  so  it  is  merely  a name  (that  we  give 
to  the  point  in  question)  when  we  speak  of  the  root  of 
things  under  the  name  of  Prakriti.  Alike  in  respect  of 
Prakriti  and  of  both  (Soul  and  Prakriti,  is  the  argument 
for  the  uncreated  existence)”  (Book  I.  Aph.  67-69). 

“ ITer  (Prakriti’s)  imperceptibility  arises  from  her 
subtlety.  (Prakriti)  exists  because  her  existence  is 
gathered  from  beholding  of  productions  (which  have 
these  qualities)”  (Book  I.  Aph.  109-110). 

“ Though  she  be  unintelligent,  yet  Prakriti  acts — as 
is  the  case  with  milk  (that  is  to  say,  as  milk,  without 
reference  to  man’s  efforts,  quite  of  itself  changes  into 


THE  SAHKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


115 


the  form  of  curd).  Or,  as  is  the  case  with  acts  (or  on- 
goings), for  we  see  them,  of  time,  etc.  (the  spontaneous 
action  of  Prakriti  is  proved  from  what  is  seen).  The 
action  of  time,  for  instance,  takes  place  cpiite  spontane- 
ously in  the  shape  of  one  season’s  now  departing  and 
another’s  coming  on — let  the  behavior  of  Prakriti  also 
be  thus — for  the  supposition  conforms  to  observed  facts. 
But  still  a senseless  Prakriti  would  never  energize,  or 
would  energize  in  a wrong  way,  less  because  of  there 
being  (in  her  case)  no  such  communing  as,  “ This  is  my 
means  of  producing  experience,”  etc.  To  this  he 
replies,  From  her  own  nature  she  acts,  not  from 
thought — -just  as  a servant  (that  is  to  say,  as  in  the  case 
of  an  excellent  servant,  naturally,  merely  from  habit, 
the  appointed  and  necessary  service  of  the  master  is 
engaged  in,  and  not  with  a view  to  his  own  enjoyment, 
just  so  does  Prakriti  energize  from  habit  alone).  Or, 
from  attraction  by  deserts  which  have  been  from  eter- 
nity” (Book  III.  Aph.  59-63). 

Here  we  bring  our  string  of  quotations  from  the  text 
— as  well  as  from  the  commentary — to  a close,  and 
emphasize  the  points  made.  Prakriti  is  eternal,  imper- 
ceptible, indiscrete,  unintelligent,  and  ever  active, 
except  when  in  a state  of  equipoise.  It  resembles  the 
soul  in  eternal  duration,  imperceptibility,  and  undis- 
cerptibility,  but  differs  from  it  in  activity  or  energy  of 
self- evolution,  not  in  its  want  of  intelligence,  as  the 
intelligence  of  the  soul,  being  destitute  of  the  elements 
of  self-consciousness  and  world-consciousness,  is  equiva- 
lent to  non-intelligence. 

Here  a couple  of  questions  ought  to  be  raised  and 
disposed  of. 

The  first  is,  If  Prakriti  is  imperceptible,  how  are  we 
to  be  sure  of  its  existence  ? To  be  able  to  answer  this 


116 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


question  it  is  necessary  to  look  into  the  laws  of  evidence 
which  are  recognized  in  the  Sankhya  school.  The  cham- 
pions of  this  school  admit  only  three  kinds  of  proof 
— viz.,  perception  (Prataksha),  inference  (Anuman), 
and  testimony  (Sabda)  ; and  they  discard  comparison 
(■ upamana ),  which  the  Logical  schools  add  to  the  list,  as 
well  as  the  two  others  admitted  in  the  Yedic  schools. 
The  objects  of  the  external  world  make  their  existence 
known  to  us  through  the  medium  of  perception,  or  the 
impressions  made  upon  the  senses  by  them.  But  they 
are,  each  of  them,  discerptible,  and  consequently  de- 
structible. Their  discerptibility,  or  divisibility,  proves 
that  they  are  not  eternal,  and  that,  therefore,  they 
cannot  lie  the  ground  of  their  own  existence.  The  law 
of  inference  leads  the  mind  to  look  for  the  cause  of 
their  existence  or  manifestation  apart  from  them  ; and 
the  ultimate  ground  at  which  we  arrive,  when  we  trace 
the  different  lines  of  causation  to  their  converging  point, 
is  Prakriti.  Its  existence,  therefore,  is  proved  by  infer- 
ence based  on  perception. 

Again,  it  is  plain  that  these  objects,  evolved  from 
Prakriti,  do  not  exist  for  themselves.  Or,  in  other 
words,  Prakriti  does  not  evolve  for  its  own  advantage. 
With  its  varieties  of  evolutes,  it  exists  for  something 
else,  as  “ axes  for  cutting,”  or  “ houses”  for  the  ben- 
efit of  those  who  dwell  in  them.  For  whom,  or  for 
what  does  Prakriti  evolve,  or  do  the  evolutes  of  Prakriti 
exist  ? For  souls,  certainly.  The  laws  of  inference, 
then,  not  merely  establish  the  existence  of  Prakriti, 
but  that  of  souls  also.  And  as  Prakriti,  like  the  soul, 
is  indiscerptible,  it  is  uncreate  and  eternal.  In  this 
piece  of  reasoning  the  doctrine  of  final  causes  is  recog- 
nized as  in  the  preceding  are  the  doctrines  of  efficient 
and  material  causes. 


THE  SAJiKHTA  PHILOSOPHY. 


117 


Xoy  comes  the  second  question,  IIo\v  can  Prakriti 
be  called  discerptible,  seeing  that  it  consists  of  the 
three  qualities  ( gunas ),  goodness,  passion,  and  darkness, 
held  in  equipoise  ? 

What  are  these  gunas  or  qualities  ? Are  they  ele- 
mentary substances  of  extreme  tenuity,  or  are  they ' 
mere  predicates  or  attributes  of  substances  ? If  they 
are  qualities  or  attributes,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the 
term,  of  substances,  their  inherence  in  Prakriti  does 
not  militate  against  its  indiscerptibility.  If,  however, 
they  are  elementary  substances,  their  union  in  Prakriti 
establishes  its  complex  nature  and  its  consequent  dis- 
cerptibility.  Their  nature  should,  therefore,  be  thor- 
oughly looked  into  before  the  claim  of  indiscerptibility 
advanced  in  favor  of  Prakriti  can  be  adjudicated  upon. 

The  word  gima,  generally  translated  “quality,” 
means  a cord,  and  the  three  gunas  of  the  Sankliya 
school  are  the  three  cords  by  which  the  soul,  or  rather 
Prakriti  itself,  is  fettered.  They  are  sattwa , rajas , 
and  tamas.  The  word  sattwa  means  purity  and  good- 
ness, and  the  sattioa  guna  is  that  which  enlightens, 
soothes,  purifies,  causes  virtue,  and  communicates 
pleasure  and  happiness.  It  prevails  in  ethereal  regions, 
and  causes  the  enlightenment,  happiness,  and  joy  char- 
acteristic of  those  seats  of  purity  and  goodness.  In  the 
world  it  predominates  in  fire,  and  that  is  the  reason 
why  flame  tapers  toward  the  sky,  and  sparks  fly  up- 
ward. When  it  abounds  in  man  he  becomes  virtuous  and 
happy  ; and  to  its  preponderance  must  be  ascribed  the 
acknowledged  happiness  of  superior  orders  of  beings, 
such  as  Prajapatis,  Indras,  Pitris,  Gfandharvas,  Gods, 
and  Demigods.  The  word  rajas  means  passion,  energy, 
and  activity  ; and  the  characteristics  of  the  rajas-guna 
are  variability,  activity,  vehemence,  and  restlessness. 


118 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


It  is  accompanied  by  vice  and  misery,  and  when  it  pre- 
vails in  man  he  becomes  a child  of  error  and  wretched- 
ness. It  abounds  in  the  atmosphere,  and  accounts  for 
its  fitful  and  erratic  movements.  Anti  lastly,  the  word 
tamas  means  stolidity  and  darkness  ; and  the  tamas- 
' guna  is  that  which  produces  sorrow,  dulness,  stupidity, 
and  inaction.  It  predominates  in  earth  and  water, 
and  accounts  for  their  downward  tendency  ; and  when 
it  abounds  in  man  it  makes  him  sorrowful,  stupid,  lazy, 
and  immobile. 

The  three  qualities  abound  respectively  in  upper, 
mundane,  and  nether  creations.  “ Aloft  (above  the 
world  of  mortals)  it  (the  creation)  abounds  in,  the 
quality  of)  purity.  Beneath  (that  is  to  say,  under  the 
world  of  mortals)  (the  creation)  abounds  in  darkness. 
In  this  midst,  (that  is,  in  the  world  of  mortals,  the 
creation)  abounds  in  passion”  (Book  III.  Aph.  48-50). 

But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  they  are,  as  a rule,  if 
not  invariably,  found  mixed  in  varied  proportions, 
never  almost  dissevered  or  separated  one  from  another. 
In  the  highest  ethereal  regions,  as  in  superior  orders  of 
beings  and  the  very  best  of  men,  purity  abounds  ; but 
it  is  not  altogether  dissociated  from  its  troublesome 
companions,  inasmuch  as  these  exist,  albeit  in  veiy 
small  proportions,  along  with  it.  And  in  the  lowest 
infernal  regions,  as  in  demons  and  evil  spirits,  as  well 
as  the  worst  of  men,  some  degree  of  purity,  however 
inconsiderable,  is  found  in  conjunction  with  the  pre- 
ponderant passion  and  darkness.  This  fact  explains  or 
shows  the  distinction  there  is  between  these  qualities, 
or  rather  material  attributes,  and  the  substances  in 
which  they  are  found  mixed  in  varied  proportions. 
They  are  almost  inseparable  in  reality,  though  separa- 
ble in  thought.  They  are  a material  trinity  in  unity, 


THE  SAHKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


119 


and  unity  in  trinity.  They  are  held  in  equipoise  only 
in  Prakriti  in  its  quiescent  state,  and  their  union  in  it 
in  equal  proportions  cannot  militate  against  the  theory 
of  its  eternity  and  indiscerptibility.  They  are,  more- 
over, ubiquitous,  existing  in  all  the  productions  or 
modifications  of  Prakriti,  in  all  the  regions  of  space,  in 
endlessly  varied  proportions.  And  they  are,  in  their 
joint  capacity  as  well  as  singly,  an  evil  ; they  being 
the  cause  of  that  bondage  of  the  mind  which  is  reflected 
in  the  soul,  and  from  the  reflection  of  which  it  has  to 
be  liberated. 

Prakriti,  in  its  Trinitarian  essence,  is  the  great 
omnific  principle,  and  it  energizes  spontaneously,  as 
milk  coagulates  into  curd  when  let  alone.  Though 
destitute  of  intelligence,  and  acting  from  a simple 
automatic  impulse,  it  never  errs,  as  “ an  excellent  ser- 
vant” anticipates  and  obeys  the  commands  of  his 
master  “from  habit.”  The  order  of  creation  is  pre- 
sented in  Aph.  Cl  of  Book  I.  : “ From  Prakriti  (pro- 
ceeds) intelligence  (Buddlii),  from  intelligence  egoizer, 
or  I-maker  (Ahankara),  from  egoizer  the  five  subtle 
elements  (Tanmatras),  and  both  sets  (internal  and  ex- 
ternal) of  organs  (Indriya),  and  from  the  subtle  elements 
the  gross  elements  (Sthul  bliuta).”  Intelligence,  the 
first  product,  or  evolute,  of  self-evolving  Prakriti,  is 
called  great  (Mahat),  because  it  is  a principle  of  “ super- 
lative purity,”  and  occupies  in  creation  the  same  place 
which  the  Prime  Minister  occupies  in  a well- organized 
government.  It  gives  birth  to  egoizer,  which  is  the 
cause  of  the  distinction  we  make  between  self  and  not- 
self,  a distinction  fictitious  rather  than  real,  and  one 
which  proves  to  us  a source  of  vexation  and  trouble. 
Then  come  the  five  tenuous  elements,  imperceptible  to 
man,  but  perceptible  to  superior  beings,  or  even  to  man 


120 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


when  liis  natural  powers  are  indefinitely  enlarged  by 
meditation — viz.,  sound,  touch,  color,  taste  or  sapidity, 
and  smell.  These  seven  principles  are  evolutes  of  Pra- 
kriti,  and  evolvent  ; and  to  their  omnific  activity,  or 
prolific  energy,  creation  in  its  multifarious  aspects  is  to 
be  traced.  Then  there  are  sixteen  other  principles, 
which  are  evolutes  or  productions,  not  evolvents  or  pro- 
ducers— viz.,  the  five  gross  elements,  earth,  fire,  water, 
air,  ether  ; the  five  organs  of  knowledge  (Gfyan-in- 
driyani),  the  eye,  the  ear,  the  nose,  the  tongue,  the 
skin  ; the  five  organs  of  action  (Karma  indriyani),  the 
hands,  the  feet,  the  larynx  or  the  organ  of  speech,  the 
orifice,  and  the  generative  organ ; and  the  mind  ( Manas), 
called  the  eleventh  organ,  the  real  cause  of  the  bondage 
under  which  it  itself  groans,  and  from  the  reflection  of 
which  the  soul  has  to  be  freed. 

The  existence  of  these  twenty-four  tattwas,  or  cate- 
gories, is  proved  by  perception  and  inference,  which 
last  is  a process  of  demonstration  rising  from  what  is 
perceptible  to  what  is  imperceptible.  For  instance,  the 
gross  elements,  earth,  fire,  water,  air,  are  perceptible 
to  mortals  ; and  their  existence  is  proved  by  the  simple 
testimony  of  the  senses.  But  thej^  do  not  explain  their 
own  existence,  and  therefore  we  are  led  by  the  laws  of 
reasoning  to  the  tenuous  principles,  the  subtle  rudi- 
ments from  which  they  proceed,  and  by  which  their 
existence  is  accounted  for.  But  these  subtle  elements, 
imperceptible  to  men  in  general,  though  perceptible  to 
superior  beings,  or  even  men  endowed  with  powers  of 
perception  keener  and  more  expanded  than  human 
beings  ordinarily  possess,  are  only  modifications  of  the 
I-maker,  which  again  is  a modification  of  intelligence, 
the  first-born  of  Prakriti  increate.  Again,  the  mind, 
the  eleventh  organ,  is  another  modification  of  the 


THE  SAXKIIYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


121 


I-maker,  and  its  existence  is  proved  by  that  of  the  per- 
ceptible organs  of  knowledge  and  action. 

The  existence  of  the  twenty-fifth  category,  the  soul, 
which  is  neither  an  evolute  nor  an  evolvent,  is  proved 
by  the  creative  energy  of  Prakriti,  which  energizes, 
not  for  its  own  advantage,  but  for  that  of  an  entity 
apart  from  itself.  This  is  emphatically  stated  in  such 
verses  as  these  : “ From  Brahma  down  to  a post  for  its 
(soul’s)  sake  is  creation  till  there  be  discrimination 
(between  soul  and  Prakriti),  on  which  its  liberation 
ensues.”  “ Prakriti’ s creation  is  for  the  sake  of  an- 

other, though  it  be  spontaneous,  for  she  is  not  the 
experiencer,  just  like  a cart’s  carrying  saffron  for  the 
sake  of  its  master.  ’ ’ 

But  why  not  carry  the  arguments  from  inference  a 
step  farther,  and  recognize  a Lord  (Iswara)  behind  the 
varied  manifestations  of  Prakriti,  as  the  ultimate 
ground  of  existence  ? There  are  insuperable  obstacles 
in  the  way.  A Lord  cannot  possibly  be  the  creator  of 
the  universe.  If  he  exists,  lie  must  either  be  free  or 
bound.  If  free,  he  cannot  have  a desire  to  create  prev- 
alent enough  to  determine  his  will,  or  lead  to  volition 
and  action.  It  is  an  established  maxim  of  Hindu  Phi- 
losophy that  a desire  leading  irresistibly  to  action,  good 
or  bad,  is  bondage.  Such  a desire  on  the  part  of  God 
cannot  but  militate  against  His  assumed  freedom.  If, 
however,  He  is  bound,  how  could  He  possibly  create  ? 
The  supposition,  therefore,  of  a Lord  behind  the  veil  of 
shifting  phenomena  is  both  irrational  and  useless. 

How  thoroughly  the  atheistic  speculations  of  our 
vaunted  age  of  progress  were  anticipated  in  times 
which  may  be  called  prehistoric,  in  India  and  other 
countries  ! The  scientists  and  philosophers  of  the  day 
now  and  then  betray  a little  weakness,  to  which  their 


122 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


prototypes  of  ancient  times  were  utter  strangers. 
Given  matter  and  the  laws  immanent  in  it,  they  have 
no  difficulty  whatever  in  explaining  the  wonders  of 
creation,  or  solving  the  knotty  problems  of  existence. 
But  they  manifest  a little  hesitation  when  they  have  to 
settle  the  question,  “ How  came  matter  to  be,  and  how 
and  by  whom  were  its  laws  impressed  upon  it  ?” 
Their  hesitation,  however,  is  momentary,  as  they  shake 
it  off  b}r  assuming  the  eternity  of  matter,  and  the  eter- 
nal inherence  of  its  laws,  as  well  as  by  upholding  the 
principle,  ex  nihilo  niliil  fit.  But  our  redoubtable  phi- 
losophers of  ancient  times  presented  a braver  front,  and 
did  not  hesitate  for  a moment  in  affirming  with  oracu- 
lar assurance  the  eternity  of  matter  ; and  their  dictum, 
as  has  already  been  said,  runs  thus  : “A  thing  is  not 
made  out  of  nothing.”  And  even  when  they  admitted 
the  existence  of  a God,  their  principle  that  an  impure 
thing,  such  as  matter  in  their  opinion  is,  cannot  possi- 
bly emanate  from,  or  be  created  by,  a pure  Being, 
made  it  impossible  for  them  to  represent  such  a Being 
as  its  Creator.  God  or  no  God,  matter,  according  to 
their  teaching,  is  eternal,  along  with  the  laws  inherent 
in  it. 

But  the  way  in  which  our  philosophers  dispose  of  the 
argument  based  on  testimony,  which  is  one  of  the  three 
kinds  of  proof  admitted  in  his  school,  is  worthy  of  con- 
sideration. By  testimony  they  understand,  not  only 
what  is  ordinarily  included  in  that  term,  but  a great 
deal  more,  even  the  teachings  of  revelation,  and  those 
of  devotees  and  adepts,  who  by  virtue  of  intense  medi- 
tation have  obtained,  and  may  obtain,  the  power  of 
recalling  to  their  minds  the  varied  events  which  oc- 
curred  to  them  in  several,  if  not  all,  of  their  past  lives, 
and  that  of  discovering  and  bringing  to  light  occult 


THE  SAXKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


123 


truths,  or  truths  hidden  among  the  arcana  of  nature. 
But  revelation  distinctly  affirms  the  existence  of  a 
Lord.  How  is  this  to  be  accounted  for  ? Is  revelation 
to  be  discarded  as  a tissue  of  Old  Wives’  Fables  ? Our 
time-serving  philosophers  did  not  allow  themselves  to 
be  ostensibly  carried  thus  far  by  their  scepticism. 
They  got  rid  of  the  difficulty  by  resorting  to  orbits  of 
shuffling  criticism,  not  unknown  to  modern  sceptics. 
(“The  Scriptural  texts  which  make  mention  of  ‘the 
Lord  ’ are)  either  glorifications  of  the  liberated  souls  or 
homages  to  the  recognized  (deities  of  the  Hindu  Pan- 
theon).” And,  besides,  “There  is  Scripture  for  this 
(world’s)  being  the  production  of  Prakriti  (not  of  a 
Lord).” 

It  may  be  mentioned  here  that,  even  when  Hindu 
Philosophy  allows  the  existence  of  a god,  it  makes  him 
so  quiescent  and  inactive  that  creation  cannot  possibly 
be  attributed  to  him.  We  cannot  ascribe  creation  to 
him  without  making  him  subject  to  passion,  the  second 
of  the  three  qualities  from  which  he  must  be  free,  and 
therefore  representing  him  as  actually  held  in  bond- 
age. Hor  can  he  be  the  governor  of  the  universe  with- 
out being  “selfish”  and  “liable  to  grief.”  In  Book 
Y.  we  have  these  Aphorisms  : 

Aph.  3.  “ (If  a Lord  were  governor,  then)  having- 
intended  his  own  benefit,  his  government  (would  be 
selfish)  as  is  the  case  (with  ordinary  governors)  in  the 
world.  ’ ’ 

“ (He  must  then  be)  just  like  a worldly  lord  (and) 
otherwise  (than  you  desire  that  we  should  conceive  of 
him)  ; for  if  we  agree  that  the  Lord  is  also  benefited,  he 
also  must  be  something  mundane — just  like  a worldly 
lord — because,  since  his  desires  are  (on  that  supposition) 
not  (previously)  satisfied,  he  must  be  liable  to  grief.” 


124 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


And  besides  the  supposition  of  a lord  is  useless.  He 
cannot  create,  cannot  govern,  cannot  judge,  cannot  re- 
ward or  punish — the  last  prerogative,  viz.,  that  of  be- 
stowing rewards  and  inflicting  punishments  being  a pre- 
rogative of  works,  not  of  God.  In  Aph.  2 of  this  Book, 
we  have  these  words  : “ Hot  from  its  (the  world’s) 
being  governed  by  the  Lord,  is  there  the  effectuation 
of  the  fruit,  for  it  is  by  works  (that  is,  by  merit  and 
demerit)  that  this  is  accomplished — by  works  alone 
which  are  indispensable — and  if  we  do  make  the  addi- 
tional and  cumbrous  supposition  of  a Lord,  he  cannot 
reward  a man  otherwise  than  according  to  his  works.” 

If  there  is  no  Lord,  the  question  arises,  Why  believe 
in  a revelation  at  all  ? The  proper  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion brings  forward  a theory  which  in  absurdity  has 
not  its  parallel  even  in  the  history  of  wild  speculation. 
The  Sankhya  philosopher  does  not  hold,  like  the  Mim- 
ansakas  and  the  Vedantins,  the  eternity  of  the  Vedas. 
The  forty- fifth  Aphorism  of  the  Fifth  Book  of  the 
work  under  review  runs  thus  : “ The  Veda  is  not  from 
eternity,  for  there  is  Scripture  for  its  being  a produc- 
tion.” If  not  eternal,  it  must  have  been  written  either 
by  God  or  by  some  gifted  man.  It  could  not  possibly 
have  been  written,  or  vouchsafed  through  verbal  com- 
munication, or  in  any  other  way,  by  God,  for  the 
Sankhya  Philosophy  does  not  recognize  His  existence. 
Hor  could  it  have  been  written  by  a gifted  man  : such 
a man  must  be  either  liberated  or  in  bondage.  If  lib- 
erated, he  could  not  have  a prevailing  desire  leading  to 
its  composition  ; and  if  in  bondage,  he  could  not  but 
have  lacked  “the  power”  needed  to  bring  about  so 
glorious  a result. 

The  Vedas,  therefore,  could  not  have  proceeded 
either  from  God  or  from  man,  nor  are  they  eternal. 


THE  SAHKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


125 


How  then  is  the  mystery  involved  in  their  existence  to 
be  unravelled  ? Here  is  the  explanation  : “ The 

Yedas,  just  like  an  expiration,  proceed  of  themselves 
from  the  self-existent,  through  the  force  of  fate,  unper- 
ceived by  thought.”  To  explain  this  statement  of  the 
commentator,  Arijnana  Bhikshu,  two  questions  have  to 
be  raised.  Who  is  the  self-existent  from  whom  the 
Yedas  are  said  to  have  emanated  as  an  expiration  ? 
The  self-existent  must  either  be  Prakriti  itself,  or  some 
evolute  of  Prakriti,  there  being  nothing  knowable  or 
within  the  reach  of  proof  behind  it,  and  the  sold  being 
incapable  of  sending  these  venerated  books  out  even  as 
an  efflation.  The  Sankhya  philosophers  speak  of  an 
emergent  deity,  whom  they  call  Brahma  when  he  cre- 
ates, Yishnu  when  he  preserves,  and  Siva  or  Mahadeva 
when  he  destroys.  This  emergent  deity  is  the  first 
evolute  of  Prakriti,  intelligence,  called  Makat,  the 
Great  One  ; not,  however,  personal  intelligence,  but 
something  like  general  intelligence,  the  intelligence  of 
which  personal  intelligence,  mine  or  thine,  is  only  a 
form.  This  great  one,  the  first-born  of  Prakriti  in- 
create,  is  the  unconscious  author  of  the  Yedas,  because 
they  emanate  from  him  as  an  expiration. 

When  do  they  emanate  ? Here  we  have  to  unfold 
the  doctrine  of  metempsychosis,  which  underlies  all 
the  philosophical  speculations  of  ancient  India  ; which 
even  those  bold  spirits  who,  like  Kapila  and  Buddha, 
cast  aside  all  faith  in  God,  personal,  if  not  impersonal, 
did  not  dare  abandon.  Prakriti  creates  one  world  after 
another  in  endless  succession,  to  meet  the  exigencies  of 
human  desert,  or  to  afford  scope  for  the  consumption  of 
the  fruits  of  work.  One  world  is  evolved  after  another 
to  reward  or  punish  the  accumulated  work  of  those 
which  precede,  and  to  furnish  cause,  by  its  own  accu- 


126 


HINDU  THILOSOPIIT. 


mulated  work  added  to  the  tremendous  load  it  inherits, 
for  the  existence  of  those  which  succeed.  Every  reno- 
vated world,  with  its  shifting  panorama  of  moral 
actions  and  moral  deserts,  is  thus  connected  with  an 
endless  chain  of  antecedent,  and  an  equally  endless 
chain  of  consequent  stages  of  existence.  Each  of  these 
gradually  unfolded  stages  of  existence  or  works  van- 
ishes, when  its  appointed  service  is  over,  only  to  see 
another  springing  up,  and  continuing  its  great  work  of 
rewarding  virtue  and  punishing  vice.  At  each  of  these 
renovations  of  the  world,  the  Yedas  issue  out  of  the 
emergent  deity,  called  intelligence  in  the  original 
Sutras,  and  the  self-existent,  or  Brahma,  in  subsequent 
times,  as  an  efflation. 

In  conclusion,  let  us  ascertain  what  the  work  under 
review  says  of  liberation,  the  great  object  and  scope  of 
all  the  speculations  embodied  in  its  pages.  Prakriti 
creates  or  energizes,  to  liberate  the  soul  from  the  bond- 
age of  non-discrimination,  or  misapprehension,  or  mis- 
conception. How  is  this  effected  ? Hot  by  worship, 
for  worship  takes  for  granted  what  is  not  admitted,  the 
existence  of  a creative  and  controlling  being  behind  the 
veil  of  natural  phenomena  ; not  by  sacrifices,  because 
these,  as  they  inflict  pain  upon  the  victims,  cannot  but 
occasion  pain  to  those  by  whom  they  are  offered,  by 
the  law  of  retribution  ; not  by  rites  and  ceremonies  of 
a bloodless  character,  because  whatever  efficacy  they 
may  have  is  of  a transient,  not  a permanent,  nature. 
These  all  are  certainly  praised  in  various  parts  of 
Scripture.  The  sacrifice  of  the  horse  is  said  to  give 
the  offerer  power  to  conquer  all  worlds,  expiate  sin, 
overcome  death,  and  attain  immortality.  The  juice  of 
the  soma,  the  moon  plant  ( Asclepias  acida),  is  said  to 
have  conferred  victory,  triumph,  “effulgence,”  and 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 


127 


“deathless  being”  on  Indra  himself,  and  the  subordi- 
nate gods  and  goddesses  of  the  Indian  Parnassus.  But 
it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  benefits  conferred 
by  bloody  and  bloodless  rites  are  evanescent,  and  that 
even  the  gods  perish  at  every  dissolution  of  the  world, 
or  at  the  consummation  of  every  single  stage  of  exist- 
ence. “Many  thousands  of  Indras  and  other  gods 
have  passed  away  in  successive  periods,  overcome  by 
time  ; for  time  is  hard  to  overcome.”  Freedom  from 
the  galling  yoke  of  transmigration,  from  an  almost  in- 
terminable chain  of  births  and  deaths,  religious  observ- 
ances cannot  possibly  secure. 

Such  freedom  is  the  result  of  right  knowledge  or  dis- 
crimination,  which  is  obtained  by  meditation.  “ From 
knowledge  (acquired  during  mundane  existence)  comes 
salvation  (soul’s  chief  end)”  (Book  III.  Aph.  23). 
Knowledge  alone,  dissociated  from,  not  in  conjunction 
with,  works,  is  the  fountain  of  liberation,  as  the  verse 
following  the  one  quoted  assures  us,  “ Since  this  (viz., 
knowledge)  is  the  precise  cause  of  liberation,  there  is 
neither  association  (of  anything  else  with  it,  e.g.  good 
works)  nor  alternativeness  (e.g.  of  good  works  in  its 
stead).”  This  knowledge  is  attained  by  meditation,  on 
the  nature  and  efficacy  of  which  the  following  verses 
give  information  : 

“ Meditation  is  the  cause  of  the  removal  of  desire 
(that  affection  of  the  mind  by  objects  which  is  a hin- 
derer  of  knowledge).  It  (meditation,  from  the  effect- 
uation of  which,  and  not  from  merely  communing  upon 
it)  knowledge  arises,  is  perfected  by  the  repelling  of  the 
modifications  (of  the  mind  which  ought  to  be  obstructed 
from  all  thoughts  of  anything).  This  meditation  is 
perfected  by  restraint,  postures,  and  one’s  duties.  Re- 
straint (of  the  breath)  is  by  means  of  expulsion  and 


128 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


retention.  Steady  and  (promoting)  ease  is  a (suitable) 
posture,  (such  as  the  crossing  of  the  arms).  One’s 
duty  is  the  performance  of  the  actions  prescribed  for 
one’s  religious  order”  (Book  III.  Aph.  30-35). 

The  subject  of  meditation  and  its  varied  appliances 
belongs,  properly  speaking,  to  Yoga  philosophy,  the 
counterpart,  not  only  of  the  Sankhya  system,  but  in 
some  respects  of  every  system  of  philosophy  pro- 
pounded in  India,  not  excluding  almost  all  of  those 
systems  which,  like  Buddhism  and  its  offshoots,  are 
branded  heterodox.  Meditation,  not  in  its  incipient 
stages,  but  when  perfected  by  years  of  close  attention, 
and  rigid  conformity  to  its  almost  endless  varieties  of 
stringent  rules,  begets  right  knowledge,  which  dispels 
non-discrimination,  and  brings  on  emancipation.  The 
essence  of  the  knowledge  begotten  by  meditation  is  the 
distinction  between  the  soul  and  non-soul,  the  passive, 
quiescent,  immobile  spirit  and  the  ever-active,  plastic, 
formative  Prakriti.  When  this  distinction  is  clearly 
apprehended  by  the  mind,  the  soul  is  set  free  from  the 
bondage  of  its  desires  and  aversions,  its  good  and  bad 
deeds,  and  their  woeful  consequences  in  an  almost  end- 
less chain  of  transmigrations. 

The  soul  is,  of  course,  in  a very  loose  sense  said  to  be 
set  free,  its  bondage  and  liberation  being  nominal,  not 
real  — reflections  and  shadows,  not  realities.  The 
bondage  and  liberation  spoken  of  throughout  this  book 
are  in  reality  the  bondage  and  liberation  of  Prakriti, 
which,  first  of  all,  weaves  a net  for  its  own  entangle- 
ment by  a process  of  evolution,  and  ultimately  effects 
its  own  emancipation  by  a process  of  meditation.  And 
to  this  mischievous  activity  it  is  impelled  by  passion 
(rajas),  the  second  of  the  three  qualities  which  form  its 
Trinitarian  essence. 


CHAPTER  Y. 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY,  OK  THE  HINDU  THEOKY  OF 
EVOLUTION  CONTINUED. 

An  exposition  of  the  principles  of  the  Sankhya  sys- 
tem must  be  incomplete  without  some  reference  to  a 
treatise  decidedly  earlier  than  the  one  already  exam- 
ined—we  mean  the  Sankhya-Karica,  or  exposition  of 
the  Sankhya,  by  Iswara  Krishna.  That  this  document 
is  more  ancient  than  the  Sankhya  Pravachana,  or  the 
Sankhya  Sutras,  falsely  ascribed  to  Kapila,  is  proved 
both  by  internal  and  external  evidence.  The  specula- 
tions embodied  in  the  Sankhya  Pravachana  about  the 
emergent  Deity,  who  appears  as  Creator  under  the 
name  of  Brahma,  as  Preserver  under  that  of  Yishnu, 
and  as  Destroyer  under  that  of  Mahadeva,  are  suffi- 
cient to  trace  its  composition  to  the  age  when  an 
attempt  was  made  to  reconcile  philosophy  with  current 
superstitions  ; and  they  would  be  enough,  even  if 
other  proofs  were  wanting,  to  establish  its  posteriority. 
The  book,  however,  abounds  with  references  to  the 
varied  systems  of  philosophy  which  are  known  to  have 
flourished  in  times  posterior  to  the  age  of  Kapila,  who 
in  one  important  sense  may  be  called  the  father  of 
Hindu  Philosophy.  Such  references,  both  direct  and 
oblique,  are  scarcely  met  with  in  the  Sankhya-Karica, 
which,  moreover,  does  not  indicate  any  advance  on  the 
part  of  Philosophy  toward  a reconciliation  between  the 
transcendental  speculations  of  the  schools  and  the  grov- 
elling beliefs  of  the  masses. 


130 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


Tho  Sankhya-Karica  consists  of  seventy-two  slokas, 
or  distichs,  each,  as  a rule,  bearing  upon  a distinct 
topic.  As  specimens  of  conciseness  of  style,  condensa- 
tion of  thought,  and  closeness  of  reasoning,  these  dis- 
tichs are  worthy  of  all  praise  ; though  they  are  free, 
comparatively  speaking,  from  the  tinge  of  controver- 
sialism  by  which  the  later  work  is  distinguished.  The 
hook  has  been  very  recently  translated  by  Mr.  John 
Davies,  whose  elucidatory  notes  and  extracts  from 
standard  commentaries  are  helps  without  which  it  is 
impossible  for  the  ordinary  reader  to  master  its  con- 
tents. Of  his  translation  we  shall  avail  ourselves  in  our 
attempt  to  present  a synopsis  of  its  contents. 

Regarding  the  author  of  the  Sankhya-Karica, very 
little  is  known  beyond  what  is  indicated  in  the  last 
three  of  its  distichs.  These  we  deem  it  desirable  to 
transcribe  : 

“ This  supreme  purifying  doctrine,  the  Sage  (Kapila) 
compassionately  imparted  to  Asuri  ; Asuri  taught  it  to 
Panchasikha,  by  whom  it  was  extensively  made  known. 

“ Handed  down  by  disciples  in  succession,  it  has  been 
compendiously  'written  in  Arya  metre  by  the  noble- 
minded  Iswara  Krishna,  having  fully  learned  the  dem- 
onstrated truth. 

“ The  subjects  treated  in  seventy  distichs  are  those 
of  the  complete  science,  containing  sixty  topics,  ex- 
cludin'? illustrative  tales,  and  omitting  also  eontrover- 
sial  questions. 

“ Thus  is  completed  the  book  of  the  Sankhya  (Phi- 
losophy) uttered  by  the  venerable,  the  great-minded, 
and  divine  Kapila. 

‘ May  prosperity  attend  it ! ’ ” 

In  accordance  with  tho  plan  referred  to,  if  not  dis- 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


131 


tinctly  laid  down  in  the  last  paper,  we  shall  present  a 
synopsis  of  the  contents  of  this  book,  allude  cursorily 
to  an  expository  argument  in  the  dissertation  on  this 
Philosophy  in  the  Sarva  Darsana  Sangraha,  and  con- 
clude with  a few  general  observations  on  the  doctrines 
and  principles  of  the  system  under  review. 

And  first,  in  accordance  with  our  arrangement,  we 
shall  inquire  into  what  the  book  says  about  the  soul 
and  Prakriti,  the  two  entities  admitted  as  existent  in 
the  Sankhya  school.  But  before  we  do  so  a prelimi- 
nary observation  is  desirable. 

The  speculations  embodied  in  Sankhya-Ivarica  begin 
exactly  where  those  of  Sankhya  Pravachana  begin, 
that  is,  with  the  admission  of  the  three  lands  of  pain 
begetting  a longing  for  liberation,  such  as  cannot  possi- 
bly be  satisfied  by  ££  the  visible  means,”  such  as  earthly 
pleasures,  medicine,  etc. , or  by  £ £ the  revealed  means,  ’ ’ 
such  as  prayers,  sacrifices,  and  other  religious  observ- 
ances. The  first  two  distichs  set  forth  in  a condensed 
form  the  object  and  scope  of  Sankhya  Philosophy,  as 
well  as  the  universally  admitted  fact  on  which  it  is 
based  : 

££  From  the  injurious  effects  of  the  threefold  kinds  of 
pain  (arises)  a desire  to  know  the  means  of  removing  it 
(pain).  If  from  the  visible  (means  of  removing  it)  this 
desire  should  seem  to  be  superfluous,  it  is  not  so,  for 
these  are  neither  absolutely  complete  nor  abiding. 

££  The  revealed  (means)  are  like  the  visible  (i.e.  ineffi- 
cient), for  they  are  connected  with  impurity,  destruc- 
tion,. and  excess.  A contrary  method  is  better,  and 
this  consists  in  a discriminative  knowledge  of  the  mani- 
fested (forms  of  matter),  the  unmanifested  (Prakriti  or 
primeval  matter),  and  the  knowing  (sold).” 

Mr.  Davies  shows  how  religious  observances  are, 


i3a 


HIXDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


according  to  Kapila,  accompanied  with  “ impurity, 
destruction,  excess,  or  inequality.”  The  Yedic  system 
which  is  an  embodiment  of  what  the  text  calls  “ re- 
vealed means,”  is  imperfect  and  inefficient,  because  it 
is  inseparably  linked  to  bloody  sacrifices,  which  cannot 
but  result  in  impurity  ; because  the  reward  it  promises 
is  temporary  happiness,  not  the  liberation  implied  in 
the  soul’s  emancipation  from  all  material  influences  ; 
and,  lastly,  because  it  gives  some  persons,  for  instance, 
the  rich,  who  can  offer  bloody  sacrifices  more  easily 
than  the  poor,  an  undue  advantage  over  others. 

How  let  us  group  some  of  the  passages  in  which  the 
antithesis  between  the  soul  and  Prakriti  is  set  forth  : 

3.  “ Prakriti,  the  root  (of  material  forms)  is  not  pro- 
duced. The  great  one  (Mahat,  Buddhi  or  Intellect) 
and  the  rest  (which  spring  from  it)  are  seven  (sub- 
stances) producing  and  produced.  Sixteen  are  produc- 
tions (only).  Soul  is  neither  producing  nor  produced.” 

11.  “The  manifested  ( VyaJda)  has  the  three  modes 
(yuna).  It  is  indiscriminating,  objective,  generic,  irra- 
tional, and  productive.  So  also  is  Pradhan  (Prakriti). 
Soul  in  these  respects  ; as  in  those  (previously  men- 
tioned), is  the  reverse.” 

15.  “ From  the  finite  nature  of  specific  objects  ; 
from  the  homogeneous  nature  (of  genera  and  species)  ; 
from  the  active  energy  of  evolution  (the  constant  pro- 
gressive development  of  finite  forms)  ; from  the  sepa- 
rateness of  cause  and  effect ; and  from  the  undivided- 
ness (or  the  real  unity)  of  the  whole  universe.” 

1G.  “ (It  is  proved  that)  there  is  a primary  cause, 
the  unmanifested  (Avyakta)  which  acts  (or  develops 
itself)  by  three  modes  ; by  blending  and  modification, 
like  water,  from  the  difference  of  the  receptacle  or  seat 
of  the  modes  as  they  are  variously  distributed.” 


THE  SANKIIYA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


133 


17.  “ Because  an  assemblage  (of  things)  is  for  the 
sake  of  another  ; because  the  opposite  of  the  three 
modes  and  the  rest  (their  modifications)  must  exist  ; 
because  there  must  be  a superintending  power  ; because 
there  must  be  a nature  that  enjoys,  and  because  of  (the 
existence  of)  active  exertion  for  the  sake  of  abstraction 
or  isolation  (from  material  contact)  ; therefore  soul 
exists.” 

18.  “ From  the  separate  allotment  of  birth,  death, 
and  the  organs  ; from  the  diversity  of  occupations  at 
the  same  time  ; and  also  from  the  different  conditions 
(or  modifications)  of  the  three  modes  ; it  is  proved  that 
there  is  a plurality  of  souls.” 

19.  “ And  from  that  contrariety  (of  soul)  it  is  con- 
cluded that  the  witnessing  soul  is  isolated,  neutral,  per- 
ceptive, and  inactive  by  nature. 5 ’ 

20.  “It  is  thus,  from  this  union,  that  the  unintelli- 
gent body  (the  linga)  appears  to  be  intelligent,  and 
from  the  activity  of  the  modes,  the  stranger  (the  soul) 
appears  to  be  an  agent.” 

These  distichs  set  forth  the  contrast  between  Prakriti 
and  soul  as  well  as  the  varied  kinds  of  proof  by  which 
their  existence  is  demonstrated.  Prakriti  is  the  root  of 
the  perceptible  and  inferrable  universe,  that  is,  the  uni- 
verse of  which  the  grosser  objects  are  perceived,  and 
the  subtler  inferred  from  those  perceived.  Prakriti  is 
the  unmanifested  (Avyakta)  developing  itself,  in  con- 
sequence of  an  immanent  law  of  cyclic  evolution,  into 
the  manifested  (Vyakta)  ; and  it  unfolds  itself  in  forms 
which  may  be  classed  in  genera  and  in  species.  Prak- 
riti is  objective,  irrational,  unfitted  to  discriminate 
one  thing  from  another,  and  productive  or  evolvent. 
The  soul  is  the  very  antipodes  in  all  these  respects  of 
Prakriti.  It  is  in  its  essence  isolated  from  the  universe 


134 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


of  material  objects,  the  entity  which  always  continues 
unmanifested,  is  subjective,  rational,  fitted  to  discern 
the  differences  subsisting  between  things  which  differ, 
non-productive,  and  inactive.  Its  rationality  and  dis- 
criminativeness are,  however,  problematical,  as  we 
shall  show  by  and  by.  Suffice  it  to  say  here  that  the 
two  entities  are  so  decidedly  opposed  to  one  another 
that,  in  order  to  produce  either  of  them,  we  have  only 
to  divest  the  other  of  its  peculiar  attributes  and  clothe 
it  with  those  which  are  their  contrasts  or  opposites. 

In  one  important  respect  the  antithesis  between  Prak- 
riti  and  soul  is  marked.  Prakriti  has  the  three  (/anas, 
or  qualities,  or  modes,  while  the  soul  is  entirely  free 
from  their  presence  or  influence.  Let  us  see  what  the 
Karica  says  about  these  constitutive  elements  of  Prak- 
riti : 

12.  “ The  modes  have  a joyous,  grievous,  and  stupe- 
fying nature.  They  serve  for  manifestation,  activity, 
and  restraint  : they  naturally  subdue  and  support  each 
other,  produce  each  other,  consort  together,  and  take 
each  other  s condition. 

13.  “ ‘ Goodness  ’ (Sattwa)  is  considered  as  light  (or 
subtle)  and  enlightening  (or  manifesting)  ; ‘ passion  ’ 
or  ‘ foulness  ’ (Rajas)  as  exerting  and  mobile  ; ‘ dark- 
ness ’ (Tamas)  as  heavy  or  enveloping  (or  obstructive). 
This  action  for  the  gaining  of  an  end  is  like  that  of  a 
lamp.  ’ ’ 

14.  “ In  the  higher  world  the  quality  (or  mode) 
called  ‘ goodness  ’ prevails  ; below,  the  creation 
abounds  in  ‘ darkness  ; ’ in  the  midst  foulness  or  pas- 
sion abounds.  Brahma  and  the  rest  (of  the  gods)  and 
a stock  form  the  limits.” 

The  f/unas , it  is  to  be  observed,  cannot,  properly 
speaking,  be  called  moral  dispositions,  such  as  good- 


THE  SANKUYA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


135 


ness,  activity,  and  indolence  are.  They  may  be  repre- 
sented as  producers  of  our  moral  dispositions,  the  mate- 
rial essence  of  which  both  our  intellectual  and  moral 
affections  are  modifications  or  evolutes.  Matter,  ac- 
cording to  this  system,  may  be  defined  as  a double- 
faced  entity  ; and  it  is  presented  in  the  universe  in  a 
variety  of  forms  more  or  less  gross,  more  or  less  subtle 
and  tenuous.  To  its  grosser  forms  we  give  the  name 
of  material  objects  ; while  its  subtler  invisible  forms 
we  characterize  as  intellectual  affections  and  moral  dis- 
positions. But  the  sharp  line  of  demarcation  that  we 
draw  between  matter  and  mind  has  no  foundation  in 
truth,  though  held  up  as  obviously  just  by  the  factitious 
rules  of  our  dictionaries  and  grammars  ! 

Another  point  of  difference,  or  rather  contrariety, 
between  Prakriti  and  Purush,  or  soul,  liiuges  on  the 
unity  of  the  one  and  multeity  of  the  other.  Prakriti 
is  one  indivisible  substance,  appearing  in  endless  varie- 
ties of  forms  under  the  influence  of  the  quality  called 
“ passion,”  which  leads  it  irresistibly  to  pass  through  a 
fixed  process  of  evolution.  Souls  are,  however,  innu- 
merable. Iiow  is  this  to  be  proved  ? Before  it  is 
possible  to  answer  this  question  satisfactorily  it  is  neces- 
sary to  inquire,  How  is  the  existence  of  Prakriti  itself, 
or  that  of  Purush,  or  soul,  to  be  proved  ? 

Here  we  must  notice  that  only  three  sources  of 
knowledge,  or  kinds  of  proof,  are  admitted  in  this 
treatise,  as  in  the  Sanlchya  Pravachana.  In  distich  I 
we  have  these  stated  : “ Perception,  inference,  and  fit 
testimony  are  the  threefold  (lands  of)  accepted  proof, 
because  in  them  every  mode  of  proof  is  fully  contained. 
The  complete  determination,  or  perfect  knowledge, 
of  what  is  to  be  determined  is  by  proof.”  And  in 
distich  G,  the  province,  so  to  speak,  of  each  of  these 


13G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


lines  of  evidence  is  indicated  : “ The  knowledge  of 
formal  or  generic  existence  is  by  perception  ; of  things 
beyond  the  senses  by  inference  ; that  which  cannot  be 
determined  by  this  (method)  and  cannot  be  perceived 
must  be  determined  by  fitting  means.” 

The  argument  brought  forward  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence and  multeity  of  souls  is  the  same  presented  as  that 
in  the  Sankkya  Pravachana  with  some  new  features 
added. 

We  are  assured  of  the  existence  of  the  objects  of 
nature  by  perception.  But  these  objects  are  finite  or 
conditioned,  and  they  cannot  but  lead  us  to  look  for 
the  ground  of  their  existence  apart  from  themselves. 
They  are,  moreover,  classed  in  genera  and  species,  and 
they  consequently  lead  the  mind  toward  an  original  or 
primary  genus.  The  process  of  evolution  noticeable  in 
their  production  suggests  an  evolving  principle  ; while 
the  chain  of  second  causes  they  point  to  leads  us  to  a 
recognition  of  a precedent  first  cause.  And,  lastly,  the 
unity  of  the  universe  indicates  the  operation  in  its  pro- 
duction of  a principle,  originally  indiscerptible  and  in- 
discrete, though  susceptible  of  modification,  such  as 
renders  it  now  multiform,  divisible,  and  divided.  In- 
ference, therefore,  rising  from  a series  of  effects  to  the 
primal  cause,  establishes  the  existence  of  Prakriti, 
“ which  develops  itself  by  the  three  modes,”  blended 
into  varieties  of  forms,  as  “ simple  water  coming  from 
the  clouds  is  modified  as  sweet,  sour,  bitter,  pungent 
in  the  nature  of  the  juice  of  the  cocoanut-palm,  bel- 
Icarcmja , and  wood-apple.” 

But  the  vast  assemblage  of  things  into  which  Prakriti 
has  developed  cannot  exist  for  nothing  ; and  it  there- 
fore suggests  the  presence,  somewhere,  of  one  fitted  to 
own  and  enjoy  it,  as  a well-furnished  house  necessarily 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


137 


carries  with-it  the  idea  of  a person  dwelling  in  it.  Be- 
sides, this  assemblage  of  inanimate  things  needs  the 
supervision  and  regulating  power  of  an  intelligent 
ruler  ; while  the  rush  toward  emancipation  made  by 
Prakriti  in  some  of  its  subtler  forms  leads  the  mind  by 
a transition,  natural  and  easy,  to ' the  recognition  of  a 
being  enthralled,  and  therefore  in  need  of  deliverance. 
The  existence  of  the  soul  is  therefore  established  ! The 
argument,  however,  is  a naked  fallacy,  inasmuch  as  the 
soul,  being  perfectly  inert  and  quiescent,  is,  properly 
speaking,  neither  an  enjoyer  nor  a ruler,  while  its 
enthralment  is  a fiction,  rather  than  reality. 

Yarious  facts  are  mentioned  as  tending  to  prove  the 
multeity  or  plurality  of  souls.  The  varied  accidents  of 
birth  and  death  form  a series  of  indisputable  facts  fitted 
to  set  forth  their  multitudinousness.  If  souls  were  one, 
not  many,  the  birth  and  death  of  one  person  would 
synchronize  with  the  birth  and  death  of  all  other  per- 
sons ; or  if  there  were  only  one  soul,  all  human  beings 
would  come  into  the  world  and  go  out  of  it  at  one  and 
the  same  time.  But  the  fact  is  that  they  come  in  at 
different  times  and  go  out  at  different  times  ; and  the 
endless  diversity  in  their  hours  of  ingress  and  egress  is 
a proof  that  souls  are  multitudinous,  not  one.  Again, 
if  souls  were  one,  the  organs  of  perception  and  intellec- 
tion attached  to  them  would  not  present  the  variety  of 
aspects  which  is  their  most  noticeable  aspect.  In  one 
man,  for  instance,  the  sense  of  hearing  or  sight  is  ten 
times  acuter  than  in  another  ; and  in  many  the  sense 
itself  does  not  exist  at  all.  Why  these  differences  ? 
Owing  certainly  to  the  deserts  of  souls,  to  the  merits  or 
demerits  accumulated  by  them  severally  in  former 
states  of  existence.  But  if  souls  were  one,  and  the 
deserts  the  same,  the  organs  would  present  a uniform 


138 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


aspect,  the  sense  of  sight  or  hearing  would  be  acute  or 
dull  in  all  human  beings,  and  defects  and  imperfections 
would  be  equally,  not  unequally,  distributed.  And, 
lastly,  all  mankind  would  in  that  case  be  equally 
affected  by  the  modes  or  qualities.  The  fact,  however, 
is  that  there  is  an  endless  variety  of  ways  in  which 
human  beings  are  affected  by  them.  Some  are  pecul- 
iarly susceptible  to  the  quality  of  goodness,  and  be- 
come good  almost  instinctively  ; while  others  are 
enslaved,  as  it  were,  by  the  evil  qualities  almost  from 
their  birth.  The  reasoning  here  is  fallacious,  as  it 
ascribes  to  the  soul  some  responsibility,  which  in  reality 
belongs  to  Prakriti  ! 

One  important  question  ought  to  be  raised  and  dis- 
posed of  before  we  proceed  to  a detailed  treatment  of 
the  products  or  evolutes  of  Prakriti.  If  those  disposi- 
tions which  are  characterized  as  moral  are  foreign  to 
the  soul,  wherein  do  they  inhere  ? The  Sankhya  Phi- 
losopher is  penetrating  enough  to  see  that  such  disposi- 
tions as  goodness,  passion,  or  indolence  cannot  inhere 
in  or  form  portions  of  our  gross  bodies.  Nor  can  they 
inhere  in  or  form  elements  of  the  soul  without  leading 
it  to  some  kind  of  action  inconsistent  with  the  hypoth- 
esis of  its  perfect  quiescence.  A habitation  for  these 
dispositions  is  therefore  a desideratum  in  the  system. 
The  Sankhya  philosopher  meets  the  want  by  positing  a 
subtle  body  between  the  perfectly  quiescent  soul  and 
the  gross,  perceptible,  and  tangible  body.  This  is 
called  the  linga-sarir,  and  it  migrates  with  the  soul 
from  one  gross  body  to  another,  and  is  dissolved  only 
when  its  perfect  emancipation  is  effected  by  intense 
meditation.  The  following  distichs  speak  of  this  subtle 
body  : 

39.  “ Subtle  (bodies),  those  which  are  born  of  father 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


139 


and  mother,  with  the  gross  forms  of  existence,  are  the 
threefold  species  (of  bodies).  Of  these  the  subtle  are 
permanent  ; those  which  are  born  of  father  and  mother 
perish. 

4-0.  “ The  subtle  (body)  linga , formed  primevally, 
unconlined,  permanent,  composed  of  intellect  and  the 
rest,  down  to  the  subtle  elements,  migrates,  never 
enjoys,  and  is  endowed  with  dispositions  (Bhavas). 

41.  “Asa  painting  does  not  stand  without  a support 
or  receptacle,  nor  a shadow  without  a stake,  etc. , so 
the  linga  does  not  exist  unsupported  without  specific 
elements. 

42.  “ Formed  for  the  sake  of  the  soul,  the  linga , by 
the  connection  of  means  and  then  results  and  by  union 
with  the  predominant  Prakriti,  plays  its  part  like  a 
dramatic  actor.” 

All  material  objects  are  in  these  verses  divided  into 
three  classes,  subtle  bodies,  gross  bodies,  or  those  which 
are  born  of  father  and  mother,  and  various  forms  of 
unorganized  matter.  The  subtle  body  or  Unga-sarir  is 
composed  of  the  three  primal  evolutes  of  Prakriti,  in- 
tellect or  intelligence,  egoism  and  Manas,  or  mind,  and 
the  rudimental  elements  (the  Tanmatras)  ; and  it  is, 
therefore,  like  these,  imperceptible.  It  is  more  perma- 
nent than  our  gross  bodies,  is  unconfined  because  it 
migrates  from  one  gross  body  to  another  with  the  soul, 
and  is  endowed  with  moral  dispositions,  though  incapa- 
ble of  enjoyment,  which  is  the  prerogative  of  the  soul, 
supposititious  rather  than  real.  It,  however,  enthralls 
the  soul,  which  must  cast  aside  this  tenuous  garment, 
as  well  as  its  series  of  grosser  bodies,  before  its  libera- 
tion or  final  separation  from  all  material  conditions  is 
effected. 

It  is  time  to  advert  to  the  productions  or  evolutes 


140 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


of  Prakriti.  These  are  set  forth  in  the  following 
distich  s : 

22.  “ From  Prakriti  issues  the  great  principle 
(Maliat,  Intellect),  and  from  this  the  ego,  or  conscious- 
ness, from  this  (consciousness)  the  whole  assemblage  of 
the  sixteen  (principles  or  entities),  and  from  five  of  the 
sixteen  the  five  gross  elements. 

23.  “ Intellect  is  the  distinguishing  principle  (Adhy- 
a vasya).  Virtue,  knowledge,  freedom  from  passion 
and  power  denote  it  when  affected  by  (the  mode) 
£ goodness  ; ’ when  affected  by  ‘ darkness  ’ it  is  the 
reverse  of  these. 

24.  “ Egoism  is  self-consciousness.  From  this  pro- 
ceeds a double  creation  (sarga,  emanation),  the  series 
of  the  eleven  (principles)  and  the  five  (subtle)  ele- 
ments. 

25.  ££  From  consciousness,  modified  (by  £ goodness  ’), 
proceed  the  eleven  good  principles  ; from  this  origin  of 
being  as  darkness  come  the  subtle  elements.  Both 
emanations  are  caused  by  the  foul  or  active  mode. 

26.  ££  The  eye,  the  ear,  the  nose,  the  tongue,  and 
the  skin  are  termed  the  organs  of  intellect  (Buddhi)  ; 
the  voice,  the  hands,  the  feet,  (the  organs  of)  excretion 
and  generation  are  called  the  organs  of  action. 

27.  ££  The  Manas  (mind)  in  this  respect  has  the 
nature  of  both  (classes).  It  is  formative  (or  determina- 
tive) and  a sense-organ,  from  having  cognate  functions 
(with  the  organs).  It  is  multifarious,  from  the  specific 
modifications  of  the  modes  and  the  diversity  of  exter- 
nal things.” 

These  evolutes  with  the  root  evolvent,  Prakriti  and  the 
soul,  which  is  neither  an  evolvent  nor  an  evolute,  form 
the  tweny-five  tattwas , or  categories  of  the  Sankhya 
Philosophy.  For  the  sake  of  easy  reference  we  give 


THE  SAMHYA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


141 


them  below  in  the  order  in  which  they  are  presented  in 
Mr.  Davies’  excellent  book  : 

1.  Prakriti,  or  primordial,  self-evolving  matter. 

2.  Ahankara,  the  egoizer  or  consciousness. 

3.  Tanmatras,  or  subtle  elements,  five  in  number, 
sound  tangibleness  or  touch,  odor  or  smell,  visibility  or 
form,  and  sapidity  or  taste. 

5.  The  five  gross  elements,  (Mahabhuta)  viz.,  ether 
from  the  subtle  element  sound,  air  from  touch,  earth 
from  odor,  fire  from  sight  or  visibility,  and  water  from 
taste  or  sapidity. 

6.  The  five  senses,  the  eye,  the  ear,  the  nose,  the 
tongue,  and  the  skin  (Gyan-Indryani,  or  organs  of 
knowledge). 

7.  The  organs  of  action  (Karma-Indryani),  the  voice, 
the  hands,  the  feet,  (the  organs  of)  excretion  and  gen- 
eration. 

8.  Manas,  or  mind,  which  receives  and  works  into 
proper  shapes  the  impressions  made  upon  the  senses, 
and  which  is  regarded  as  one  of  the  three  internal 
organs,  the  other  two  being  intelligence  and  conscious- 
ness. 

9.  The  soul  (Atman  or  Purush),  which  is  an  entity 
distinct  from  Prakriti. 

Among  the  evolutes  of  Prakriti,  the  organs  are 
divided  into  internal  and  external,  and  the  elements 
into  subtle  and  gross. 

The  internal  organs  are  the  intellect  or  intelligence, 
consciousness  or  egoizer,  and  the  mind  or  the  thinking 
principle.  They  are  the  gate-keepers  of  the  soul,  while 
the  external  organs,  the  five  organs  of  knowledge  and 
the  five  organs  of  action,  are  the  gates.  The  external 
objects  of  nature  send  their  impressions  through  five 
especially  of  these  gates  to  the  mind,  which  works 


142 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


them  into  appropriate  forms  or  ideas,  and  communi- 
cates them  to  consciousness,  by  which  they  are  individ- 
ualized and  conveyed  to  the  intellect,  which  forms  gen- 
eral concepts,  such  as  are  reflected  in  the  soul,  which  is 
erroneously  said  to  be  the  cognat ive  principle.  This  is 
Mr.  Davies’  view  of  the  functions  of  these  internal 
organs,  but  the  commentators  whom  he  consults  pre- 
sent a very  different  and  a much  more  confused  notion 
of  their  varied  operations.  Vachaspati  speaks  of  the 
mind  thus  : “ It  gives  form  in  a collective  manner  to 
that  which  is  perceived  by  an  organ  of  sense,  and  says, 
‘ this  is  a thing,  ’ ‘ this  is  compounded  and  that  is  not  so  ’ ; 
and  it  discriminates  or  defines  a thing  by  its  specific 
and  unspecific  nature.”  And  Gaudapada  says  : “As 
a person  going  along  a road  sees  an  object  at  a dis- 
tance and  is  in  doubt  whether  it  be  a post  or  a man  ; 
he  then  observes  some  characteristic  mark  upon  it,  or  a 
bird  perched  there,  and,  doubt  being  thus  dissipated  by 
the  reflection  of  the  mind,  the  understanding  (Buddhi, 
or  intellect)  discriminates  that  it  is  a post  ; and  then 
egoism  interposes  for  the  sake  of  certainty,  as  £ verily, 
or  (I  am  certain)  it  is  a post.  ’ In  this  way  the  func- 
tions of  intellect,  egoism,  and  mind,  and  the  eye  are 
(successively)  fulfilled.” 

The  functions  of  the  internal  organs  are  not  categori- 
cally stated  in  the  Sankhya-Karica  and  the  Sankhya 
Pravachana  ; and  modern  commentators  mislead  when 
they  speak  of  them  in  the  phraseology  current  in  mod- 
ern schools  of  philosophy.  Let  us  turn  from  what  is 
at  least  speculation  to  what  is  distinctly  stated  about 
them.  Intellect  under  the  influence  of  “ goodness”  is 
distinguished  by  virtue,  knowledge,  dispassion,  and 
supernatural  power  ; but  it  is  disfigured  under  the  in- 
fluence of  “ darkness”  by  vice,  ignorance,  passionate- 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


143 


ness,  and  weakness.  The  emancipation  of  the  soul  is 
ultimately  effected  by  it,  when  it  clearly  sees  the  dis- 
tinction between  soul  and  non-soul,  the  ego  and  the 
non-ego.  Yirtue  and  vice,  therefore,  as  well  as  knowl- 
edge and  ignorance,  are  material  conditions,  not  moral 
dispositions  and  intellectual  states  in  the  proper  sense 
of  these  terms. 

Intelligence,  however,  retires  from  the  scene  as  soon 
as  its  great  offspring  egoism,  or  self-consciousness, 
makes  its  appearance.  The  work  of  creation  is  effected 
by  this  principle.  Under  the  control  of  “ goodness,” 
it  evolves  out  of  its  own  substance  the  eleven  organs, 
which  are  all  good,  viz.,  the  five  organs  of  knowledge, 
the  five  organs  of  action,  and  the  eleventh  organ,  or 
the  mind,  which,  though  one  of  the  last  of  creations, 
takes  rank  with  the  first,  and  its  own  producer,  con- 
sciousness. Under  the  control  of  ££  darkness”  it  creates 
the  subtle  elements,  and  through  them  the  gross  ele- 
ments, which  in  varieties  of  combinations  are  found  in 
the  objects  of  nature.  Consciousness  evolves  out  of  its 
own  substance  the  entire  creation  ; and  if  consciousness 
were  not  a material  product,  an  evolute  of  the  assumed 
primordial  material  form,  the  Sankhya  system  might 
appropriately  be  characterized  as  a beautiful  scheme  of 
idealistic  philosophy. 

The  Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha  presents  in  its  disquisi- 
tion on  Sankhya  Philosophy  the  categories  of  the 
system  in  these  words  : ££  Now  the  Sastra  of  this 
school  may  be  concisely  said  to  maintain  four  several 
kinds  of  existences,  viz. , that  which  is  evolvent  only, 
that  which  is  evolute  only,  that  which  is  both  evolute 
and  evolvent,  and  that  which  is  neither.” 

Regarding  the  bondage  and  liberation  - of  souls  we 
have  these  utterances  : 


144 


HINDU  PIIILOSOFHY. 


44.  “ By  virtue  an  ascent  to  a higher  region  is  ob- 
tained, by  vice  a descent  into  a lower  region.  Deliv- 
erance is  gained  by  knowledge,  and  bondage  by  the 
contrary. 

45.  “ By  the  absence  (or  destruction)  of  passion 
there  is  dissolution  of  Prakriti  (or  the  power  of  Pra- 
kriti  is  destroyed).  Transmigration  is  from  disorderly 
passion.  By  power  we  gain  destruction  of  obstacles, 
and  the  reverse  by  the  contrary.  ’ ’ 

The  cause  of  the  bondage  of  the  soul  is  ignorance, 
not  vice  ; and  its  liberation  is  effected  by  knowledge, 
not  virtue.  This  is  one  of  those  principles  of  Hindu 
philosophy  which  are  common  to  all  the  systems,  many 
of  those  called  heterodox  not  excepted.  According  to 
these,  virtue  is  a source  of  bondage  as  well  as  vice. 
Yirtue,  as  has  already  been  said,  proceeds  from  desire 
for  happiness  and  aversion  to  pain,  which  are  in  them- 
selves wrong  principles  of  action.  Virtue  results  only 
in  the  prolongation  of  the  chain  of  transmigration,  its 
upshot  being  the  translation  of  the  soul  into  one  of 
those  ethereal  regions  which  rise  in  an  ascending  scale, 
one  above  another,  from  this  world,  for  the  purpose  of 
temporary  enjoyment  of  the  fruits  of  its  good  works, 
and  its  return  in  a bodily  shape  to  this  world,  when 
these  are  in  the  course  of  slow-circling  ages  consumed. 
Permanent  liberation  of  the  soul,  or  its  relegation  to  its 
original  state  of  non-contact  with  matter,  virtue  cannot 
effect.  That  is  the  fruit  of  knowledge,  knowledge  of 
the  categories  of  the  Sankhya  system — or  rather  of  the 
difference  between  soul  and  non- soul  ! 

Gaudapada,  one  of  the  great  commentators,  without 
whose  help  it  is  impossible  to  undertsand  the  book 
under  review,  thus  speaks  of  knowledge  in  general  : 
“ Knowledge  is  of  two  kinds,  external  and  internal. 


THE  SAHKHYA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


145 


Tlie  former  includes  knowledge  of  the  Vedas,  and  the 
six  branches  of  knowledge  connected  with  them — reci- 
tation, ritual,  grammar,  interpretation  of  words,  pros- 
ody and  astronomy  ; also  of  the  Purans,  and  of  knowl- 
edge, theology,  and  law.  Internal  knowledge  is  the 
knowledge  of  Prakriti  and  soul,  or  the  discrimination 
that  “ this  is  Prakriti,”  the  equipoised  condition  of  the 
modes,  and  “ this  is  soul,”  devoid  of  the  modes,  per- 
manent and  intelligent.  By  external  knowledge 
worldly  distinction  or  admiration  is  obtained  ; by  in- 
ternal knowledge,  liberation,  that  is  from  the  bondage 
of  matter. 5 ’ And  in  another  place  the  same  comment- 
ator says  : “ lie  who  knows  the  twenty-five  principles, 
whatever  order  of  life  he  may  enter,  and  whether  he 
wore  braided  hair,  or  top-knot  only,  or  be  shaven,  ho 
is  free  ; of  this  there  is  no  doubt.” 

But,  after  all,  the  bondage  and  liberation  of  the  soul 
are  mere  fictions.  It  is  Prakriti  that  is  in  reality 
bound  and  liberated,  the  soul  being  essentially  free  and 
incapable  of  bondage  ; nor  is  transmigration,  the 
perennial  source  of  misery  from  which  deliverance  is  to 
be  earnestly  desired,  a cause  of  trouble  to  the  pure 
spirit.  Distich  62  of  the  Book  runs  thus  : “Where- 
fore not  any  soul  is  bound,  or  is  liberated,  or  migrates. 
It  is  Prakriti,  which  has  many  receptacles  (or  bodily 
forms  of  being)  which  is  bound,  or  is  liberated,  or 
migrates.  Again,  in  verse  3 we  have  the  words  : 
“ Prakriti  by  herself  binds  herself  by  seven  forms,  she 
causes  deliverance  for  the  benefit  of  soul  by  one  form.” 
Prakriti  is  said  to  be  “generous”  and  “modest.” 
She  is  generous,  because  all  the  trouble  that  she  uncon- 
sciously takes  in  evolving  creation  out  of  its  substance 
is  for  the  benefit  of  the  soul,  not  its  own.  But  as  she 
is  after  all  the  incarcerator  and  liberator  of  the  soul, 


146 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


her  belauded  generosity  is  problematical.  She  is  more- 
over called  modest,  because  she  retires  as  soon  as  she 
has  exhibited  herself  to  the  soul.  “ As  a dancer,  hav- 
ing exhibited  herself  on  the  stage,  ceases  to  dance,  so 
does  Prakriti  cease  (to  produce)  when  she  has  made 
herself  manifest  to  soul”  (59).  “ Nothing  is  more 

modest  than  Prakriti  ; that  is  my  judgment.  Saying, 

‘ I have  been  seen  ; ’ she  does  not  expose  herself  again 
to  the  view  of  the  soul  ” (61).  But  the  fact  remains 
indisputable,  that  she  creates  or  evolves  only  to  be  seen  ; 
and  a girl  who  takes  a world  of  trouble  only  to  be 
seen,  cannot  appropriately  be  called  modest,  even 
though  she  has  the  good  sense  to  retire  as  soon  as  she 
is  seen. 

If  bondage  and  liberation  really  belong  to  Prakriti, 
why  ascribe  them  at  all  to  the  soul  ? Let  the  com- 
mentator Yachaspati  answer  this  question  : “ These 
circumstances  are  ascribed  to  and  affect  the  soul,  as  the 
superior,  in  the  same  manner  that  victory  and  defeat 
are  attributed  to  and  relate  to  a king,  though  actually 
occurring  in  his  generals  ; for  they  are  his  servants,  and 
the  gain  or  loss  is  his,  not  theirs.”  This  is,  however, 
a string  of  words  without  meaning.  The  soul  is  in 
reality  nor  king,  nor  master,  nor  gainer,  nor  loser  ; nor 
does  it,  properly  speaking,  see.  Prakriti  in  all  its 
modifications  is  only  reflected  in  the  tranquil,  immobile 
and  luminous  soul,  which,  as  it  is  destitute  of  volition 
and  vitality,  cannot  possibly  recognize  what  is  fitted  to 
make  it  miserable  or  happy. 

To  show  in  what  respect  the  Sankhya  system  is 
different  from  the  forms  of  thought  subsequently  de- 
veloped, let  us  refer  for  a moment  to  a discussion  em- 
bodied in  the  Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha.  The  author, 
after  having  stated  the  categories  of  the  system  and' 


THE  SANKHTA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


147 


grouped  them  under  the  heads  evolvent  only,  evolutes 
and  evolvent,  evolutes  only,  and  non-evolvent  and  non- 
evolute,  thus  raises  the  discussion  alluded  to  : 

‘ ‘ Here  a fourfold  discussion  arises  as  to  the  nature  of 
cause  and  effect.  The  Saugatas  (Buddhists)  maintain 
that  the  existent  is  produced  from  non-existent  ; the 
Maiyayika,  etc.,  that  the  (as  yet)  non-existent  is  pro- 
duced from  the  existent  ; the  Yedantins  that  all  effects 
are  an  illusory  emanation  from  the  existent,  and  not 
themselves  really  existent  ; while  the  Sankhyas  hold 
that  the  existent  is  produced  from  the  existent.  ’ ’ 

It  is  not  our  intention  to  follow  the  author  through 
the  varied  steps  of  his  argument  ; our  object  being 
simply  to  show  that,  while  Buddhism,  the  source  of 
the  heterodox  systems,  maintains  a species  of  rank 
nihilism,  the  orthodox  systems  were  based  on  the  as- 
sumption of  a primordial  substance,  either  material  or 
spiritual,  and  they  were  all  evolved  from  the  teaching 
of  the  Llpanishads.  Dr.  Mullens,  in  his  well-known 
treatise  on  Hindu  Philosophy,  has  fallen  into  the  mis- 
take of  holding  up  these  venerable  documents  as  the 
sources  of  Hindu  Pantheism,  not  that  of  Hindu  Philos- 
ophy in  all  its  phases  of  development  from  nihilism. 
And  men  more  profoundly  versed  in  Hindu  philosophy 
than  the  lade  doctor  have  shown  a strong  tendency  to  a 
similar,  or  rather  identical,  mistake.  But  one  cannot 
study  the  Hpanishads  in  connection  with  the  systems  of 
philosophy  which  have  flourished  in  India  in  different 
periods  of  its  history,  without  being  led  to  connect  the 
former  with  the  latter,  the  Hpanishads  with  the  sys- 
tems, as  cause  and  effect. 

It  is  not  denied  that  the  prevalent  line  of  philosophic 
thought  in  the  Hpanishads  is  pantheistic.  Then  great 
motto,  one  without  a second,  is  the  battle-cry  of  Indian 


148 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


.and  European,  indigenous  and  foreign,  pantheistic 
forms  of  speculation.  The  cosmogonies  presented  in 
them,  the  description  given  of  man’s  nature  and  of  the 
world  itself,  and  the  theory  of  salvation  developed, 
manifest  a stronger  leaning,  so  to  speak,  toward  pan- 
theism than  toward  any  other  form  of  speculative 
thought.  But  there  are  lines  of  reasoning  and  forms  of 
expression  in  these  records  eminently  fitted  to  uphold 
forms  of  thought  other  than  those  which  are  properly 
called  pantheistic.  The  four  well-known  expressions, 
Sat  and  Asat,  Yyakta  and  Avyakta,  which  play  so 
conspicuous  a part  in  the  cosmogonies  of  the  ITpan- 
ishads,  are  certainly  susceptible  of  nihilistic  and  mate- 
rialistic, as  well  as  pantheistic  interpretation,  and  they 
have  in  consequence  been  bandied  backward  and  for- 
ward by  almost  all  the  jarring  schools  of  Indian  phi- 
losophy. 

In  one  verse  especially,  quoted  in  a former  paper, 
creation  is  distinctly  said  to  have  flowed  out  of  Asat, 
non-being  and  non-existent  ; and  in  several  passages 
the  Avyakta,  unmanifested,  is  represented  as  the 
ground  of  the  Yyakta  or  manifested  aspects  of  nature, 
and  these  passages  may  obviously  be  construed  so  as  to 
uphold  any  form  of  thought  ranging  between  absolute 
nihilism  and  absolute  pantheism.  The  Buddhists,  or 
some  classes  of  Buddhists,  have  evolved  from  them 
their  idea  of  an  eternal  void  of  non-being,  developing 
into  innumberable  forms  of  existence,  more  illusory 
than  real.  The  Sankhya  school  has  derived  from  them 
its  notion  of  Prakriti,  unmanifested  in  its  undeveloped 
form,  but  manifesting  itself  in  various  imperceptible 
and  perceptible  shapes,  in  consequence  of  the  mischiev- 
ous activity  of  one  of  its  three  essential  elements.  And 
the  Yedantic  thinker  has  elaborated  these  very  utter- 


THE  SANKIIYA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


149 


ances  into  bis  theory  of  illusory  existence,  concealing 
the  real  under  the  phenomenal,  the  one  pure  being 
under  various  types  of  non-being.  The  Upanishads, 
therefore,  have  given  rise  to  the  various  lines  of  specu- 
lation by  which  the  intellect  of  the  country,  by  no 
means  deficient  in  acuteness  and  depth,  has  been  exer- 
cised and  moulded  for  centuries  and  ages  untold. 

The  main  principles  of  the  Sankhya  Philosophy  have 
been  set  forth  in  this  and  the  preceding  paper,  in  the 
words  mainly  of  the  books  which  may  be  represented 
as  its  standard  and  authoritative  documents.  A simple, 
unvarnished  statement  of  these  is  enough  to  show  that 
the  glowing  eulogy  of  which  it  has  been  made  the 
favored  subject  in  some  quarters  is  entirely  misplaced 
and  fulsome.  The  system  is  a heap  of  nonsense, 
dreamy  in  its  character,  self-contradictory  in  its  state- 
ments, and  immoral  in  its  principles  and  tendencies. 
This  will  appear  in  the  sequel.  Meanwhile  we  raise 
the  question,  How  is  the  system  to  be  characterized  ? 
With  what  system  of  philosophic  thought  is  it  to  be 
compared  ? 

It  has  been  called,  apparently  with  propriety,  a sys- 
tem of  dualism,  because  it  postulates  the  existence  of 
two  entities,  the  passive  soul  and  the  active  Prakriti. 
But  the  description  it  gives  of  the  soul  tends  to  make  it 
an  entity  of  no  consequence  whatever,  in  fact,  a non- 
entity. The  soul  is  without  volition,  without  intelli- 
gence in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  without  sensi- 
bility— a lump  of  passivity  and  quiescence.  It  is  im- 
possible to  divine  what  use  is  subserved  by  its  existence, 
or  why  its  existence  is  posited.  It  thinks  not,  feels 
not,  sees  not,  handles  not.  It  plays  no  part  whatever 
in  the  varied  work  of  creation,  preservation  and  de- 
struction ; and  it  is  only  falsely  called  a spectator  and 


150 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


enjoyer  of  experience.  It  may  therefore  be  appropri- 
ately thrown  out  of  calculation  entirely. 

The  system,  then,  is  rank  materialism,  and  differs 
from  the  materialism  of  the  day  in  its  arrangement 
rather  than  in  its  principle.  Modern  materialism  can- 
not ignore  the  established  facts  and  conclusions  of 
science,  and  consequently  the  theory  of  evolution  it 
brings  forward  goes  up  in  an  ascending  scale  from  the 
elements,  the  ultimate  powers  of  nature,  to  their  varied 
combinations,  from  inorganic  to  organized  matter,  from 
the  lower  to  the  higher  types  of  life,  from  molecular 
motion  to  thought,  feeling,  and  volition.  But  the 
founder  of  the  Sankhya  school  was  a stranger  to  that 
insight  into  the  mysteries  of  creation  which  a schoolboy 
in  these  days  may  justly  boast  of  ; and  he,  in  conse- 
quence, propounded  a theory  of  evolution  which  comes 
down  in  a descending  scale,  or  rather  moves  fitfully  or 
irregularly.  But  the  two  classes  of  systems  agree  in 
representing  intelligence,  consciousness,  and  mind  with 
all  its  affections,  apprehension,  sensibility,  volition,  etc. 
as  modifications  of  matter.  The  difference  is  that,  in 
accordance  with  one  of  these  two  sets  of  systems, 
thought  is  evolved  from  gross  matter  ; while  in  accord- 
ance with  the  other  gross  matter  is  evolved  from 
thought.  Or,  to  express  the  same  idea  in  a different 
form,  gross  matter  is  sublimated  into  thought  according 
to  the  one  set,  while  thought  degenerates  into  gross 
matter  according  to  the  other. 

The  two  classes  of  systems  also  agree  in  another 
respect.  They  make  hair-splitting  distinctions  between 
matter  in  its  essence  and  matter  in  its  grossness,  be- 
tween matter  subtle  and  matter  gross.  The  Sankhya 
system  discriminates  between,  as  has  already  been 
shown,  a subtle  body  and  a gross  body,  a body  which 


THE  SANKHYA.  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


151 


migrates  with  the  soul  from  one  tenement  of  clay  to 
another,  and  does  not  dissolve  till  its  final  emancipation 
from  corporeal  thraldom,  and  a body  which  is  decom- 
posed soon  after  death.  ISTor  does  the  discrimination 
stop  here.  A distinction  is  made  between  the  senses 
and  the  powers  inherent  in  them,  between  the  sense, 
for  instance,  of  sight  and  the  unseen  power  of  sight  in- 
herent in  the  organ  ; the  sense  of  hearing  and  the 
power  of  hearing  inherent  in  the  organ  ; and  so  on. 
Again,  a distinction  is  made  between  subtle  and  gross 
elements,  between  the  elements  perceptible  to  us  and 
those  the  existence  of  which  is  proved  by  inference, 
and  which  are  perceptible  to  beings  endowed  with 
powers  of  sensation  and  intellection  more  enlarged 
than  ours.  Materialism  of  the  modern  school  is  obliged 
to  make  such  subtle  distinctions,  as  without  them  it  is 
impossible  to  place  the  functions  of  the  mind  in  the 
same  category  with  the  functions  of  the  body. 

A tendency  has  been  growing  up,  especially  since  the 
publication  of  the  well-known  treatise,  the  “ Unseen 
Universe,”  to  laugh  at  the  idea  of  a vacuum,  and  fill 
the  interminable  regions  of  space,  which  were  looked 
upon  as  a boundless  void  in  former  times,  with  a mate- 
rial, or  quasi-material,  luminiferous  fluid  of  extreme 
tenuity  ; as  well  as  to  posit  a sort  of  invisible  material 
organization  or  casement  for  the  soul  beneath  the 
body,  which  is  obviously  decomposed  after  death. 
Many  even  of  those  persons  who  believe  in  the  instinc- 
tively recognized  dualism  in  man  are  prone  to  believe 
in  the  existence  of  a tenuous,  subtle  body  between  the 
immaterial  soul  and  the  gross  material  body,  a sort  of 
intermediate,  permanent  substance  which  death  cannot 
affect,  and  of  which  the  soul  never  gets  rid.  These 
advanced  thinkers  will  rejoice,  or  be  mortified,  to  find 


152 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


that  their  new-fangled  theory  was  anticipated  in  India 
about  live  centuries  before  the  birth  of  Christ.  The 
existence  of  an  all-pervacling  substance,  material  or 
quasi-material,  consisting  of  three  qualities,  held  in 
equipoise,  was  assumed  by  Ivapila  long  before  such 
words  as  “nebulous  matter”  or  “star-dust”  were 
coined.  And  the  idea  of  a linga-sarir,  or  tenuous  body 
in  contradistinction  to,  though  intimately  connected 
with,  the  sthul-sarir,  or  gross  body,  is  developed  both 
in  the  treatise  under  review  in  this  discourse  and  that 
taken  notice  of  in  the  former. 

This  idea  is  somewhat  differently  stated  and  further 
expanded  in  the  Sankhya  Sutras.  The  second  Aphor- 
ism of  Book  III.  runs  thus  : “ Therefrom  (i.e.  from 
the  twenty-three  principles  there  is  the  organization  of) 
the  body  (or  pair  of  bodies,  the  gross  and  the  subtle).’  ’ 
The  gross  body  ( sthul-sarir ) consists  of  the  gross  ele- 
ments, or  rather  the  grossest  of  the  gross  elements,  the 
earth  ; and  it  is  propagated  by  generation.  It  is  in- 
capable of  experiencing  pleasure  or  pain,  and  it  is  per- 
ishable, and  does  actually  perish.  For  purposes  of 
fruition  it  is  of  no  use  to  the  soul,  or  rather  Prakriti,  as 
it  cannot  effect  its  liberation  by  consuming  the  fruits  of 
its  merit  or  demerit.  For  such  purposes  another  body 
of  subtler  elements,  of  greater  permanence,  and  of 
capacities  more  expanded,  must  be  posited.  This  is 
the  subtle  body  created  at  the  commencement  of  the 
creation  or  annus  magnus , or  at  every  renovation  of 
creation,  not  propagated  by  generation,  consisting  of 
seventeen  principles,  the  eleven  organs,  the  five  rudi- 
ments, and  the  organ  of  consciousness,  the  egoizer.  It 
migrates  from  body  to  body,  and  disappears  only  when 
the  fruits  of  merit  or  demerit  on  the  part  of  its  associ- 
ate, the  soul,  or  rather  the  mind,  are  consumed,  and 


TIIE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


153 


beatification  is  realized.  This  body  is  sentient,  but  it 
is  incapable  of  pleasure  or  pain,  except  in  association 
with  the  gross  body,  which  is  its  counterpart,  and  the 
existence  of  which  is  essential  to  the  performance  of  its 
functions.  This  body,  moreover,  has  a case  or  sheath, 
and  that  is  called  cinusthcmi-sarir,  a sort  of  intermedi- 
ate link  between  the  impalpable,  subtle,  and  the  palpa- 
ble, gross  body.  Are  not  our  modern  philosophers 
beaten  hollow  by  their  prototypes  of  ancient  times  ? 

The  Sankhya  philosopher  cannot  properly  be  said  to 
indicate  the  process  of  evolution.  He  states  the  mate- 
rial categories,  the  formative  principles,  but  does  not 
show  how  they  combine  or  re-combine,  integrate,  dis- 
integrate, and  redintegrate  ; or  by  what  process  they 
develop  into  the  innumerable  forms  of  beauty  and 
proportion  we  see  around  us.  But  if  he  were  asked  to 
indicate  this  process,  he  would  very  likely  adopt  the 
language  of  Herbert  Spencer,  and  affirm  that  the  prog- 
ress of  creation  was  from  homogeneity  to  heterogene- 
ity, by  a series  of  differentiations  gradually  effected. 
2STor  would  he  in  the  slightest  degree  object  to  apply 
this  law  to  social  and  moral  development,  as  well  as  to 
that  which  is  material.  The  truth  is,  his  school,  as 
that  of  Herbert  Spencer,  recognizes  no  real  difference 
between  material  and  moral  conditions  ; and  therefore 
the  attempts  made  by  some  Orientalists  to  identify  his 
system  ’frith  the  idealism  of  Bishop  Berkeley  is  futile 
indeed.  He  certainly  does  represent  consciousness  as 
the  originator  of  material  creation  ; and  if  by  con- 
sciousness he  understood  what  is  now  meant  by  it,  as  a 
rule,  he  might  be  held  up  as  an  idealist  of  the  first 
water.  But  consciousness  according  to  him  is  a mate- 
rial organ  or  principle,  not  intellectual  power,  and  in 
the  work  of  evolution  it  performs,  if  work  it  can  be 


154 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


called  at  all,  its  own  substance,  not  anything  extrane- 
ous, is  utilized. 

The  comparison  instituted  between  the  Sankhya  sys- 
tem and  that  propounded  by  Pythagoras  of  Samos, 
about  the  time  when  it  was  itself  elaborated  in  India, 
is  juster.  If  the  existing  fragments  of  the  work  of 
Philolaus,  who  was  a contemporary  of  Socrates,  be 
regarded  as  correct  exponents  of  the  Pythagorean  phi- 
losophy, the  two  systems  may  be  represented,  with 
some  degree  of  justice,  as  similar,  in  many,  if  not  all, 
respects.  The  system,  which  traces  the  wonders  of 
creation  through  monadic  and  geometrical  magnitudes 
to  the  principles  of  numbers,  limiting  and  illimitation, 
may  be  placed  in  juxtaposition  with  one  which  per- 
forms the  same  feat  under  the  auspices  of  a trinitarian, 
material  essence  called  Prakriti,  or  Malia  (Great)  Prak- 
xiti.  But,  barring  the  speculative  wildness  character- 
istic of  both  the  systems,  there  are  two  points  of  simi- 
larity or  contact  to  which  prominence  ought  to  be 
given.  The  Pythagorean,  like  the  Sankhya  system,  is 
based  on  the  doctrine  of  metempsychosis,  and  it  repre- 
sents the  soul  as  enchained  to  the  body,  in  which,  as  it 
is  material,  it  recognizes  an  inherent  and  irremovable 
depravity.  Add  to  this  the  fact  that  the  outcome  of 
these  two  systems  is  one  and  the  same  process,  the  sys- 
tematic mortification  of  the  body  by  ascetic  penance 
with  a view  to  complete  emancipation  of  the  soul  from 
its  bondage. 

The  Indian  system,  however,  is  “ racy  of  the  soil,” 
and  almost  all  the  principal  vocables,  which  figure  in 
the  two  systems,  are  used  in  it  in  a sense  different  from 
that  which  is  attached  to  them  by  its  rival.  When  the 
Indian  system  speaks  of  the  bondage  and  liberation  of 
the  soul,  it  simply  means  the  bondage  and  liberation  of 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY  CONTINUED. 


155 


Prakriti  and  its  products  down  to  the  gross  body,  and 
the  grossest  of  elements  ; and  it  represents  the  extinc- 
tion of  conscious  life,  consequent  on  the  extinction  of 
desire  as  the  summum  bonum , to  be  attained  by  a 
species  of  mortification  and  penance  before  which  the 
most  self -torturing  Greek  philosopher  would  have  stood 
.aghast. 

But  the  emancipation  of  Prakriti  cannot  be  perma- 
nent, as  it  is  fated  to  energize  after  long  periods  of 
quiescence.  Creation  emanates  from  it,  and  is  ulti- 
mately absorbed  in  it,  to  be  once  more  forced  out  and 
forced  in.  And,  as  Prakriti  is  never  to  get  rid  of  its 
creative  fits,  it  is  fated  to  entangle  and  disentangle 
itself  throughout  eternity.  Nor  can  the  emancipa- 
tion of  the  soul  be  called  permanent,  inasmuch  as, 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  this  philoso- 
phy, it  is  neither  bound  nor  liberated.  The  in- 
numerable contradictions  which  the  system  betrays 
in  expression,  if  not  in  enunciation  of  principle,  and 
which  the  reader  must  have  noticed  in  this  brief 
sketch,  proceed  mainly,  if  not  entirely,  from  the  fact 
that  such  a thing  as  the  soul,  without  life,  energy,  or 
activity,  mental,  emotional  or  volitional,  and  without 
material  properties,  is  uselessly  placed  in  juxtaposition 
with  an  active  and  plastic  material  principle,  which, 
through  the  vicious  activity  of  one  of  its  elements, 
evolves  and  gets  entangled,  and  which  laboriously  pro- 
cures its  own  emancipation  by  a series  of  self-inflicted 
tortures  of  the  most  appalling  nature  ! 

The  Sankhya  system  is  called  Nirishwar,  or  godless, 
in  contradistinction  to  the  Yoga  Philosophy,  which  is 
called  Seishwar,  or  with  God.  But  yet  it  is  an  offshoot 
of  a system  of  superstition  and  the  fountain  of  an- 
other. It  is  an  intermediate  link  between  the  nature- 


15G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


worship  of  V edic  times  and  the  polytheistic  worship  of 
those  of  the  Purans.  The  elemental  gods  of  the  Rio: 
Yeda  were,  by  a process  of  generalization  not  certainly 
unnatural,  unified  by  the  spirit  of  philosophic  inquiry 
into  a living,  diffusive,  and  creative  essence  ; and  this, 
in  process  of  time,  became  the  active,  formative  princi- 
ple of  the  Sankhya  school,  its  Prakriti,  or  Pradkan. 
But  such  a principle,  too  subtle  to  be  grasped  by  the 
common  mind,  could  not  possibly  make  the  system 
popular  among  the  masses,  or  could  not  transfer  it  from 
academic  groves  to  the  thoroughfare  and  the  market. 
It  had  therefore  to  be  materialized  or  embalmed  in  a 
tangible,  cognizable  material  form  ; and  the  trans- 
formation was  effected  without  much  difficulty.  The 
trinitarian  material  essence  was  merged  into  the  triad 
of  Hindu  Mythology,  Prakriti  identified  with  Brahma 
under  the  influence  of  the  quality,  goodness,  into 
Vishnu  under  that  of  passion,  and  into  Mahadeva 
under  that  of  darkness.  But  other  transformations 
followed.  The  passionless,  inactive,  and  dead  soul, 
uselessly  posited  by  Sankhya  Philosophy,  ultimately 
became  the  fountain-head,  so  to  speak,  of  an  almost 
unbounded  pantheon  of  male  gods,  who  are  all  more  or 
less  dronish  ; while  the  active  Prakriti  became,  under 
the  name  of  Sakti  or  Brahmi,  the  mother  of  the  almost 
innumerable  female  deities  with  whom  these  male  gods 
are  consorted.  And  thus,  in  process  of  time,  the  recon- 
dite speculations  of  Kapila  were  incorporated  with  the 
popular  religion  of  the  Hindus,  and  a system  of  rank 
Atheism  culminated  in  a system  of  rank  polytheism. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE  TOGA  PHILOSOPHY,  OR  HINDU  ASCETICISM. 

The  Yoga  Philosophy  is  the  counterpart  of  the 
Sankhya  system,  and  it  begins  where  the  other  ends. 
The  conclusion  to  which  the  Sankhya  system  brings  us 
is  that  the  emancipation  of  the  soul  is  effected  by  right 
knowledge,  or  knowledge  of  the  essential  distinction 
between  the  ego  and  the  non-ego,  the  soul  and  the  non- 
soul. But  a formal  enunciation  of  this  principle  would 
be  not  merely  useless,  but  positively  tantalizing,  if  the 
means  of  attaining  such  knowledge  were  not  indicated. 
The  question  therefore  is  one  of  paramount  importance, 
How  is  right  knowledge  or  knowledge  of  the  essential 
distinction  between  soul  and  non-soul  to  be  obtained  ? 
The  Sankhya  Philosophy  raises  the  question,  but  refers 
to  the  Yoga  Philosophy  for  its  solution  ; and  therefore 
the  first  form  of  philosophic  thought  is  incomplete 
without  the  second. 

But  the  Yoga  Philosophy  may  properly  be  repre- 
sented as  the  counterpart,  not  only  of  the  Sankhya 
system,  but  of  almost  every  other  system  of  Indian 
philosophy,  theistic,  atheistic,  and  pantheistic.  Almost 
every  system  of  Indian  philosophy  makes  salvation 
dependent  on  right  knowledge,  and  represents  right 
knowledge  as  attainable  only  by  such  ascetic  exercises 
as  are  prescribed  in  the  Yoga  Shastra.  The  exercises 
may  not  be  exactly  the  same  in  all  the  systems,  but  the 
variations  are  so  slight  that  we  are  justified  in  holding 


158 


IIINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


out  this  philosophy  as  the  counterpart,  not  only  of  the 
scheme  with  which  it  is  consorted,  but  of  every  other 
form  of  philosophic  thought  which  flourished  in  ancient 
India,  or  which  has  flourished  in  India,  both  ancient 
and  modern,  leaving  out  of  course  those  which  are 
thoroughly  Epicurean  in  their  practical  development. 
The  Yoga  system  does  not  deserve  the  name  of  phi- 
losophy, it  being  an  art  rather  than  a science.  The 
science  of  the  soul  and  the  mind,  as  well  as  of  the 
powers  known  and  unknown  of  nature,  is  embodied 
in  the  standard  Works  of  the  Sankhya  School,  but  the 
varieties  of  bodily  and  mental  exercises  by  which  that 
science  is  utilized  or  practically  developed  are  enumer- 
ated and  described  in  the  great  treatise  on  Yoga  Phi- 
losophy to  be  taken  notice  of  ; but  it  ought  not  to  be 
forgotten  that  the  Y oga  Philosophy  properly  so  called 
is  the  art  by  which  the  teaching,  not  only  of  the  San- 
khya school,  but  of  every  other  prominent  school  of 
Hindu  Philosophy,  is  reduced  to  practice.  It  is  the 
art  of  asceticism,  without  which  salvation  is  not  attain- 
able according  to  the  approved  maxims,  not  of  one  or 
two,  but  of  all  the  prominent  schools  of  Indian  thought, 
from  Buddhistic  nihilism  up  to  Yedantic  pantheism. 
Its  importance  therefore  cannot  be  overrated,  though 
its  claim  to  be  recognized  as  a scheme  of  philosophic 
thought  may  justly  be  questioned. 

In  its  character  of  universality,  in  the  importance  it 
enjoys  in  every  prominent  system  of  Hindu  Philoso- 
phy, it  has  a parallel  only  in  the  essential  or  distinctive 
portion  of  the  Nyaya  philosophy",  viz.,  logic.  The 
logic  of  the  Hyaiyaika  philosophy  runs  like  a thread  of 
gold  through  one  and  all  the  dissertations  on  Hindu 
thought  extant  in  the  Sanskrit  language.  Its  forms  of 
expression  and  modes  of  reasoning  are  so  thoroughly 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


159 


intertwined  with  the  original  Shastras  and  the  com- 
mentaries by  which  they  are  elucidated,  that  it  is  im- 
possible for  a student  of  Hindu  Philosophy  to  make  any 
progress  whatever  in  his  favorite  task  without  intimate 
acquaintance  with  them.  How,  as  Indian  logic  is  in 
some  respects  an  indispensable  feature  of  the  theoretic 
developments  of  Hindu  Philosophy,  the  stringent  rules 
of  the  asceticism  represented  by  the  Yoga  School  form 
an  essential  and  inseparable  feature  of  its  practical  de- 
velopments. 

The  reputed  founder  of  the  Yoga  school  was  Patan- 
jali,  regarding  whom  almost  nothing  is  known,  barring 
the  fact  that  he  was  a man  of  a versatile  genius,  and 
distinguished  both  as  a philologist  and  as  a philosopher. 
The  book  ascribed  to  him,  the  Yoga  Shastra,  consists 
of  four  chapters  and  191  aphorisms,  the  contents  of 
which  are  thus  analyzed  in  the  Sarva-Darsana-San- 
graha  : 

“ This  school  follows  the  so-called  Yoga  Sastra  pro- 
mulgated by  Patanjali,  and  consisting  of  four  chapters 
which  also  bears  the  name  of  the  ‘ Sankhya  Prava- 
chana,’  or  detailed  explanation  of  the  Sankhya.  In  the 
first  chapter  thereof  the  venerable  Patanjali,  having  in 
the  opening  aphorism — c How  is  the  exposition  of  con- 
centration (Yoga)  ’ — announced  his  commencement  of 
the  Shastra,  proceeds  in  the  second  aphorism  to  give  a 
definition  of  his  subject  : c Concentration  is  the  hinder- 
ing of  the  modifications  of  the  thinking  principle  ; ’ 
and  then  he  expounds  at  length  the  nature  of  Medita- 
tion (Samadhi). 

“ In  the  second  chapter,  in  the  series  of  aphorisms 
commencing,  ‘ The  practical  part  of  concentration  is' 
modification,  muttering,  and  resignation  to  the  Su- 
preme,’ he  expounds  the  practical  part  of  Yoga  proper 


160 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


to  him  whose  mind  is  not  yet  thoroughly  abstracted, 
viz. , the  five  external  subservients  or  means,  ‘ forbear- 
ance ’ and  the  rest. 

“ In  the  third  chapter,  in  the  series  commencing, 
‘ Attention  is  the  fastening  of  the  mind  on  some  spot,  ’ 
he  expounds  three  internal  subservients,  attention,  con- 
templation, and  meditation,  collectively  called  by  the 
name  of  ‘ subjugation  ’ (Sanyana),  and  also  the  various 
superhuman  powers  which  are  their  subordinate  fruit. 

“In  the  fourth  chapter,  in  the  series  commencing, 
‘ Perfections  spring  from  birth,  plants,  spells,  mortifica- 
tion, and  meditation,’  he  expounds  the  highest  end, 
Emancipation,  together  with  a detailed  account  of  the 
five  so-called  perfections  (Siddhis).” 

Two  of  the  four  chapters  of  the  Yoga  Shastra  were 
translated  into  English  by  Dr.  J.  It.  Ballantyne,  some 
years  ago  ; while  the  first  of  these  two  has  recently 
been  translated  in  the  learned  Professor  Ivunte’s  well- 
known  serial,  “ Saddarsana  Cliintanika,  ” to  which 
special  reference  will  have  to  be  made  in  a separate 
paper.  But  the  whole  book  has  been  translated,  also 
recently,  by  our  illustrious  countryman,  Babu  Rajendra 
Lala  Mitra,  LL.D.,  C.I.E.,  who  has  done  so  much  to 
popularize  the  knowledge  enshrined  in  the  sacred  lit- 
erature of  the  country.  His  translation,  of  which  the 
last  instalment  has  just  been  issued,  is  prefaced  by  a 
scholarly  dissertation  on  Hindu  Philosophy  in  general, 
and  Yoga  Philosophy  in  particular,  and  is,  moreover, 
accompanied  with  a complete  translation  of  the  cele- 
brated commentary  of  Bhoj  Rajah,  and  his  own  valua- 
ble notes.  Of  this  work  of  his  we  shall  avail  ourselves 
freely  in  our  treatment  of  the  subject  as  we  did  of  his 
translation  of  the  Chandogya  Upanisliad  in  a former 
paper. 


THE  TOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


1G1 


The  fact  that  an  enlightened  king,  like  Bhoj,  who  is 
said  to  have  flourished  in  the  latter  part  of  the  tenth 
and  the  earlier  part  of  the  eleventh  century,  considered 
it  his  duty  to  comment  upon  the  Aphorisms  of  Patanjali, 
is  a proof  of  the  importance  attached  to  them,  or 
rather  to  the  asceticism  embodied  in  them  in  all  ages 
and  by  all  classes  of  the  people  of  India.  His  remarks 
on  commentaries  in  general  and  his  own  in  particular 
are  worthy  of  notice  : 

“ All  commentaries  are  the  percenters  of  the  mean- 
ing of  their  authors  ; they  avoid  those  parts  that  are 
most  difficult  to  understand  by  saying  that  the  meaning 
there  is  obvious  ; they  dilate  upon  those  parts  with 
useless  compound  words  where  the  meaning  is  plain  ; 
they  confound  their  hearers  by  misplaced  and  inappro- 
priate dissertations  without  number.  Avoiding  volu- 
minousness, keeping  clear  of  all  mystifying  and  obvi- 
ously worthless  network  of  words,  and  abstracting  the 
inmost  meaning,  I publish  this  exposition  of  the  sage 
Patanjali,  for  the  edification  of  intelligent  persons” 

(p.  2). 

The  general  accuracy  of  this  exordium  is  unchal- 
lenged, though  the  claim  of  perfect  freedom  from  the 
defects  pointed  out  advanced  in  favor  of  Bhoj  Rajah’s 
own  commentary  may  be  disallowed.  It  may  also  be 
affirmed  in  justification  of  these  defects  that  the  com- 
mentaries cannot  but  partake  of  the  confusedness,  ob- 
scurity, and  mystification  stamped  on  the  originals. 

The  portion  of  the  Yoga  Shastra  which  may  justly 
be  called  philosophical,  may  be  disposed  of  in  a few 
words.  Dr.  Rajendra  Lala  Mitra  enters  into  a super- 
fluous argument  in  his  scholarly  introduction,  to  prove 
that  the  Yoga  system  was  elaborated  subsequently  to 
the  organization  of  the  Sankhya  school.  The  fact  that 


1G2 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


tlio  former  completes  the  latter  is  enough  to  sustain 
this  conclusion.  ~W ere  an  additional  reason  needed, 
the  fact  that  the  Yoga  Shastra  accepts  the  twenty- five 
categories  of  the  Sankhya  system  without  attempting  a 
formal  description  or  even  enumeration,  might  he  in- 
sisted upon.  The  Yoga  Shastra,  however,  adds  an- 
other category — viz. , God,  whose  existence  is  declared 
unproven  and  undemonstrable  in  the  Sankhya  system. 
Here  are  the  verses  in  which  God  is  spoken  of  : “Or 
by  devotion  to  God.  God  is  a particular  soul,  which 
is  untouched  by  afflictions,  works,  deserts,  and  desires. 
In  Him  the  seed  of  the  omniscient  attains  infinity.  He 
is  the  instructor  of  even  ail  early  ones  ; for  he  is  not 
defined  by  time.  Ilis  indicator  is  the  Prana va”  (Book 
I.  23-27). 

These  verses  point  to  an  entity  in  addition  to  the  two 
entities,  the  existence  of  which  is  postulated  in  the 
Sankhya  system  ; and  they  may  in  one  sense  be  said  to 
convert  the  “ dualism”  of  Kapila  into  a sort  of  “ trial- 
ism.”  It  is  to  be  observed  that  God  as  described  in 
these  extracts  is  obviously  different  from  the  sold  or 
souls  posited  by  him.  lie  is  not  merely  intelligence, 
as  the  soul  is,  but  unlimited  intelligence  ; omniscient, 
not  parviscient.  He  is  the  instructor  of  all  the  great 
teachers  of  ancient  times,  even  of  Kapila  and  his  great 
teacher  Maheshwara  or  Sayambhu,  and  lie  is  said  to 
be  untouched  by  the  afflictions — viz.,  ignorance,  egoism, 
desire,  aversion,  and  tenacity  of  life,  by  works,  good 
and  bad,  and  by  deserts  and  desires,  or  the  antecedents 
and  consequents  of  works.  The  soul,  on  the  contrary, 
is  represented  as  limited  in  its  being,  circumscribed  in 
its  knowledge,  and  held  in  bondage  by  ignorance,  the 
first  of  the  afflictions  and  the  source  of  the  other  four. 
God  therefore  is  a new  entity,  and  His  introduction 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


1G3 


into  the  sacred  circle  divests  the  system  of  its  dualistic, 
and  invests  it  with  a trialistic,  character. 

Such  doubtless  appears  to  be  the  truth  at  first  sight  ; 
but  a closer  examination  brings  us  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  addition  does  not,  in  the  slightest  degree, 
interfere  with  the  essentially  monistic  character  of  the 
Sankhya  system.  The  entity  brought  in  to  satisfy  a 
popular  clamor  or  to  humor  current  superstition,  is  as 
thoroughly  a nonentity  as  the  soul  is.  There  is  in 
reality  no  difference  whatever  between  God  and  the 
soul,  the  Paramatma  and  the  Jivatma,  as  brought  out 
in  this  scheme  of  philosophic  thought.  God,  like  the 
soul,  is  perfectly  quiescent  and  inactive.  lie  does  not 
create,  does  not  preserve,  does  not  destroy — these  im- 
portant functions  being  all  discharged  by  Prakriti,  the 
active  principle  which  exists  independently  of  Him  and 
over  the  evolutions  of  which  He  has  only  a nominal 
rather  than  a real  control.  It  may  be  said  that  the 
soul  is  bound,  while  God  is  untouched  by  the  afflic- 
tions. But  it  has  been  shown  that  the  soul  is  bound 
nominally,  not  really.  Prakriti,  through  the  mischiev- 
ous activity  of  one  of  its  evolutes,  viz.,  the  mind,  is 
bound,  passes  through  varieties  of  self-inflicted  tortures, 
and  is  finally  liberated  ; and  its  bondage,  self-inflicted 
tortures,  and  liberation  are  only  reflected  in  the  soul 
in  consequence  of  the  proximity  of  the  one  to  the  other. 
But  it  may  be  said  that  God  is  free  even  from  this  re- 
flectional  bondage.  How  can  He  be  ? Is  He  not  all- 
pervasive,  all-diffusive,  as  Prakriti  is  ? If  so,  how  can 
contact,  such  as  that  to  which  the  troubles  of  the  soul 
are  attributable,  be  avoided  ? 

There  is,  after  all,  no  difference  whatever  between 
the  soul,  as  posited  and  described  by  Kapila,  and  the 
God  whose  existence  is  postulated  by  Patanjali.  The 


164 


IIIKDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


soul  is  a useless  entity,  a nonentity  rather  than  an 
entity,  devoid  of  moral  qualities  as  well  as  of  natural 
properties,  devoid  therefore  of  all  of  those  phenomena 
by  which  alone  existence  can  manifest  itself.  The 
being  called  God,  posited  by  the  Yoga  school,  is  pre- 
cisely of  this  description. 

It  is  instructive  to  note  how  the  theistio  conclusion 
was  arrived  at  by  the  champions  of  the  Yoga  Philoso- 
phy. It  was  by  an  exoteric  rather  than  by  an  esoteric 
process  that  they  were  brought  to  a recognition  or 
assumption  of  an  entity  in  addition  to  the  two  posited 
by  Kapila  and  his  followers. 

In  this  respect  the  Yoga  philosophers  occupied  a 
platform  the  very  antipodes  of  that  occupied  by  Fichte 
and  the  Fichteans.  These,  like  the  Sankhya  philoso- 
phers, concentrated  their  attention  first  upon  the  soul, 
called  by  them  the  individual  ego.  P>ut,  unlike  the 
Sankhya  philosopher,  they  proceeded  a step  farther. 
From  the  individual  ego  they  were  brought  by  a pro- 
cess of  subjective  reasoning  to  a recognition  of  the 
Universal  Ego,  that  of  which  the  Ego  within  is  a mode 
or  manifestation.  But  the  Yoga  philosopher  was  not 
evidently  brought  to  such  recognition  by  a process  of 
esoteric  reasoning.  In  his  case  the  supposition  of  a 
God  was  simply  a contrivance  or  stratagem  resorted  to 
for  the  purpose  of  meeting  a popular  demand  rather 
than  a necessity  of  the  reasoning  mind. 

A system  of  rank  atheism  could  not  be  popular  even 
in  countries  like  Greece,  where  the  sensuous  was 
allowed  admittedly  to  prevail  over  the  intellectual  life. 
Far  less  could  it  prevail  in  a country  where  the  reverse 
of  this  process  was  noticeable — that  is,  where  the  intel- 
lectual was  allowed  to  swallow  up  the  sensuous  and 
aesthetic  natures  of  man. 


THE  YOGA.  PHILOSOPHY. 


165 


Besides,  it  vras  not  possible  to  make  the  Yoga  Shastra 
popular  among  the  masses,  or  even  among  sensible 
men,  without  the  entity  added  by  it.  Could  sensible 
Hindus  be  persuaded  to  go  through  an  extraordinary 
process  of  mortification  and  penance  without  a divine 
command  behind,  and  a divine  ideal  before  them  1 
They  must  be  assured  that  a command  of  the  Almighty, 
rather  than  a mere  dictum  of  philosophy,  was  upon 
them  ; and  they  must  be  assured  that  the  grand  pros- 
pect before  them  was  no  other  than  extinction  of  being, 
along  with  all  its  misery,  in  God,  before  they  could  be 
induced  to  exchange  the  comforts  of  domestic  life  for 
the  privations  and  tortures  of  the  life  of  an  anchorite. 
The  hypothesis  of  a God  was  therefore  essential  to  the 
success  of  the  system,  not  only  among  the  masses,  but 
among  thinking  men  of  all  classes,  and  such  a hypoth- 
esis was  in  process  of  time  resorted  to. 

It  may,  however,  be  said  that  the  extraordinary 
powers,  represented  as  attainable  by  intense  meditation, 
might  be  enough  to  make  the  system  popular,  even 
apart  from  the  supposition  of  a God  attached  to  but 
not  incorporated  with  it.  That  the  hope  of  the  ulti- 
mate acquisition  of  such  powers  was  a potent  induce- 
ment to  many  of  those  who  actually  did  resort  to 
hermit  solitude  and  self-inflicted  mortification,  cannot 
be  denied  ; but  this  hope  could  be  sustained  amid  trials 
of  a disheartening  character,  only  by  the  hypothesis  to 
which  recourse  was  had  in  the  Yoga  school. 

But  the  God  assumed  was  after  all  a mere  nonentity, 
a magnificent  nothing.  How,  it  may  be  asked,  could 
such  an  assumption  promote  the  object  of  the  framers 
of  the  scheme  ? How  ! The  framers  of  the  scheme 
could  legitimately  calculate  upon  popular  inability  to 
reason,  to  analyze,  and  to  comprehend.  A phantom 


1G6 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


was  enough  to  conciliate  the  masses  ; while  the  think- 
ing classes  might  gradually  be  persuaded  to  prefer  a 
perfectly  quiescent  God  to  one  moved  by  a desire  to 
create  and  ready  to  create,  for  the  purpose  of  supplying 
a felt  want.  Why,  the  history  of  the  world  points  to 
more  miracles  wrought  by  chimeras,  phantoms,  and 
shams,  than  by  facts  and  realities  of  a stubborn  charac- 
ter ; and  Patanjali  could  not  be  ignorant  of  human 
life  ! 

This  opinion,  formed  long  before  the  publication  of 
the  fourth  part  of  Dr.  Mitra’s  translation  and  his  Intro- 
duction, is  confirmed  by  the  following  extract  from  the 
latter  : 

“ Still  the  coincidence  of  a number  of  names  of  a 
given  period  is  one  which  in  Indian  history  cannot  be 
easily  set  aside  as  purely  accidental.  Confining,  how- 
ever, one’s  attention  to  the  text-books  only,  no  one 
who  has  read  them  carefully  can  fail  to  perceive  that 
Patanjali  has  contented  himself  by  taking  a theistic 
appendage  of  no  direct  utility  to  a positively  atheistic 
model,  without  in  any  way  blendiug  the  two  ideas  into 
one  homogeneity  or  consistency.  Hence  it  is  that  the 
Hindus  call  it  Sesvara  Sankhya,  or  Sankhya  cum  deo , 
as  opposed  to  the  former,  which  is  IN'  ires  war  a Sankhya, 
or  Sankhya  sine  deo’’’’  (p.  xxii.). 

It  is  time  to  set  forth  the  groat  object  of  the  Yoga 
Philosophy ; and  with  a view  to  do  this  it  is  necessary 
to  inquire  into  the  meaning  of  the  word  yoga.  The 
word  is  derived  from  the  root  yuj,  which  means  “ join- 
ing and  it  has  therefore  been  explained  by  Yajna- 
valkya  as  the  u conjunction  of  the  individual  with  the 
supreme  soul.”  To  this  meaning  two  exceptions  have 
been  taken  by  Madhavacharjya,  and  the  author  of  the 
Sarva-darsana-sangraha.  The  first  is  the  impossibility 


THE  TOR  A PHILOSOPHY. 


1G7 


of  the  conjunction  suggested  according  to  the  approved 
rules  of  Indian  logic,  which  maintain  that  two  eternal 
and  infinite  substances  cannot  possibly  be  conjoined. 
The  second  is  the  present  identity  of  the  individual 
and  universal  soul  according  to  the  pantheistic  princi- 
ples of  the  Yedantic  school. 

These  objections  are  brought  forward  to  gratify  a 
propensity  to  pugnaciousness  rather  than  to  remove 
obstacles  to  the  attainment  of  truth.  For  neither  the 
dictum  of  Indian  logic  on  which  the  first  is  based,  nor 
the  principle  of  pantheistic  philosophy  which  upholds 
the  second,  is  recognized  in  the  Yoga  Shastra.  The 
word  yoga  is  used  to  mean  both  the  end  proposed  by 
Yoga  Philosophy  and  the  means  used  according  to  its 
teaching  to  compass  it.  The  end  proposed  is  the  union 
of  the  individual  with  the  universal  spirit  ; and  the 
means  indicated  are  varieties  of  exercises,  culminating 
in  samadhi  or  concentration.  But  Yajnavalkya  cannot 
but  admit  that  though  this  is  the  present  meaning  of 
yoga,  the  word  had  a very  different  meaning  in  Patan- 
jali’s  time  ; for  he  himself  says  in  his  commentary  on 
the  Yoga  Shastra  : 

“ Yoga  means  samadlii , concentration,  in  the  sense 
of  the  union  of  the  subject  and  object — thought  with 
thought  itself.” 

The  first  two  aphorisms  of  Patanjali’s  great  work 
:lrus  set  forth  the  objects  of  Yoga  Philosophy  : 

“ How  the  exposition  of  Yoga  is  to  be  made.  Yoga 
.8  the  suppression  of  the  functions  of  the  thinking  prin- 
ciple. ’ ’ 

The  word  translated  “ the  thinking  principle”  is 
diitta,  Avliich  certainly  means  the  mind,  the  principle 
n us  which  receives  impressions  from  the  external 
world  through  the  senses,  and  passes  in  consequence 


108 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


through  an  almost  endless  series  of  transformations 
and  changes. 

The  Sanskrit  word  for  these  mutations  or  modifica- 
tions is  vritti , translated  “functions”  in  the  text. 
These  words,  along  with  the  word  yoga , play  an  im- 
portant part  in  this  philosophy,  and  they  must  there- 
fore be  thoroughly  understood.  The  following  verses 
show  what  is  meant  by  “ functions”  or  vritti  : 

“ The  functions  are  fivefold,  and  they  are  either 
painful  or  not  painful.  The  functions  of  the  thinking 
principle  are  right  notion,  misconception,  fancy,  sleep, 
and  memory.  Right  notions  are  perception,  inference, 
and  testimony.  Misconception  is  incorrect  notion,  or  a 
notion  which  abides  in  a form  which  is  not  that  of  its 
object.  Fancy  is  a notion  founded  on  knowledge  con- 
veyed by  words,  but  of  which  there  is  no  object  corre- 
sponding in  reality.  Sleep  is  that  function  of  the 
thinking  principle  which  has  far  its  object  the  concep- 
tion of  nothing.  Memory  is  the  not  letting  go  of  an 
object  that  has  been  recognized  ” (chap.  i.  5-11). 

These  five  functions  of  the  mind  or  of  the  thinking 
principle  are  the  sources  of  its  unutterable  changeable- 
ness and  restlessness.  Right  notions  of  the  objects 
around  us,  obtained  through  the  sources  of  correct 
knowledge,  admitted  in  the  Sankkya  school,  viz.,  per- 
ception, inference,  and  testimony  ; wrong  notions  aris- 
ing from  errors,  such  as  we  commit  when  we  mistake  a 
rope  for  a serpent,  or  from  doubt  realized  when  we 
cannot  decide  whether  the  object  we  see  is  a man  or  a 
cow  ; phantasms  of  things  which  have  no  existence 
apart  from  a heated  brain  ; dreams  of  all  kinds,  from 
those  distinguished  by  some  degree  of  reasonableness  or 
propriety  down  to  those  marred  by  the  greatest  wild- 
ness and  incoherence  ; and  the  innumerable  clusters  of 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


169 


ideas  and  associations  recalled  or  revived  by  memory — 
all  these  form  the  ever-shifting  elements  of  our  mental 
existence,  and  they  produce  in  us  a restlessness  similar 
to  that  by  which  they  themselves  are  characterized. 

Here  it  ought  to  be  noted  that  one  of  the  universally 
admitted  maxims  of  Hindu  Philosophy  is  that  the  mind 
assumes  the  form  of  what  it  perceives  ; and  therefore 
it  necessarily  becames,  really  not  figuratively,  a tree,  a 
tank,  an  animal,  a sweet  mango,  a musical  pipe,  an 
odoriferous  flower,  or  a hard  stone  ; not  only  so,  it  is 
changed  into  the  grotesque  forms  and  shapes  conjured 
up  by  fancy  either  when  we  are  awake  or  when  we  are 
asleep,  or  into  the  ideas,  equally  subjective,  exhumed 
by  memory  from  the  vaults  of  its  own  mausoleum. 
Who  can  form  an  adequate  idea  of  its  volatility,  its 
fickleness,  its  restlessness  ? Who  can  number  the  varie- 
ties of  mutations  and  transformations  through  which  it 
passes  in  the  course  of  the  day,  not  to  say  a year,  a 
decade,  or  the  course  of  a long  life  ? To  destroy  this 
fickleness,  this  changeableness,  this  restlessness,  to  lead 
the  mind  to  wade,  so  to  speak,  through  these  innumer- 
able transformations  to  its  original  state  of  serene 
repose — such  is  the  object  proposed  by  the  Yoga  Phi- 
losophy. The  idea  of  union  with  God  is  a later  graft. 

How  can  this  be  effected  ? How  are  the  modifica- 
tions of  the  mind  to  be  suppressed,  and  how  is  it  to  be 
brought  back  to  its  primitive  state  of  quiescence  and 
repose  ? To  this  question  the  proper  reply  is  given  in 
the  twelfth  aphorism  of  the  first  chapter  : “ The  sup- 
pression of  these  functions  is  effected  by  Exercise  and 
Dispassion.”  These  two  expressions  or  vocables  make 
up  what  is  called  Yoga,  which  consists  of  several  mem- 
bers or  parts.  But  before  we  refer  to  them  it  is  desir- 
able to  point  out  the  obstructions  which  hinder  our 


170 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


progress  through  ascetic  exercises  to  the  goal  of  Yoga 
Philosophy.  These  are  enumerated  in  Aphorism  30 
(Book  I.)  : “ Disease,  languor,  doubt,  carelessness, 
idleness,  worldly-mindedness,  mistaken  notions,  unat- 
tainment of  any  stage  of  abstraction,  and  instability 
therein  ; these,  causing  distractions,  are  the  obstacles” 
(p.  38). 

Bodily  ailments  incapacitating  the  mind  for  close 
thinking,  intellectual  lassitude  and  indolence,  doubt  as 
to  the  feasibility  and  utility  of  meditation,  careless  or 
slipshod  methods  of  procedure,  earthly  ambition,  illu- 
sion, such  as  that  which  leads  to  a bit  of  mother-of-pearl 
being  mistaken  for  silver,  inability  to  attain  to  a partic- 
ular stage  of  contemplation,  or  to  continue  steady  in  it 
when  attained — these  are  hindrances  to  Yoga  ; and 
they  are  accompanied  with,  as  the  next  aphorism 
assures  us,  “ pain,  distress,  trembling,  inspiration,  and 
expiration” — that  is,  pain  in  the  threefold  form  referred 
to  in  the  Sankliya  Philosophy  ; shaking  of  the  body 
interfering  with  its  proper  posture,  and  irregular  breath- 
ing. These  can  be  avoided  only  by  long- continued  and 
persevering  exercise. 

But  not  only  are  these  interruptions  or  hindrances  to 
meditation  to  be  overcome,  but  efforts  should  be  put 
forward  to  annihilate  the  great  causes  of  our  bondage. 
These  are  called  “afflictions,”  and  they  are  described 
in  the  following  aphorisms  : “ Ignorance,  egoism,  de- 
sire, aversion,  and  ardent  attachment  to  life  are  the 
five  afflictions.  Ignorance  is  the  field  of  those  which 
follow,  whether  they  be  dormant,  weak,  intercepted, 
or  simple.  Ignorance  is  the  assumption  of  that  which 
is  non-eternal,  impure,  painful,  and  non -soul— to  be 
eternal,  pure,  joyous,  and  soul.  Egoism  is  the  identi- 
fying of  the  power  that  sees  with  the  power  of  seeing. 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


171 


Desire  is  dwelling  on  pleasure.  Aversion  is  dwelling 
on  pain.  Tenacity  of  life  is  an  attachment  to  the 
body,  which  relates  to  the  residua  of  one’s  former  life, 
even  on  the  part  of  the  wise.  These,  the  subtle  ones, 
should  be  avoided  by  an  adverse  course”  (chap.  ii. 
3-9). 

Five  causes  of  our  bondage  are  stated  ; and  the  first 
of  these,  viz. , ignorance,  is  declared  to  be  the  source  of 
the  rest.  Ignorance,  therefore,  is,  according  to  this,  as 
to  every  other  system  of  Hindu  Philosophy,  the  ulti- 
mate cause  of  that  bondage  from  which  deliverance  is 
to  be  ardently  desired.  Ignorance  of  what  ? Hot  of 
God  and  His  attributes  ; nor  of  the  teaching  in  His  rev- 
elation ; but  of  the  essential  and  everlasting  difference 
between  soul  and  non-soul.  The  characteristics  of  the 
soul  are  in  marked  antithesis  to  the  properties  and 
qualities  of  matter  and  its  evolutes.  The  soul  is  eter- 
nal, pure,  and  joyous  ; while  matter,  in  at  least  its 
present  forms,  is  non-eternal,  impure,  and  painful. 
But  we  are  laboring  under  the  hallucination  that  the 
soul  is  impure  and  miserable,  while  the  fact  is  that  im- 
purity and  pain  belong  to  matter,  and  cannot  possibly 
appertain  to  soul.  And  the  consequence  of  this  igno- 
rance is  that  we  wish  to  see  the  connection  of  the  pure 
spirit  with  impure  and  painful  matter,  perpetuated 
rather  than  dissolved. 

But  how  does  ignorance  bring  us  to  a conclusion  so 
wretched  ? The  different  stages  of  its  operation  are  in- 
dicated. Ignorance  begets  egoism,  by  which  the  seer 
is  identified  with  the  seeing  faculty,  the  enjoyer  is  con- 
founded with  the  instrument  of  enjoyment,  or  the  soul 
is  declared  to  be  nothing  more  or  less  than  one  of  its 
own  material  organs.  The  soul  is  the  enjoyer,  and  the 
enjoyment  is  communicated  to  it  through  the  internal 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


172 

organ,  intelligence  or  mind,  which  is  an  evolute  of 
Prakriti,  and  therefore  a material  form,  though  of  the 
subtlest  kind  and  imperceptible.  But  this  form,  though 
merely  an  instrument  of  enjoyment,  is  inflated  with  an 
idea  of  its  own  importance,  and  says,  “ I enjoy.”  Its 
ignorance  of  its  own  nature  and  position  among  the 
admitted  categories  of  the  system  is  the  cause  of  its 
egoism.  But,  properly  speaking,  as  it  has  been  so  often 
said,  the  charge  of  ignorance  or  egoism  cannot  be  le- 
gitimately brought  against  it.  It  is  in  reality  the 
enjoyer,  and  its  enjoyment  is  simply  reflected  in  the 
tranquil  spirit,  as  the  serene  evening  sky  with  its  rosy 
light  is  reflected  upon  the  surface  of  a calm  sheet  of 
water.  The  mistake  does  not  rest  therefore  with  the 
internal  organ,  but  with  the  philosopher,  who,  after 
having  extinguished  all  individuality  on  the  part  of  the 
human  spirit,  allows  himself  to  be  led  by  his  instincts 
to  attribute  some  sort  of  responsibility  to  it. 

From  egoism  proceed  a longing  for  pleasure  and  a 
recoil  from  pain  ; and  these  instincts  give  birth  to 
tenacity  of  life,  or  an  aversion  to  that  dissolution  of  the 
connection  of  the  soul  with  material  organs,  on  which 
true  emancipation  hinges.  IIow  ? Men  instinctively 
desire  happiness,  and  perform  good  works  to  secure  it. 
But  good  works  are  fructescent,  and  they  necessarily 
lead  to  their  translation  to  regions  of  happiness,  whence, 
as  soon  as  the  fruits  of  their  good  works  are  consumed, 
they  have  to  come  back  in  renewed  bodies.  Or,  if  they 
are  bent  on  present  enjoyment  and  secure  it  by  bad 
works,  they  are  sent  into  regions  of  punishment, 
whence,  the  fruits  of  their  evil  deeds  being  consumed, 
they  also  come  back  in  fresh  bodies.  The  chain  of 
transmigration  is,  therefore,  necessarily  lengthened  by 
works,  which,  whether  good  or  bad,  proceed  from  our 


THE  TOGA  PHILOSOPHY.  173 

instinctive  and  fatuous  desire  for  happiness  and  our 
equally  instinctive  and  foolish  aversion  to  pain.  An 
additional  reason  is  given  for  our  shrinking  from  death 
in  the  expression,  “ The  residua  of  one’s  former  life.” 
What  are  the  residua  of  a former  life  ? There  are 
varieties  of  such,  but  those  referred  to  here  are  our  own 
recollections  of  the  pains  experienced  in  consequence  of 
death  in  former  lives  ; and  these  cannot  but  lead  us  to 
shrink  from  even  a temporary  dissolution  of  the  ma- 
terial conditions  by  which  the  soul  is  enchained. 

These  products  of  ignorance  are  found  in  various 
states  in  various  individuals.  In  some  they  are  “ dor- 
mant,” or  in  a state  of  hibernation,  from  which  they 
are  sure  to  come  out  with  renewed  vigor  to  torment  us 
and  drive  us  to  works,  fruits,  births,  deaths,  repeated 
in  all  but  endless  chains.  In  some  they  are  “ inter- 
cepted,” or  their  development  is  checked  by  the  undue 
preponderance  of  one  of  them,  such  as  the  prevalence 
of  egoism  decided  enough  to  check  the  manifestation  of 
desire,  aversion,  and  tenacity  of  life.  In  some  they 
have  been  weakened  by  the  preliminary  operations  of 
Yoga;  while  in  some  they  have  their  full  play,  and  are 
therefore  called  “ simple.” 

But  in  one  case  all  the  afflictions  may  justly  be 
represented  as  the  “ residua”  of  former  lives.  To 
understand  this  let  attention  be  called  to  the  following 
aphorisms  : 

“ The  residua  of  works  have  affliction  for  their  root, 
and  are  felt  either  in  this  manifested  birth  or  in  the 
unmanifested  one.  The  root  existing,  the  deserts  are 
land,  age  and  experience.  They  have  joy  or  suffering 
for  their  fruit  according  as  their  cause  is  virtue  or  vice. 
To  the  discriminating  all  are  verily  painful,  because  of 
the  adversity  of  the  actions  of  the  three  qualities,  and 


174 


HINDU  rillLOSOPHY. 


of  tlie  pains  of  sequence,  anxiety,  and  residua”  (chap, 
ii.  12-15). 

The  afflictions — ignorance,  etc. — are  to  be  held  ac- 
countable not  merely  for  the  works  performed  by  us  in 
this  life,  but  for  those  we  have  performed  in  all  the 
transmigrations  through  which  we  have  passed.  The 
remains,  so  to  speak,  of  these  works,  we  carry  with  us, 
and  their  consequences  we  take  in  “ kind,”  or  in  rank, 
either  in  society  or  in  the  scale  of  being  ; in  “ age”  or 
in  longevity  or  its  reverse  ; and  lastly,  in  “ experi- 
ence,” or  in  the  delectation  of  pleasure,  or  the  endur- 
ance of  pain.  JSTor  are  their  consequences  or  fruits,  ex- 
cept in  rare  cases,  consumed  in  this  life,  they  being  dis- 
played in  that  which  is  to  come,  and  which,  therefore, 
is  yet  unmanifested.  If  they  have  been  effectuated  by 
virtue,  their  present  and  future  consequence  must  be 
joy  ; while  if  they  have  been  caused  by  vice,  their 
present  and  future  consequence  is  and  will  be  sorrow. 
The  discriminating,  however,  look  upon  all  the  con- 
sequences, joyful  or  sorrowful,  as  evils  to  be  depre- 
cated for  four  different  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  the 
three  cosmic  qualities  to  which  virtue,  vice,  and  activity 
benevolent  or  malevolent,  are  to  be  ascribed,  are,  when 
their  equipoise  in  Prakriti  is  once  interrupted,  in  an- 
tagonism to  one  another  ; and  their  frequent  contests 
cannot  but  lead  to  disorder  and  misery.  Pleasure,  in 
the  second  place,  is  invariably  followed  by  pain,  “ by 
the  law  of  sequence.”  It  is,  moreover,  accompanied 
with  a great  deal  of  anxiety,  arising  mainly  from  our 
consciousness  of  its  evanescent  character.  And,  lastly, 
all  our  actions  and  feelings  leave  behind  them  impres- 
sions, which  revive  the  sensations  of  pleasure  and  pain 
within  us,  leaving  aside  the  consequences,  which  it  is 
absolutely  impossible  for  us  to  evade  or  avert. 


TIIE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


175 


Now,  we  come  to  the  means  or  accessories  of  Yoga. 
These  are — first,  Yama,  restraint  ; second,  Niyama, 
obligation  ; third,  Asana,  posture  ; fourth,  Prana 
yama,  regulation  or  restraint  of  the  breath  ; fifth, 
Pratyahara,  abstraction  ; sixth,  Dharana,  devotion  ; 
seventh,  Dhyana,  contemplation  ; eighth,  Samadhi, 
meditation. 

The  following  are  the  aphorisms  in  which  these  are 
set  forth  with  their  characteristics  : 

“ On  the  decay  of  impurity,  through  the  practice  of 
the  accessories  of  the  Yoga,  there  is  illumination  of  the 
understanding  till  discriminative  knowledge  results. 
Restraint,  obligation,  posture,  regulation  of  the  breath, 
abstraction,  devotion,  contemplation,  and  meditation 
are  the  eight  accessories.  Restraint  includes  abstinence 
from  slaughter,  falsehood,  theft,  incontinence,  and 
avarice.  The  obligations  are  purification,  contentment, 
penance,  study,  and  devotion  to  the  Lord  : Posture  is 
that  which  is  firm  and  pleasant.  On  its  being  accom- 
plished, the  regulation  of  breath,  which  is  interruption 
in  the  flow  of  inspiration  and  expiration.  Abstraction 
is  the  assumption  by  the  senses  of  the  original  nature 
of  the  thinking  principle,  from  want  of  application  to 
their  respective  objects”  (chap.  ii.  18-54,  114). 

“ Steadfastness  or  devotion  is  the  confinement  of 
the  thinking  principle  to  one  place.  Contemplation  is 
unison  there  of  the  understanding.  When  that  con- 
templation, existing  as  if  without  its  own  identity, 
enlightens  solely  one  object,  it  is  meditation”  (chap, 
iii.  1-3). 

These  eight  means  of  Yoga  are  called  its  members  as 
well  as  its  accessories.  The  first  five  the  outer,  and 
the  last  three  the  inner  members  ; and  they  indicate 
the  varied  stages,  incipient  as  well  as  advanced,  of  that 


17  G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


laborious  and  painful  exercise  which  terminates  in  the 
extinction  of  the  thinking  principle.  It  being  neces- 
sary to  draw  particular  attention  to  them,  they  are  set 
forth  one  after  another,  in  the  order  in  which  they  ap- 
pear in  the  above  extracts,  with  elucidating  comments  : 

1.  Restraint  is  the  first  step  in  all  schemes  of  ref- 
ormation, meaning,  as  it  does,  abstinence  from  gross 
sins  and  sinful  dispositions.  The  word  “slaughter” 
as  used  in  the  aphorism  bearing  upon  it  has  a twofold 
meaning.  It  means  religious  sacrifice  as  well  as  mur- 
der. The  Yoga  Philosophy  is  as  thoroughly  opposed 
to  the  doctrine  of  sacrifice  as  Buddhism  ; and  it  brings 
forward  veracity  as  a substitute  for  the  bloody  rites 
enjoined  in  the  Vedas,  while  it  promises  “ jewels  from 
all  sides”  to  him  “ who  is  confirmed  in  abstinence  from 
theft,”  and  represents  attainment  of  vigor  as  insepa- 
rably associated  with  “continence.”  It  prohibits 
avarice  not  only  in  the  sense  in  which  the  word  is  ordi- 
narily used,  but  in  a sense  unknown  perhaps  to  all  but 
students  of  Hindu  Philosophy.  The  avaricious  longing 
for  fresh  bodies  and  fresh  births,  of  which  we  are  sup- 
posed to  be  conscious,  is  condemned,  as  well  as  cupidity 
in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term.  The  first  step  of 
Yoga  is  renunciation  of  sin  in  act,  word,  and  even 
thought.  So  far  it  is  worthy  of  commendation. 

2.  The  second  step  is  the  cultivation  of  right  disposi- 
tions within  us  by  a strict  conformity  to  the  command- 
ments and  ordinances  of  religion.  A careful  study  of 
the  Vedas,  certain  prescribed  austerities  and  devotion 
to  the  Lord  are  fitted  to  purify  the  soul  from  all  its  base 
desires,  and  breed  contentment  in  it.  There  would  be 
no  objection  to  this  statement,  if  by  ‘ ‘ devotion  to  the 
Lord”  were  meant  something  more  than  muttering 
mechanically  the  two  words  Pranava  and  Om,  which 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


177 


are  represented  as  His  symbols.  It  is  affirmed  that  the 
frequent  repetition  of  these  symbols,  or  of  some  select 
verses  from  the  Yedas,  such  as  the  Gayatri,  leads  to 
God- vision.  Through  muttering  results  vision , as  ex- 
plained by  Bhoj  Rajah,  of  the  desiderated  deity.  But 
God-vision  according  to  this  philosophy  is  tantamount 
to  nothing- vision- — the  God  posited  being  a nonentity  ! 

3.  Here  begin  those  bodily  exercises  which  do  not 
profit.  The  varieties  of  postures  recommended  and 
detailed  for  the  attainment  of  firmness  of  mind  and 
cheerfulness  of  disposition  are  too  numerous  to  be  taken 
notice  of  here.  Yasistha,  Yajnavalkya,  and  other 
sages  of  the  Yedic  and  Post-Yedic  age  fixed  their 
number  at  84,  stating  that  these  had  been  prescribed 
and  described  by  Siva,  the  Father  of  Indian  Yogis. 
Goralcshanatha,  a Yogi  of  a later  date,  disgusted  with 
their  paucity,  swelled  their  number  to  84,000,000.  Of 
this  number,  however,  ten  are  considered  as  the  more 
important,  and  three  or  four  of  these  last  we  shall  in- 
dicate in  the  words  of  the  learned  translator. 

(a)  “ Padmasana.  The  right  foot  should  be  placed 
on  the  left  thigh,  and  the  left  foot  on  the  right 
thigh  ; the  hands  should  be  crossed,  and  the  two  great 
toes  should  be  firmly  held  thereby  ; the  chin  should  be 
bent  down  on  the  chest  ; and  in  this  posture  the  eyes 
should  be  directed  to  the  tip  of  the  nose.  It  is  called 
Padmasana  (lotus-posture),  and  is  highly  beneficial  in 
overcoming  all  diseases.” 

(b)  “ Put  the  right  ankle  on  the  leftside  of  the  chest, 
and  similarly  the  left  ankle  on  the  right  side,  and  the 
posture  will  be  Gomukha,  or  of  the  shape  of  a cow’s 
mouth.” 

(c)  “ Having  assumed  the  fowl  posture,  should  the 
two  hands  be  placed  on  the  sides  of  the  neck,  it  would 


178 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


make  the  posture  like  that  of  the  tortoise  upset  ; it  is 
called  tortoise-upset  posture.” 

The  fowl  posture  is  thus  described  : £ ‘Having'  estab- 
lished the  lotus  posture,  if  the  hand  be  passed  between 
the  thigh  and  the  knees  and  placed  on  the  earth  so  as 
to  lift  the  body  aloft,  it  will  produce  the  fowl  seat.” 

(d  ) “ Hold  the  great  toes  with  the  hands,  and  draw 
them  to  the  ears  as  in  drawing  a bowstring,  and  this  is 
called  the  bow  posture”  (p.  104). 

The  translator  concludes  his  description  of  the  prin- 
cipal varieties  of  postures  recommended  with  these 
words  : 

“ Treating  of  a system  of  philosophy,  Patanjali  has 
not  thought  proper  to  enter  into  details  regarding  age, 
sex,  caste,  food,  dwelling,  etc.,  as  bearing  upon  Yoga  ; 
but  other  works  supply  information  about  them  to  a 
considerable  extent.  A few  notes  derived  therefrom 
may  not  be  unfitly  added  here.  The  first  question  that 
would  arise  would  be,  Who  are  fit  to  perform  the 
Yoga  ? On  this  subject  the  “ Hatha  dipika”  fixes  no 
limit.  It  says,  “By  the  practice  of  Y’oga,  every  one 
may  attain  perfection,  whether  he  be  youthful,  or  old, 
or  very  old,  or  diseased  or  decrepid.  ” The  next  point 
is  the  selection  of  a proper  place.  “ A small  monastery, 
a dwelling  not  larger  than  a cube  of  six  feet,  situated 
in  an  out-of-the-way  place,  where  there  is  no  danger, 
within  a circuit  of  a bow,  of  hail,  fire,  and  water,  in  a 
country  abounding  in  food,  and  free  from  danger  of 
wars  and  the  like,  where  religion  prevails  in  a thriving 
kingdom,”  is  the  most  appropriate.  The  cell,  or 
mathika , should  have  a small  door  and  no  window  ; it 
should  be  free  from  holes,  cavities,  inequalities,  high 
steps,  and  low  descents.  It  should  be  smeared  with 
cow-dung,  devoid  of  dirt,  not  infested  by  vermin,  with 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


179 


a terrace  in  front,  a good  well,  and  the  whole  sur- 
rounded by  a wall.  Dwelling  in  such  a place,  avoid- 
ing all  anxieties,  the  Yogi  should  follow  the  path 
pointed  out  by  his  teachers  in  the  exercise  of  the  Yoga. 
He  should  avoid  all  excess  of  food,  violent  exertions, 
and  vain  disputations.  His  food  should  consist  of 
wheat,  sali  rice,  barley,  shasti  rice  (or  that  which 
matures  in  six  days),  the  syama  and  the  nivara  grains, 
milk,  clarified  butter,  coarse  or  candied  sugar,  butter, 
honey,  ginger,  palval,  fruits,  five  kinds  of  greens,  mung 
pulse,  and  water,”  and  all  soothing  sweet  things  in  a 
moderate  quantity,  avoiding  flesh-meat,  and  too  much 
salt,  acids,  and  all  stale,  putrid,  decomposed,  or  acrid 
substances.  The  quantity  of  food  taken  should  be  such  as 
to  leave  one  fourth  of  his  appetite  unappeased  ” (p.  110). 

When  the  adept  is  able  to  assume  any  posture  he 
wishes  to  appear  in,  he  is  unaffected  “ by  the  pairs,” 
i.e.  by  the  extremes  of  cold  and  heat,  light  and  dark- 
ness, storm  and  lull,  etc.  Neither  is  he  tormented  by 
hunger  and  thirst.  In  a word,  he  becomes  impassible  ; 
and  his  steadiness  of  posture  no  contingency  can  shake 
for  a moment. 

4.  Eegulation  of  breath  is  an  important  member  of 
Yoga,  and  the  process  consists  of  expiration,  inspiration, 
and  retention  of  breath,  according  to  fixed  rules.  To 
give  an  insight  into  these,  let  us  present  an  extract  from 
the  translator’s  notes  (p.  43)  on  the  subject  : “ The 
time  devoted  to  inspiration  is  the  shortest,  and  to  reten- 
tion the  longest.  A Yaishnava  in  his  ordinary  daily 
prayer  repeats  the  Yija-mantra  (containing  specific 
mystic  syllables)  once  while  expiring,  seven  times  while 
inspiring,  and  twenty  times  while  retaining.  A Shakta 
repeats  the  mantra  16  times  while  inspiring,  64  times 
while  retaining,  and  32  times  while  expiring.  These 


ISO 


iiindu  rniLosoniY. 


periods  are  frequently  modified.  The  details  vary 
according  to  each  particular  form  of  meditation  and 
the  capacity  of  the  performer.  As  a rule  it  may  be 
said  that  the  longer  the  retention,  the  more  proficient 
is  the  Yogi.  The  usual  mode  of  performing  the  Prana- 
yama  is,  after  assuming  the  posture  prescribed,  to  place 
the  ring  finger  of  the  right  hand  on  the  left  nostril, 
pressing  it  so  as  to  close  it,  and  to  expire  with  the 
right,  then  to  press  the  right  nostril  with  the  thumb, 
and  to  inspire  through  the  left  nostril,  and  then  to  close 
the  two  nostrils  with  the  ring;  finger  and  the  thumb, 
and  to  stop  all  breathing.  The  order  is  reversed  in  the 
next  operation,  and  in  the  third  act  the  first  form  is 
required.  This  constitutes  the  Pranayama,  and  it 
may  be  repeated  after  short  intervals,  according  to 
choice,  for  hours.  The  Ilatha-dipika  philosophizes  on 
this  by  saying,  “ By  the  motion  of  the  breath,  the 
thinking  principle  moves.  When  that  motion  is 
stopped,  it  becomes  motionless,  and  the  Yogi  becomes 
firm  as  the  trunk  of  a tree  ; therefore  the  breath  should 
be  stopped.  As  long  as  the  breath  remains  in  the 
body,  so  long  it  is  called  living.  Death  is  the  exit  of 
the  breath,  therefore  it  should  be  stopped.” 

5.  Abstraction  of  the  senses  is  effected  by  their  with- 
drawal from  the  objects  toward  which  they  are 
attracted  almost  irresistibly,  and  by  their  concentration 
on  the  thinking  principle.  The  senses  cannot  be  ex- 
tinguished so  long  as  the  body  of  which  they  are  in- 
separable organs  continues  ; but  their  natural  ten- 
dency may  not  merely  be  counteracted,  but  completely 
neutralized.  Their  natural  tendency  is  to  go  outward 
toward  the  varieties  of  tempting  objects  in  which  the 
world  abounds  ; and  when  they  have  their  full  play 
left  unrestrained,  they  prove  sources  of  ceaseless  change 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


181 


to  the  mind,  and  through  it  to  the  other  internal 
organs  and  the  soul.  Their  natural  action  must  there- 
fore be,  not  only  restrained  and  circumscribed,  but 
completely  paralyzed,  or  rather  annihilated,  and  an 
action  to  which  they  are  naturally  averse  substituted  in 
its  place.  In  other  words,  their  outward  and  objective 
action  must  give  place  to  action  purely  inward  and  sub- 
jective. The  mind  must  draw  them  in  as  a tortoise 
draws  its  limbs  within  its  shell  ; and  when  thus  fixed 
upon  the  sotil  itself  they  cease  to  be  sources  of  rest- 
lessness and  trouble. 

This  consummation  is  the  first  great  step  attained  in 
meditation  ; and  the  complete  subjugation  or  abstrac- 
tion of  the  soul  ushers  us  into  the  inner  temple  of  Yoga. 
The  three  remaining  members  are  said  to  be  “ more 
intimate”  than  those  already  described,  and  they  are 
therefore  separated  from  the  others  and  made  to  con- 
stitute a class  by  themselves.  One  result  of  this  classi- 
fication is,  that  the  number  five  plays  an  important 
part  in  Yoga  Philosophy,  as  the  perfect  number  seven 
does  in  Hebrew  literature.  We  have,  for  instance,  five 
functions  or  modifications — right-notion,  misconception, 
purity,  sleep,  and  memory  ; five  afflictions — ignorance, 
egoism,  desire,  aversion,  and  tenacity  of  life  ; five  for- 
bearances — slaughter,  theft,  falsehood,  incontinence, 
and  avarice ; five  obligations— purification,  contentment, 
penance,  study,  and  devotion  to  the  Lord  ; five  subsid- 
iary means — restraint,  obligation,  posture,  regulation 
of  the  breath,  and  abstraction  of  the  senses.  To  these 
may  be  added  th q five  recognized  sources  of  perfections 
( siddhis ),  viz. , birth,  works,  incantations,  austerity,  and 
samadhi. 

6.  The  sixth  step  in  this  exercise  is  the  confinement 
of  the  thinking  principle  to  one  place.  In  the  earlier 


182 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


stages  of  meditation,  the  mind  is  not  fitted  for  con- 
centration on  its  great  theme  of  contemplation,  viz., 
the  soul.  It  must  therefore  he  fixed  on  an  external 
object,  either  through  the  eye  or  without  the  help  of 
any  of  the  senses.  That  external  object  may  be  the  tip 
of  the  nose  or  the  navel- wheel  or  a plexus  of  nerves  in 
the  belly,  or  the  crown  of  the  head  or  the  sky  or  ether. 
When  the  thinking  principle  lias  acquired  by  such  exer- 
cise the  power  of  concentration,  it  may  easily  be  trans- 
ferred from  an  external  to  an  internal  object,  from  the 
objective  11011-self  to  the  subjective  self. 

7.  Dhyan , or  contemplation,  is  the  concentration  of 
the  thinking  principle,  not  on  an  external  object  like 
the  tip  of  the  nose,  or  the  crown  of  the  head,  but  on  its 
proper  object  of  thought.  Dliyau  is  not  the  finishing 
stroke  of  the  Yoga,  because  it  is  not  accompanied  with 
the  obliteration  of  all  distinction  between  the  thinking 
principle,  the  object  of  thought,  and  thought  itself. 
The  state  of  perfect  unconsciousness,  which  is  the  goal 
before  the  Yogi,  is  only  a step  ahead. 

8.  Samadhi , or  concentration,  is  the  final  stage  in 
which  the  thinking  principle  loses  its  separate  identity 
and  becomes  merged  in  the  object  of  thought  and 
thought  itself  ; or  rather  in  which  the  thinking  principle 
is  extinguished  along  with  thought,  and  the  object  of 
thought  remains  in  its  original  state  of  solitude.  This 
state  is  called  Tcaivalya,  translated  “ abstraction”  by 
Mr.  Davies,  and  “ isolation”  by  Dr.  Mitra.  It  is  indi- 
cated in  the  following  extracts  from  Book  IY. : 

“ For  the  knower  of  the  difference  between  soul  and 
non-soul,  there  is  a cessation  of  the  idea  of  self  in  the 
thinking  principle.  Then  the  thinking  principle  is 
turned  toward  discriminative  knowledge,  and  bowed 
down  by  the  weight  of  commencing  isolation.” 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


183 


££  On  the  completion  of  the  series  there  is  produced 
the  meditation  called  the  £ Cloud  of  Virtue,’  even  in 
the  case  of  the  non-aspirant,  from  the  appearance  of 
constant  discrimination.  Thence  follows  the  cessation 
of  afflictions  and  works.  Then  the  knowable  becomes 
small  from  the  infiniteness  of  the  knowledge  free  from 
all  coverings  and  impurities.  Thereupon  takes  place 
the  termination  of  the  succession  of  the  modifications  of 
the  qualities  which  have  accomplished  their  ends.” 

££  Isolation  is  the  regression  of  the  qualities  devoid  of 
the  purpose  of  the  soul,  or  it  is  the  abidance  of  the 
thinking  power  in  its  own  nature.” 

The  process  is  plain.  The  devotee  first  recognizes 
the  fact  that  his  self  is  different  from  the  thinking 
principle,  and  thus  attains  this  discriminative  knowledge. 
Then  a shower  of  virtues  or  rewards  falls  upon  him  un- 
solicited, in  spite  of  his  aspirations  being  completely 
withdrawn  from  them.  Then  the  afflictions  and  works 
disappear,  and  the  objects  of  knowledge  appear  insignifi- 
cant before  its  vastness  and  infinitude.  Then  the 
cosmic  gunas  or  qualities  with  all  their  modifications 
abandon  the  soul  forever,  or  retire  leaving  the  soul  in 
its  original  state  of  quiescense  and  repose.  Here  is 
emancipation,  the  soul’s  liberation  from  the  trammels 
of  Prakriti  till  a fresh  renovation  of  the  world,  if  not 
forever. 

It  is  to  be  noted  here  that  Patanjali  does  not  teach 
the  doctrine  of  the  soul’s  absorption  into  the  deity.  On 
this  important  point  let  us  hear  what  the  learned  trans- 
lator says  : 

“ Professor  Weber  in  his  1 History  of  Indian  Litera- 
ture ’ (pp.  238-39)  has  entirely  misrepresented  the  case, 
lie  says  : £ One  very  peculiar  side  of  the  Yoga  doctrine, 
and  one  which  was  more  and  more  exclusively  devel- 


184 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


oped  as  time  went  on,  is  the  Yoga  practice — that  is,  the 
outward  means,  such  as  penances,  mortifications,  and 
the  like,  whereby  the  absorption  into  the  supreme  God- 
head is  sought  to  be  attained.’  To  those  who  have 
attentively  read  the  preceding  pages,  it  will  be  obvious 
that  the  idea  of  absorption  into  the  Godhead  forms  no 
part  of  the  Yoga  theory.  Indeed  it  is  difficult  to  con- 
ceive how  so  well  read  a scholar  as  the  learned  profes- 
sor could  have  formed  this  opinion  unless  we  behove 
that  he  has  not  read  the  Yoga,  and  has  borrowed  his 
theory  from  the  Bhagavat  Gita  and  Puranic  and  Tan- 
tric  modifications  of  Yoga.  Patanjali,  like  Kapila, 
rests  satisfied  with  this  isolation  of  the  soul.  He  does 
not  pry  into  the  how  and  the  where  the  soul  resides 
after  the  separation”  (p.  209). 

Patanjali’s  God  being  a phantom  conjured  up  to 
satisfy  a popular  clamor  rather  than  to  meet  a necessity 
of  his  philosophy,  he  is  simply  laid  aside,  as  all  phan- 
toms deserve  to  be  in  the  work  of  liberation  as  in  that 
of  creation  and  entanglement  of  Prakriti  in  its  own 
meshes,  and  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  so-called 
emancipation  of  the  soul  is  in  reality  liberation  of  Pra- 
kriti in  the  shape  of  the  thinking  principle  from 
troubles  of  its  own  creation. 

But  this  highest  consummation,  this  summum  bonum, 
is  preceded  by  certain  earthly  advantages  to  the  Yoga  ; 
and  to  these  some  reference  must  be  made.  They  are 
indicated  in  the  following  aphorisms  : 

“ The  knowledge  of  the  past  and  the  future  is  ac- 
quired by  sanyama  over  the  threefold  modification. 
A confused  comprehension  of  word,  meaning,  and 
knowledge  arises  from  indiscriminate  understanding. 
By  Sanyama  with  due  discrimination  is  acquired  an 
understanding  of  the  cry  of  all  creatures.  A knowl- 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


185 


edge  of  former  existence  by  making  the  residua  ap- 
parent. With  reference  to  cognition,  a knowledge  of 
another’s  thinking  principle”  (Book  III.  16-19). 

“ From  Sanyama  with  reference  to  the  shape  of  the 
body,  the  power  of  vision  being  diminished  and  the 
correlation  of  light  and  sight  being  severed,  there  is 
disappearance.  Works  are  deliberate  and  non -de- 
liberate, and  by  Sanyama  about  them  a knowledge  of 
final  end,  or  by  portents.  In  powers,  the  powers  of 
the  elephant  and  the  like.  From  contemplation  of  the 
light  of  the  extremely  luminous  disposition,  a knowl- 
edge is  acquired  of  the  subtile,  the  intercepted,  and 
the  remote.  From  Sanyama  in  the  sun,  a knowledge 
of  regions”  (III.  21-26).  “ In  the  coronal  light,  vision 
of  perfected  ones’  ’ (III.  82). 

These  extracts  are  enough  to  show  that  all  sorts  of 
extraordinary  powers  are  derivable  from  the  applica- 
tion of  the  last  three  members  of  Yoga,  called  San- 
yama in  their  joint  capacity,  to  varieties  of  objects 
perceptible  and  imperceptible — (a)  knowledge  of  the 
past  and  the  future,  of  all  sciences,  of  another’s  mental 
states,  of  one’s  own  adventures  in  past  times,  and  the 
coming  rewards  or  punishments  predestined  on  account 
of  them  and  of  present  works  ; (5)  ability  to  compre- 
hend all  inarticulate  and  indistinct  sounds,  even  the 
cries  of  inferior  animals,  which,  be  it  observed,  have 
souls  as  well  as  men,  and  speak  intelligibly  ; (c)  en- 
larged powers  of  vision  such  as  to  enable  a man  to  see 
heavenly  intelligences,  things  subtile,  such  as  ether, 
and  concealed  beneath  the  earth,  such  as  the  contents 
of  mines,  and  such  things  as  the  ehxir  of  life,  found  on 
the  other  side  of  the  mountain  of  Meru  ; (d)  physical 
powers,  such  as  those  of  the  lion,  the  behemoth — nay, 
much  more  expanded,  even  the  powers  that  may  enable 


18G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


us  literally  to  remove  mountains  and  dry  up  seas  ; (e) 
the  power  of  intercepting’  the  light  between  one’s  own 
body  and  the  eyesight  of  all  classes  of  spectators,  and 
thereby  rendering  one’s  self  either  partially  or  wholly 
invisible  ; (f)  power,  in  a word,  to  assume  all  shapes, 
walk  on  the  water,  fly  in  the  air,  remain  buried  under 
the  earth  for  months  and  years,  and  then  come  up  as 
the  dead  are  expected  to  do  on  the  day  of  judgment, 
or  remain  buried  in  the  earth  as  a pillar  of  stone  till  a 
mound  is  thrown  up  around  the  body  of  the  entranced 
devotee  by  ants,  and  nests  are  built  by  birds  in  his 
tangled  and  clotted  hairs.  The  varied  powers  attain- 
able are  classed  under  eight  heads.  And  these  are  in- 
dicated by  Bhoj  Rajah  in  the  following  order  : 

1.  “ Attenuation  (anima),  the  attainment  of  the  form 
of  atoms— molecularity. 

2.  “ Levity  ( laghima ),  attainment  of  lightness,  like 
that  of  floss  or  cotton. 

3.  “ Ponderosity  ( garima ),  attainment  of  great 
weight. 

4.  ct  Illimitability  ( mahinia ),  attainment  of  great- 
ness, or  the  power  of  touching  the  moon  or  the  like 
with  the  tip  of  one’s  finger. 

5.  “ Irresistible  will  ( prakamya ),  non-fructification 
of  one’s  desires. 

G.  “ Supremacy  ( 'isita ),  highest  authority  over  the 
body  and  internal  organs. 

T.  “ Subjection  ( vasita ),  prevailing  everywhere,  that 
is,  the  elements,  being  subservient  to  him,  do  not  dis- 
obey his  behests. 

8.  “Fulfilment  of  desires  (ka rn a vasay itva) , accom- 
plishing one’s  desires  everywhere — that  is,  in  whatever 
object  a desire  is  found,  the  Yogi  becomes  accomplished 
in  that,  or  brings  it  to  fruition  by  attaining  it  ” (p.  158). 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


187 


These  perfections  are  not  the  products  exclusively  of 
samadhi  / other  causes  are  mentioned  in  the  first  apho- 
rism of  the  fourth  or  last  chapter  of  the  book  under  re- 
view as  co-operating-  with  it  in  their  production.  The 
aphorism  runs  thus  : “ The  perfections  are  produced 
by  birth,  herbs,  incantations,  austerity,  or  samadhi.  ” 
Actions  performed  in  former  lives  must  have  their 
fruits,  and  if  they  are  unfavorable  to  the  acquisition  of 
supernatural  powers,  they  interfere  with  their  attain- 
ment in  spite  of  the  admitted  efficacy  of  concentration. 
And  therefore  merit  acquired  in  past  lives  must  co- 
operate with  Yoga  in  the  generation  of  these  marvel- 
lous powers  of  the  body  and  mind.  Mor  must  such 
things  as  herbs,  amulets,  and  incantations  be  despised, 
they  being  fitted  as  well  to  offer  facilities  for  the  ac- 
quisition of  these  powers  as  to  remove  obstacles  or 
hindrances  to  the  realization  of  the  conditions  on 
which  their  attainment  is  based.  And  as  to  austerity, 
nothing  can  be  more  meritorious  than  that  to  which 
the  great  sages  of  the  Yedic  age,  like  Viswamitra, 
owed  that  greatness  and  glory  which  subsequent  writ- 
ers have  unanimously  represented  as  even  more  than 
divine. 

It  is,  however,  to  be  observed  that  these  powers  are 
after  all  the  subordinate  fruits  of  samadhi  or  concen- 
tration. They  are  accompaniments  of  the  lower,  not 
of  the  higher  kind  of  meditation.  Meditation  is  said 
to  be  with  seed  ( smija ) or  seedless  ( nirvija ) ; that  is, 
with  distinct  recognition  of  subject  and  object  alive, 
and  such  recognition  dead.  Meditation  with  seed  is 
the  stage  where  the  mind  gets  rid  of  all  modifications 
produced  by  external  objects,  but  retains  a distinct 
recognition  of  self  or  its  self-consciousness.  The  ex- 
traordinary powers  enumerated  are  the  gorgeous  ap- 


188 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


pendage  of  this  stage  ; and  there  is  therefore  some 
degree  of  selfishness  connected  with  it.  But  when  the 
mind  passes  to  the  higher  stage  and  loses  its  recognition 
of  self  or  becomes  unconscious,  these  powers  are  cast 
aside  as  old  garments,  and  complete  absorption  into 
the  object  of  thought  is  realized,  and  the  soul  is  saved 
from  material  conditions. 

But  a great  trial  awaits  the  devotee  before  the  final 
emancipation  of  his  soul  is  realized.  This  is  indicated 
in  aphorism  51  of  Book  III.  : “ Avoidance  should  be 
made  of  association  with,  and  encouragement  of,  celes- 
tial temptations,  from  apprehension  of  evil  recurring.” 
The  holy  gods  become  jealous  of  the  man  who,  by  pen- 
ance and  meditation,  acquires  extraordinary  powers 
and  brings  himself  to  the  borders  of  complete  emanci- 
pation. Xo  wonder  ! Mortals  have  at  times,  if  not 
very  frequently,  made  themselves  terrors  and  scourges 
to  the  gods  themselves  by  means  of  extraordinary 
powers  attained  by  austerity  and  meditation,  and  their 
deliverance  is  deprecated  in  heaven.  And,  therefore, 
the  gods  most  naturally  throw  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
the  devotee  about  to  be  beatified,  by  inducing  their 
king,  Indra,  to  send  down  courtesans  from  his  court, 
and  they  make  use  of  their  charms  and  blandishments 
to  induce  him  to  swerve  from  the  path  of  meditation. 
And  when  they  fail,  ghosts  and  hobgoblins,  growling 
tigers  and  hissing  snakes  are  let  loose  with  the  same 
object.  But  when  the  devotee  succeeds  in  frustrating 
all  “ celestial  ” attempts  to  cajole  or  frighten  him  out 
of  his  chosen  path,  he  is  beatified,  and  his  face  becomes 
radiant  with  celestial  glory,  and  the  sweet  smile  of  con- 
scious deliverance  pla}rs  upon  his  lips  ; such  at  least 
was  the  case  with  the  great  Buddha  under  the  Bo-tree 
at  Gy  a,  though  the  temptations  thrown  in  his  way 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


ISO 


proceeded  from  the  malice  of  Mara,  not  from  the 
jealousy  of  the  gods  ! 

Such  is  Yoga  Philosophy,  if  philosophy  a series  of 
practical  rules,  having  for  their  object  the  complete  ex- 
tinction of  mental  activity,  can  properly  be  called. 
Contradictory  statements  are  sure  to  be  met  in  our  ex- 
position of  its  maxims,  as  the  system  itself  veers  about, 
now  assuming  the  existence  of  God,  and  then  convert- 
ing Him  into  a mere  phantom  or  a useless  appendage  ; 
now  making  the  soul  the  object  ' of  thought,  and  then 
making  thought  feed  upon  itself  ; now  representing 
salvation  as  the  extinction  of  happiness  as  well  as  pain  ; 
and  then  representing  the  “ saved  ” man  as  happy 
beyond  description  ! The  system,  however,  can  be 
thoroughly  understood  only  when  we  divest  ourselves 
of  all  our  metaphysical  ideas,  and  look,  according  to  the 
known  principles  of  the  Sankhya  Philosophy,  upon  the 
so-called  internal  organs,  intelligence,  self-conscious- 
ness, and  mind  as  material  evolutes  essentially  uncon- 
nected with  the  soul  ; and  the  complete  extinction  of 
all  these  subtle  productions  of  matter  as  necessary  to 
its  salvation  from  both  the  happiness  and  the  misery 
reflected  in  it  on  account  of  their  existence  and  proxim- 
ity to  it.  The  process  by  which  such  extinction  is 
brought  about  is,  not  the  skeleton  merely,  but  the  body 
and  soul  of  this  philosophy. 

The  Yoga  Philosophy  has  been  compared  to  mesmer- 
ism and  spiritualism  by  philosophic  thinkers,  as  well  as 
by  the  charlatans  who,  under  the  banner  of  so-called 
Theosophy,  are  trying  to  revive  its  lost  prestige  in 
India.  But  it  has  very  little  in  common  with  mesmer- 
ism, as  it  does  not  uphold  that  belief  in  animal  magnet- 
ism which  its  founder,  Franz  Mesmer,  propagated  ; 
and  that  faith  in  magnetic  somnambulism  by  which  one 


190 


HIXDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


of  his  followers  infused  new  life  into  it,  when  his  theory 
was  condemned  by  a conclave  of  professional  men. 
Varieties  of  bodily  exercises,  rather  than  magnetization 
of  chosen  “ subjects”  by  passes  of  hand,  were  the  ap- 
proved weapons  of  the  Yoga  philosopher,  and  self-con- 
trol rather  than  control  over  others  his  main  aim. 
Some  of  the  powers  said  to  have  been  acquired  by  him, 
such  as  introvision,  prevision,  and  retrovision,  resemble 
those  which  are  said  to  be  realized  under  what  is  tech- 
nically called  clairvoyance  ; but  while  these  played  only 
a secondary  part  in  Yoga  Philosophy,  they  are  the 
very  soul  of  mesmerism. 

And  as  to  Spiritism,  there  is  one  aphorism  in  Pa- 
tanjali’s  work,  the  verse  in  which  the  power  of  seeing 
subtle  evolutes  of  matter  and  spirits  is  represented  as 
attainable,  that  alone  has  the  remotest  reference  to  it. 
The  idea  of  seances  and  communication  with  the  dis- 
embodied spirits  of  the  great  men  of  the  world,  dead 
and  gone,  may  be  represented  as  an  innovation  upon 
the  system,  not,  however,  as  one  of  its  original  ele- 
ments. Nor  did  an  investigation  into  the  occult  powers 
of  nature  originally  constitute  any  portion  of  the  Yogi’s 
business  ; his  aim  being,  not  tlie  acquisition  of  general 
knowledge,  but  that  of  the  knowledge  of  the  essential 
distinction  between  soul  and  non-soul. 

It  may,  however,  be  admitted  that  truths,  some- 
what like  those  of  Mesmerism  and  Spiritism,  were  su- 
peradded  to  the  system  before  it  was  many  years  old  ; 
and  the  Yogi  appears,  in  consequence,  as  a juggler  and 
necromancer  in  Sanscrit  poetry  and  drama.  The  sys- 
tem deteriorated  early  ; and  its  success  in  a lower 
sense  and  failure  in  a higher  are  exhibited  in  India  to- 
day. The  power  of  self-torture  the  Yogi  evinces  now, 
as  he  did  in  days  gone  by,  is  miraculous  indeed. 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


191 


Monier  Williams  in  his  “ Indian  Wisdom”  thus  groups 
the  forms  of  self-torture  resorted  to  : 

“ We  read  of  some  who  acquire  the  power  of  re- 
maining under  water  for  a space  of  time  quite  incredi- 
ble ; of  others  who  bury  themselves  up  to  the  neck  in 
the  ground  or  even  below  it,  leaving  only  a little  hole 
through  which  to  breathe  ; of  others  who  keep  their 
fists  clenched  for  years  till  the  nails  grow  through  the 
back  of  their  hands  ; of  others  who  hold  one  or  both 
arms  aloft  till  they  become  immovably  fixed  in  that  posi- 
tion and  withered  to  the  bone  ; of  others  who  roll  their 
bodies  for  thousands  of  miles  to  some  place  of  pilgrim- 
age ; of  others  who  sleep  on  beds  of  iron  spikes  . . . 
others  have  been  known  to  chain  themselves  for  life  to 
trees  ; others,  again,  to  pass  their  lives,  heavily 
chained,  in  iron  cages.  Lastly,  the  extent  to  which 
some  Indian  ascetics  will  carry  fasting,  far  exceeds  any- 
thing ever  heard  of  in  Europe,  as  may  be  understood 
by  a reference  to  the  rules  of  the  lunar  penance  {chan- 
dr  ay  ana)  given  by  Mann.  This  penance  is  a kind  of 
fast,  which  consists  in  diminishing  the  consumption  of 
food  every  day  by  one  mouthful  for  the  waning  half  of 
the  lunar  month,  beginning  with  fifteen  mouthfuls  at 
the  full  moon,  until  the  quantity  is  reduced  to  nothing 
at  the  new  moon,  and  then  increasing  it  in  like  manner 
during  the  fortnight  of  the  moon’s  increase”  (pp. 
105-106). 

But  the  Yogis,  as  a body,  are  for  various  reasons  de- 
spised, rather  than  honored,  except  perhaps  among  the 
most  ignorant  and  superstitious.  They,  in  the  first 
place,  associate  varied  acts  of  self-indulgence  of  a cul- 
pable nature  with  the  varieties  of  tortures  they  inflict 
upon  themselves.  They  make  use  of  intoxicating 
drugs,  so  as  to  be  always  in  a state  of  partial  insensi- 


192 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


bility  ; and  they  never  scruple  to  allow  themselves  to 
be  implicated  in  nefarious  and  libidinous  intrigues. 
They  are,  in  the  matter  of  self-control,  the  very  anti- 
podes of  what  they  are  expected  to  be,  being  as  a rule 
avaricious,  irascible,  quarrelsome,  and  turbulent.  And 
lastly,  they  never  hesitate  to  resort  to  varieties  of  low 
tricks  for  the  purpose  of  imposing  on  the  credulity  of 
those  by  whom,  but  for  them,  they  would  be  held  in 
contempt.  Their  attitude  proves  to  a demonstration 
that  bodily  tortures  are  not  necessarily  accompanied 
with  spiritual  renovation,  even  when  inflicted  by  the 
devotee  upon  his  own  self,  with  the  most  pious  of 
motives.  It  also  shows  that  those  missionaries  who 
advise  native  preachers  to  live  as  they  do,  do  not  place 
before  them  very  exalted  models  of  character  or  types 
of  self-sacrifice  ! 

But  why  do  they  not  give  up  those  bodily  tortures 
which  are  trying  to  flesh  and  blood  ? Because  they 
believe  that  they  are,  in  spite  of  their  freaks  of  temper 
and  aberrations  of  conduct,  acquiring  extra  merit  by 
their  chosen  course  of  mortification  and  penance.  The 
idea  that  sin  and  virtue  can  on  no  account  be  united  is 
foreign  to  Hindu  theology  ; and  external  observances 
of  the  most  exacting  stamp  are  eagerly  resorted  to  in 
our  country  by  persons  who  never  dream  of  giving  up 
their  favorite  sins  as  fitted,  not  merely  to  make  an 
atonement  for  these,  but  to  secure  a store  of  superero- 
gatory merit  in  spite  of  them  ! Can  moral  turpitude 
go  further  ? 

We  cannot  conclude  without  an  opportune  reference 
to  the  farce  played  by  the  Hew  Dispensationists  under 
color  of  the  Yoga  system.  They  call  themselves  dev- 
otees of  Yoga,  entertain  the  public  with  a new  species 
of  dance,  and  practise  some  species  of  sacred  jugglery 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 


193 


within  the  walls  of  a splendid  house,  and  amid  comforts 
spurned  by  the  ancient  Yogi  as  antagonistic  to  the 
main  object  of  his  life.  But  they  are  utter  strangers  to 
the  sacrifices,  privations,  mortifications,  and  penances 
as  enjoined  in  the  Yoga  Sastra  ; while  as  busybodies, 
engaged  in  getting  up  sensational  demonstrations  for 
the  purpose  of  maintaining  their  sinking  prestige,  they 
never  dream  of  betaking  themselves  to  that  intense 
meditation  without  which  their  loudly  tallied  of  “ God- 
vision’  ’ is  unattainable,  even  according  to  books  which 
might  be  represented  as  a series  of  improvements  upon 
that  Sastra.  All  this,  and  something  more,  may  be 
said  of  the  self-constituted  Theosophist,  who,  while  talk- 
ing aloud  of  Yoga  as  the  best  of  sciences,  never  scruple 
to  live  after  the  fashion  of  the  world,  and  thereby  set 
forth  the  contrast  between  what  they  say  and  what 
they  do  ! 


CHAPTER  YII. 


THE  NAYAYA  SYSTEM,  OK  THE  HUTDU  LOGIC. 

Tiie  two  systems  of  philosophy,  the  Sankhya  and 
Yoga,  are  synthetic,  the  process  adopted  by  them  being 
that  of  an  evolution  from  a primordial,  diffusive  sub- 
stance, through  material  forms  of  a tenuous,  impercep- 
tible character,  into  that  complicated  framework  of 
nature,  the  varied  portions  of  which  make  suitable  im- 
pressions on  the  senses.  But  the  two  systems  we  have 
to  deal  with  in  this  and  the  succeeding  paper — viz.,  the 
Yyaiyaika  and  Yaiseshika — are  analytic,  as  their 
adopted  method  indicates  a descent  from  complexity  to 
unity,  not  an  ascent  from  the  uniform  to  the  multi- 
form, the  one  to  the  many.  They  begin  with  classifica- 
tion ; place  the  objects  of  nature,  both  imperceptible 
and  perceptible,  under  fixed  categories  ; state  the  prin- 
ciples by  which  the  cognition  of  the  latter  by  the  mind 
is  regulated,  and  the  existence  of  the  former  is  demon- 
strated ; show  how  the  soul  is  enslaved  and  distressed 
by  them  ; proceed  to  the  very  source  of  its  bitter 
bondage,  and  the  ultimate  cause  of  creation  ; and, 
finally,  point  out  the  way  in  which  its  emancipation  is 
insured  and  effected.  They  therefore  embrace  a 
variety  of  subjects,  and  can  only  be  called  Logical  in 
the  most  ancient  and  comprehensive  sense  of  the  term. 
The  philosophy  of  these  schools  is  what  was  understood 
in  ancient  times  by  the  now  rarely  used  term,  Po- 
lymathy,  including,  as  it  does,  Logic,  Physiology,  Psy- 


THE  NAYAYA  SYSTEM. 


195 


chology,  and  Theology.  It  includes  what  is  embraced 
in  the  tripartite  classification  of  the  Hegelian  system, 
in  which  the  Science  of  Logic,  the  Philosophy  of  Ma- 
ture, and  the  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit  are  all  em- 
bodied. 

We  shall  in  this  paper  confine  ourselves  to  a portion 
of  the  all-comprehensive  philosophy  of  the  Nyaiyaika 
and  Yaiseshika  schools,  the  portion  embodying  its 
Logic  and  Physiology,  and  reserve  our  exposition  of  its 
Psychology  and  Theology  for  a separate  paper.  Our 
desire  is  to  present  the  salient  features  of  this  huge  and 
all-comprehensive  system  in  the  modes  of  reasoning, 
the  forms  of  expression,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  in  the 
very  words  in  which  these  are  set  forth  in  its  standard 
works. 

A word  about  the  founders  of  these  two  schools  of 
Philosophy,  and  the  original  and  standard  documents  in 
which  their  principles  are  unfolded,  ought  to  precede 
our  analysis  of  the  system  in  question.  The  founder  of 
the  Nyaiyaika  school  was  Gfotama  or  Gautama,  and  the 
founder  of  the  Yaiseshika  school  was  Kanada.  These 
two  persons  are  mythical  heroes,  like  Kapila  and 
Patanjali,  the  founders  respectively  of  the  Sankhya  and 
Yoga  systems.  Scarcely  anything  reliable  is  known 
regarding  them  besides  the  undisputed  fact  that  they 
founded  respectively  the  schools  of  thought  with  which 
their  names  are  inseparably  associated. 

Gautama  is  said  in  a sacred  legend  to  have  been  born 
in  Northern  India  in  the  beginning  of  the  Treta  Yuga, 
or  the  second  of  the  four  great  eras  into  which  the  his- 
tory of  the  world  is  divided  by  Hindu  chronologists, 
and  to  have  married  Ahalya,  the  daughter  of  Brahma 
himself.  But  though  thus  highly  connected,  his  family 
life  was  by  no  means  happy,  inasmuch  as  his  wife, 


196 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


albeit  a goddess  herself,  was  seduced  by  Indra,  the 
king  of  heaven,  and  ultimately  changed  into  a rock  for 
her  infidelity  to  the  solemn  vows  of  matrimony.  Her 
divine  seducer  and  lover  was  also  punished,  but  in  a 
manner  over  which  decency  compels  us  to  draw  the 
veil.  Scarcely  any  reliable  report,  good  or  scandalous, 
has  come  down  to  us  about  Kanada  ; but  he  appears 
to  have  been  the  more  austere  devotee  and  the  greater 
thinker.  On  the  whole,  the  two  philosophers  agreed 
with  each  other,  though  their  differences  on  minor 
points  have  been  noticed  in  the  exegetic  disquisitions  by 
which  their  writings  have  been  elucidated  by  eminent 
commentators. 

The  original  works  of  these  schools  are  the  Sutras  or 
Aphorisms  ascribed  to  Gautama,  called  the  Ay  ay  a 
Sutras,  and  those  traced  to  Kanada,  called  the  Yaise- 
shika  Sutras.  These,  like  all  the  Aphorisms  of  all  the 
schools  of  the  ancient  philosophy  of  our  country,  are 
elliptical,  enigmatical,  and  obscure  ; and  they  would, 
but  for  the  triple  set  of  commentaries  by  which  they 
have  been  made  to  some  extent  clear,  be  positively  un- 
intelligible. 

Gautama’s  work,  the  Ay  ay  a Sutras,  consists  of  five 
books,  each  of  which  is  divided  into  two  Lessons.  The 
miscellaneous  nature  of  its  contents  is  set  forth  in  the 
following  conspectus  presented  in  the  “ Sarva-Darsana- 
Sangraha 

“ The  principle  that  final  bliss,  i.e.  the  absolute  aboli- 
tion of  pain,  arises  from  the  knowledge  of  the  truth 
(though  in  a certain  sense  universally  accepted),  is 
established  in  a special  sense  as  a particular  tenet  of 
the  Ay  ay  a school,  as  is  declared  by  the  author  of  the 
Aphorisms  in  the  words,  ‘ Proof,  that  which  is  to  be 
proved,  etc. — from  knowledge  of  the  truth  as  to  these 


THE  NAYATA  SYSTEM. 


197 


things,  there  is  the  attainment  of  final  bliss.’  This  is 
the  first  aphorism  of  the  Nyaya  Sastra.  Now  the 
Nyaya  Sastra  consists  of  five  books,  and  each  book 
contains  two  ‘daily  portions.’  In  the  first  daily  por- 
tion of  the  first  book  the  venerable  Gautama  discusses 
the  definitions  of  nine  categories,  beginning  with 
‘ proof,  ’ and  in  the  second  of  those  of  the  remaining 
seven  beginning  with  ‘discussion.’  In  the  first  daily 
portion  of  the  second  book  he  examines  ‘ doubt,  ’ dis- 
cusses the  four  kinds  of  ‘ proof,  ’ and  refutes  the  sug- 
gested objections  to  their  being  instruments  of  right 
knowledge  ; and  in  the  second  he  says  that  ‘ presump- 
tion,’ etc.  are  really  included  in  the  four  kinds  of  proof 
already  given  (and  therefore  need  not  be  added  by  the 
Mimansakas  as  separate  ones).  In  the  first  daily  por- 
tion of  the  third  book  he  examines  the  soul,  the  body, 
the  senses,  and  their  objects  ; in  the  second,  ‘ intelli- 
gence ’ (Buddhi)  and  ‘ mind  ’ (Manas).  In  the  first 
daily  portion  of  the  fourth  book  he  examines  ‘ volition  ’ 
(Pravritti),  the  ‘ faults,’  ‘transmigration,’  ‘fruits’  (of 
actions),  ‘ pain,’  and  ‘ final  liberation  ; ’ in  the  second 
he  investigates  the  truth  as  to  the  causes  of  the 
‘faults,’  and  also  ‘wholes’  and  ‘parts.’  In  the 'first 
daily  portion  of  the  fifth  book  he  discusses  the  various 
kinds  of  ‘ futility  ’ (Jati),  and  in  the  second  the  various 
kinds  of  ‘ occasions  for  rebuke  ’ (Xigrahastama  or  ‘ un- 
fitness to  be  argued  with  ’).” 

Four  of  the  five  books  were  edited  and  translated  by 
Dr.  Ballantyne,  with  portions  of  one  of  the  standard 
modern  commentaries.  These,  with  a Compendium  of 
Indian  Logic,  called  “ Tarka  Sangraha,”  edited  and 
translated  by  the  same  scholar  with  his  own  comments, 
and  the  larger  book,  called  “ Bhasa  Parichheda,”  with 
its  commentary,  “ Sidhanta  Muktavali,”  both  partially 


19S 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


edited  and  translated  by  him,  and  fully  by  Dr.  Doer, 
are  the  standard  works  on  the  system  of  logic  to  be  un- 
folded in  these  pages.  Our  remarks  on  the  Vaiseshika 
Sutras,  edited  and  translated  in  a masterly  manner  by 
Professor  Gough,  are  reserved  for  our  next  paper, 
though  our  determination  to  lay  this  great  work  under 
contribution  in  this  is  freely  expressed.  The  system  of 
Indian  Logic  belongs  in  its  main  features  to  both  these 
schools,  and  therefore  a discrimination  between  them  is 
hardly  desirable  in  an  attempt  to  set  forth  its  princi- 
ples. 

It  cannot  be  asserted  too  often  that  the  peculiar 
phraseology  of  Indian  Logic  and  its  approved  modes  of 
reasoning  run  like  threads  of  gold  through  all  the  dis- 
* sertations  on  Hindu  Philosophy  extant,  insomuch  that 
the  latter  cannot  be  understood  unless  the  former  are 
thoroughly  mastered.  A careful  study  of  foreign  logic 
is  by  no  means  a proper  preparation  for  a study  of 
indigenous  philosophy.  A person  may  be  a perfect 
master  of  Aristotelian  logic  and  the  varied  systems  to 
which  it  has  given  birth  in  Europe  ; but  such  mastery, 
though  acquired  after  years  of  toil,  will  not  in  the 
slightest  degree  help  him  through  the  tangled  webs  of 
logomachy  and  sophistry,  as  also  of  correct  reasoning, 
which  stand  out  in  bold  relief  from  the  pages  of  stand- 
ard works  on  Hindu  Philosophy.  To  be  able  to  bring 
this  enterprise  to  a successful  issue,  he  must  master  the 
high-sounding  terminology  and  the  cumbrous  modes  of 
reasoning  by  which  the  Indian  Logical  System  is  differ- 
entiated from  all  other  rival  schemes.  Of  this  fact  he 
will  be  convinced  the  moment  he  takes  up  a book  like 
the  “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha,”  opens  it  at  random, 
and  begins  the  arduous  task  of  understanding  what  is 
set  before  him  on  the  page  on  which  his  attention  is  con- 


THE  KAYATA  SYSTEM. 


199 


cent  rated.  Treatises  like  Sankar’s  commentaries  on 
the  Hpanishads  or  the  Brahma  Sutras,  or  the  innumer- 
able other  commentaries  piled  up  in  the  way  of  the 
student  of  Hindu  Philosophy,  cannot  possibly  be  under- 
stood, not  to  say  mastered,  without  an  intimate  ac- 
quaintance with  the  peculiarities  of  the  Logic,  from 
which  they  derive  their  most  prominent,  as  well  as 
repellant,  features. 

Indian  Logic  is,  to  adopt  a word  current  in  mediaeval 
schools,  a trivium , or  a complex  system  of  grammar, 
logic,  and  rhetoric.  The  following  quotations  from  the 
“ Tarka  Sangraka”  will  show  that  even  the  most  ordi- 
nary principles  of  grammar  are  not  forgotten  in  a 
standard  treatise  on  logic  : 

“ The  cause  of  a sentence’s  being  .significant  (is  the 
presence  of)  mutual  correspondence,  compatibility,  and 
juxtaposition  (of  words). 

“ Mutual  correspondence  means  the  reverse  of  a dis- 
position to  indicate  any  other  than  the  intended  connec- 
tion of  one  word  with  another.  Compatibility  consists 
in  (a  word’s)  not  rendering  futile  the  sense  (of  the  sen- 
tence). Juxtaposition  consists  in  the  enunciation  of  the 
words  without  a (long)  pause  between  each. 

£ ‘ A collection  of  words  devoid  of  mutual  corre- 
spondence, etc.,  is  no  valid  sentence — for  example, 
‘ Cow,  horse,  man,  elephant  ’ gives  go  information, 
the  words  having  no  reference  to  one  another. 

“ The  expression,  ‘ He  should  irrigate  with  fire,’  is 
no  valid  sentence,  for  there  is  no  compatibility  (between 
fire  and  irrigation). 

“The  words,  ‘Bring — the — cow,’  not  pronounced 
close  together,  but  with  an  interval  of  some  three  hours 
between  each,  constitute  no  valid  sentence  from  the 
absence  of  (the  requisite)  closeness  of  juxtaposition.” 


200 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


These  extracts  are  not  presented  as  instances  of  de- 
fectiveness in  the  system,  it  being  a well-known  fact 
that  a little  grammar  must  always  be  associated  with 
logic,  especially  in  its  classification  of  propositions  and 
its  statement  of  the  terms  of  which  each  distinct  propo- 
sition, positive  or  negative,  universal  or  particular,  con- 
sists. The  very  second  essay  of  Aristotle’s  “ Organon” 
is  an  essay  on  philology  rather  than  logic,  treating  as  it 
does  of  what  he  represents  as  the  component  parts  of 
discourses,  such  as  propositions  and  sentences.  It  must 
he  confessed  that  in  its  classification  of  propositions  or 
presentation  of  the  peculiarities  of  sentences,  Indian 
Logic  is  poorer  than  the  system  of  Aristotle. 

In  rhetoric  it  is  perhaps  richer.  Rhetoric  cannot  be 
dissociated  from  logic,  inasmuch  as  the  efficacy  of  a 
logically  conducted  argument  is  often  enhanced  by 
happy  turns  of  expression,  attractive  illustrations,  and 
eloquent  appeals  to  feeling.  Inchan  Logic  has  not 
erred  in  enlisting  on  its  side  a few  of  the  well-known 
rules  of  grammar,  and  a few  of  the  imposing  embel- 
lishments of  rhetoric,  as  will  be  made  manifest  by 
and  by. 

Indian  Logic,  like  every  other  system  of  logic,  treats 
of  the  objects  of  knowledge  and  the  laws  of  thought, 
and  its  approved  mode  or  method  of  discussion  is  indi- 
cated by  three  words  : (1)  Enunciation  (Uddesa),  (2) 
Definition  (Lakshana),  and  (3)  Investigation  (Pariksha). 
Enunciation  is  the  formal  statement  of  the  subject  to  be 
discussed  ; Definition  is  a statement  of  the  differentia 
by  which  it  is  discriminated  from  all  other  subjects, 
whether  cognate  or  otherwise  ; and  Investigation  is  an 
examination  into  and  an  analysis  of  these  differentiat- 
ing properties. 

The  subjects  discussed  in  the  Ryaya  Sastra  are  six- 


THE  XAYAYA  SYSTEM. 


201 


teen  in  number,  ancl  they  are  categorically  stated  in  the 
first  aphorism  of  the  book.  They  are  : 

1.  Pramana,  or  Proof  or  Instrument  of  Right  Notion 
or  Knowledge. 

2.  Prameya,  or  Objects  of  Right  Notion  or  Knowl- 
edge. 

3.  Sansaya,  or  Doubt  about  the  Point  to  be  Dis- 
cussed. 

4.  Prayajana,  or  Motive  for  Discussing  it. 

5.  Drishtanta,  or  Familiar  Example. 

G.  Siddhanta,  or  a Determinate  Case  or  Tenet. 

7.  Avayava,  or  the  Syllogism. 

8.  Tarka,  or  Refutation. 

9.  Nirnaya,  or  Ascertainment. 

10.  Yada,  or  Controversy. 

11.  Jalpa,  or  Wrangling. 

12.  Yitanda,  or  Cavilling. 

13.  Hetwabhasa,  or  Fallacies. 

11.  Chhala,  or  Frauds  or  Quibbling  Artifices. 

15.  Jati,  or  Futile  Replies. 

16.  Nirgahastana,  or  Conclusion  by  pointing  out  the 
objector’s  “ unfitness  to  be  argued  with.” 

1.  The  first  subject  treated  of  is  “ Proof,”  in  accord- 
ance with  the  maxim  given  in  the  “ Sarva-Darsana-San- 
graha,”in  these  words  : “To  know  the  thing  to  be 
measured,  you  must  first  know  the  measure.”  The 
Nyaiyaikas  admit  four  kinds  of  proof  or  instruments 
of  right  knowledge,  the  three  admitted  in  the  Sankhya 
school  and  one  more.  These  are  : ( a ) Perception,  (Z>) 
Inference,  (c)  Testimony,  (d)  Comparison. 

a.  The  importance  of  Perception  as  an  instrument  of 
knowledge  need  not  be  enlarged  upon  at  a time  when  a 
tendency  is  manifested  by  a class  of  philosophers  to  a 
recognition  of  the  evidence  furnished  by  it  as  the  only 


202 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


conclusive  evidence  available  to  us.  It  is,  however, 
desirable  to  sliow  the  process  involved  in  every  distinct 
act  of  perception,  according  to  the  principles  of  this 
school.  Cognition  is  the  result,  not  of  an  external 
object  only,  not  even  of  the  conjunction  of  an  external 
object  with  a sense-organ,  but  of  “ contiguity  of  soul, 
organ,  and  object.”  “That,”  says  Kanada,  “is  an 
invalid  argument  (which  affirms  that  sensible  cognition 
is  an  attribute  either  of  the  body  or  of  the  senses).” 
The  cognitive  faculty  is  then  transferred  from  the 
material  body  and  from  the  senses,  both  external  and 
internal,  to  the  soul  ; and  in  this  a marked  deviation 
from  the  principles  of  the  Sankhya  school  is  realized. 

It  is  distinctly  affirmed  that  “consciousness”  does 
not  inhere  in  the  body  or  in  the  external  senses,  or  in 
the  inner  sensory  or  mind  ; and  that  the  process  of 
elaboration  by  which  the  raw  materials  of  sensation  are 
worked  up  into  appropriate  ideas  is  not  their  work. 
The  soul,  then,  according  to  the  theory  of  perception 
propounded  in  this  school,  is  not  an  unconscious  recipi- 
ent of  reflected  impressions,  but  a conscious,  percipient 
principle,  and  an  active  framer  of  ideas.  This  is  a 
great  improvement  on  the  Sankhya  philosophy,  which, 
by  positing  an  unconscious,  inactive,  perfectly  quiescent 
soul,  has  laid  itself  open  to  the  charge  of  propagating 
rank  materialism.  But  it  will  be  shown  by  and  by 
that  the  analytical  schools  are  not  thoroughly  consistent 
either  in  their  representations  of  God,  the  universal,  or 
in  their  descriptions  of  the  individual  soul. 

The  peculiarity  of  the  theory  of  perception  propounded 
in  schools  of  Hindu  Philosophy  in  general  is  set  forth 
when  it  is  stated  that  the  object  of  perception  is  identi- 
cal with  the  subject  of  right  notion.  The  percipient 
faculty  literally  becomes  the  object  perceived.  For  in- 


THE  NAYAYA  SYSTEM. 


203 


stance,  when  a jar  is  perceived,  the  percipient  mind  or 
soul  assumes  the  form  of  the  jar ; and  therefore  the  idea, 
which  is  formed  in  the  mind  or  into  which  the  mind 
is  changed — viz.,  the  subject  of  right  notion— is  not 
different  from  the  external  object  perceived.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Vedantic  school,  when  an  object  is  perceived  " 
an  effluence  comes  out  of  the  percipient  soul  and  as- 
sumes the  form  of  that  object,  and  all  difference  be- 
tween the  subjective  idea  and  the  objective  reality  is 
annihilated. 

I).  Inference  is  represented,  by  no  less  a logician  than 
John  Stuart  Mill,  as  “ not  only  valid,”  but  “ the  foun- 
dation” of  both  induction  and  deduction,  or  syllogism. 
Our  great  Indian  logicians  make  as  much  of  it  as  he 
does,  though  they  do  not  seem  disposed  to  sympathize 
with  him  in  his  avowed  contempt  for  the  syllogistic  or 
deductive  process  of  reasoning.  Inference,  according  to 
them,  is  of  three  kinds,  as  perception  is  of  six,  the  in- 
struments of  the  latter  being  the  five  external  and  one 
internal  organ.  “In  the  Ay  ay  a Aphorisms,” -says  a 
modern  commentator,  “ it  is  taught  that  inference  is  of 
three  kinds — from  the  antecedent,  from  the  subsequent, 
and  that  which  is  drawn  generally.  That  which  is 
from  antecedence  (or  progressive  inference)  has  for  its 
mark  a cause,  or  an  invariable  sequence.  That  which 
is  from  subsequence  (or  regressive  inference)  has  an 
affect  for  its  mark,  or  the  incompatibility  of  other 
causes.  That  which  is  general  has  for  its  mark  some- 
thing distinct  from  cause  and  effect,  or  is  from  concom- 
itance and  incompatibility.”  The  same  commentator 
slse where  says  : “ Inference  is  threefold,  as  produced 
by  illation  from  only  positive  conditions  ; from  only 
negative  conditions,  and  from  both  positive  and  nega- 
tive conditions.  For  example  : This  is  a proposition, 


204 


HIXDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


inasmuch  as  it  is  knowable,  etc.,  is  an  illation  only 
from  positive  conditions  ; earth  differs  from  other  sub- 
stances inasmuch  as  it  is  possessed  of  odors,  etc.,  is  an 
illation  from  only  negative  conditions  ; the  mountain  is 
fiery  inasmuch  as  it  smokes,  etc.,  is  an  illation  from 
both  positive  and  negative  conditions.” 

In  plainer  terms,  we  have  here  set  forth  inference 
a priori,  or  inference  from  cause  to  effect  ; inference 
a posteriori , or  inference  from  effect  to  cause  ; and  in- 
ference by  analogy,  as  our  inference  that  mango-trees 
are  generally  blossoming  from  the  sight  of  one  blossom- 
ing mango- tree.  These  three  classes  are  subdivided  into 
various  smaller  ones,  of  which  no  notice  need  be  taken 
in  a brief  synopsis  like  what  is  attempted  in  this  paper. 

The  ingenuity  of  Indian  logicians  is  displayed  in 
what  is  said  about  inferential  cognition  in  the  first 
aphorism  of  the  Second  Daily  Lesson  of  the  Ninth 
Book  of  the  Vaiseshika  Sutras  : “ Inferential  cognition 
is  that  one  thing  is  the  effect  or  cause  of,  conjunct 
with,  repugnant  to,  or  coinherent  in,  another.”  This 
is  thus  explained  by  another  commentator  : “ Inference 
results  from  a mark,  which  is  an  effect,  as  the  inference 
of  fire,  etc.  from  smoke,  light,  etc. ; also  from  a mark 
which  is  in  a cause,  as  where  a deaf  man  infers  a sound 
from  a particular  conjunction  of  a drum  with  the  drum- 
stick. . . . This  single  connection,  then,  characterized 
as  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  has  been  stated  in 
two  ways.  Inference  from  a conjunct  object  is  such  as 
inference  of  the  organ  of  touch  from  observation  of  an 
animal  body.  Inference  from  a repugnant  object  is 
such  as  inference  of  an  ichneumon  concealed  by  bushes, 
etc.,  from  observation  of  an  excited  snake.  Inference 
from  a coinherent  object  is  such  as  the  inference  of  fire 
connected  with  water  from  the  heat  of  the  water.” 


THE  NAYAYA  SYSTEM. 


205 


c.  Testimony,  as  an  instrument  of  knowledge,  is 
twofold,  divine,  and  human.  The  “ Tarka  Sangraha” 
thus  sets  forth  the  difference  : “ Speech  is  of  two  kinds, 
Sacred  ( yaidika ) and  Temporal  or  Profane  ( laukiha ). 
The  former,  being  uttered  by  God,  is  all  authoritative  ; 
but  the  latter,  only  if  uttered  by  one  who  deserves  con- 
fidence, is  authoritative,  otherwise  it  is  not  so.  ’ ’ Here 
not  only  is  revelation  admitted,  but  its  perpetuation 
through  the  instrumentality  of  a succession  of  prophets 
and  seers. 

The  existence  of  objects  not  generally  perceptible, 
such  as  the  soul,  space,  time,  etc.,  is  proved  both  by 
inference  and  revelation.  We  say  “ not  generally  per- 
ceptible,” because  it  is  possible,  according  to  Hindu 
Philosophy,  to  have  our  faculties  of  perception  so  far 
expanded  as  to  make  it  competent  to  us  to  perceive 
those  realities  which  are  generally  represented  as  im- 
perceptible. The  eleventh  aphorism  of  the  First  Daily 
Lesson  of  the  Hi  nth  Book  of  the  Vaisesliika  Sutras 
runs  thus  : “ Perception  of  the  soul  (results)  from  a 
particular  conjunction  between  the  soul  and  the  internal 
organ  in  the  soul.”  On  these  words  we  have  these 
comments  : “ Ascetics  are  of  two  kinds,  those  who 
have  meditated  on  the  internal  organ  and  are  called 
united,  and  those  who  have  not  meditated  on  the  inter- 
nal organ  and  are  called  disunited.  Of  these  the 
united,  having  reverently  fixed  on  the  object  to  be  pre- 
sented to  it,  are  engaged  in  meditation  ; and  in  them 
cognition  of  the  soul,  whether  of  their  own  or  of  that 
of  others,  is  produced.  Perception  of  the  soul  is  that 
cognition  wherein  the  soul  is  the  percept  or  object  of 
presentation.  ’ ’ 

cl.  Comparison  as  a source  of  right  notion  is  thus  set 
forth  in  the  “Tarka  Sangraha”:  “Comparison 


206 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


(' upamana ) is  tlie  cause  of  an.  inference  from  similarity 
(' wpamiti ).  Such  an  inference  consists  in  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  relation  between  a name  and  the  thing  so 
named.  The  recollection  of  the  purport  of  a statement 
of  resemblance  is  a step  involved  in  the  process.  For 
example,  a person  not  knowing  what  is  meant  by  the 
word  gavaya  ( Bos  gavceus ) having  heard  from  some  in- 
habitant of  the  forest  that  a gavaya  is  like  a cow,  goes 
to  the  forest.  Kemembering  the  purport  of  what  he 
has  been  told,  he  sees  a body  like  that  of  a cow.  Then 
this  inference  from  similarity  arises  (in  his  mind)  that 
this  is  what  is  meant  by  the  word  gavaya.’’’’  There  is, 
after  all,  not  much  difference  between  comparison,  as 
enunciated  in  this  extract,  and  the  third  kind  of  infer- 
ence already  alluded  to,  inference  from  analogy  ; and 
hence  the  Sankyha  philosophers  are  right  in  limiting  the 
number  of  the  instruments  of  right  knowledge  to  three. 

Here  it  is  desirable  to  observe  that,  in  one  respect, 
the  analytical  schools  concur  thoroughly  with  the  syn- 
thetical. Both  the  classes  of  schools  are  arrayed 
against  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  and  thus  far  they 
may  be  patronized  by  the  champions  of  materialism  in 
these  days.  There  are  no  such  things,  according  to 
them,  as  a priori  truths,  those  represented  as  such 
being  generalizations  of  experience.  With  reference  to 
axioms  and  intuitions,  the  primary  beliefs  of  humanity, 
scientific  or  moral,  their  champions  might,  with  an  air 
of  triumph,  reiterate  the  words  of  Mill  : “ They  are 
only  a class,  the  most  universal  class,  of  inductions 
from  experience,  the  easiest  and  simplest  generalizations 
of  the  facts  furnished  by  the  senses  and  the  conscious- 
ness.” They  would  only  add  to  these  facts  a new  class 
of  facts,  regarding  things  unseen  and  eternal  furnished 
by  revelation  ; while  their  view  of  the  contents  of 


THE  NAY  AT  A SYSTEM. 


207 


human  consciousness  would  appear  ridiculously  defec- 
tive to  a champion,  not  only  of  idealism,  but  of  empi- 
ricism also,  in  these  days. 

It  remains  to  be  added,  under  this  head,  that  Gau- 
tama in  his  Second  Book  proves  that  the  additional 
means  of  right  knowledge  assumed  by  the  Mimansakas 
— viz. , Bumor,  Conjecture,  Probability,  and  JSTon-exist- 
ence — are  superfluous.  Rumor  is  included  in  testimony 
or  ‘ ‘ verbal  evidence,  ’ ’ while  the  rest  may  very  well  be 
merged  in  inference.  He  also  states  and  refutes  some 
of  the  objections  raised  against  the  instruments  of 
knowledge  he  himself  points  out,  as  that  there  may  be 
a conjunction  of  an  organ  of  sense  with  an  object  with- 
out leading  to  perception  as  in  sleep,  and  inference  may 
be  wrong,  owing  to  the  disjunction  of  a sign  from  the 
tiling  signified.  But  the  objection  against  such  testi- 
mony as  is  embodied  in  the  Yeda  indicates  the  preva- 
lence of  scepticism.  “ That  (the  Yeda)  is  no  instrument 
of  right  knowledge,  because  of  its  faults  of  untruth, 
self-destructiveness,  and  tautology.”  Its  promises  had 
out  been  fulfilled  in  the  case  of  well-known  devotees  ; 
its  inconsistencies  and  contradictions  had  been  pointed 
out  as  inconsistent  with  its  assumed  authoritativeness, 
and  its  prolixity  had  passed  into  a proverb  ! A feeble 
attempt  is  made  to  rebut  these  objections.  The  non- 
fulfilment  of  promise  complained  of  results  from  un- 
known faults  perpetrated  in  a past  fife,  or  from  some 
defect  in  the  fulfilment  of  conditions  on  the  part  of  a 
devotee.  The  charge  of  inconsistency  is  repelled  by  an 
assertion  of  the  obvious  truth  that  different  classes  of 
instructions  are  demanded  by  the  exigencies  of  different 
times.  And  the  tautology  pointed  out  results  from  the 
necessity  of  “re-inculcation,”  especially  in  matters  of 
religion. 


20S 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


2.  Prameya,  or  Objects  of  Right  Knowledge,  are  pre- 
sented in  Aphorism  IX.  of  the  First  Book  of  Gautama’s 
Sutras  : “ Soul,  body,  sense,  sense-object,  understand- 
ing or  intelligence,  mind,  activity,  fault,  transmigra- 
tion, retribution,  pain  and  emancipation — such  are  the 
objects  concerning  which  it  is  desirable  that  we  should 
have  right  notions.” 

Let  us  pass  over  for  the  present  the  objects  of  knowl- 
edge reserved  for  the  next  paper — viz. , soul,  intelligence, 
etc. — and  confine  our  attention  to  what  is  said  about 
the  body,  its  organs  of  sense,  and  the  objects  of  sense 
around  it. 

a.  The  body  is,  according  to  Gautama,  “ the  site  of 
muscular  action,  of  the  organs  (of  sense),  and  of  the 
sentiments  (of  pleasure  or  pain  experienced  by  the 
soul).”  Kanada  has  the  following  utterances  in  the 
Second  Daily  Lesson  of  the  Fourth  Book  : “ The  body 
is  not  composed  of  the  five  elements,  for  the  conjunc- 
tion of  things  perceptible  and  imperceptible  is  imper- 
ceptible.” “The  body  is  not  composed  of  three  ele- 
ments, because  there  is  not  manifested  another  quality.  ” 
“ Of  these,  body  is  twofold,  uterine  and  non -uterine.” 

The  body  is  represented  by  some  philosophers  as 
consisting  of  five  elements — viz.,  odor,  moisture,  heat, 
breath,  and  ether  ; by  others  as  consisting  of  four  of 
these.  But  the  body  cannot  be  such  a compound,  in- 
asmuch as  it  is  visible,  while  the  component  elements 
are  not.  Again,  the  opinion  that  it  consists  of  three  of 
these  elements — viz.,  odor,  moisture,  and  heat — is  not 
admissible,  as  a union  of  heterogeneous  substances  is 
impossible.  Bodies  are  of  various  kinds  besides  the 
earthy — viz.,  aqueous,  igneous,  and  aerial — seen  in  the 
spheres  respectively  of  Varuna,  the  sun,  and  the  air. 
These  are  not  visible  to  ordinary  mortals,  but  they  can 


THE  NAYAYA  SYSTEM. 


209 


be  seen  by  those  ascetics  who  have  had  their  visual 
organ  almost  indefinitely  expanded  by  dint  of  austerity 
and  meditation. 

All  classes  of  bodies  are  either  uterine  or  non- 
uterine,  the  former  class  including  the  varieties  known 
as  the  viviparous  and  the  oviparous  ; and  the  latter 
bodies  ungenerated,  such  as  those  of  some  classes  of 
gods  and  goddesses  ; bodies  generated  in  filth,  such  as 
worms,  maggots,  and  other  vermin  ; and  vegetative 
bodies,  such  as  those  of  trees  and  plants.  The  body, 
of  whatever  kind  it  may  be,  not  even  barring  trees  and 
plants,  which,  according  to  Hindu  notions,  suffer  pain 
and  are  but  human  beings — nay,  gods  and  goddesses  in 
embryo — is  the  seat  of  activity  and  the  site  of  sensation 
and  of  the  soul’s  enjoyment  or  suffering. 

b.  t£  The  organs  of  sense,”  says  Gautama — “viz., 
smell,  taste,  sight,  touch,  and  hearing — are  what  appre- 
hend the  qualities  of  the  elements  and  of  things  formed 
of  these”  (Book  I.  Sec.  3,  Aph.  12).  To  these  must  be 
added  the  internal  organ,  mind,  which  communicates 
with  the  external  world  through  them,  as  its  servitors. 

Aphorism  11  of  this  section  thus  sets  forth  the  ob- 
jects of  the  senses  : “ Their  objects  are  the  qualities 
of  the  elements  and  of  things  formed  of  these— mean- 
ing the  qualities  odor,  savor,  color,  tangibility,  and 
sound.”  These  are  divided  into  seven  categories  by 
Kanada  ; and  these  categories  are  substance,  attribute, 
action,  generality,  particularity,  and  inhesion.  Ac- 
cording to  the  established  method  of  Hindu  logicians, 
these  ought  to  be  particularized  under  this  head,  but 
we  shall  confine  ourselves  here  to  the  first  of  the  seven, 
viz.,  substance. 

Under  the  generic  name  “ substance”  are  specified 
earth,  water,  light,  air,  ether,  time,  space,  soul,  and 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


210 


the  internal  organ.  Setting  aside  for  the  time  being 
the  metaphysical  ideas  and  entities  called  substances  by 
a misnomer,  it  is  desirable  to  set  forth  what  is  said 
about  the  five  so-called  elements. 

“ Earth,”  says  Kanada,  “ is  possessed  of  color,  taste, 
smell,  and  touch”  (Book  II.  Lesson  First,  Aph.  1). 
Odor,  however,  is  its  distinguishing  property.  It  is 
eternal  in  its  original  form  of  atoms,  but  transient  in 
its  present  aggregate  or  complex  shape.  It  has,  of 
course,  the  attributes  common  to  most  substances — 
number,  quantity,  individuality,  conjunction,  disjunc- 
tion, priority,  posteriority,  gravity,  placidity,  velocity, 
elasticity. 

Aphorism  2 of  the  same  section  thus  speaks  of  water  : 
“ Water  is  possessed  of  color,  taste,  and  touch,  and  is 
fluid  and  viscid.”  Its  distinguishing  property  is  taste 
according  to  some,  coolness  or  clamminess  according  to 
others.  It  is  also  eternal  as  atoms  and  transient  as 
aggregates.  Bodies  made  only  of  water  or  aqueous 
bodies  are  seen  in  the  realm  of  Yaruna.  Odor  when 
perceived  in  water  proceeds  from  some  earthy  particles 
dissolved  in  it,  and  is  therefore  adscititious. 

Aphorism  3 of  the  same  runs  thus  : “ Light  has  color 
and  touch.  Its  peculiar  characteristic  is  color,  and 
its  work  is  to  illumine  other  substances.”  These  are, 
however,  seen,  not  on  account  of  luminous  rays  falling 
upon  and  emitted  by  them,  but  on  account  of  the  visual 
ray  which  issues  out  of  the  eye  and  makes  them  trans- 
parent. Light  is  also  eternal  as  atoms  and  non-eternal 
as  aggregates.  Light  and  heat  are  inseparably  associ- 
ated ; and  the  united  substance  is  said  to  be  of  four 
kinds— terrestrial  light,  or  that  of  which  the  fuel  is 
earthy  ; celestial,  or  that  of  which  the  fuel  is  watery, 
as  lightning,  meteoric  lights,  etc. ; alvine  or  stomachic, 


THE  NATAYA  SYSTEM. 


211 


of  which  the  fuel  is  both  earthy  and  watery,  and  which 
digests  both  food  and  drink  ; and  mineral,  or  that 
which  is  found  in  mines,  as  goM,  which  is  simply  light 
solidified.  Luminous  bodies  are  to  be  found  in  the 
realm  of  the  sun. 

Aphorism  4 represents  air  as  “possessed  of  touch.” 
It  also  is  eternal  as  atoms  and  non-eternal  as  aggre- 
gates. Aerial  aggregates  are  of  four  kinds — organized 
aerial  bodies  and  evil  spirits  inhabiting  the  atmosphere  ; 
the  organ  of  touch,  which  is  air  spread  over  the  cuticle, 
or  an  aerial  integument  ; mind,  or  unorganized  air  ; 
and  breath  and  other  vital  airs. 

In  aphorism  5 we  have  these  words  : “ These  (quali- 
ties) do  not  exist  in  ether.”  Ether  is,  unlike  other 
elements,  infinite-  and  eternal,  and  is  the  substance  of 
which  the  auditory  organ  is  composed.  It  is  posited, 
as  Dr.  Ballantyne  says  in  his  comments  on  “ Tarka 
Sangraha,”  to  account  for  sound,  which  is  perceptible 
on  account  of  a peculiar  virtue  in  the  ether  of  the  ear, 
and  which,  where  this  peculiar  virtue  does  not  exist,  as 
in  the  ether  of  the  ear  of  a deaf  man,  cannot  possibly 
be  perceived. 

3.  The  first  section  of  the  Second  Book  of  Gautama’s 
Aphorisms  embodies  a disquisition  on  the  subject  of 
Doubt,  and  four  aphorisms  (17-20)  of  the  Second  Daily 
Lesson  of  the  Second  Book  of  the  Yaiseshika  Sutras 
treat  of  the  same  subject.  According  to  Gautama, 
doubt  arises  “ from  the  consideration  of  characters  com- 
mon (to  more  than  one)  or  several  (such  as  cannot  really 
belong  to  one  and  the  same  thing),”  and  “ from  the  con- 
centration of  (mutually  exclusive)  characters  under  the 
aspect  of  an  attributive.  ’ ’ Doubt  also  arises  from  <;  ‘ con- 
flict of  opinion”  and  “ from  unsteadiness  (in  the  recog- 
nition of  criteria  as  present  or  absent).  ” The  five  sources 


212 


HIHDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


of  doubt  set  forth  in  these  obscure  words  may  be  thus  put 
in  plain  English.  Doubt  arises  in  the  first  place  from 
the  possession  by  two  distinct  objects  of  a common  at- 
tribute, such  as  tallness,  which  may  lead  us  to  doubt 
whether  a particular  tall  object  indistinctly  seen  is  a 
man  or  a post.  In  the  second  place,  the  two  objects 
seen  may  resemble  in  one  respect  and  differ  in  another, 
and  a doubt  may  be  generated  in  the  mind  by  both  the 
similarity  and  the  difference.  That  doubt,  in  the  third 
place,  arises  from  a conflict  of  opinion  is  plain  enough. 
Again,  doubt  arises,  in  the  words  of  the  commentator, 
from  “unsteadiness  in  the  recognition  (of  some  mark 
which,  if  we  could  make  sure  of  it,  would  determine 
the  object  to  be  so  and  so)  or  unsteadiness  in  the  non- 
recognition (of  some  mark  which,  were  we  sure  of  its 
absence,  would  determine  the  object  to  be  not  so  and 
so).” 

According  to  Tvanada,  doubt  arises  “ from  perception 
of  a general,  non-perception  of  a particular,  and  remem- 
brance of  particularity  also  from  “ knowledge  and 
want  of  knowledge.”  These  five  sources  of  doubt — viz., 
perception  of  a general  or  common  property,  non-per- 
ception of  a special  or  specific  property,  memory  of  an 
attribute  seen  at  a past  time  but  not  in  the  present  mo- 
ment, knowledge  of  the  varieties  of  opinion  held  on  a 
particular  subject,  and  partial  ignorance — are  almost 
identical  with  those  pointed  out  by  Gautama.  Our 
philosophers  did  not  fail  to  see  that  absolute  knowledge 
or  absolute  ignorance  precludes  doubt,  it  being  a state 
of  hesitancy  generated  by  two  propositions,  neither  of 
which  has  a preponderance  of  evidence  hi  its  favor. 
The  well-known  affirmation  of  Herbert  Spencer, 
“ Force  is  unknowable,”  involves,  therefore,  a flagrant 
contradiction  in  terms,  an  item  of  certain  knowledge, 


THE  NAYAYA  SYSTEM. 


213 


its  unknowableness,  being  authoritatively  stated  regard- 
ing a thing  not  known.  In  other  words,  the  attitude 
of  absolute  knowledge  and  absolute  ignorance  is  as- 
sumed where  that  of  dubiousness  alone  would  be  justifi- 
able ! 

4.  The  motive  for  discussing  a particular  subject 
ought  to  be  definitively  stated  in  every  properly  con- 
ducted argument,  as  without  its  timely  disclosure  the 
importance  of  the  controversy  may  be  underrated. 
Motive  is  defined  by  Gautama  to  be  “that  thing 
which,  when  placed  before  us,  causes  us  to  act.” 

5.  A familar  example  is  then  brought  forward,  and 
regarding  it  we  have  these  words  in  Aphorism  25,  Sec. 
iv.,  Book  I.  : “In  regard  to  (some  fact  respecting) 
what  thing  both  the  ordinary  man  and  the  acute  in- 
vestigator entertain  a sameness  of  opinion,  that  (thing) 
is  called  a c familiar  case’  (of  the  fact  in  question).” 
In  plain  English  an  ordinary  example,  which  may 
appear  admissible  to  both  the  parties  engaged  in  dis- 
cussion, ought  to  be  adopted  for  use  in  the  course  of 
the  controversy  in  preference  to  other  illustrations. 
The  example  generally  selected  in  the  case  of  fire  and 
smoke  is  “ the  culinary  hearth.” 

6.  “A  tenet,”  says  Gautama,  “is  that,  the  stead- 
fastness of  the  acceptance  of  which  rests  on  a treatise 
(of  might  and  authority).”  Tenets  are  divided  into 
four  classes — “Dogma  of  all  the  Schools,”  “Dogma 
peculiar  to  some  one  or  more  Schools,”  “ A Hypotheti- 
cal Dogma,”  or  one  implied  in  a particular  declaration. 
What  is  meant  under  this  head  is  simply  a statement  of 
a single  or  of  a series  of  truths,  constituting  what  is 
called  common  ground. 

7.  Then  comes  the  syllogism,  which  is  more  complex 


214 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


a compound  of  tlie  enthymeme  and  the  syllogism. 
Says  Gautama  : “ The  members  (of  a syllogism)  are 
(1)  the  Proposition,  (2)  the  Reason,  (3)  the  Example, 
(4)  the  Application,  and  (5)  the  Conclusion.”  The  fol- 
lowing examples  are  generally  brought  forward  to  illus- 
trate the  five-membered  syllogism  of  Hindu  Logic  : 

1.  The  hill  is  fiery,  ....  Pralijna,  or  Proposition. 

2.  For  it  smokes,  ....  1 lelu,  or  Eeason. 

3.  Whatever  smokes  is  fiery,  as  a culi- 

nary hearth,  .....  Udaharan,  or  Example. 

4.  This  hill  is  smoking,  . . . Upanaya,  or  Application. 

5.  Therefore  it  is  fiery,  . . . Nujamana,  or  Conclusion. 


Example  Second. 

1.  Sound  is  non-eternal,  . . . Proposition.  ■ 

2.  Because  it  is  produced,  . . . Eeason. 

3.  Whatever  is  produced  is  non-eternal, 

as  pots, Example. 

4.  Sound  is  produced,  ....  Application. 

5.  Therefore  it  is  non-eternal,  . . Conclusion. 

Here  a peculiarity  of  Indian  Logic  ought  to  be  set 
forth.  There  are  three  terms  which  must  be  thor- 
oughly understood  before  arguments  couched  in  the 
cumbrous  phraseology  and  method  of  Indian  Logic  can 
be  comprehended  or  intelligently  followed.  The  first 
of  these  terms  is  Vyapati,  which  means  invariable  con- 
comitance or  pervasion.  The  second  is  Vyapaka  or  the 
pervader,  or  invariably  pervading  attribute,  and  the 
third  is  Yyapya , or  invariably  pervaded.  An  ordinary 
example,  capitalized  so  often  in  Hindu  Logic,  will  illus- 
trate the  significance  of  these  technical  terms  : “ Wher- 
ever there  is  smoke  there  is  fire.”  Here  the  invariable 
connection  between  smoke  and  fire  is  Yyapati,  or  inva- 
riable concomitance  or  pervasion  ; smoke  is  Yyapya,  or 
invariably  pervaded,  and  fire  the  pervader,  or  Yyapaka. 


THE  HAY  AY  A SYSTEM. 


215 


Translated  into  Aristotelian  phraseology,  Yyapati  is 
the  connection  between  the  two  terms  in  the  major 
premiss  ; Yyapaka  is  the  major  term  ; and  Yyapya,  or 
smoke,  is  the  middle  term. 

It  ought  here  to  be  mentioned  that  no  regular  classi- 
fication of  syllogisms,  such  as  that  of  Aristotle,  who 
divides  them  into  apodictic,  dialectic,  and  sophistic,  is 
attempted  in  standard  works  on  Indian  Logic  ; but  the 
syllogism  is  made  neither  too  much  of,  as  in  the  Aris- 
totelian system,  nor  too  little  of,  as  in  that  of  Mill. 

8.  Refutation  or  Confutation,  is  thus  set  forth  in  the 
opening  aphorism  of  Sec.  7,  Book  I.  of  Gautama’s  Sutras : 
“Confutation,  (which  is  intended)  for  the  ascertaining 
of  the  truth  in  regard  to  anything,  the  truth  in  regard 
to  which  is  not  thoroughly  discerned,  is  reasoning  from 
the  presence  of  the  reason  (which  would  not  be  present 
if  that  which  is  to  be  established  were  not  present).” 
That  is,  when  a disputant  admits  the  premisses,  but 
refuses  to  accept  the  conclusion  legitimately  deduced 
therefrom,  a new  method  of  refutation,  reductio  ad 
(Jjsurdum,  must  be  resorted  to. 

9.  “ Ascertainment,”  we  are  told  in  the  following 
aphorism,  “ is  the  determination  of  a matter  by  dealing 
with  both  sides  of  the  question  after  having  been  in 
doubt.”.  It  is  the  settlement  of  the  question  by  setting 
forth  the  legitimacy  of  the  conclusion  deduced  and  the 
absurdity  of  the  opposite  one.  The  argument  ought  to 
conclude  here,  but  the  Hindu  love  of  wrangling  renders 
some  additional  steps  necessary,  and  therefore  we  have 

10.  A fresh  controversy  or  discussion,  regarding 
which  we  have  these  words  in  the  opening  aphorism  of 
Sec.  8 : “ Discussion  is  the  undertaking  (by  two 
parties  respectively)  of  the  one  side  and  of  the  other  in 
regard  to  what  (conclusion)  has  been  arrived  at  by 


216 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


means  of  the  five-membered  (process  of  demonstration 
already  explained  ; this  discussion)  consisting  in  the 
defending  (of  the  proposition)  by  proofs  (on  the  part  of 
the  one  disputant),  and  the  assailing  it  by  objections  (on 
the  part  of  the  other),  the  discussion  being  conducted 
on  both  sides  without  discordance  in  respect  of  the 
tenets  (or  principles  on  which  the  conclusion  is  to  de- 
pend).” This  simply  implies  another  fight  pro  and  con 
over  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  such  a tedious  process. 

11.  Wrangling,  therefore,  is  not  out  of  place: 
“ Wrangling,  consisting  in  the  defence  or  attack  (of  a 
proposition)  by  means  of  ‘frauds,’  ‘futilities,’  and 
‘what  calls  for  nothing  save  an  indignant  rebuke,’  is 
what  takes  place  after  the  procedure  aforesaid  (that  is 
to  say,  after  a fair  course  of  argumentation) — supposing 
this  to  have  failed  to  bring  the  disputants  to  an  agree- 
ment.” Frauds  are  of  three  kinds — fraud  “ in  respect 
of  a term,”  “ in  respect  of  a genus,”  and  “ in  respect 
of  a trope.”  The  first  species  of  fraud  is  knowingly 
attaching  to  a term  employed  a sense  different  from 
what  it  is  intended  to  convey  ; the  second  is  knowingly 
deducing  a fallacy  from  the  similarity  subsisting  be- 
tween two  objects  mentioned  ; and  the  third  is  con- 
scious misconstruction  of  figurative  language.  Futili- 
ties result  from  attempts  made  to  confound  invariable 
concomitance  with  a bare  outward  resemblance,  and 
that  which  calls  for  an  indignant  reproof  is  “ stupid- 
ity,” assumed  or  real. 

12.  Then  comes  cavilling.  “This  (viz.,  wrangling), 
when  devoid  of  (any  attempt  made  for)  the  establishing 
of  the  opposite  side  of  the  question,  is  cavilling.” 

13.  Fallacies  are  divided  into  five  classes  : (1)  “ Er- 
ratic,” (2)  “ contradictory,  ” (3)  “ equally  available  on 
both  sides,”  (4)  “in  the  same  case  with  what  is  to 


THE  KAYAYA  SYSTEM. 


217 


be  proved,”  and  (5)  tlio  u mistimed.’  ’ The  u Tarka  San- 
graha,  ’ ’ under  the  head  of  fallacies,  has  these  words  : 
“ The  five  that  merely  present  the  appearance  of  a 
reason  are  : (1)  that  which  goes  astray,  (2)  that  which 
would  prove  the  contradictory,  (3)  that  than  which 
there  is  a stronger  argument  on  the  other  side,  (d)  the 
inconclusive,  and  (5)  the  futile.  In  the  Yaiseshika 
Sutras  we  have  one  example  given  illustrative  of  all 
the  fallacies  : “ Because  this  has  horns,  therefore  it  is 
a horse.”  On  this  we  have  these  comments  : “ Where 
a hare  or  the  like  is  the  subject,  and  the  being  a horse 
is  that  which  is  to  be  proved,  and  the  notion  of  having 
horns  the  argument,  in  such  a case  there  exist  all  the 
five  fallacies.” 

It  is  very  difficult  indeed  to  make  this  manifest,  but 
not  impossible.  The  hare  has  horns,  therefore  it  is  a 
horse.  But  it  has  no  horns,  and  therefore  the  conclu- 
sion is  derived  from  a major  premiss  which  is  erroneous, 
- — viz. , whatever  has  horns  is  a horse  —and  a minor  pre- 
miss equally  erroneous.  Again,  granting  that  the 
hare  has  horns,  the  conclusion  deduced  is  the  converse 
of  what  is  deducible.  Supposing,  again,  the  horse  has 
horns,  the  premises  may  prove  that  the  subject  is  a 
horse  or  not  a horse.  Again,  the  premises  and  the 
conclusion  are  in  the  same  predicament,  the  one  need- 
ing proof  as  well  as  the  other.  And  lastly,  the  whole 
argument  is  mistimed,  as  our  senses  prove  that  both 
the  hare  and  the  horse  have  no  horns. 

But  examples  more  apposite  than  this  ought  to  be 
adduced.  The  example  of  the  first  given  in  “ Tarka 
Sangraha”  is  this  : “ The  mountain  is  fiery  because 
the  existence  of  the  mountain  is  capable  of  proof.” 
Here  the  major  premiss — whatever  may  be  proved  ex- 
istent is  fiery — is  an  error.  Of  the  second  the  example 


21S 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


given  is  : “ Sound  is  eternal  because  it  is  created.” 
Here  the  premises  support  the  very  opposite  conclu- 
sion. Of  the  third  : “ Sound  is  eternal  because  it  is 
audible.”  Its  audibility  may  be  brought  forward  with 
equal  cogency  to  prove  its  non-eternity.  Of  the 
fourth  : “ The  sky- lotus  is  fragrant  because  the  nature 
of  a lotus  resides  in  it.”  Here  the  nature  of  a lotus  is 
assumed  to  be  invariably  associated  with  fragrance. 
And  lastly,  the  fallacy  called  mistimed  or  futile  is  thus 
illustrated  : “For  example  : suppose  one  argues  that 
fire  does  not  contain  heat  because  it  is  factitious,  the 
argument  is  mistimed,  if  we  have  already  ascertained, 
by  the  superior  evidence  of  the  senses,  that  fire  (grant- 
ing it  to  be  factitious)  does  contain  heat.” 

FTothing  sets  forth  the  crudeness  of  Hindu  Logic  more 
than  its  disquisitions  on  the  subject  of  Fallacy,  the  few 
instances  given  being  almost  all  reducible  to  the  irregu- 
lar fallacy  non  causa  pro  causae. 

14-,  15,  and  10.  Quibbling  artifices,  or  frauds,  or 
futile  objections  have  already  been  taken  notice  of,  and 
it  is  not  necessary  to  refer  to  them  here,  excepting  for 
the  purpose  of  showing  that  their  separate  specification 
in  the  text  is  an  example  of  tautology.  The  conclusion 
brings  the  discussion  to  a close  by  showing  the  oppo- 
nent’s stupidity,  and  his  inability  in  consequence  to 
carry  on  the  argumentation  any  further,  as  well  as  by 
upholding  the  proposition  originally  stated. 

Dr.  Ballantyne,  always  prone  to  whitewash  Hindu 
learning,  offers  a very  ingenious  explanation  of  this 
cumbrous  process  of  reasoning.  He  affirms  that  this 
style  of  reasoning  combines  all  the  advantages  of  a logi- 
cal process  with  those  of  what  may  be  called  a rhetorical 
flourish.  The  objector  is  first  of  all  led  through  the. 
varied  steps  of  a well-conducted  argument,  beginning 


THE  NAYAYA  SYSTEM. 


219 


with  the  proofs  admitted,  and  rising  up  to  a direct  dem- 
onstration in  the  form  of  a lucidly  stated  syllogism,  and 
an  indirect  demonstration  fitted  to  reduce  any  conclu- 
sion but  the  right  one  to  an  absurdity.  He  is  then 
allowed,  if  found  stubborn,  to  plunge  afresh  into  con- 
troversy, get  entangled  in  wrangling,  resort  to  cavil- 
ling, make  use  of  naked  fallacies,  stoop  to  frauds  and 
futilities,  and  ultimately  have  himself  “ voted  a nui- 
sance” amid  the  plaudits  of  a large  body  of  spectators. 

But  whatever  the  advantage  of  the  process  may  be  in 
a public  discussion,  conducted  in  a large  hall  under  the 
nose  of  innumerable  spectators,  it  is,  as  a method  of 
arriving  at  truth,  both  prolix  and  cumbrous.  - never- 
theless the  Pandits  are  so  decidedly  attached  to  it  that 
they  look  upon  a simpler  mode  of  argumentation  as  one 
which  it  is  beneath  their  dignity  to  have  recourse  to. 
And  if  these  incarnations  of  pedantry  are  to  be  influ- 
enced at  all  in  favor  of  a body  of  truth  other  than  what 
they  are  apt  to  look  upon  as  worthy  of  acceptance,  the 
varied  steps  of  this  tedious  and  awkward  process  must 
be  utilized,  and,  if  possible,  they  voted  nuisances  in  the 
presence  of  people  thoroughly  versed  in  their  habits  of 
thought  and  modes  of  reasoning.  And  it  is  because 
missionaries  as  a body  cannot  use  this  weapon  with  any 
degree  of  dexterity,  and  the  few  who  can  will  not  wield 
it,  that  their  influence  over  the  learned  in  Hindustan 
has  hitherto  been  almost  nil. 

We  shall  now  refer  to  the  subject  of  Cause  and  its 
varieties  as  set  forth  in  Indian  Logic.  The  definition 
given  of  cause  in  the  “ Tarka  Sangraha”  is  simple, 
and  on  the  whole  unexceptionable  : “ That  which  in- 
variably precedes  an  effect,  that  cannot  else  be,  is  a 
cause.”  An  effect  is  defined  as  “ that  of  which  there 
was  antecedent  non-existence.”  The  different  kinds  of 


220 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


causes  are  thus  set  forth  : “ Cause  is  of  three  kinds, 
according  to  the  distinction  of  intimate,  non-intimate, 
and  instrumental.  That  from  which  an  intimately 
relative  effect  arises  is  an  intimate  cause,  as  threads  are 
of  cloth,  and  the  cloth  itself  of  its  own  color,  etc. 
Where  this  intimate  relation  exists,  that  cause,  which 
is  associated  in  one  and  the  same  object  with  such 
effect  or  cause,  is  non-intimate.  Thus  the  conjunction 
of  threads  is  the  non-intimate  cause  of  the  cloth,  and 
the  color  of  the  threads  that  of  the  color  of  the  cloth. 
The  cause  which  is  distinct  from  both  of  these  is  the 
instrumental  cause,  as  the  weaver’s  brush,  loom,  etc., 
are  of  cloth.  Among  these  three  kinds  of  causes,  that 
only  which  is  not  a universally  concurrent  cause  or 
condition  (of  all  effects,  as  God,  time,  place,  etc.  are) 
is  called  the  instrumental  cause.” 

Dr.  Ballantyne  shows  that  we  have  here  the  four 
kinds  of  causes  described  in  Aristotle’s  logic — material, 
efficient,  formal,  and  final.  The  intimate  cause,  which 
in  the  case  of  a piece  of  cloth  is  the  threads  of  which  it 
is  composed,  corresponds  evidently  to  his  material 
cause.  The  non-intimate  cause,  which  is  the  conjunc- 
tion of  the  threads  into  a particular  shape,  is  the  formal 
cause.  The  piece  of  cloth  itself  is  the  final  cause,  if  by 
this  expression  we  understand  what  seems  to  have  been 
understood  by  Aristotle  himself — viz.,  the  effect  in  its 
completeness,  not  the  use  to  which  it  is  subservient. 
The  instrumental  cause,  properly  so  called,  is  by  Aris- 
totle included  in  his  definition  of  efficient  cause  ; and 
if  we  merge  his  efficient  cause  in  the  instrumental,  we 
have  all  the  varieties  of  causes  he  enumerates  treated  of 
in  the  ‘ ‘ Tarka  Sangraha.  ’ ’ 

Professor  Gough,  in  his  elaborate  translation  of  the 
Yaiseshika  Sutras,  makes  use  of  expressions  different 


THE  NAYAYA  SYSTEM. 


221 


from  these  in  his  presentation  of  the  view  of  causes 
entertained  in  Indian  schools  of  philosophy.  Instead 
of  Ballantyne’s  terms,  “intimate,”  “non-intimate,” 
and  “ instrumental,”  he  makes  use  of  the  terms  “ coin- 
herent,”  “ non-coinherent,”  and  “efficient.”  Let  us 
present  a fe\Y  of  the  many  examples  scattered  in  the 
aphorisms  and  commentaries  he  translates  to  show  that 
the  Hindu  notion  of  an  efficient  cause  is  very  peculiar. 
Before  doing  so  let  us  give  the  definition  of  an  efficient 
cause  presented  in  the  “ Tarka  Sangraka  :”  “An 
efficient  cause  not  common  to  other  causes  is  called  a 
special  cause. 5 ’ 

In  the  First  Daily  Lesson  of  Book  VI II.  the  subject 
of  cognition  is  treated  of,  and  its  causes  are  thus  set 
forth  : “ The  causes  of  knowledge  were  stated  in  the 
aphorism,  that  which  is  produced  by  contiguity  of  soul, 
sense-organ,  and  object  is  other  than  those.  The  soul, 
then,  is  the  cause,  is  the  coin  herein  or  material  cause  of 
cognition  ; conjunction  of  the  soul  and  internal  sense 
is  the  non-coinherent  cause  ; apposition  of  the  object  is 
the  occasional  or  efficient  cause.”  Here  it  should  be 
remembered  that,  according  to  an  established  maxim  of 
Hindu  Philosophy,  the  soul  is  literally  changed  into  the 
object  perceived,  and  that  a line  of  distinction  is 
scarcely  drawn  between  instrumental  and  efficient 
causes.  The  soul  is  the  matter  of  cognition,  its  con- 
junction with  the  internal  sense  gives  it  a definitive 
form,  and  the  object  placed  before  it  is  the  instru- 
mental cause. 

Take  another  example.  Aphorism  IT  of  the  First 
Daily  Lesson  of  Book  V.  runs  thus  : “ The  first  ac- 
tion of  the  arrow  is  from  impulse,  the  next  is  from 
self-reproduction  caused  by  that  action,  and  in  like 
manner  the  next  and  the  next.”  On  this  we  have 


222 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


these  comments  : “ The  first  action  in  an  arrow  when 
discharged  is  produced  by  a bowstring  drawn  by 
human  volition.  In  this  case  the  impulse  is  the  non- 
coinherent  cause  ; the  arrow  is  the  coinherent  cause, 
volition  and  gravity  are  the  efficient  causes.  By  this 
first  action  self-reproduction,  termed  velocity,  is  pro- 
duced in  the-same  substance.”  Here  there  is  evidently 
a confusion  of  ideas  according  to  modern  notions, 
though  efficiency  is  traced  to  its  proper  source,  if  voli- 
tion and  gravity  are  not  caused  by  some  extraneous 
power  and  influence.  But  both  these  are  in  reality 
effects,  and  efficiency  is  traced  to  some  mysterious 
power  called  Destiny. 

Aphorism  15  of  this  very  section  runs  thus  : “ The 
movement  of  the  gem  and  the  approach  of  the  needle 
are  caused  by  destiny.”  The  commentator  thus  eluci- 
dates the  passage  : “ By  the  term  gem  are  intended 
vessels  made  of  gold,  etc.,  and  filled  with  water.  To 
such  a vessel  magicians  apply  incantations  for  the 
recovery  of  stolen  property.  The  tradition  of  the  an- 
cients is  that  the  vessel  is  set  on  the  ground,  and  some 
other  person  lays  his  hand  upon  it.  The  vessel  accom- 
panied with  the  hand,  in  consequence  of  the  efficiency 
of  incantation,  turns  toward  the  spot  where  the  stolen 
property  has  been  deposited.  The  reason  of  the  move- 
ment of  such  a vessel  is  not  a particular  volition,  but 
the  efficient  cause  of  the  merit  of  the  former  possessor 
or  the  demerit  of  the  thief.  The  non-coinherent  cause 
is  the  conjunction  of  such  a vessel  with  soul  possessing 
such  destiny  (or  results  of  actions  done  in  previous 
states  of  existence),  and  the  coinherent  cause  is  such  a 
vessel.  In  like  manner  destiny  is  also  the  cause  of  the 
attraction  toward  a loadstone  which  takes  place  in 
needles  or  metallic  rods  when  in  proximity  to  the  mag- 


THE  NATAYA  SYSTEM. 


223 


net.”  All  efficiency,  wh ether  apparently  inherent  in 
volition  or  really  immanent  in  the  forces  of  nature,  is 
traced  to  merit  or  demerit,  or  to  'Work,  (Karma)  the 
god  not  only  of  the  Buddhists  but  of  Hindu  philosophers 
in  general. 

Apropos  of  the  subject  of  causes,  it  is  desirable  to 
mention  that  our  Indian  logicians  display  a good  deal 
of  acuteness  and  ingenuity  in  their  classifications,  as 
well  as  considerable  breadth  of  view  in  their  generaliza- 
tions. We  have  not  only  three  kinds  of  causes  enumer- 
ated, but  several  subordinate  ones  not  only  coinherent, 
but  con-coinherent  and  con-con-coinherent  causes,  as 
will  be  seen  in  the  following  extracts  from  the  “ Tarka 
Sangraha  “ The  relative  proximity  of  the  sense  and 
its  object,  which  is  the  cause  of  perception,  is  of  six 
kinds  : (1)  conjunction,  (2)  intimate  union  with  that 
which  is  in  conjunction,  (3)  intimate  union  with  what 
is  intimately  united  with  that  which  is  in  conjunction, 
(I)  intimate  union,  (5)  intimate  union  with  that  which 
is  intimately  united,  (6)  and  the  connection  which  arises 
from  the  relation  between  that  which  qualifies  and  the 
thing  qualified.  For  example  : when  a jar  is  perceived 
by  the  eye,  there  is  (between  the  sense  and  the  object) 
the  proximity  of  conjunction.  In  the  perception  of  the 
color  of  the  jar  there  is  the  proximity  of  intimate 
union  with  that  which  is  in  conjunction,  because  color 
d is  intimately  united  with  the  jar,  which  is  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  sense  of  vision.  In  the  perception  of  the 
fact  that  color  generally  is  present,  there  is  the  prox- 
imity of  intimate  union  with  what  is  intimately  united 
with  that  which  is  in  conjunction,  because  the  generic 
property  of  being  colored  is  inherent  in  the  particular 
color  which  is  intimately  united  with  the  jar  which  is 
in  conjunction  with  the  sense  of  vision.  In  the  percep- 


224 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


tion  of  sound  by  the  organ  of  hearing,  there  is  the 
proximity  of  intimate  union,  because  the  organ  of  hear- 
ing consists  of  the  ether  which  resides  in  the  cavity  of 
the  ear,  and  sound  is  a quality  of  ether  ; and  there  is 
intimate  union  between  quality  and  that  of  which  it  is 
a quality.  In  the  perception  of  the  nature  of  sound  (in 
a given  sound  of  which  we  are  cognizant)  the  proximity 
is  that  of  intimate  union  with  what  is  intimately 
united,  because  the  nature  of  sound  is  inherent  in 
sound,  which  is  intimately  united  with  the  organ  of 
hearing.  In  the  perception  of  non-existence  the  prox- 
imity is  dependent  on  the  relation  between  a distinctive 
quality  and  that  which  is  so  distinguished,  because 
when  the  ground  is  (perceived  to  be)  possessed  of  the 
non-existence  of  a jar,  the  non-existence  of  a jar  dis- 
tinguishes the  ground  which  is  in  conjunction  with  the 
organ  of  vision.” 

The  system  of  logic,  into  which  we  have  striven  to 
present  an  insight  through  the  media  of  quotations  and 
extracts  from  standard  works,  displays  a good  deal  of 
acuteness  ; but  as  a method  of  arriving  at  truth  it  has 
failed.  It  has  fostered,  not  the  science  of  dialectics 
properly  so  called,  but  what  is  justly  called  “ the 
pseudo-dialectical  science  of  dispute,”  or  Eristic  ; and 
its  result  has  been  scepticism  rather  than  recognition, 
spread,  and  preponderance  of  truth.  It  may  be  com- 
pared to  that  lore  of  the  Sophists  of  ancient  Greece, 
which  led  to  individualism,  pantheism,  and  nihilism,  to 
Stoic  pride  and  Epicurean  libertinism.  It  is,  however, 
a favorite  study  with  the  learned  Pandits  of  India,  and 
the  ascendency  in  their  minds  of  its  phraseology  and 
modes  of  reasoning  make  them  inaccessible  to  truth 
conveyed  in  a simpler  manner.  And  the  only  way  in 
which  their  minds  can  be  influenced  in  favor  of  truth 


THE  HAY  AT  A SYSTEM. 


225 


unknown  and  unpalatable  to  them  is,  as  has  already 
been  said,  a skilful  use  of  the  weapons  borrowed  from 
this  armory.  The  preachers  of  the  Gospel  in  this 
country  have,  as  a rule,  neglected  them  either  on  ac- 
count of  their  ignorance  of  or  distaste  for  the  style  of 
reasoning  in  vogue  ; but  such  neglect  cannot  be  justi- 
fied ; and  when  such  neglect  is  the  inevitable  sequence 
of  an  accumulation  of  non -missionary  work,  the  pres- 
ence in  our  systems  of  this  heterogeneous  element 
cannot  be  condemned  in  terms  too  strong  ! 


CHAPTER  Till. 


THE  VAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY,  OR  THE  HINDU  ATOMIC 
THEORY. 


We  presented  in  our  last  paper  several  extracts  from 
the  Vaiseshika  Sutras,  the  Sutras  ascribed  to  Kanada, 
the  reputed  and  doubtless  real  founder  of  the  Vaiseshika 
school,  and  embodied  in  ten  books,  each  of  which  is 
divided  into  two  Daily  Lessons,  like  each  of  the  books 
of  the  Nyaya  Sastra.  But  we  have  yet  to  present,  ac- 
cording to  our  practice,  a conspectus  of  the  contents  of 
the  Vaiseshika  Sastra  in  the  words  of  the  “ Sarva- 
Darsana-Sangraha 

“ In  the  first  book,  consisting  of  two  daily  lessons, 
he  (Kanada)  describes  all  the  categories  which  are 
capable  of  intimate  relation.  In  the  first  ahinka  (daily 
lesson)  lie  defines  those  which  possess  ‘ genus  ’ (jati)  ; 
in  the  second,  ‘ genus  ’ (or  generality)  itself,  and  ‘ par- 
ticularity.’ In  the  similarly  divided  second  hook  he 
discusses  ‘substance,’  giving  in  the  first  ahinka  the 
characteristics  of  the  five  elements,  and  in  the  second 
he  establishes  the  existence  of  space  and  time.  In  the 
third  book  he  defines  the  soul  and  the  internal  sense — 
the  former  in  the  first  ahinka , the  latter  in  the  second. 
In  the  fourth  book  he  discusses  the  body  and  its  ad- 
juncts— the  latter  in  the  first  ahinka,  and  the  former  in 
the  second.  In  the  fifth  book  he  investigates  action  ; 
in  the  first  ahinka  he  considers  action  as  connected 
with  the  body,  in  the  second  as  belonging  to  the  mind. 


THE  VAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


227 


In  the  seventh  book  he  discusses  quality  and  intimate 
relation  ; in  the  first  ahinJca  he  considers  the  qualities 
independent  of  thought,  in  the  second  those  qualities 
which  are  related  to  it,  and  also  intimate  relation.  In 
the  eighth  book  he  examines  ‘ indeterminate  ’ and  ‘ de- 
terminate ’ perception  and  means  of  proof.” 

The  author  of  the  “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha”  falls 
into  an  unaccountable  mistake  as  to  the  contents  of  the 
ninth  and  tenth  books.  Professor  Cowel,  who  is  the 
translator  of  the  paper  on  Yaiseshika  Philosophy  in  the 
book,  thus  speaks  of  their  contents  : “ The  ninth  book 
treats  of  that  perception  which  arises  from  supersensi- 
ble contact,  etc.,  and  inference.  The  tenth  treats  of 
the  mutual  difference  of  the  qualities  of  the  soul,  and 
the  three  causes.”  It  may  be  added  that  the  con- 
tents of  each  of  these  books  are  of  such  a miscellaneous 
nature  that  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  assign 
it  its  distinctive  character  ; and  consequently  the  clas- 
sification given  above  may  justly  be  called  in  ques- 
tion. 

The  object  of  the  work  is  one,  though  its  contents 
are  varied  and  multiform.  That  object  is  set  forth  in 
its  first  two  aphorisms  : “ How,  then,  we  will  explain 
(what)  merit  (is).  Merit  is  that  from  which  (results) 
attainment  of  elevation  and  of  the  highest  good.” 
The  first  result  of  merit  acquired  in  a former  state  of 
existence,  or  in  a series  of  former  states  of  existence,  is 
the  acquisition  of  “ elevation”  or  knowledge  of  the 
truth,  or  the  true  distinction  between  soul  and  non- 
soul  ; and  the  ultimate  result  is  “the  highest  good,” 
the  summum  ~bonum,  which  is  cessation  of  pain.  One 
of  the  celebrated  commentators,  in  commenting  upon 
these  aphorisms,  says  : “ The  attainment  of  paradise 
by  merit  is  with  visible  means,  while  the  attainment  of 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


OOQ 

/C/vU 

liberation  is  by  means  of  knowledge  of  the  truth  ; con- 
sequently there  is  a distinction.” 

The  Vaiseshika  Aphorisms,  though  a unity  as  regards 
their  object,  are  a complexity  as  regards  the  variety  of 
subjects  treated  of.  The  lore  they  present  is  of  the 
most  miscellaneous  nature,  consisting  as  it  does  of  dis- 
sertations on  logic,  physics,  psychology,  metaphysical 
inquiries  about  the  ultimate  ground  of  existence,  and 
practical  directions  as  to  the  best  mode  of  insuring 
liberation  from  the  chains  of  transmigration.  No  one 
can  study  the  book  without  concluding  that  the  modern 
theory  of  the  co-ordination  of  the  sciences  was  not  un- 
known in  ancient  times  in  our  country,  and  that  an 
approach  at  least  was  made  to  Comte’s  vaunted  “ hier- 
archical classification.” 

There  is  doubtless  some  beauty  or  attractiveness  in 
the  thought  that  all  the  knowledge  'which  we  may  ac- 
quire by  investigating  into  the  facts  and  mysteries  of 
nature,  as  well  as  by  prying  into  the  realities  of  the 
moral  world,  has  a reflex  bearing  on  the  advancement 
of  the  soul,  and  its  final  emancipation.  But  the  prac- 
tical influence  emanating  from  such  an  idea  is  demoral- 
izing, inasmuch  as  it  leads  to  a concentration  of  one’s 
gaze,  while  engaged  in  prosecuting  a course  of  liberal 
study,  upon  one’s  own  self,  rather  than  upon  some 
object  or  being  apart  from  self.  But  whether  fitted  to 
exalt  or  calculated  to  degrade,  the  conception  is  the 
root -principle  of  Hindu  Philosophy  ; and  it  is  not  a 
matter  of  wonder  that  a knowledge  of  the  categories  of 
the  Vaiseshika  system,  the  categories  which  set  forth 
the  distinction  between  the  ego  and  the  non-ego,  should 
be  represented  as  a stepping-stone  to  complete  salva- 
tion. 

These  categories,  six  in  number,  though,  according  to 


THE  VAISESHIIvA  PHILOSOPHY. 


229 


some  champions  of  the  school,  seven,  have  already  been 
enumerated  : (1)  substance,  (2)  attribute,  (3)  action, 
(4)  generality,  (5)  particularity,  and  (6)  inhesion.  With 
the  exception  of  the  first,  the  categories  may  be  identi- 
fied with  Aristotle’s  predicables — viz.,  genus,  species, 
difference,  property,  and  accident.  What  the  Yaise- 
shika  Sutras  say  with  reference  to  these  categories 
ought  now  to  be  indicated  in  order. 

1.  The  word  substance  is  used  in  a philosophical 
rather  than  in  its  ordinary  acceptation,  as  a substrate 
of  attributes  or  qualities,  and  therefore  we  have  under 
this  head  not  only  earth,  water,  light,  air,  ether,  but 
time,  space,  soul,  and  the  internal  organ,  or  the  mind. 
Of  these  the  physical  entities  have  already  been  taken 
notice  of,  and  the  others  will  be  treated  of  by  and  by. 

2.  The  attributes  assumed  originally  were  seventeen 
— viz.,  color,  taste,  smell,  touch,  numbers,  extensions, 
individuality,  conjunction  and  disjunction,  priority  and 
posteriority,  intellections,  pleasure  and  pain,  desire  and 
aversion,  and  volitions.  To  these  seven  were  subse- 
quently added  gravity,  fluidity,  viscidity,  self-restitu- 
tion, merit,  demerit,  and  sound. 

3.  Actions  are  ££  throwing  upward,  throwing  down- 
ward, contracting,  expanding,  and  going.  ” 

4 and  5.  Generality  and  particularity  are  what  con- 
stitute genus  and  species.  Existence  is  represented 
as'the  summum  genus,  and  it  includes  the  first  three  of 
the  categories — substance,  attribute,  and  action — while 
the  subaltern  genera  are  substantiality  ( dra/oyatya ),  the 
genus  of  quality  or  qualitativeness  {gunatya ;),  and  the 
genus  of  action  (Jmrmatya). 

Particularity  may  in  one  sense  be  said  to  indicate 
the  difference  between  the  summum  and  subaltern 
genera,  as  well  as  between  genera  and  species.  But 


230 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


the  word  particularity  (vises It),  from  which  the  school 
derives  its  name  Yaiseshika,  indicates  the  peculiarity 
by  which  such  substances  as  ether,  time,  space,  the 
atomic  minds,  and  the  varied  kinds  of  atoms,  of  which 
earth,  water,  air,  and  fire  are  composed,  are  discrimi- 
nated from  others.  It  is,  therefore,  “ the  ultimate 
difference”  between  simple  and  compound  substances. 
It  corresponds  in  some  respects  to  the  technical  word 
differentia  or  differentiae. 

0.  Inhesion  or  intimate  relation  is  the  relation  in 
which  the  series  of  relations  pointed  out  by  the  Yaise- 
shika doctrine  of  causality  terminates  when  traced  back- 
ward. Colebrooke  thus  explains  this  in  his  essay  on  the 
Nyaya  and  the  Yaiseshika  philosophy : “For  the  relation 
of  cause  and  effect,  and  for  distinguishing  different  sorts 
of  cause  connection  (sambodha)  or  relation,  in  general, 
must  be  considered.  It  is  twofold  : simple  conjunction 
(sanyoga)  and  aggregation,  or  intimate  or  constant  re- 
lation (samanaya)  ; the  latter  being  the  connection  of 
things,  whereof  one,  so  long  as  they  coexist,  continues 
united  with  the  other — for  example  : parts  and  that 
which  is  composed  of  them,  as  yarn  and  cloth  ; for  so 
long  as  the  yarn  subsists  the  cloth  remains.  Here  the 
connection  of  the  yarn  and  cloth  is  intimate  relation  ; 
but  that  of  the  loom  is  simple  con  junction.  Intimate 
relation  or  inhesion  is,  in  Aristotelian  phraseology,  the 
material  cause,  and  inseparable  from  the  effect  as  long 
as  it  continues  what  it  is. 

To  set  forth  the  order  of  the  categories,  let  us  present 
an  extract  from  the  “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha  ” : “If 
you  ask,  ‘ What  is  the  reason  for  this  definite  order  of 
categories  ? ’ we  answer  as  follows  : Since  ‘ substance  ’ 

O 

is  the  chief,  as  being  the  substratum  of  all  the  catego- 
ries, we  enounce  this  first  ; next,  £ quality,’  since  it 


THE  VAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


231 


resides  in  its  generic  character  in  all  substances  (though 
different  substances  have  different  qualities)  ; then 
‘ action,’  as  it  agrees  with  ‘ substance  ’ and  ‘ quality  ’ 
in  possessing  ‘ generality then  ‘generality,’  as  resid- 
ing in  these  ; then  ‘ particularity,’  inasmuch  as  it  pos- 
sesses ‘ intimate  relation  ; ’ and  lastly,  intimate  relation 
itself  ; such  is  the  principle  of  arrangement.” 

To  these  categories  originally  assumed,  one  was  sub- 
sequently added,  viz.,  non-existence,  which  may  be 
represented  as  a peculiar  feature  of  Indian  Logic.  Non- 
existence  is  of  four  kinds — cmtecedent , subsequent,  recip- 
rocal, and  absolute. 

Antecedent  non-existence  is  thus  set  forth  in  the  first 
aphorisln  of  the  First  Daily  Lesson  of  Book  IX  : “ (An 
effect)  is  antecedently  non-existent,  inasmuch  as  there 
is  non-existence  of  assertion  of  actions  and  qualities.  ’ ’ 
Let  this  be  read  in  conjunction  with  these  comments: 
“ Antecedently,  that  is,  before  the  production  of  an 
effect,  an  effect  or  product,  such  as  a water-pot  or  piece 
of  cloth,  is  non-existent ; that  is,  non-existent  by  self- 
determined  negation  during  that  time.  The  reason 
assigned  is  the  absence  of  predication  of  actions  and 
qualities.  If  the  effect,  the  water-pot,  etc.,  were  exist- 
ent during  that  time,  it  would  be  affirmed  to  possess 
actions  and  qualities,  as  in  the  case  of  a water-pot 
already  produced,  such  affirmations  are  made  as  that 
the  water-pot  is  at  rest,  or  in  motion,  or  seen  to  be 
colored.  There  is  no  such  assertion  antecedent  to  its 
production.  It  is,  therefore,  inferred  that  it  is  during 
that  time  non-existent.” 

Subsequent  non-existence  is  simply  destruction. 
Aphorism  2 runs  thus  : “ The  existent  (becomes)  non- 
existent.” “It  is  proved,”  says  the  commentator, 
“ by  perception  and  inference  that  an  existent  product, 


232 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


such  as  a water-pot,  after  the  operation  of  a hammer, 
etc.,  which  destroys  it,  is  now  non-existent,  in  like 
manner  as  it  is  proved  by  perception  and  inference  that 
an  effect  is,  previous  to  the  operation  of  its  cause,  non- 
existent.” 

Aphorism  -f  sets  forth  reciprocal  non-existence  in 
these  words:  “The  existent  also  is  non-existent.” 
“ For,”  says  the  commentator,  “ there  are  such  cogni- 
tions as  that  a horse  is  not  identical  with  a cow,  a cow 
is  non-existent  as  a horse,  a piece  of  cloth  is  non-exist- 
ent as  a water-pot,  a cow  is  not  a horse,  a horse  is  not 
a cow.  There  appears  then  in  such  a cognition  the  fact 
that  a cow  possesses  reciprocal  non-existence  with  a 
horse,  a water-pot  is  reciprocally  non-existent  -with  a 
piece  of  cloth  ; and  this  reciprocal  non-existence  is 
otherwise  designated  absence  of  identity.” 

Absolute  non-existence  is  set  forth  in  Aphorism  5 : 
“Whatever  else,  moreover,  than  these  is  non-existent 
is  (absolutely)  non-existent.”  Absolute  non-existence 
is  that  of  which  the  three  other  kinds  of  non-existence 
cannot  be  predicated— antecedent,  emergent  or  subse- 
quent, and  reciprocal — which  never  was  existent,  and 
never  will  be,  and  which  does  not  exist  now.  An  ex- 
ample often  adduced  in  Hindu  Logic,  viz.,  “ hare’s 
horn,”  may  be  brought  forward  in  illustration  of  this 
species  of  non-existence. 

The  logical  schools  may  justly  be  characterized  as 
atomic,  as  the  cosmology  they  teach  traces  creation 
through  successive  stages  of  development  to  primordial 
atoms  of  various  kinds  and  properties.  It  is  time  to 
set  forth  the  atomic  theoiy  of  these  schools.  Let  the 
following  aphorisms  be  considered  and  weighed  : 

“ The  common  property  of  substance  and  quality  is 
that  they  originate  things  of  the  same  class”  (Book  II. 


THE  YAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


Lesson  I.  Aph.  9).  The  commentator  has  these  words 
in  explanation  : “ Terrene  atoms  originate  a terrene 
aggregate  of  two  atoms  ; blue  color  and  the  like  in  an 
atom  produce  blue  color  and  the  like  in  an  aggregate  of 
two  atoms.” 

“ The  eternal  is  existent  and  uncaused  ” (Book  I A". 
Lesson  I.  Aph.  1). 

u The  effect  thereof  is  the  mark  of  its  existence” 
(Book  IY.  Lesson  I.  Aph.  2). 

£<  The  supposition  that  atoms  are  non- eternal  is 
nescience”  (Book  IY.  Lesson  I.  Aph.  5). 

“ The  qualities  have  been  stated.  Also  the  color, 
taste,  smell,  and  touch  of  the  earth,  etc. , inasmuch  as 
substances  are  non-eternal.  By  this  is  declared  their 
eternity  in  things  eternal  ” (Book  YII.  Lesson  I.  Aph. 
1-3). 

“ In  the  non-eternal  (extension)  is  non-eternal.  In 
the  eternal  it  is  eternal.  Atomic  extension  is  eternal  ” 
(Book  YII.  Lesson  I.  Aph.  18-20). 

In  these  aphorisms  the  theory  appears  in  a germinal 
form,  and  it  seems  to  have  been  matured  in  subsequent 
times  by  the  champions  of  these  schools.  Atoms  are 
the  ultimate  particles  of  matter,  indivisible  and  eternal. 
They  are  divided  into  four  classes,  according  to  the  four 
elements  recognized  in  ancient  times — terrene,  aqueous, 
aerial,  and  igneous.  The  terrene  atoms  have,  as  the 
earth  which  they  compose,  color,  taste,  smell,  and 
touch.  The  aqueous  atoms  have,  as  water,  color,  taste, 
and  touch  ; the  aerial,  as  air,  color  and  touch,  and  the 
igneous  color  only.  The  atoms  cohere  or  agglutinate, 
not  in  consequence  of  the  power  of  God,  not  in  conse- 
quence of  an  inherent  efficacy,  but  owing  to  an  ex- 
traneous plastic  influence  or  force. 

AYhat  is  that  influence  or  force  ? A modern  com- 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


234 


mentator  has  these  words  on  an  aphorism  already 
quoted  : “ It  is  to  be  inferred  that  destiny  is  the  cause 
of  the  motion  of  pieces  of  grass  attracted  by  amber,  of 
the  upward  flaming  of  fire,  of  the  horizontal  motion  of 
wind,  and  of  the  action  of  primordial  atoms.”  The 
same  commentator  says  elsewhere  : “The  universal 
pervasion  of  the  soul  is  proved,  inasmuch  as  conjunc- 
tion with  soul  influenced  by  destiny  is  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion in  the  atoms  at  the  time  of  creation.” 

Atoms  are  made  to  act  or  set  in  motion  by  destiny 
or  the  accumulated  work  of  past  states  of  existence, 
together  with  the  merit  and  demerit  attached  thereto. 
And  when  set  in  motion  by  this  mysterious  and  irresist- 
ible force,  the  principle,  like  attracts  like,  is  realized, 
and  atoms  of  one  and  the  same  class  cohere.  T wo  of 
them  form  a compound  atom,  and  three  a tertiary 
atom,  which  is  visible  like  a mote  in  a sunbeam.  And 
in  this  way,  by  a process  of  integration,  disintegration, 
and  redintegration,  the  universe  is  evolved  out  of  these 
ultimate  particles. 

The  atomic  theory,  propounded  in  ancient  Greece  by 
Leucippus  and  Democritus  of  Abdera,  is  in  some  re- 
spects essentially  different  from  that  of  our  Logical 
schools.  The  motive  power  in  it  is  derived,  through 
gravitation,  from  chance,  not  from  the  efficacy  of  accu- 
mulated merit  and  demerit,  called  destiny.  The  atoms 
posited  by  these  philosophers  are  of  different  kinds, 
differing  in  size,  form,  and  weight.  The  higher  ones 
being  heavier  than  the  lower  ones  descend,  causing  the 
latter  to  ascend  ; and  thus  horizontal  motion  is  gen- 
erated. And  this  motion  produces  lateral  motion  by 
means  of  percussion,  the  particles  in  their  constant 
ascent  and  descent  striking  and  causing  one  another  to 
move  laterally.  In  this  way  arose  their  rotary  motion, 


THE  VAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


235 


which  resulted  in  their  conglomeration  into  the  huge 
masses  of  matter  called  worlds.  The  earth,  when  small 
in  bulk  and  weight,  was  in  motion,  but  it  came  to  a 
state  of  rest  when  increased  in  volume  and  gravity. 
From  its  moisture  arose  organized  beings,  while  souls 
were  formed  of  those  nice,  smooth,  and  round  atoms 
which  are  the  constituent  elements  of  fire.  Such  atoms 
are  diffused  over  the  whole  body,  and  exercise  particu- 
lar functions  in  its  particular  organs,  generating  thought 
in  the  brain,  anger  in  the  heart,  desire  in  the  liver,  and 
so  on.  We  inhale  soul-atoms  and  exhale  them,  and  we 
live  so  long  as  this  process  of  respiration  lasts. 

This  statement  makes  the  main  difference  between  the 
two  systems  manifest.  While  the  one  system  makes 
atoms  the  source  of  existence  in  all  its  forms,  physical 
and  spiritual,  the  other  looks  upon  the  process  which 
evolves  pure  spirits  out  of  the  ultimate  particles  of  im- 
pure matter  as  thoroughly  absurd.  Hindu  Philosophy, 
in  all  its  orthodox  branches  at  least,  affirms  the  eternal 
existence  and  incorruptible  purity  of  the  soul,  as  well  as 
the  eternity  and  impurity  of  matter.  The  antithesis 
between  matter  and  mind  has  nowhere  such  promi- 
nence given  it  as  in  our  national  schools  ; and  whatever 
scheme  of  thought  is  calculated  to  confound  these  two 
irreconcilable  entities  is  thrown  aside  as  un-FIindu,  un- 
reasonable, and  absurd.  The  atomic  system  of  ancient 
Greece  presents  such  confusion,  and  all  attempt  to 
assimilate  it  to  what  was  elaborated  in  ancient  India 
must  be  pronounced  futile.  Besides,  work  as  a primal 
force  has  a methodical  way  of  operating,  and  must  not 
be  confounded  with  chance,  the  inscrutable  and  unin- 
telligent force  behind  the  varied  movements  and  com- 
binations of  varieties  of  atoms  assumed  in  the  Greek 
school  referred  to. 


230 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


We  pass  on  now  to  the  metaphysical  ideas,  time  and 
space,  represented  by  Kant  as  subjective  forms  of 
thought  rather  than  objective  realities.  They  are 
called  substances  because  either  of  them  is  a substratum 
of  certain  qualities  or  attributes.  The  qualities  of  the 
one  are  priority,  posteriority,  and  simultaneity,  and 
those  of  the  other  are  proximity  and  remoteness,  both 
included  in  the  quality  “extensions.”  Here  are  the 
aphorisms  that  speak  of  time  and  space  : 

“ The  notions  of  posteriority  in  relation  to  posterior- 
ity, of  simultaneity,  of  slowness  and  quickness,  are 
marks  of  the  existence  of  time.  Its  substantiality  and 
eternity  are  explained  by  air.  Its  unity  is  explained 
by  existence”  (Book  II.  Daily  Lesson  II.  Apli.  6-8). 

“ The  mark  appertaining  to  space  is  that  whence  the 
knowledge  arises  that  one  thing  is  remote  and  not 
remote  from  another.  The  substantiality  and  eternity 
(of  space)  are  explained  by  air.  Its  unity  (is  explained) 
by  existence.  Its  diversity  is  (caused  to  be  conceived) 
by  the  difference  of  its  effects.  (Space  is  regarded  as) 
east  because  of  a past,  future,  or  present  conjunction  of 
the  sun.  So  likewise  (space  is  regarded  as)  south,  west, 
and  north”  (Book  II.  Daily  Lesson  II.  Aph.  10-15). 

The  meaning  of  these  extracts  is  plain.  Time  is  a 
substance,  because  it  is  the  substrate  of  certain  attributes 
or  predicates.  It  is  eternal  as  air,  or  the  primary  aerial 
atom,  and  it  is  one  as  the  summum  genus  existence  is 
one.  Its  marks  have  already  been  pointed  out. 

Space  also  is,  for  similar  reasons,  a substance  eternal 
and  one  ; but  it  appears  diverse  on  account  of  its  acci- 
dental conjunction  with  other  objects.  “ One  man,” 
says  a commentator,  “ has  the  practical  assurance  that 
this  is  the  east  because  the  conjunction  of  the  sun  in 
the  orient  first  took  place  yesterday.  Another  has  the 


THE  VAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


237 


notion  of  the  east  from  observing  that  the  conjunction 
of  the  sun  in  the  orient  will  first  take  place  to-morrow. 
Another  has  the  notion  of  the  east  from  observing  that 
there  is  a present  conjunction  of  the  sun  now  taking 
place  in  that  quarter.”  “In  like  manner  the  practical 
assurance  of  the  south  arises  from  past,  future,  or  pres- 
ent conjunction  of  the  sun  with  the  mountains,  etc.,  in 
the  southern  quarter.  So  also  the  notion  of  west  and 
north  may  be  analogously  accounted.” 

From  the  metaphysical  entities  we  pass  on  to  what 
is  called  the  internal  organ  or  the  inner  sensory,  manas, 
the  mind.  Let  us,  according  to  our  usual  course,  pre- 
sent in  a group  the  aphorisms  bearing  on  the  subject, 
and  deduce  proper  conclusions  from  them.  These, 
however,  may  be  prefaced  by  a quotation  from  the  first 
book  of  Gautama’s  Sutras  : “The  characteristic  of  the 
mind  is  this,  that  there  does  not  arise  (in  a single  soul) 
more  than  one  cognition  at  once.”  The  Yaiseshika 
Sutras  bearing  on  the  subject  are  these  : 

“ Existence  and  non-existence  of  knowledge  on  con- 
tact of  the  soul  with  the  objects  of  sense  are  the  mark 
of  the  existence  of  an  internal  organ.  Its  substantiality 
and  eternity  are  explained  by  air.  Because  of  non- 
simultaneity of  volitions  and  non-simultaneity  of  cog- 
nitions it  is  one  (in  each  body)”  (Book  III.  Lesson  II. 
Aph.  1-3). 

“ The  upward  flaming  of  fire,  the  sideward  blowing 
of  wind,  and  the  first  action  of  atoms  and  of  the  inter- 
nal organ  are  caused  by  destiny.  The  action  of  the 
internal  organ  is  explained  by  the  action  of  the  hand. 
Pleasure  and  pain  result  from  contact  of  soul,  sense, 
mind,  and  object.  Absence  of  action  in  the  internal 
sensory  reposing  in  the  soul  ; non-existence  of  pain  in 
the  body — this  is  union.  The  egress  and  ingress  (of 


238 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


internal  sensories  from  and  into  bodies),  conjunctions 
with  tilings  eaten  and  drunk,  conjunctions  with  other 
effects — all  these  things  are  caused  by  destiny”  (Book 
Y.  Lesson  II.  Aph.  13-17). 

“ In  consequence  of  the  non-existence  of  that  (univer- 
sal pervasion),  the  internal  organ  is  absolutely  small” 
(Book  VII.  Lesson  I.  Aph.  23). 

To  these  extracts  one  from  the  paper  on  Vaiseshika 
Philosophy  in  the  “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha”  ought 
to  lie  added  with  a view  to  a comprehensive  presenta- 
tion of  the  idea  of  the  mind  as  enounced  in  the  Logical 
schools  : 

“ The  general  terms  atmatya  and  mancostya  are  the 
respective  definitions  of  soul  ( atman ) and  mind  ( manas ). 
The  general  idea  of  soul  is  that  which  is  subordinate  to 
substance,  being  also  found  existing,  with  intimate  re- 
lation, in  that  which  is  without  form  ( amurta ).  The 
general  idea  of  mind  is  that  which  is  subordinate  to 
substance,  being  also  found  existing  with  intimate  rela- 
tion in  an  atom,  but  (unlike  other  atoms)  not  the  inti- 
mate cause  of  any  substance.”  In  these  extracts  a 
view  of  the  mind  is  presented  such  as  may  justly  be 
represented  as  somewhat  ambiguous.  At  first  sight 
the  mind  appears  to  be  nothing  more  or  less  than  a 
material  organ  of  communication  between  the  soul  and 
the  bodily  senses.  It  is  merely  an  organ  of  sensation 
and  intellection  to  the  soul.  The  external  world 
makes,  by  its  endless  varieties  of  objects,  suitable 
impressions  upon  the  bodily  senses  ; and  these  impres- 
sions, called  the  raw  materials  of  sensation,  are  one 
after  another  communicated  to  the  soul  for  cognition 
by  the  mind.  It  is  material,  being  small  as  an  atom. 
Its  atomic  character  is  set  forth  by  the  fact  that  it  can 
let  in  only  one  idea  at  a time.  It  has  a form  ( murta ), 


THE  VAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


239 


and  therefore  differs  from  time,  space,  and  ether,  which 
are  amurta , or  without  form.  It  is  not  infinite  like 
ether,  for  had  it  been  so  it  would  have  made  simultane- 
ity or  cotemporaneity  of  cognitions  and  volitions  on  the 
part  of  the  soul  a possibility.  It  is,  like  the  soul,  mul- 
titudinous, its  plurality  being  proved  by  the  fact  that 
everybody  in  the  world  has  a particular  mind  attached 
to  it.  It  moves  to  and  fro,  gets  into  and  comes  out  of 
bodies  ; but  all  its  movements  are  caused  and  regulated 
by  the  mysterious,  unseen  power  called  destiny.  It  is  in 
reality  the  internal  sensory,  as  Professor  Gough  calls  it, 
a material  organ  of  communication  attached  to  the  soul, 
and  forming  a sort  of  intermediate  post-office  between 
the  governor  within  and  the  external  senses,  its  servitors. 

This  view  of  the  mind  appears  at  first  sight  to  be  a, 
great  advance  on  that  of  the  Sankhya  school.  By  the 
Sankhya  philosopher  the  mind  is  called  the  internal 
sense,  the  eleventh  organ,  a material  evolute  ; but  it  is 
not  according  to  his  views  an  unconscious,  inactive  in- 
strument of  communication  between  the  soul  and  the 
external  world.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  the  only  active 
principle  in  man  ; it  receives  the  impressions  made 
upon  the  senses,  elaborates  them  into  ideas,  arranges 
and  classifies  them,  deduces  general  conclusions  from 
them,  wills  and  acts,  and  desists  from  willing  and  act- 
ing according  as  it  is  moved  by  preponderant  and  non- 
preponderant  motives.  In  a word,  it  performs  all  those 
functions  which  are  ascribed  by  general  consent  to  the 
soul,  or  to  the  mind  as  the  soul  itself,  not  as  one  of  its 
organs.  The  soul,  again,  is  merely  a passive,  uncon- 
scious, luminous  substance,  in  which  the  sensations  and 
ideas  elaborated  by  the  mind  are  simply  reflected. 

But  here  in  the  Logical  schools  the  order  seems 
reversed.  The  mind  is  the  passive,  unconscious  sub- 


240 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


stance  of  atomic  size  and  shape,  and  the  soul  is  the 
active  principle  in  man.  The  mind  is  caused  to  find  its 
own  level  among  its  internal  organs,  while  the  soul 
has  its  ceaseless  activity  restored  to  it,  along  with  its 
percipient,  elaborative,  volitionating  power.  Thus  far 
an  improvement  seems  to  have  been  realized. 

But  these  schools  waver,  and  there  are  aphorisms  in 
their  standard  works  which  indicate  a tendency  to 
return  to  the  Sankliya  view,  which,  be  it  observed,  is 
in  perfect  accord  with  the  most  approved  principles  of 
Hindu  Philosophy  in  general.  The  aphorism,  for  in- 
stance, already  quoted  : “ Absence  of  action  in  the 
internal  sensory  reposing  in  the  soul,  non-existence  of 
pain  in  the  body — this  is  union.”  The  meaning  of 
these  words  is  elucidated  in  these  comments  : “ When 
the  internal  sensory  abides  in  the  soul  alone  . . . there 
results  the  non-commencement  or  non-production  of  the 
action  of  the  internal  sensor}7.  The  sensory  then  be- 
comes immovable.  In  this  state  there  is  non-existence 
of  pain  in  the  body — that  is,  pain  is  not  produced  in 
relation  to  the  body.  This  is  called  the  conjunction  or 
union  with  soul  of  the  internal  organ  excluded  from  all 
tilings  external.” 

Here  the  internal  organ  is  represented  as  active,  and 
its  action  is  a source  of  pain,  and  therefore  a stum- 
bling-block or  an  obstacle  all  but  insuperable  in  the 
way  of  emancipation.  Its  activity,  moreover,  is  the 
result  of  its  outward  move  toward  the  objects  of  exter- 
nal nature  or  the  organs  of  sense.  And  the  cessation 
of  its  activity  can  be  realized  only  when  this  outward 
tendency  is  superseded  by  an  inclination  inward,  or,  in 
plainer  terms,  when  it  is  withdrawn  from  the  objects  of 
sense,  and  made  to  repose,  calm  and  imperturbable,  in 
the  soul. 


THE  YAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


241 


Tlie  “ sixfold  union”  by  which  this  change  in  the 
mischievous  outward  tendency  of  the  mind  is  brought 
about  is  set  forth  in  these  comments  : “ Sitting,  check- 
ing the  vital  airs,  abstraction,  suspension  of  the  facul- 
ties, meditation,  and  contemplation — these  are  the  six 
elements  of  union.”  Here  the  course  recommended  for 
the  suppression  of  the  mischievous  activity  of  the  mind, 
and  the  insurance  of  its  ultimate  repose  in  the  soul,  is 
nearly  the  same  detailed  in  Patanjali’s  treatise  on  Yoga 
Philosophy.  We  notice,  therefore,  in  the  Hyaya  and 
Vaiseshika  Sutras  a sort  of  oscillation  between  the 
views  which  ascribed  perfect  quiescence  to  the  soul 
and  mischievous  activity  to  the  mind,  and  those  which 
reverse  the  order  of  the  synthetic  schools,  and  make  the 
soul  active  and  the  mind  passive. 

This  vacillation,  by  no  means  unaccountable,  will  be 
still  more  manifest  when  the  aphorisms  on  the  soul  are 
presented  and  thoroughly  examined.  Here  are  these 
aphorisms  : 

“ The  universal  cognition  of  the  objects  of  sense  is  an 
argument  for  (the  existence  of)  another  object  than  the 
objects  of  sense”  (Book  III.  Lesson  I.  Aph.  2). 

The  aphorism  embodies  an  argument  in  favor  of  the 
existence  of  souls  drawn  out  in  the  succeeding  apho- 
risms. It  is  very  plain  and  forcible  to  the  Hindu  mind. 
The  objects  of  sense  have  no  consciousness  and  percipi- 
ent faculty,  and  therefore  cannot  cognize  themselves. 
Nor  can  the  senses,  which  are  also  without  conscious- 
ness and  percipient  faculty,  cognize  them.  The  mind 
being  in  the  same  predicament — a material  organ — 
cannot  be  the  author  of  cognition.  But  the  objects  of 
sense  are  cognized  and  made  the  bases  of  appropriate 
ideas,  general  concepts,  or  judgments  both  simple  and 
complex  ; and  as  the  cognitive  and  elaborative  faculty 


242 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


does  not  reside  in  them,  nor  in  the  instruments  through 
which  they  are  perceived,  something  must  be  assumed 
as  its  substratum  or  as  in  possession  of  it.  That  some- 
thing is  the  conscious  soul. 

The  marks  of  the  existence  of  the  soul  are  thus  set 
forth  : 

“ The  ascending  and  descending  vital  airs,  the  open- 
ing and  closing  of  the  eyes,  lips,  motions  of  the  internal 
organ,  affections  of  the  other  organs,  pleasure,  pain, 
desire  and  aversion,  and  volition,  are  marks  of  the  ex- 
istence of  the  soul  ” (Book  III.  Lesson  II.  Aph.  4). 

This  continues  the  argument  presented  in  the  apho- 
rism commented  on  above.  Hot  only  is  the  existence  of 
the  soul  proved  by  “ the  existence  or  non-existence  of 
knowledge,”  by  science  and  nescience,  but  by  the 
physical  conditions  of  life,  such  as  the  horizontal  and 
circular  motions  of  the  vital  airs  within,  by  the  impres- 
sions made  upon  the  organs  of  sense,  by  the  activity  of 
the  internal  sensory,  by  the  qualities  of  pleasure  and 
pain,  desire  and  aversion,  and  lastly  by  volition.  Are 
all  movements  within  the  body  voluntary  ? If  so,  they 
certainly  indicate  the  presence  of  a volitionating  princi- 
ple, or  the  soul.  But  some  of  the  movements  of  which 
we  are  conscious,  such  as  the  action  of  the  lungs,  are  in 
reality  automatic  rather  than  voluntary.  How  can 
these  demonstrate  the  existence  of  the  soul  ? Here  the 
well-known  argument  of  the  Sankhya  school  is  utilized. 
Even  action,  which  is  called  automatic,  from  which  the 
principle  of  volition  is  absent,  is  not  objectless.  What 
can  be  the  object  of  the  varieties  of  physical  movements 
within  us  ? Certainly  the  gratification  of  the  soul. 
They,  therefore,  ought  to  be  brought  forward  as  fitted 
to  prove  the  existence  of  the  soul.  All  this  may  be 
predicated  of  the  motions  of  the  internal  organs,  which 


THE  VAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


243 


also  have  for  their  object  the  gratification  of  the  soul. 
And  as  to  pleasure  and  pain,  desire  and  aversion,  they 
certainly  indicate  the  existence  of  the  soul,  as  they  can- 
not possibly  be  properties  of  inanimate  matter.  And 
lastly,  what  can  prove  the  existence  of  soul  better  than 
volition  ? 

To  this  argument  an  exception  may  be  taken.  In 
the  case  of  a simple  judgment,  such  as,  This  is  Yajna 
Datta,  nothing  is  perceived  beyond  the  conjunction  of 
an  organ  of  sense  and  an  object  ; why  should  it  be 
regarded  as  an  indication  of  the  existence  of  some  prin- 
ciple behind  the  perceptible  contact'*  Besides,  even  if 
we  grant  that  desire  and  aversion,  cognition  and  voli- 
tion are  indicative  of  a substratum  in  which  they  in- 
here, why  should  we  look  upon  that  substratum  as  the 
soul,  not  as  something  else  ? It  may  therefore  be  con- 
cluded that  nothing  short  of  revelation  can  prove  the 
existence  of  an  imperceptible  entity  like  the  soul.  To 
this  the  proper  reply  is  couched  in  Aphorism  9 of  Les- 
son II.  of  Book  III.  : 

“ Existence  of  the  soul  being  the  conditio  sine  qua 
non  of  the  use  of  the  word  1 is  not  evidenced  only  by 
revelation.  ” 

Again,  in  Aphorism  1 8 we  have  these  words  : 

“ The  knowledge  of  the  ego,  being  individually  estab- 
lished, like  sound,  as  a conditio  sine  qua  non , neither 
too  narrowly  nor  too  widely  affirmed,  by  its  predomi- 
nant and  sensible  attributes,  does  not  depend  upon  rev- 
elation. ’ ’ 

These  aphorisms  indicate  a fresh  item  of  deviation 
from  the  Sankhya  and  Yoga  schools.  Egoism  or  con- 
sciousness is  represented  in  these  schools  as  an  entity 
distinct  from  the  soul,  which  appears  more  like  an  un- 
conscious lump  of  luminous  matter  than  a spiritual 


244 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


principle.  But  in  the  Logical  schools  egoism  is  identi- 
fied with  the  soul.  Its  predominant  and  sensible  at- 
tributes are  pleasure,  pain,  etc.,  and  these  prove  its  ex- 
istence as  decidedly  as  sound  proves  the  existence  of 
ether  ; inasmuch  as  these  attributes  are  not  applicable 
to  the  body  as  the  quality  sound  is  not  applicable  to 
earth,  water,  air,  or  fire.  It  may,  however,  be  said 
that  we  do  speak  of  the  body  being  pained  or  of  the 
body  moving  or  acting.  But  these  expressions  are 
tropical  or  figurative,  and  they  should  not  be  taken  in 
a literal  sense.  The  plurality  of  souls  is  maintained  in 
these,  as  well  as  in  the  synthetic  schools.  The  follow- 
ing quotations  are  enough  to  prove  this  : 

“ Activity  and  inactivity  observed  in  one’s  own  soul 
are  the  mark  of  the  existence  of  other  souls”  (Book 
III.  Lesson  I.  Aph.  19). 

“Because  of  its  circumstances,  soul  is  manifold” 
(Book  III.  Lesson  II.  Aph.  20). 

It  is  not  at  all  hard  to  explain  the  first  of  these 
aphorisms.  Activity  and  inactivity  are  generated  by 
desire  and  aversion,  a natural  longing  for  pleasure,  and 
an  instinctive  recoil  from  pain.  Of  this  fact  our  con- 
sciousness assures  us,  as  well  as  the  testimony  of  credi- 
ble or  trustworthy  witnesses.  But  of  all  the  activity 
and  inactivity  noticed  in  the  world,  we  are  not  the 
centre.  The  largest  quantity  by  far  must  needs  be 
traced  to  other  individuals — our  companions,  fellow-citi- 
zens, and  fellow-men.  Activity  and  inactivity  in  their 
case  indicate  what  they  indicate  in  ours — viz.,  desire 
and  aversion.  But  these  are  properties  or  affections  of 
the  soul,  and  consequently  activity  and  inactivity  in  the 
case  of  our  fellow-men  indicate  the  existence  in  them 
of  souls  similar  to  ours. 

But  the  plurality  of  souls  is  proved  by  another  fine  of 


THE  VAISESIIIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


245 


reasoning.  Our  circumstances  vary.  Some  among  us 
are  rich,  some  poor  ; some  are  respectable,  some  mean  ; 
some  are  liappy,  and  some  miserable.  This  variety  in 
our  circumstances  is  an  indisputable  evidence  of  the 
plurality  of  souls. 

These  lines  of  proof,  though  shabbily  stated  in  the 
Sutras,  may  be  adopted  by  a modern  psychologist. 
But  there  is  one  which  may  be  described  as  “ racy  of 
the  soil.”  The  existence  of  souls  in  general  may  be 
proved,  as  has  already  been  affirmed,  by  direct  percep- 
tion. Devotees  have  had  their  vision  so  far  extended, 
by  dint  of  austerity  and  meditation,  that  they  have  been 
able  to  see  human  souls— their  own  soul  and  the  souls 
of  others — just  as  we  see  the  visible  objects  of  nature 
around  us.  As  a rule,  souls  are  said  to  be  impercepti- 
ble. The  second  aphorism  of  the  First  Lesson  of  Book 
VIII.  sets  forth  its  imperceptibility  along  with  that  of 
the  internal  organ  : “ Therein  the  sonl  and  the  internal 
organ  are  imperceptible.  ’ ’ As  an  imperceptible  object, 
it  is  placed  in  the  same  category  with  ether,  time, 
space,  air,  and  atoms.  But  cognition  of  the  soul  is  the 
result  of  a particular  condition,  which  is  set  forth  in 
Aphorism  11  of  the  Second  Daily  Lesson  of  Book 
VIII. : “ Perception  of  the  soul  (results)  from  a particu- 
lar conjunction  between  the  soul  and  the  internal  organ 
in  the  soul.”  The  meaning'  is  clear.  When  the  inter- 
nal  organ,  having  withdrawn  itself  from  the  external 
objects  of  sense,  as  the  tortoise  draws  its  limbs  within 
its  shell,  merges  itself  in  the  soul,  that  which  is  invis- 
ible becomes  visible  ; souls  are  seen,  while  the  material 
creation  vanishes  out  of  sight,  except  in  its  atomic  forms. 

Gautama,  in  Book  I.  Sec.  3,  speaks  of  the  soul  in 
these  words  : “ Desire,  aversion,  volition,  pleasure, 
pain,  and  knowledge  are  the  sign  of  the  soul.” 


240 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


Let  us  now  present  in  one  focus  all  that  is  predicated 
of  the  soul  in  these  and  other  aphorisms  of  the  stand- 
ard works  of  these  two  schools  of  Hindu  Philosophy. 

The  soul  is  an  eternal,  imperceptible,  active  principle, 
not  a passive  substance  endowed  with  the  cognitive 
faculty  and  volitionating  power.  It  is,  therefore,  the 
source  of  cognition,  knowledge,  emotion,  every  species 
of  noticeable  activity,  and  every  species  of  voluntary 
abstinence  from  activity.  Its  characteristic  features 
are  volition,  desire,  aversion,  pleasure,  pain,  and  knowl- 
edge, both  in  its  incipient  and  matured  states.  It  com- 
municates with  the  external  world  through  the  internal 
organ,  the  mind,  and  the  external  organs  of  sense,  hear- 
ing, seeing,  taste,  smell,  and  touch.  It  has  no  innate 
or  supersensuous  ideas.  Thus  far,  barring  the  repre- 
sentation of  the  mind  as  an  internal  organ,  not  as  an- 
other name  for  the  soul  itself,  the  description  may  in 
all  its  entireness  be  adopted  by  those  philosophers  of 
the  sensational  school  who  do  not  look  upon  it,  as  John 
Stuart  Mill  does,  as  simply  “ a permanent  possibility 
of  sensation,”  and  therefore  inferentially  identical  with 
or  not  different  from  matter  itself. 

The  view  presented  of  the  soul  may  at  first  sight 
seem  correct  and  consistent.  But  while  studying  Hindu 
Philosophy  we  must  never  lose  sight  of  the  proverb, 

“ Everything  that  ..glitters  is  not  gold.”  According  to 
its  approved  maxims,  the  properties  or  affections  enunci- 
ated are  adventitious,  not  essential.  Desire  and  aver- 
sion are  defects  of  which  the  soul  must  get  rid  before 
emancipation  can  possibly  be  realized.  Again,  desire 
and  aversion  are  generated  in  the  soul  through  the 
cognitive  faculty  by  the  objects  of  the  external  world.  _ 
The  cognitive  faculty  is,  therefore,  a mischievous  princi- 
ple, and  must  also  be  annihilated.  Once  more,  desire 


THE  VAISESIIIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


247 


and  aversion  lead  the  soul  to  activity  or  inactivity 
through  volition,  which  is,  therefore,  a mischievous 
power  to  be  suppressed  or  eradicated.  The  soul  simply 
goes  back  to  its  original  condition  of  perfect  quiescence 
when  its  emancipation  from  the  bondage  of  ignorance 
is  realized.  A state  of  happy  inactivity  or  blissful  pas- 
sivity is  its  starting-point  and  goal,  and  whatever  is 
calculated  to  bring  it  out  of  such  state  is  an  acci- 
dent to  be  deprecated,  and  ruthlessly  eradicated  when 
realized. 

This  point  will  have  to  be  enlarged  on  before  the 
sequel.  Meanwhile  it  is  desirable  to  raise  a question  of 
paramount  importance — viz.,  Do  the  Sutras  speak  of  a 
Universal  Soul  of  an  unlimited  power,  and  do  they 
represent  Him  as  the  creator  of  the  world,  the  source 
of  all  knowledge  and  bliss  ? The  aphorisms  in  which 
God  is  spoken  of  in  the  Vaiseshika  Sutras  are  very  few 
in  number,  and  are  by-  no  means  of  an  unambiguous 
nature.  The  first  of  these  runs  thus  : 

“ Authoritativeness  belongs  to  revelation  because  it 
is  a declaration  of  that”  (Book  I.  Lesson  I.  Aph.  3). 

On  this  verse  a modern  commentator  has  the  follow- 
ing remarks  : 

“ The  word  Tat  (that)  signifies  God,  though  He  has 
not  been  previously  mentioned,  it  being  inferred  from 
His  being  universally  known,  just  as  in  the  aphorism  of 
Gautama,  ‘ That  is  unauthoritative,  being  vitiated  by 
falsity,  self -contradictoriness,  and  repetition.’  By  the 
word  ‘that’  the  Veda  is  signified,  though  not  pre- 
viously mentioned.  Accordingly  an  authoritativeness 
belongs  to  revelation — the  Veda— because  it  was  de- 
clared by  Him — revealed  by  God.” 

Another  aphorism  bearing  on  the  subject  runs  thus  : 
‘ £ But  word  and  work  are  the  mark  of  those  beings 


248 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


who  are  distinguished  from  ourselves”  (Book  I.  Lesson 
II.  Apli.  18). 

An  ancient  commentator  thus  explains  these  ambigu- 
ous words  : 

“ The  word  ‘ but  ’ implies  the  exclusion  of  the  marks 
of  touch,  etc.  A word  is  a name,  a work  an  effect, 
such  as  the  earth,  etc.  Both  of  these  are  a mark  of  the 
existence  of  God  and  the  great  sages  who  are  more  ex- 
cellent than  ourselves.’’ 

The  modern  commentator  referred  to  thus  comments 
upon  these  words  : 

“ The  word  ‘ but  ’ expresses  a division  of  the  sec- 
tions, and  implies  that  the  section  treating  of  the  Deity 
is  now  commenced.  A word  is  a name,  such  as  air,  a 
boar,  barley,  a reed,  and  the  like  ; a work  is  an  effect, 
as  the  earth,  a blade  of  grass,  etc.  These  are  both 
marks  inferring  the  existence  of  God  and  the  great 
sages,  who  are  distinguished  from  ourselves,  who  are 
able  to  produce  this  and  that  effect,  and  are  possessed 
of  omniscience  and  omnipotence.” 

The  reader  must  not  suppose  that  “ the  section  treat- 
ing of  the  Deity”  is  of  average  length  and  breadth  ; it 
only  consists  of  the  aphorism  quoted  above  and  the  fol- 
lowing : 

“ Because  words  and  works  are  known  by  perception 
to  be  produced.” 

The  ancient  commentator  thus  explains  these  words  : 

“ As  when  the  bodies  of  Chaitra,  Maitra,  and  others 
are  objects  of  perception  to  a father  and  others,  the 
names  Chaitra,  Maitra  are  given,  so  the  giving  of 
names  to  a water-pot,  a piece  of  cloth,  etc.,  is  depen- 
dent on  the  will  of  God.  Whatever  word  God  wills  to 
be  the  name  of  anything  is  applicable  to  it,  in  the  same 
manner  that  every  herb  that  is  touched  by  the  edge  of 


TIIE  VAISESMKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


249 


an  ichneumon’s  teeth  is  an  antidote  to  the  venom  of  a 
snake.  Therefore  a name  of  this  kind  is  a mark  infer- 
ential of  those  beings  which  are  distinguished  from  our- 
selves and  others.  ’ ’ 

These  aphorisms  and  these  comments  make  it  evident 
that  the  argument  resorted  to  or  brought  forward  by 
the  ancient  logicians  of  India  is  that  based  on  design  in 
nature  or  the  teleological  argument.  They  sometimes 
did  bring  forward  explicit  statements,  culled  from  rev- 
elation, in  support  of  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  all 
religion,  the  existence  of  God  ; but  even  when  this  was 
done,  the  point  on  which  the  greatest  stress  was  laid 
was  not  so  much  the  testimony  itself  as  the  marks  of 
design  in  the  testimony,  as  the  following  passage  from 
the  “ Kusumanjali,”  a work  on  Logic  recently  trans- 
lated by  Professor  Cornell,  will  show  : 

“ An  omniscient  and  indestructible  Being  is  to  be 
proved  from  the  existence  of  effects,  from  the  combina- 
tion of  atoms,  from  the  support  of  the  earth  in  the  sky, 
from  traditional  arts,  from  belief  in  revelation,  from 
the  Veda,  from  its  sentences,  and  from  particular 
members.  ’ ’ 

In  this  extract,  design  in  the  construction  of  the  sen- 
tences of  the  Veda,  and  the  clauses  of  which  they  are 
composed,  is  insisted  on,  as  well  as  the  bare  testimony 
embodied  in  revelation.  What  a gap  between  the 
teleological  argument,  as  it  was  unfolded  in  those  days, 
when  the  best  example  of  design  available  was  a jar  or 
a water-pot,  and  the  same  argument  as  it  is  presented 
in  these  days  of  steam-engines,  locomotives,  and  tele- 
graphic wires  ! A modern  audience  might  laugh  if  an 
orator  prone  to  enlarge  upon  the  art  of  giving  names, 
or  constructing  sentences,  or  weaving  cloths,  or  making 
jars  as  an  indisputable  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  ; 


250 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


but  it  must  not  lie  forgotten  that  the  absurdity  of  the 
theory  of  evolution,  as  propounded  by  those  who  do  not 
believe  in  design,  has  often  been  set  forth  in  our  day 
by  the  hypothesis  of  an  accidental  agglomeration  of 
letters  into  words,  words  into  sentences,  sentences  into 
the  beauty  and  pathos,  the  truth  and  depth  of  Shake- 
speare. Our  ancient  philosophers  had  evidently  no  idea 
either  of  the  ontological  or  of  the  moral  argument  in 
favor  of  the  existence  of  God. 

It  may  seem  strange  that  a multitude  of  sages, 
“ more  excellent  than  ourselves,”  are  associated  with 
God  in  the  aphorisms  of  Kanada  quoted  above,  in  the 
work  and  word  which  demonstrate  His  and  their  ex- 
istence. It  is  explicitly  declared  that  the  objects  of 
nature  and  the  names  given  to  many  of  them  are  proofs 
of  the  existence,  not  only  of  God,  but  of  other  spiritual 
beings  imperceptible  to  our  gross  percipient  faculties. 
"Who  are  these  ? Men  raised  to  the  position  of  the 
gods  by  austerity  and  meditation,  or  angelic  beings  who 
have  always  stood  nearer  to  God  than  man  ? Perhaps 
both  these  classes  of  glorious  beings  are  referred  to, 
though  the  word  “ sages”  used  by  the  commentator  is 
more  applicable  to  human  adepts  than  to  ethereal  intel- 
ligences. They  are  represented  as  co-sharers,  both  in 
His  attributes  and  in  His  works,  with  God.  They  are 
expressly  said  to  be  “ possessed  of  omniscience  and 
omnipotence.” 

But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  this  representation, 
paradoxical  though  at  first  sight  it  may  appear,  is  in 
perfect  keeping  with  the  approved  principles  of  Hindu 
Philosophy.  One  of  these  is  that  a person  literally  be- 
comes that  which  he  makes  the  subject  of  long-contin- 
ued and  intense  meditation.  He  can  transform  himself 
into  an  atom  by  meditating  intensely  upon  an  atom,  or 


THE  YAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


251 


the  diffusive  ether  by  making  that  all-pervasive  sub- 
stance the  subject  of  concentrated,  self -oblivious  con- 
templation. By  a similar  process  he  can  even  change 
himself  into  God.  “ I will  be  God  by  meditating 
upon  God  ” — such  is  the  sublime  aspiration  of  many  a 
devotee  in  India.  And  if  the  God  believed  in  were 
something  more  than  a mere  nonentity,  such  aspiration 
would  be  higher  than  the  highest  ever  cherished  by  a 
human  being1.  But  neither  God  nor  the  human  soul  is 
anything  better  than  a nonentity,  according  to  Hindu 
Philosophy  ; and  therefore  this  aspiration,  at  first 
sight  so  high,  resolves  itself  into  a desire  to  pass  from 
troublesome  existence  into  troubleless  non-existence  ! 

In  these  verses  God  is  certainly  represented  as  the 
Creator  of  the  universe.  In  the  paper  on  the  Ay  ay  a 
Philosophy  in  the  “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha”  there  is 
an  elaborate  argument  presented  to  prove  that  lie  is 
such.  The  objections  against  the  notion  of  attributing 
creation  to  Him  are  by  no  means  few  or  of  a contemp- 
tible order,  according  to  Hindu  Philosophy.  God,  you 
say,  is  the  Creator  of  the  universe.  Yery  well ; the 
question  rises,  What  could  lead  Him  to  create  ? His 
own  advantage  or  that  of  His  creatures  ? Hot  cer- 
tainly His  advantage,  because  as  the  Absolute  Being 
He  needed  nothing,  and  can  need  nothing  to  complete 
His  perfection.  Did  He,  then,  create  to  make  His 
creatures  happy  ? If  so,  He  must  have  miserably 
failed,  for  His  creatures  are  far  from  happy — are  very 
miserable  indeed.  This  objection  may  be  easily  rebut- 
ted. God’s  determination  to  create  proceeded  from 
“ compassion,”  or  a wish  to  make  His  creatures  happy. 
But  these  have  by  their  own  works  made  themselves 
miserable. 

There  is,  however,  an  insuperable  objection  to  the 


252 


hikdu  rniLOsornY. 


idea  of  God  bringing  Himself  to  a determination  to 
create.  God  cannot  create  without  being  moved  by  a 
desire  to  do  so.  Hence  creation  on  the  part  of  God 
implies  on  Ilis  part  a desire,  and  a preponderant  desire, 
or  a desire  leading  to  a volition  and  an  action.  How  a 
desire,  according  to  Hindu  Philosophy,  is  an  evil  and  a 
source  of  bondage,  however  good  it  may  be.  How 
can  that  which  is  admittedly  a source  of  misery  be 
evinced  by  a Being  described  as  eternally  free  from  all 
pain  as  well  as  pleasure  ? The  Hindu  philosopher 
shows  no  little  vacillation  here,  and  escapes  the  horns 
of  a formidable  dilemma  by  supposing  a force  behind 
the  Deity  as  the  ultimate  source  of  creation.  That 
force  is  in  these  Sutras  called  Destiny. 

We  have  already  had  occasion  to  dwell  upon  the 
many  forms  in  which  this  mysterious  primal  force 
manifests  itself.  It  is,  properly  speaking,  the  source 
of  all  material  movements  in  creation.  In  commenting 
upon  a verse  already  quoted,  one  of  the  commentators 
says  : “ It  is  to  be  inferred  that  Destiny  is  the  cause  of 
the  motion  of  pieces  of  glass  attracted  by  amber,  of 
the  upward  flaming  of  fire,  of  the  horizontal  motion  of 
wind,  and  of  the  action  of  primordial  atoms  in  crea- 
tion.” It  is  also  the  source  of  desire  and  aversion  to 
which  every  species  of  activity,  other  than  material,  is 
traceable.  Let  the  following  aphorisms  prove  this  : 

“ From  pleasure  arises  desire.  And  also  through 
that  being  ingrained.  And  also  through  destiny” 
(Book  V.  Lesson  II.  Aph.  10-12). 

From  pleasure  arises  desire,  and  that  is  traceable  to 
Destiny.  Destiny,  therefore,  generates  and  controls 
all  material  movements,  and  all  our  thoughts,  feelings, 
and  volitions.  And  Destiny  originally  caused  the 
atoms  to  combine,  integrate  and  disintegrate,  and  de- 


THE  YAISESHIKA  rniLOSOPHY. 


253 


velop  into  the  varied,  objects  of  creation.  Destiny, 
then,  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  existence  in  its  multi- 
farious forms.  Or  if  God  were  represented  as  the  cre- 
ative principle  or  power,  the  representation  would  not 
be  correct  unless  He  were  held  up  as  a sort  of  demi- 
urgic link  between  the  creation  and  the  Creator.  God 
could  not  create  without  being  moved  by  a desire  to  do 
so.  But  all  desires  proceed  from  Destiny,  to  which, 
therefore,  His  desire  to  create  must  be  traced.  Des- 
tiny, therefore,  is  the  Creator,  whether  creation  is 
traced  to  it  through  God  or  through  atoms  ! 

But  why  are  two  plans  of  creation  set  forth — the  one 
tracing  it  through  a God,  and  the  other  directly  through 
innumerable  atoms  to  Destiny  \ Because  perhaps  the 
philosophers  of  these  schools  oscillated  between  their 
own  and  the  popular  notion  of  creation;  or  perhaps 
they  tried  to  conciliate  popular  sentiment  by  an  intro- 
duction into  their  scheme  of  some  elements  of  belief, 
without  which  it  was  sure  to  fall  flat  on  the  public. 
And  lastly,  we  may  suppose  that  they  identified  Des- 
tiny with  God.  The  second  of  these  hypotheses  ap- 
pears to  us  correct.  The  logicians  posited  a perfectly 
inactive  and  quiescent  God  more  to  humor  popular 
prejudices  than  to  serve  any  recognized  purpose  of  their 
essentially  atheistic  scheme  of  philosophy. 

But  what  is  Destiny,  the  Adrishta , Unseen  Force 
behind  the  phenomena  of  nature  and  evolutions  of 
Providence  ? To  settle  this  question  we  must  examine 
what  is  said  about  desire  and  aversion,  and  merit  and 
demerit. 

Gautama  describes  the  passions,  or  desire  and  aver- 
sion, as  having  “ this  characteristic,  that  they  actuate,” 
or  cause  actions.  Kanada  defines  desire  as  a longing 
for  pleasure  and  aversion,  as  a recoil  from  pain.  They 


254 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


both  lead  to  activity,  and  therefore  they  are  both  mis- 
chievous. We  have  already  quoted  the  aphorism  : 
“ From  pleasure  arises  desire.”  The  following  com- 
ments on  these  words  are  worthy  of  consideration  : 

“ Desire  or  wish  arises  from  pleasure  generated  by 
attachment  to  garlands,  sandal-wood,  women,  and 
other  objects  of  sense,  or  in  the  pleasures  of  those  suc- 
cessive kinds,  or  in  the  means  of  those  pleasures.  It  is 
also  to  be  considered  that  aversion  arises  from  pain  be- 
gotten by  snakes,  thorns,  etc. ; in  these  pains  or  in  the 
means  of  these  pains.  Desire,  aversion,  and  infatua- 
tion, in  virtue  of  being  incentives  to  activity,  are 
called  defects.  Accordingly  the  aphorism  of  Gautama, 
Defects  have  for  their  characteristic  incitement  to 
activitju” 

Here  the  thing  to  be  noted  is,  that  pleasure  and  pain 
are  antecedent  to  desire  and  aversion,  which  again 
lead  to  action,  and  that  to  bondage.  The  definitions 
given  of  pleasure  and  pain  are  of  the  crudest  type. 
"What  a gap  between  them  and  Sir  William  Hamilton’s 
definition  of  pleasure  as  unimpeded  energy,  and  of  pain 
as  impeded  energy  ! How  gross,  again,  are  the  ideas 
of  pleasure  and  pain  presented  ! The  exquisite  enjoy- 
ments and  the  exquisite  sufferings  arising  from  the  in- 
tellectual and  moral  nature  of  man  are  almost  entirely 
thrown  out  of  calculation  ! 

Let  us  now  advert  to  the  subject  of  merit  and  de- 
merit. In  Aph.  3 of  the  Second  Lesson  of  Book  Y.  we 
have  these  words  : “ The  duty  of  the  four  periods  of 
religious  life  (has  been  declared).  Fidelities  and  infidel- 
ities are  the  causes  of  merit  and  demerit.  ” This  is  a 
very  important  aphorism,  inasmuch  as  it  traces  merit 
and  demerit,  not  only  to  external  acts,  such  as  the 
duties  performed  by  a Brahmin  passing  through  the 


THE  VAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


255 


four  stages  of  studentship,  householdership,  hermitship, 
and  mendicancy,  hut  to  states  of  the  heart  or  internal 
dispositions.  In  the  aphorism  following,  infidelity  is 
said  to  be  “a  deficiency  of  faith,”  and  fidelity  “ non- 
deficiency.” 

In  aphorisms  If  and  15  of  the  same  book  and  section 
we  have  these  words  : “ Activity  in  merit  and  demerit 
has  for  its  antecedents  desire  and  aversion.  By  these 
are  conjunction  and  disjunction.” 

The  ancient  commentator  explains  the  last  few  words 
thus  : 

“ Existence  in  a future  state  is  now  declared  to  be 
the  occasion  of  merit  and  demerit.  By  these— by  merit 
and  demerit — conjunction — that  is,  birth— is  caused. 
By  conjunction  is  here  intended  connection  with  non- 
previous  pains  of  bodily  organs.  Disjunction  is  the  dis- 
junction of  body  and  the  internal  sensory,  characterized 
as  death.  The  meaning  is,  therefore,  that  this  transi- 
tory world,  a series  of  births  and  deaths,  otherwise 
termed  existence  in  a future  state,  is  caused  by  merit 
and  demerit.  ” 

We  shall  only  quote  another  aphorism  from  Book 
IX.  : “ The  knowledge  of  inspired  sages  and  perfect 
vision  result  from  merit.” 

The  ideas  presented  in  these  extracts  may  be  thus 
grouped  : Our  present  life  is  the  result  of  merit  and 
demerit  accumulated  in  past  lives.  We  are  adding 
constantly  to  this  accumulated  load  by  our  conduct  in 
this  life,  our  dispositions  and  acts.  We  acquire  tran- 
scendent knowledge  and  miraculous  powers  by  such 
meditation  as  is  a result  of  merit,  and  our  final  eman- 
cipation is  also  connected  therewith.  From  these 
statements  it  is  plain  that  what  is  called  Destiny  is 
identical  with  merit  and  demerit,  or  with  work,  the 


25G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


source  of  merit  and  demerit.  Work,  then,  rather  than 
God,  is  the  creator  of  the  universe,  our  creator  and 
incarcerator  ; and  it  also  ultimately  leads  to  our  eman- 
cipation through  the  medium  of  that  meditation  by 
which  it  is  itself  annihilated  ! Here,  again,  is  the  im- 
personal God  of  Buddhism  ! 

And  lastly  we  come  to  what  Gautama  calls  the  chief 
end  of  man,  Emancipation.  In  Book  V.  Lesson  II. 
Aph.  18,  we  have  this  set  forth  : “ Where  there  is 
non-existence  of  this  (that  is,  of  Destiny),  there  is  non- 
existence of  conjunction,  and  non-existence  of  manifes- 
tation, emancipation.” 

Destiny  or  work  is  the  cause  of  that  all  but  endless 
chain  of  births  and  deaths  under  which  we  groan. 
But  when  its  fruits  are  consumed  and  it  itself  is  annihi- 
lated, in  the  case  of  a spirit  raised  through  successive 
stages  of  exalted  existence  to  the  summit  of  concentra- 
tion, its  conjunction  with  material  conditions  disap- 
pears, along  with  its  manifestation  in  a bodil}r  form, 
and  its  final  liberation  is  realized. 

The  means  are  indicated  in  this  aphorism  : “ Eman- 
cipation is  declared  as  dependent  on  the  actions  of  the 
soul  ” (Book  YI.  Lesson  II.  Aph.  16). 

These  words  are  thus  explained  : “ This  it  is  which 
is  separation  of  body  and  soul.  When  there  exist  the 
actions  of  the  soul,  emancipation  ensues.  The  actions 
of  the  soul  are  as  follows  : Hearing,  meditation,  the 
practice  of  devotion,  abstraction,  a sitting  posture,  re- 
straining the  vital  airs,  acquisition  of  quietism,  and  self- 
subjugation, the  presentation  of  one’s  own  and  others’ 
souls,  knowledge  of  merit  and  demerit  previously  ac- 
quired by  fruition,  and  emancipation  characterized  as 
removal  of  pain,  consequent  on  the  cessation  of  birth, 
resulting  from  the  cessation  of  activity,  in  consequence 


THE  VAISESHIKA  PHILOSOPHY. 


257 


of  the  non-production  of  further  merit  and  demerit,  by- 
overcoming  the  mist  of  defects  characterized  as  desire 
and  aversion.  Of  these,  the  primary  act  of  soul  is 
knowledge  of  the  real  nature  of  the  six  categories.” 

The  concatenation  ending  in  emancipation  is  else- 
where set  forth  in  these  comments  : “ Therefore  the 
practical  application  of  this  introductory  section  of  two 
aphorisms  is  that  persons  desirous  of  emancipation  are 
concerned  in  the  non-existence  of  birth  for  the  sake  of 
non-existence  of  pain  ; in  the  non-existence  of  activity 
for  the  sake  of  non-existence  of  birth ; in  the  non-exist- 
ence of  faults  for  the  sake  of  non-existence  of  activity  ; 
in  the  cessation  of  false  knowledge  for  the  sake  of  non- 
existence of  faults ; and  in  forming  a mental  presenta- 
tion of  the  soul  for  the  sake  of  cessation  of  false  knowl- 
edge.” 

The  links  to  be  successively  destroyed  are  false 
knowledge,  faults,  or  desire  and  aversion,  activity, 
pain,  birth  ; and  the  means  of  destruction  is  right 
knowledge  of  the  soul  and  its  difference  from  non-soul, 
which  right  knowledge  is  attained  by  work  and  the 
meditation  which  destroys  work  ! And  when  mundane 
existence  is  rolled  up  as  a scroll,  we  have  the  perma- 
nent entities,  God,  Soul,  Mind,  Atoms,  left — all  im- 
mobile and  inactive  except  when  operated  upon  by 
Destiny.  How  came  Destiny  to  exist  before  the  be- 
ginning of  the  chain  of  conjunction  and  disjunction, 
births  and  deaths,  to  which  it  gave  birth ; or  how,  when 
destroyed  by  a process  of  self-destruction,  it  reappears, 
Phoenix-like,  at  every  renovation  of  creative  work — 
these  mysteries  are  left  unsolved.  The  only  reply  at- 
tempted is,  The  process  is  eternal  ! 

Pandit  Nehemiah  Goreh  praises  the  system  in  his 
well-known  book  on  Hindu  Philosophy7-  for  its  recogni- 


258 


HIHDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


tion  of  God  as  the  Creator  of  the  universe.  It  is  im- 
possible to  say  how  the  truth  has  escaped  his  calm  and 
philosophical  intellect,  that  God,  according  to  it,  has 
nothing  to  do  with  our  creation,  our  incarceration,  and 
our  salvation.  He  is  simply  a superfluous  entity,  intro- 
duced for  conventional  or  utilitarian  purposes,  and 
therefore  perfectly  dispensable,  along  with  the  soul, 
and  perhaps  the  mind.  Destiny  and  atoms,  matter  and 
force,  are  in  reality  the  ground  of  existence.  The  ap- 
parent trialism  of  these  schools  dwindles,  when  prop- 
erly interpreted,  into  the  materialistic  monism  of  the 
Sankhya  system  ! 


CHAPTER  IX. 


THE  PUKVA  MIMANSA,  0E  HINDU  EITUALISM. 

The  scliools  directly  and  ostensibly  associated  with 
the  Yeda  next  claim  attention — viz.,  the  Pnrva  and 
the  TTttara  Mimansa.  The  words  Purva  and  Uttar  a 
mean  “prior”  and  “posterior,”  “antecedent”  and 
“subsequent;”  and  in  connection  with  the  word 
Mimansa  the  ideas  they  express  are  a prior  and  a pos- 
terior decision.  There  is  a little  ambiguity  attached  to 
the  expressions  at  first  sight,  and  it  has  plunged  such 
great  thinkers  as  Dr.  Ritter  into  error.  Is  the  idea  of 
antecedence  or  subsequence  in  time  conveyed  by  these 
words  in  this  connection  ? Or  are  the  predicates  ap- 
plicable to  something  lying  beyond  the  confines  of 
chronology  ? Some  writers  of  eminence  have  fallen 
into  the  mistake  of  attaching  to  them  the  ideas  of 
priority  and  posteriority  in  time  ; and  Dr.  Ritter  occu- 
pies the  foremost  place  among  them.  According  to 
them,  the  Uttara  Mimansa  school,  or  what  is  oftener 
called  the  Yedantic  school,  was  founded  after  the 
Purva  Mimansa  school  had  been  organized  ; and  this 
circumstance  sets  forth  the  significance  of  the  appella- 
tives in  question.  But  this  notion  is  not  obviously  ten- 
able, as  in  the  Sutras  ascribed  to  Jaimini,  the  acknowl- 
edged founder  of  the  Purva  Mimansa  or  the  prior 
school,  the  name  of  Badarayana,  the  founder  of  the 
later  school,  is  distinctly  mentioned  as  an  authority. 
In  Book  I.  Sec.  1,  Aph.  5,  we  have  these  words  : 


2G0 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


1 1 But  the  natural  connection  of  a word  with  its  sense 
is  (the  instrument  of)  the  knowledge  thereof  (i.e.  of 
Duty),  and  the  intimation  (of  Scripture,  which  is) 
unerring,  though  given  in  respect  of  something  imper- 
ceptible. This  (according  to  our  opinion,  as  well  as 
that)  of  Badarayana  (the  author  of  Y edanta  Aphorisms) 
is  the  evidence  (by  means  of  which  we  recognize  Duty), 
for  it  has  no  respect  (to  any  other  evidence,  such  as 
that  of  sense).” 

This  express  mention  of  the  founder  of  the  later 
school  as  an  authority,  co-ordinate,  if  not  supraordi- 
nate,  in  one  of  the  opening  Sutras  of  the  standard  doc- 
ument of  the  prior  school,  militates  against  the  princi- 
ple of  interpretation,  to  which  the  mistake  alluded  to  is 
attributable.  The  ideas  of  priority  and  posteriority  in 
time  must  be  set  aside  altogether.  These  epithets 
refer  to  the  well-known  divisions  of  the  Yeda,  to  the 
prior  and  posterior  portions  of  that  venerable  work, 
rather  than  to  two  successive  divisions  of  time. 

In  the  first  of  this  series  of  papers,  the  three  main 
divisions  of  the  Big  and  other  Yedas  were  pointed  out. 
A fresh  reference  to  them  is  needed  to  explain  these 
two  important  terms.  The  three  principal  divisions 
of  each  of  the  Yedas  are  : (1)  Mantra,  or  Hymns  ; 
(2)  Brahmana,  or  Ritualistic  Directory;  and  (3)  Upan- 
ishad,  or  Underlying  Philosophy.  The  hymnology  and 
the  ritual  form  the  prior  portion,  while  the  philosophy 
in  which  these  two  elements  terminate  constitutes  the 
later  portion.  The  Purva  Mimansa  philosophizes  on 
the  earlier  portion  of  the  Yeda,  or  the  portion  embrac- 
ing the  Mantra  and  the  Brahmana;  and  the  Uttara 
Mimansa  treats  of  the  later  portion,  or  that  embracing 
the  Upanishad.  The  former  school  is,  properly  speak- 
ing, called  the  Mimansa,  and  the  latter  the  Yedanta. 


THE  PUEVA  MIMANSA. 


2G1 


The  schools  are  also  called  the  Exoteric  and  the 
Esoteric. 

It  is  to  he  observed  that,  though  in  one  sense  they 
may  justly  be  said  to  have  appeared  contemporane- 
ously, the  Yedantic  school  was  not  matured  and  per- 
fected till  the  rival  form  of  thought  had  nearly,  if  not 
entirely,  lost  its  prestige  and  dominating  influence. 
The  Yedantic  school  may  therefore  be  called  the 
Uttara  Mimansa,  both  in  a chronological  as  well  as  in 
the  sense  of  its  philosophy  being  confined  to  the  con- 
cluding portion  of  the  Yeda. 

The  founder  of  the  Mimansa  school  was  Jaimini, 
who  is  more  than  once  named  in  the  Sutras  ascribed 
to  him,  but  regarding  whom  little  or  nothing  is 
known  besides  the  fact  of  his  having  founded  one  of 
the  six  great  schools  of  Hindu  Philosophy,  and  ex- 
pounded its  principles,  after  the  orthodox  fashion,  in  a 
series  of  aphorisms.  The  number  of  aphorisms  ascribed 
to  him  is  no  less  than  2652,  and  they  are  classified  into 
915  AcUiikarans,  or  topical  sections,  and  these  again 
are  grouped  into  sixty  chapters,  which  form  twelve 
books,  each  consisting  of  four  chapters,  besides  the 
third,  sixth,  and  tenth,  each  of  which  has  twice  as 
many,  or  eight  chapters. 

This  mass  of  aphorisms  would  be  thoroughly  unintel- 
ligible but  for  the  glosses  and  scholias  extant,  or  within 
reach  of  the  plodding  student.  The  ancient  commen- 
tator, whose  great  commentary  has  been  revised  by 
subsequent  scholiasts,  was  Sabara  Swami  Bhatta,  and 
his  great  work  is  called  after  him,  “ Sabara- Bhasliya.” 
The  greatest  of  the  subsequent  annotators  was  Kuma- 
rilla  Swami  Bhatta,  who  is  one  of  the  great  leaders  of 
the  memorable  crusade,  the  issue  of  which  was  the 
almost  complete  banishment  of  Buddhism  from  the 


2G2 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


country  of  its  birth.  Of  this  great  man  Colebrooke 
speaks  thus  : 

“ Kumarilla  Bhatta  figures  greatly  in  the  tradition- 
ary rehgious  history  of  India.  He  was  predecessor  of 
Sankar  Acharya,  and  equally  rigid  in  maintaining  the 
orthodox  faith  against  heretics  who  reject  the  authority 
of  the  Vedas.  He  is  considered  to  have  been  the  chief 
antagonist  of  the  sect  of  Buddha,  and  to  have  insti- 
gated an  exterminating  persecution  of  that  heresy.  He 
does  indeed  take  every  occasion  of  controverting  the 
authority  and  doctrine  of  Sakva  or  Buddha,  as  well 
as  Arhat  or  Jina,  together  with  obscurer  heretics, 
Bodhyana  and  Umsaka  ; and  he  denies  them  any  con- 
sideration, even  when  they  do  concur  upon  any  point 
with  the  Vedas.  The  age  of  Kumarilla,  anterior  to 
Sankar,  and  corresponding  with  the  period  of  the  per- 
secution of  the  Bandhas,  goes  back  to  an  antiquity  of 
much  more  than  a thousand  years.  ’ ’ 

Another  annotator  of  note  ought  to  be  named,  as, 
from  references  in  the  “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha,”  he 
appears  to  have  led  one  great  division  of  the  Miman- 
salcas,  a division  forming  a sort  of  opposition  to  Kuma- 
rilla Bhatta.  Ilis  name  is  Pravakara,  and  he  might 
have  been  a contemporary  of  his  opponent,  Kumarilla. 

Ve  give,  as  usual,  the  synopsis  of  the  contents  of 
Jaimini’ s great  work,  as  presented  in  the  paper  entitled 
“ Jaimini  Darsana”  in  the  “ Sarva-Darsana-San- 
graha 

“ An  objector  may  here  ask,  Are  you  not  continually 
repeating  that  merit  (Dharma)  comes  from  the  practice 
of  duty  (Dharma) ; but  how  is  duty  to  be  defined  or 
proved  ? Listen  attentively  to  my  answer.  A reply 
to  this  question  has  been  given  in  the  older  Mimansa 
by  the  holy  sage  Jaimini.  Kow  the  Mimansa  consists 


THE  PURVA  HIM  ANSA. 


263 


of  twelve  books.  In  the  first  book  is  discussed  the 
authoritativeness  of  those  collections  of  words  which 
are  severally  meant  by  the  terms  £ injunction  ’ ( vidhi ), 
£ explanatory  passage  ’ ( arthavada ),  ‘ hymn  ’ ( mantra ), 
‘ tradition  ’ ( smriii ),  and  £ name  ’ (nam).  In  the  second, 
certain  subsidiary  discussions  (as  e.g.  on  Apurva)  relat- 
ing to  the  difference  of  various  rites,  refutation  of 
(erroneously  alleged)  proofs,  and  difference  of  perform- 
ance (as  in  £ constant  ’ and  £ voluntary  ’ offerings). 
In  the  third  sruti,  £ sign,  ’ or  £ sense  of  the  passage  ’ 
(ling a),  £ context  ’ ( vakya ;),  etc. , and  their  respective 
weight  when  in  apparent  opposition  to  one  another, 
the  ceremonies  c&Vlq(\.  pratipatti-karmcmi  ; things  men- 
tioned incidentally,  things  accessory  to  several  main 
objects,  as  prayajas,  etc.,  and  the  duties  of  the  sacri- 
ficer.  In  the  fourth,  the  influence  on  other  rites  of  the 
principal  and  subordinate  rites,  the  fruit  caused  by  the 
jiihu  being  made  of  the  hutea-prondosa,  and  the 
dice-playing,  etc.,  which  form  subordinate  parts  of  the 
vajasuya  sacrifice.  In  the  fifth,  the  relative  order  of 
different  passages  of  sruti,  etc. , the  order  of  different 
parts  of  a sacrifice  (as  the  seventeen  animals  at  the 
vajapeya),  the  multiplication  and  non -multiplication  of 
rites,  and  the  respective  force  of  words  of  sruti , order 
of  mention,  etc.,  in  determining  the  order  of  perform- 
ance. In  the  sixth,  the  persons  qualified  to  offer 
sacrifices,  them  obligations,  the  substitute  for  enjoined 
materials,  supplies  for  the  lost  and  injured  offerings, 
expiatory  rites,  the  sattara  offerings,  things  proper  to 
be  given,  and  the  different  sacrificial  fires.  In  the  sev- 
enth, transference  of  the  ceremonies  of  one  sacrifice  to. 
another  by  direct  command  in  the  Yedantic  texts,  and 
then  as  inferred  by  £ name  ’ or  £ sign. 5 In  the  eighth, 
transference  by  virtue  of  the  clearly  expressed  or  ob- 


204 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


scurely  expressed  ‘ sign,’  or  by  the  predominant  ‘ sign,’ 
and  cases  where  no  transference  takes  place.  In  the 
ninth,  the  beginning  of  the  discussion  on  the  adaptation 
of  hymns  when  quoted  in  a new  connection  ( uha ),  the 
adaptation  of  samans  and  mantras , and  collateral  ques- 
tions connected  therewith.  In  the  tenth,  the  discus- 
sion of  occasions  where  the  non-performance  of  the 
primary  rite  involves  the  ‘ preclusion  ’ and  non-per- 
formance of  dependent  rites,  and  of  occasions  where  the 
rites  are  precluded,  because  other  rites  produce  their 
special  result;  discussions  connected  with  the  cjraha 
offerings,  certain  samans,  and  various  other  things,  and 
a discussion  on  different  kinds  of  negation.  In  the 
eleventh,  the  incidental  mention  and  subsequently  the 
fuller  discussion  of  tantra  (where  several  acts  are  com- 
bined into  one).  In  the  twelfth,  a discussion  on 
jrrasanja  (where  the  rite  is  performed  for  one  chief 
purpose,  but  with  an  incidental  further  reference)  ; 
tantra , cumulation  of  concurrent  rites,  and  option.  ” 
From  the  foregoing  conspectus  it  is  evident  that  very 
little  of  what  is  properly  called  philosophy  is  found  in 
this  mass  of  aphorisms.  The  problems  of  existence  are 
not  here  even  referred  to.  The  soul,  its  nature,  the 
relation  in  which  it  stands  to  the  non-ego  or  to  the  infi- 
nite, the  source  of  its  bondage,  and  its  emancipation — 
subjects  discussed  with  no  little  logical  acumen  and 
philosophical  insight  in  the  other  schools — are  simply 
thrust  into  the  background.  And  practical  directions 
as  to  the  sacred  books  to  be  invested  with  canonical 
authority,  the  rites  and  ceremonies  to  be  performed 
with  punctilious  care,  the  varieties  of  sacrifices  to  be 
offered,  the  mystical  syllables  and  words  to  be  re- 
peated, the  hymns  to  be  chanted,  and  the  incantations 
to  be  muttered,  are  made  to  occupy  the  prominent  posi- 


THE  PUKVA  MIMAHSA. 


265 


tion  which  in  the  other  philosophical  works  of  the 
orthodox  schools  is  assigned  to  dissertations  on  the 
abstruse  problems  of  life. 

There  is  philosophy,  however,  in  the  method  in 
which  the  disquisitions  embodied  in  this  work,  on  a 
variety  of  non-philosophical  topics,  are  presented.  The 
logical  acumen  shown  is  deserving  of  all  praise,  though 
the  conviction  forces  itself  on  the  mind  that  a great 
deal  of  close  and  accurate  reasoning  is  wasted  on  what 
might  justly  be  characterized  as  trash.  As  a repertory 
of  truth  or  a magazine  of  philosophic  thought,  the 
book  is  exceedingly  worthless  ; but  as  a picture  of  an 
age  of  ritualistic  fervor,  brought  on  by  a reaction 
against  speculations  of  the  wildest  sort,  it  is  not  with- 
out value.  And  therefore  we  are  inclined,  on  the 
whole,  to  sympathize  in  what  Max  Miiller  says  of  it  in 
a private  note  published  in  the  serial  to  be  referred  to  : 
“ To  me  these  Mimansaka  discussions  are  extremely 
attractive,  and  for  accuracy  of  reasoning  they  have  no 
equal  anywhere.”  As  a specimen  of  the  way  in  which 
its  discussions  are  conducted,  we  are  tempted  to  tran- 
scribe the  section  in  which  its  approved  doctrine — that 
the  connection  between  a word  and  its  sense  is  eter- 
nal—is  set  forth,  with  the  reasons  pro  and  con. 

But  before  we  yield  to  the  temptation  we  must  say 
something  on  the  translations  which  are  to  be  utilized 
in  our  exposition  of  the  maxims  of  the  Mimansa  school. 
Of  the  great  work  of  this  school  a very  small  fragment 
was  translated  by  Dr.  Ballantyne,  with  the  accuracy 
characteristic  of  all  the  versions  made  by  that  distin- 
guished Orientalist.  But  a much  larger  portion  has 
been  translated  by  our  learned  countryman,  Pundit 
Moreshwar  Ivunte,  B.A.  and  M.D.,  in  his  serial  named 
Saddarsa/na-Ohintanika , a magazine  started  in  1877, 


26G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


and  edited  up  to  date  with  an  amount  of  ability  and 
erudition  worthy  of  all  praise.  The  work  has  been  of 
the  greatest  value  to  Oriental  scholars  as  far  as  it  has 
gone,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  learned  author  will 
live  to  finish  it.  He  has  translated  more  than  a moiety 
of  the  Sutras  associated  with  the  Mimansa  school,  a 
considerable  portion  of  the  Yedanta  Sutras,  and  a frag- 
ment of  the  Yoga  Sutras  ; and  the  work  before  him  is 
more  formidable  by  far  in  bulk,  if  not  in  importance, 
than  what  he  has  so  patiently  and  persistently  accom- 
plished. When  the  serial  is  completed  it  will  present 
complete  translations  of  the  standard  original  works  of 
the  orthodox  schools,  with  copious  notes  and  comments, 
which,  barring  the  one-sided  theory  they  are  evidently 
intended  to  bolster  up,  will  be  looked  upon  as  very  val- 
uable indeed.  From  the  second  number  of  this  series 
we  quote  the  arguments  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  alluded 
to,  the  arguments  for  and  against  : 

“ 5.  Therefore  the  connection  between  a word  and 
its  sense  is  eternal.  The  knowledge  of  this  eternal 
connection  is  a precept.  Such  a precept  is  never  erro- 
neous. (But)  when  the  sense  is  unknown,  then  there 
is  an  error.  Therefore,  according  to  Badasayana,  a 
precept  is  authoritative,  (as)  other  knowledge  is  not 
needed. 

“ 6.  Some  (state)  that  a word  is  an  action.  It  ap- 
pears when  pronounced.  (This  is  a statement  in  oppo- 
sition.) 

“ 7.  The  sound  of  a word  vanishes  the  moment  it  is 
pronounced,  therefore  it  is  transitory.  (Second  state- 
ment of  an  opponent.) 

“ 8.  The  verb  to  make  is  used  in  relation  to  a sound  ; 
therefore  it  is  transitory.  (Third  statement  of  an  op- 
ponent.) 


THE  PURVA  MIHANSA. 


267 


“ 9.  Different  animals  simultaneously  hear  the  same 
sound  ; therefore  it  is  transitory.  (Fourth  statement 
of  an  opponent.) 

“10.  A word  has  an  original  form  and  a modified 
form  ; therefore  it  is  transitory.  (Fifth  statement  of 
an  opponent.) 

“11.  By  many  making  a sound,  its  increase  (is  seen). 
(Sixth  statement  of  an  opponent.)” 

Thus  are  the  arguments  against  the  theory  of  the 
eternity  of  the  connection  between  a word  and  its  sense 
methodically  or  categorically  stated.  The  replies  are 
attached  as  pendants  to  these  : 

“ 12.  On  this  subject  there  is  a parity  of  reasoning, 
therefore  a word  is  not  eternal.”  The  reasoning  of 
the  opponent  himself — viz. , a word  appears  when  pro- 
nounced— is  enough  to  prove  its  non-transitoriness,  be- 
cause it  presupposes  the  latent  existence  of  a word  pre- 
vious to  its  utterance.  Mr.  Kunte  thus  explains  what 
is  meant  by  “parity  of  reasoning”:  “An  example 

will  illustrate  this  logical  contrivance.  ‘Well,’  says 
Jaimini  to  his  opponent,  ‘ you  say  a word  appears  when 
pronounced  ; your  statement  implies  that  a word  exists 
latent  before  its  appearance.  Well,  its  latent  existence 
is  not  against  me.  Tour  statement  shows  that  this  is 
not  against  you.’  This  is  a case  of  parity  of  reason- 
ing.” 

“ 13.  When  not  an  object  (of  sensuous)  perception, 
even  an  existing  substance  is  not  cognized.”  The 
transitoriness  of  a word  is  proved  because  its  sound  is 
not  perceived  after  it  is  uttered.  This  argument,  how- 
ever, will  prove  the  non-existence  of  several  things 
which  are  not  perceived,  but  which  nevertheless  are 
proved  to  be  existent,  such  as  ether,  etc. 

“ 11.  That  which  exists  is  cognized  (only)  after  (its) 


2G8 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


application.”  Sound  is  said  to  be  made  or  employed 
or  applied  when  it  is  heard,  but  it  exists  before  it  is 
heard,  and  its  non-perception,  except  when  employed, 
is  no  argument  against  its  eternity. 

“ 15.  Because  sound  is  simultaneous  (and  universal) 
like  the  sun.”  As  the  sun  is  one  and  universal,  sound 
is  one  and  universal  ; hence  the  fact  noticed  by  the  op- 
ponent— viz.,  that  it  is  simultaneously  heard  by  differ- 
ent animals. 

“ 16.  The  change  of  a letter  is  its  non-modification.” 
Here  the  opponent’s  statement,  that  a word  has  a modi- 
fied form,  is  emphatically  denied.  The  original  form  is 
in  reality  not  changed  when,  in  consequence  of  certain 
slight  changes  of  letter,  it  appears  in  so-called  modified 
forms. 

“17.  A word  is  augmented  in  proportion  as  sound  is 
augmented.”  Sound,  according  to  Hindu  Philosophy, 
is  produced  by  vibrations  in  the  air  generating  vibra- 
tions in  the  ether  in  the  cavity  of  the  ear.  The  quan- 
tity of  ether  in  the  ear  stirred  up  varies  in  volume, 
but  in  all  such  apparent  modifications  it  remains  un- 
altered. 

The  objections  having  been  refuted,  the  reasons  for 
maintaining  the  doctrine  in  question  are  categorically 
stated.  They  are:  (1)  the  impossibility  of  our  grasping 
the  meaning  conveyed  by  words,  after  they  have  been 
uttered,  but  for  the  eternity  of  sound  ; (2)  the  simul- 
taneity of  the  recognition  of  sound  by  various  parties 
in  different  places  ; (3)  the  non-applicability  of  the 
predicate  number  to  sound — the  word  “go,”  for  in- 
stance, ten  times  repeated  being  simply  the  word 
“go  ;”  (4)  the  indestructibility  of  sound  or  the  absence 
of  a cause  fitted  to  destroy  it  ; (5)  the  fact  that  sound 
is  not  a modification  of  air,  and  therefore  an  effect  ; and 


THE  PURVA  HIM  ANSA. 


269 


(6)  lastly,  express  declarations  in  the  Scripture  affirm- 
ing the  eternity  of  sound. 

This  is  the  precise  though  somewhat  cumbrous  way 
in  which  the  argument  in  favor  of  the  eternity  of 
sound,  or  eternity  of  the  connection  between  a word 
and  its  meaning,  is  presented.  Let  it  be  observed  that 
this  is  by  no  means  the  method  of  conducting  argu- 
ments approved  of  in  this  school  in  all  its  entireness. 
That  method  has  five  distinct  parts  : the  first,  the 
enunciation  of  the  subject  ; the  second,  the  statement 
of  a doubt  arising  from  it  ; the  third,  the  formal  ad- 
vancement of  the  objections  that  may  be  started,  to- 
gether with  their  refutation  in  a consecutive  order  ; 
the  fourth,  the  declaration  of  the  demonstrated  conclu- 
sion ; and  the  fifth,  its  connection  and  relevancy  set 
forth.  The  paper  in  “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha”  on 
the  Mimansa  of  Jaimini  or  the  Jaimini  Darsana,  brings 
forward  an  example  in  illustration  of  this  complicated 
style  of  carrying  on  debates.  But  as  a rule  it  is  simpli- 
fied, and  the  mode  of  argumentation  utilized  is  that 
shown  in  the  quotations  already  presented  in  support 
of  the  strange  doctrine  of  the  eternity  of  sound. 

Before  proceeding  further  it  is  proper  to  remark  that 
the  Mimansa  doctrine  of  the  eternity  of  sound  is  essen- 
tially different  from  the  doctrine  of  permanence  of 
sound  maintained  by  modem  scientists.  An  impres- 
sion made  upon  the  atmosphere  by  a sound  may  last 
forever.  The  ripples  occasioned  may  go  round  and 
round  throughout  eternity,  or  as  long  at  least  as  the 
atmosphere  lasts ; and  after  millions  or  billions  of  ages 
some  gifted  angel  may,  after  carefully  tracing  the 
vibrations  to  their  source,  get  at  the  original  sound  by 
which  they  are  occasioned  and  perpetuated.  A sound 
once  made  lives  in  the  atmosphere  in  vibrations  and 


270 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


convolutions  forever,  according  to  established  laws  of 
nature  ; but  such  a statement  is  very  different  from  the 
one  which  represents  sound  as  without  beginning  and 
without  end,  and  as  having,  moreover,  a meaning 
which  usage  did  not  originate  and  which  usage  cannot 
change.  And  it  is  to  us  a matter  of  surprise  that  an 
intelligent  man  like  Dr.  Ballantyne  should  have  been 
prone  to  confound  the  ancient  Hindu  and  modern  scien- 
tific theory,  and  go  so  far  as  to  represent  them  as  one 
and  the  same  ! 

Let  us  now  advert  to  the  various  kinds  of  proof  ad- 
mitted in  this  school.  They  are  six  : (1)  Perception,  (2) 
Inference,  (3)  Comparison,  (4)  Testimony,  (5)  Presump- 
tion, and  (6)  Privation.  Perception  is  thus  defined  in 
Book  I.  Aph.  4 of  the  treatise  under  consideration  : 

“ Sensuous  perception  is  the  knowledge  produced  by 
the  senses  coming  in  contact  with  the  soul.” 

This  is  Mr.  Kunte’s  translation.  That  of  Dr. 
Ballantyne  is  somewhat  different,  and  it  runs  thus  : 
“ When  a man’s  organs  of  sense  are  rightly  applied  to 
something  extant,  that  birth  of  knowledge  (which  then 
takes  place)  is  Perception.” 

Perhaps  both  the  versions  are  more  or  less  accurate. 
According  to  the  Nyaya  and  Yaiseshika  Sutras,  per- 
ception results  from  a twofold  conjunction — conjunction 
of  a sense-organ  with  an  external  object  on  one  side, 
and  the  indwelling  soul  on  the  other.  The  ancient 
scholiast  referred  to  thus  defines  four  of  the  other 
sources  of  knowledge  or  means  of  proof  : 

“ On  sight  of  one  member  of  a known  association, 
the  consequent  apprehension  of  the  other  part  which  is 
not  actually  proximate  is  ( anuman ) Inference.  The 
association  must  be  such  as  had  been  before  directly 
perceived,  or  had  become  known  by  analogy. 


THE  PURVA  MIMANSA. 


271 


“ Comparison  ( 'upamana ) is  knowledge  arising  from 
resemblance  more  or  less  strong.  It  is  apprehension  of 
the  likeness  which  a thing  presently  seen  bears  to  one 
before  observed  ; and  likeness  or  similitude  is  concomi- 
tancy  of  associates  or  attributes  vTitk  one  object,  which 
were  associated  with  one  another. 

‘ £ Presumption  ( artliajpatli ) is  deduction  of  a matter 
from  that  which  could  not  else  be.  It  is  assumption  of 
a thing  not  itself  perceived,  but  necessarily  implied  by 
another,  which  is  seen,  heard,  or  proven. 

‘ ‘ Knowledge  of  a thing  which  is  not  proximate  (or 
subject  to  perception),  derived  through  understood 
sound — that  is,  through  words,  the  acceptation  whereof 
is  known — is  (sastras)  ordinance  or  revelation.  It  is 
(sabda)  or  verval  communication.” 

All  classes  of  the  Mimansakas  accept  these  five 
means  of  proof  or  sources  of  knowledge  ; but  those 
under  the  guidance  of  Kumarilla  Bhatta  add  another 
kind  of  proof  to  this  list — viz.,  Privation.  This  may 
be  explained  by  a simple- illustration.  The  presence  of 
an  effect  indicates  the  presence  of  its  cause,  as  the  pres- 
ence of  a jar  indicates  the  presence  of  clay.  The  ab- 
sence of  an  effect  similarly  indicates  the  absence  of  its 
cause,  and  hence  the  conclusion — -no  jar,  no  day.  This 
is  Privation  ( ' Abhab ). 

Colebrooke  shows  how  these  various  kinds  of  proof 
are  held  by  various  schools  of  Indian  Philosophy,  in  a 
passage  which  ought  to  be  quoted  : 

“ The  Charvakas,  as  noticed  in  the  first  part  of  this 
essay,  recognize  but  one — viz.,  Perception.  The  fol- 
lowers of  Kanada  and  those  of  Sugata  (Buddha)  ac- 
knowledge two — Perception  and  Inference.  The  San- 
khyas  recognize  three,  including  Affirmation  (or  Revela- 
tion). The  Kaiyayikas  or  followers  of  Gautama  count 


272 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


four — viz.,  the  foregoing,  together  with  Comparison. 
Tiie  Prabhakarars  (or  the  Mimansakas  under  the  guid- 
ance of  Prabhakara)  admit  five  (adding  Presumption). 
And  the  rest  of  the  Mimansakas  enumerate  six  (adding 
Privation).  It  does  not  appear  that  a greater  number 
has  been  alleged  by  any  sect  of  Indian  Philosophy.” 

The  statement  that  Panada’ s followers,  or  philoso- 
phers of  the  Yaiseshika  school,  hold  only  two  of  these 
proofs  is  not  quite  correct,  though  their  tendency  to 
merge  the  others  in  the  two  accepted  by  the  Baudhas 
may  be  admitted. 

The  Mimansa  Sutras  may  justly  be  said  to  embody 
an  encyclopaedia  of  exegesis  ; and  almost  all  the  prob- 
lems they  attempt  to  solve  are  hermeneutical  and 
philological  rather  than  philosophical.  Here  are  some 
of  them  stated  by  Mr.  Kunte  in  his  number  for  June, 
1877  : “ What  is  the  principal  sentence  ? a subordinate 
sentence  X an  indirect  subordinate  sentence  ? or  a rea- 
son or  a causative  statement  X Whether  subversion  of 
the  synthetical  order  of  words  is  advisable  or  not  ? 
What  are  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  dividing  a sen- 
tence ? The  solution  of  these  develops  the  system  of 
exegetics.” 

To  what  books  are  the  canons  of  interpretation  de- 
veloped in  this  system  applied  ? To  the  Vedas,  in  the 
first  place.  The  authoritativeness  of  these  venerable 
documents  was  upheld  in  the  teeth  of  the  objections 
raised  by  a school  of  rationalists,  if  not  several  such 
schools,  which  had  sprung  up  as  a standing  protest 
against  the  dogmatism  maintained  by  the  champions  of 
orthodoxy.  It  is  curious  to  note  that  the  objections 
raised  by  rationalism  against  the  authoritativeness  of 
the  Vedas,  or  their  canonicity,  are  very  nearly  the 
same  which  are  advanced  to-day  against  every  book 


THE  PUHY A MIMANSA. 


273 


professing  to  be  a revelation  directly  or  miraculously 
vouchsafed  by  God.  The  principles  needed  for  our 
guidance  in  life  were,  it  was  affirmed  with  emphasis, 
implanted  in  the  human  mind,  and  an  examination  or 
analysis,  subjective  rather  than  objective,  was  enough 
to  bring  them  to  light.  Such  being  the  case,  where 
was  the  necessity  of  an  objective  revelation  granted  in 
a supernatural  way  ? Again,  the  Yedas  might  be 
proved  antagonistic  to  those  moral  principles  regarding 
the  accuracy  or  acceptability  of  which  no  sane  man  had 
ever  or  could  ever  doubt.  The  Y edas,  moreover,  were 
rendered  useless  by  the  air  of  mysteriousness  thrown 
over  many  of  their  parts,  and  the  mysteries  coming 
out  in  bold  relief  from  their  pages.  This  last  objection 
is  stated  in  the  following  aphorism  : “ (The  Yedas  are 
to  no  purpose)  because  it  is  impossible  to  know  the  sense 
(of  some  Yaidika  texts).” 

It  was  also  affirmed  that  the  Yedas  were  full  of  con- 
tradictions as  Avell  as  mystification,  as  appears  from 
these  aphorisms  : “ (The  Yedas  are  to  no  purpose)  be- 
cause there  are  in  them  contradictory  statements  on  the 
subject.”  “ (At  the  time  of  learning  under  a precep- 
tor, as  prescribed  by  sacred  canons),  the  sense  of  the 
texts  (in  this  connection)  is  never  taught,  and  therefore 
(the  Yedas  are  to  no  purpose).” 

These  objections — objections  based  on  intuition,  in- 
consistence with  the  inner  laws  of  our  being,  the  pres- 
ence of  mysteries,  obscurity  of  language,  and  self-con- 
tradictoriness— are  the  stock-in-trade  of  our  modern 
rationalists,  as  they  appear  to  have  been  of  their  proto- 
types in  bygone  days.  But  some  of  the  objections 
against  the  canonical  authority  of  the  Yedas,  brought 
forward  by  the  rationalists  of  ancient  India,  were  pe- 
culiarly Indian.  Here,  for  instance,  is  one  : “ (The 


274 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


Vedas  are  to  no  purpose)  because  objects  incapable  of 
knowing  are  described  (as  performing  sacrifices).  Mr. 
Kunte  thus  explains  this  aphorism  in  bis  notes  : 

£ £ An  illustration  will  explain  the  Sutra  : 1 Oh  veg- 
etable ! save  him  ! ’ This  text  occurs  in  the  Taithriya 
Sanliita  (1.  2.  1).  £ Being  learned,  oh  stones  ! listen  ! ’ ” 
This  text  occurs  in  the  Taithriya  Sanliita  (1.  3.  13). 
The  opponent  asks,  How  can  stones  listen,  and  how  can 
they  be  learned  ?”  There  were  also  objections  raised  of 
a purely  grammatical  type.  These  varieties  of  objec- 
tions were  advanced  with  an  earnestness  fitted  to  show 
that  Jaimini,  in  defending  the  great  citadel  of  Hindu 
orthodoxy  and  propping  up  its  moribund  rites  and  cere- 
monies, had  by  no  means  an  easy  task  to  perform. 

But  the  canons  of  criticism  developed  in  his  Sutras 
are  applied  not  only  to  the  V edas,  but  also  to  the  vast 
body  of  literature  which  had  gathered  around  these 
sacred  records.  The  Vedas  of  course  have  the  prece- 
dence, but  other  documents  are  regarded  as  authori- 
tative, though  not  equally  so.  This  appears  from  the 
opening  aphorisms  of  the  third  chapter  of  Book  I.  : 

££  All  duty  originates  in  the  Vedas  ; therefore  what 
is  not  to  be  found  in  the  Vedas  is  not  to  be  accepted. 
(First  statement  of  an  opponent.) 

“ No  (though  whatever  is  not  to  be  found  in  the 
Vedas  is  not  to  be  accepted,  yet)  from  their  author  (of 
the  Vedas  and  Smritis)  being  common,  it  is  to  be  in- 
ferred that  what  is  not  in  the  Vedas  is  to  be  accepted. 
(Final  statement.) 

££  For  when  that  which  is  established  by  testimony 
(sabda  or  sruti)  is  opposed  to  that  which  is  not  so  estab- 
lished (as  asabda  or  smriti),  the  latter  is  not  to  be 
recognized.  (And)  when  the  two  are  not  opposed,  in- 
ference (smriti)  is  to  be  recognized.  ’ ’ 


THE  PUKVA  MIMANSA. 


275 


The  word  sruti  means  that  which  is  heard,  and  rep- 
resents revelation.  The  Yedas  alone  form  the  sruti.; 
and  as  authoritative  records  they  are  placed  above  all 
other  books  or  documents.  The  word  smriti  means 
that  which  is  remembered,  and  is  applied  to  the  body 
of  tradition  that  in  the  course  of  time  gathered  around 
these  venerable  records.  This  body  of  tradition  is  au- 
thoritative, but  its  authoritativeness  is  subject  to  one 
limitation.  Its  authoritativeness  must  be  disallowed 
where  there  is  within  its  compass  a statement  inconsis- 
tent with  the  spirit  or  even  the  letter  of  what  was  con- 
tradistinguished from  it  as  the  revelation  heard  from 
the  lips  of  the  Supreme  Spirit.  Barring  such  state- 
ments, and  those  in  which  “ a worldly  motive  is  pat- 
ent, ” the  tradition  is  to  be  received  as  of  co-ordinate 
authority  with  the  Yedas. 

In  one  of  the  aphorisms  quoted  above,  the  authorita- 
tiveness of  smriti  or  tradition  is  affirmed,  because  the 
author  of  the  Yedas  is  also  its  author.  But,  properly 
speaking,  the  Yedas  have  no  author,  and  they  are 
therefore  declared  to  be  eternal.  The  eternity  of  the 
Yedas  is  one  of  the  peculiar  doctrines  of  this  school, 
and  is  connected  with  its  doctrine  of  the  eternity  of 
sound,  as  a corollary  is  connected  with  the  proposition 
from  which  it  is  legitimately  deduced.  It  is  set  forth 
in  the  verses  immediately  following  those  in  which  the 
theory  of  which  it  is  a counterpart  is  propounded.  We 
quote  these  from  Dr.  Ballantyne’s  Fragment  : 

“ And  the  Yedas  some  declare  to  be  something 
recent,  (because)  there  are  the  names  of  men  (in  them.) 

“ Because  of  our  seeing  uneternal  persons  (mentioned 
in  the  Yedas). 

“ But  there  has  been  declared  (already)  the  priority 
of  sound  (to  any  point  of  time). 


270 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


“ The  name,  (derived  from  that  of  some  mortal,  was 
given  to  this  or  that  section  of  the  Yeda)  because  of 
his  reading  it. 

“ But  the  terms  in  the  text  (which  seem  to  be  names 
of  men)  are  common  to  other  objects,  and  do  not  desig- 
nate men.  ’ ’ 

These  aphorisms  affirm  the  eternity  of  the  Yedas, 
and  refute  one  or  two  of  the  arguments  advanced 
against  the  doctrine  by  the  champions  or  followers  of 
the  Logical  schools.  Certain  names  are  found  at  the 
heads  of  certain  sections  of  these  records,  such  as 
Kathaka,  Karma,  etc.  ; and  their  appearance  in  such 
connection  indicates  human  authorship,  and  conse- 
quent^ militates  against  this  peculiar  doctrine.  Again, 
there  are  sentences  in  the  Yedas  in  which  mortals,  or 
“ persons  to  whom  belonged  birth  and  death,”  express 
some  wish  or  breathe  some  prayer — such  as  “ Babara, 
the  son  of  Pravahini,  desired,”  and  “ Kusuruhinda,  the 
son  of  Uddulaki,  desired.”  These  sentences  could  not 
possibly  have  been  penned  before  these  persons  were 
born.  These  objections  are  rebutted  in  a very  ingeni- 
ous way.  The  persons  named  at  the  heads  of  certain 
sections  are  the  readers,  not  the  authors,  of  these  sec- 
tions, while  the  mortals  named  or  represented  as  desir- 
ing are  everlasting  things,  not  human  beings  subject 
to  the  law  of  birth  and  death.  Let  us  quote  the  pas- 
sage in  which  this  piece  of  exegetical  finesse  appears  : 
“Although  there  is  the  name  ‘babara’  or  ‘Prava- 
hini ’ (in  the  Yeda),  yet  in  the  text,  the  word  Pravahini 
or  the  like  is  common — that  is,  is  expressive  also  of 
some  other  thing  (than  it  may  appear  at  first  sight  to 
denote).  For  example,  (in  the  word  Pravahini),  the 
prefix  Pra  implies  ‘ excess,’  the  word  vah  signifies 
‘motion,’  the  final  i represents  ‘ the  agent,’  and  thus 


TIIE  FTJRVA  MIMANSA. 


277 


the  word  signifies  mind  which  moves  very  fast,  and  this 
is  without  beginning  ; and  (moreover)  the  word 
‘ Babara  ’ is  a word  imitative  of  the  sound  of  the  mind, 
so  that  there  is  not  even  a smell  of  inconsistency.” 

Is  not  this  precisely  the  way  in  which  mythological 
heroes  are  being  converted  into  natural  forces  and  ob- 
jects by  a class  of  critics  in  modern  Europe  ? Here  an 
extract  from  an  article  which  appeared  in  the  Hindu 
Patriot  years  ago  may  be  presented  : “ The  Mimansa 
is  by  far  the  most  important  in  connection  with  the 
religion  of  the  Hindus.  Its  object  is  to  reconcile  the 
rituals  of  Hindu  worship  and  the  legends  of  the  Puraus 
with  philosophy  ; and  the  success  with  which  the 
reconcilement  has  been  effected  by  Jaimini  is  worthy 
of  the  highest  praise.  To  quote  an  instance  from  the 
writings  of  the  Mimansists  : ‘ European  writers  have 
for  a long  time,  and  very  justly,  condemned  the  Hindu 
Sastras  for  having  attributed  to  Brahma  the  odious 
charge  of  a disgusting  incest.  The  Mimansists  show 
that  the  whole  of  it  is  a mere  myth.  Brahma  is  but 
another  name  for  Prajapati  or  the  sun,  and  the  dawn, 
which  p’recedes  sunrise,  is  poetically  and  very  aptly  de- 
scribed as  a fair  maiden  born  of  the  sun.  Therefore,  as 
the  sun  follows  the  dawn,  it  is  in  poetry  described  as 
chasing  the  maiden ; and  since  the  dawn  merges  in  the 
sun  as  soon  as  the  latter  has  risen  above  the  horizon, 
the  allegory  is  complete.  Other  myths  have  been 
treated  in  the  same  way,  and  it  is  no  ordinary  praise  to 
say  that  the  Indian  gymnosophists,  some  two  thousand 
years  ago,  adopted  a line  of  philosophical  argumenta- 
tion which  would  not  be  unworthy  of  the  greatest 
German  scholars  of  the  present  day.  ’ ’ ’ 

W e are  certainly  disposed  to  give  our  ancient  philos- 
ophers credit  for  originating  a specious  method  of  ex- 


278 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


plaining  away  the  obscenities  associated  with  the  Hindu 
faith,  and  the  more  so  as  it  is  our  intention  in  this 
treatise  to  show  that  the  most  ingenious  speculations 
and  theories  of  the  day  were  anticipated  in  the  ancient 
world  in  India  and  in  other  advanced  countries.  But 
it  ought  always  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  it  is  one  thing 
to  explain  away  the  obnoxious  features  of  a book  or 
creed,  and  another  to  explain  them.  Nor  must  it  be 
forgotten  that,  after  all  such  features  have  been  ex- 
plained away  as  are  likely  to  bend  under  such  handy 
modes  of  interpretation,  an  immense  residuum  of  ob- 
scenity and  filth  remains,  which  no  amount  of  exegetic 
skill  and  finesse  can  clear  away.  The  gain  therefore  is 
very  little  indeed.  Besides,  what  shall  we  say  of  the 
prurient  imagination  which  delighted  to  clothe  ordinary 
natural  phenomena  in  various  putrid  shapes  of  vice,  and 
thereby  corrupt  the  minds  and  morals  of  a nation  ? 

In  the  paper  on  the  Mimansa  in  the  “ Sarva-Darsana- 
Sangraha,”  an  elaborate  argument  is  presented  in  sup- 
port of  the  eternity  of  the  Yedas  ; and  in  it,  as  in 
almost  all  arguments  in  Hindu  books,  we  notice  a great 
deal  of  acuteness  in  combination  with  much  puerility 
and  sheer  nonsense.  One  of  the  arguments  brought 
forward  by  the  Mimansakas  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  in 
question  is  thus  expressed  : “ But  (asks  the  Mimansaka) 
how  can  the  Yeda  have  been  uttered  by  the  incorporeal 
Parameswara,  or  God,  who  has  no  palate  and  no 
organ  of  speech,  and  who  therefore  cannot  have  pro- 
nounced the  letters  ?”  “ This  objection  (answers  the 

Naiyayika)  is  not  happy,  because,  though  Parameswara 
is  by  nature  incorporeal,  he  can  yet  assume  a body  in 
sport,  in  order  to  show  kindness  to  his  worshippers. 
Consequently  the  arguments  in  favor  of  the  doctrine 
that  the  Veda  had  no  personal  author  are  inconclusive.  *’ 


THE  PURVA  MIMANSA. 


279 


The  argument  on  which  the  eternity  of  the  Vedas  is 
made  to  hinge  is  a marvel  of  futility  and  inconclusive- 
ness. Let  us  here  present  an  extract  from  the  “ Sarva- 
Darsana-Sangraha”  as  illustrative  of  it,  and  the  way  in 
which  it  was  met  by  the  followers  of  the  Nyaya 
system  : “ Well,  be  it  so  (say  the  followers  of  the 
Nyaya)  ; but  how  can  the  Vedas  be  said  to  be  unde- 
rived from  any  personal  author,  when  there  is  no  evi- 
dence to  establish  this  ? Would  you  maintain  that 
they  have  no  personal  author  because,  although  there  is 
an  unbroken  line  of  tradition,  there  is  no  remembrance 
of  any  author,  just  as  is  the  case  with  the  soul  ? This 
argument  is  weak,  because  the  alleged  characteristics 
(unbroken  tradition,  etc.)  are  not  proved  ; for  those 
who  hold  the  human  tradition  of  the  Vedas  maintain 
that  the  line  of  tradition  was  interrupted  at  the  time  of 
the  dissolution  of  the  universe.  And  again,  what  is 
meant  by  this  assertion  that  the  author  is  not  remem- 
bered ? Is  it  (a)  that  no  author  is  believed,  or  (b)  that 
no  author  is  remembered  ? The  first  alternative  cannot 
be  accepted,  since  we  hold  that  God  is  proved  to  have 
been  the  author.  Nor  can  the  second,  because  it  can- 
not stand  the  test  of  the  following  dilemma — viz. , is  it 
meant  (a)  that  no  author  of  the  Veda  is  remembered 
by  some  person,  or  (b)  by  any  person  whatever  ? The 
former  supposition  breaks  down,  as  it  would  prove  too 
much,  since  it  would  apply  to  such  an  isolated  stanza 
as  “ He  who  is  religious  and  has  overcome  pride  and 
anger,’  ’ etc.  And  the  latter  supposition  is  inadmissi- 
ble, since  it  would  be  impossible  for  any  person  who 
was  not  omniscient  to  know  that  no  author  of  the 
V eda  was  recollected  by  any  person  whatever.  More- 
over, there  is  actual  proof  that  the  Veda  had  a personal 
author,  for  we  argue  as  follows  : “ The  sentences  of 


280 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


the  Vecla  must  have  originated  from  a personal  author, 
since  they  have  the  character  of  sentences  like  those  of 
Kalidasa  and  other  writers.  And  again,  the  sentences 
of  the  Veda  have  been  composed  by  a competent  per- 
son, since,  while  they  possess  authority,  they  have  at 
the  same  time  the  character  of  sentences  like  those  of 
Manu  and  other  sages.” 

There  is  one  reasoning  in  these  lines  which  will  ap- 
pear dark  to  a reader  not  versed  in  the  philosophical 
literature  of  India — the  reasoning  with  pointed  reference 
to  the  stanza  quoted.  The  meaning  is  that  the  author 
of  that  stanza,  though  not  generally  known,  might  have 
been  known  to  some  person.  The  argument  that  it  is 
necessary  to  be  omniscient  in  order  to  prove  a universal 
negative,  such  as  no  person  ever  remembered  the 
author  of  any  of  the  books  of  the  V eda,  shows  a meas- 
ure of  penetration  scarcely  appreciated  in  the  present 
age,  when  it  has  been  made  familiar  by  many  a philo- 
sophical writer. 

Is  the  body  of  tradition  called  smriti  also  eternal  like 
the  V edas  ? The  aphorism  quoted  above — that  which 
ascribes  the  Vedas  and  the  smritis  to  a “ common” 
authorship — would  seem  at  first  sight  to  justify  an 
affirmative  reply.  The  smriti , however,  is  by  univer- 
sal consent  attributed  to  human  authorship,  to  holy 
sages  deeply  read  in  the  Vedas.  It  consists,  properly 
speaking,  of  three  parts  : the  first,  in  which  Vedic 
truths  and  precepts  are  found  epitomized  and  classified; 
the  second,  in  which  matter  supplementary  and  elucida- 
tory is  embodied  ; and  the  third,  in  which  statements 
occur  either  in  direct  contravention  of  some  truth  or 
precept  revealed,  or  apparently  fitted  to  set  forth  the 
selfishness  or  cupidity  of  the  writers.  The  first  part  is 
of  course  to  be  accepted  in  all  its  entireness,  in  conse- 


THE  FURY  A MIMANSA. 


281 


quence  of  its  perfect  harmony  with  revelation  ; and  the 
second  part  on  the  supposition  that  it  would  be  corrob- 
orated if  the  entire  revelation  assumed  eternally  exist- 
ent were  within  reach  ; but  the  third  part  is  to  be  re- 
jected without  ceremony. 

Then  there  are  other  books  which  may  be  accepted 
as  authoritative  only  so  far  as  they  agree  with  Script- 
ure and  reason — viz.,  the  Kalpa- Sutra  and  the  Griiiya- 
Grantha,  etc.  They  are,  however,  not  to  be  considered 
as  parts  of  revelation,  and  they  must  be  placed  far  below 
the  Yedas  and  the  smritis  in  authority  and  importance. 
But  as  they  are  the  productions  of  men  conversant  in 
the  Yedic  literature,  they  may  and  should  be  consulted, 
and  treated  moreover  with  some  degree  of  reverence. 

Established  usages,  customs,  and  institutions  should 
not  be  despised  in  our  attempts  to  ascertain  our  duty. 
These  are  of  two  kinds — universal  and  local.  The  lat- 
ter, or  festivals  merely  local,  “ such  as  the  Holoka 
(Huh),  or  the  spring  festival  in  the  East,  the  worship 
of  local  tutelary  deities  hereditarily  by  families  in  the 
South,  the  racing  of  oxen  on  the  full  moon  of  Jyeslititha 
in  the  Horth,  and  the  adoration  of  tribes  of  deities  in 
the  West,”  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  of  much  con- 
sequence. 

The  great  object  of  the  Mimansa  Philosophy  is  the 
knowledge  or  ascertainment  of  duty,  its  watchword 
being  “ Duty-inquisitiveness”  in  contradistinction  to 
(e  Brahma-inquisitiveness,”  the  watchword  of  the 
Yedanta  school.  The  very  first  aphorism  of  the  book 
under  review  makes  this  manifest  : “ Yext,  therefore, 
(O  student  that  hast  attained  thus  far),  a desire  to  know 
Duty  (Dharma)  (is  to  be  entertained  by  thee).”  To 
ascertain  this,  to  know  our  duty,  we  have  to  consult 
these  sources  of  information,  the  Yedas,  the  srnriti,  the 


282 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


Kalpa-Sutras,  etc.,  and  the  established  customs  and 
institutions  of  a universal  stamp,  not  merely  of  local 
importance.  These  sources  of  knowledge  ought  to  be 
consulted  as  pointing  to  duty  rather  than  to  a Being 
from  whom  duty  derives  its  sanctity  and  authority  or 
imperativeness.  The  Mimansakas  as  a rule  thrust  God 
into  the  background,  and  some  of  them  even  go  so  far 
as  to  deny  His  existence.  Pandit  Nehemiah  Hilkanta 
Goreh,  in  his  very  able  treatise,  ‘ ‘ A Rational  Refuta- 
tion of  the  Hindu  Philosophical  Systems,”  thus  sum- 
marizes the  principles  of  this  school  : 

“ It  is  not  the  design  of  the  Mimansa,  as  it  is  of  the 
other  systems,  to  consider  bondage,  and  emancipation, 
and  soul,  and  what  is  not  soul,  but  simply  to  treat  of 
the  precepts  of  the  Yeda,  and  of  its  cultus  ; and  I do 
not  purpose  examining  it  as  touching  these  heads.  Its 
points,  which  are  here  specially  deserving  of  mention, 
are  as  follows  : First,  it  repudiates  the  idea  of  a God, 
and,  in  the  second  place,  it  contends  that  the  Yeda  was 
originated  by  no  one,  but  has  always  existed.  The  in- 
junctions, inhibitions,  and  good  and  evil  fruits  of  works 
rehearsed  in  it,  are  held  indeed  to  be  true.  But  the 
accounts  of  the  divinities  given  in  the  Yeda  are  reputed 
to  be  false,  and  are  written  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
magnifying  works.  With  regard  to  this  matter,  the 
surprising  notions  about  to  be  noted  are  proposed.  It  is 
recorded  in  the  Yeda  that  Elysium  is  obtained  by  sacri- 
fice. And  a sacrificial  observance  consists  in  offering 
in  fire,  clarified  butter,  flesh,  etc.,  to  Indra,  Yanina, 
Agni,  and  other  divinities,  with  the  recitation  and 
reiteration  of  hymns  of  praise  from  the  Yeda,  and 
laudation  of  the  exploits  and  virtues  of  the  aforesaid 
divinities.  How,  the  Mimansakas  assert  that  Indra 
and  those  other  divinities  have  no  existence  whatever, 


THE  PURVA  MIMANSA. 


283 


and  that  the  prowess  ascribed  to  them  is  entirely  ficti- 
tious. Nevertheless,  there  is  such  a wonderful  potency 
in  the  falling  of  offerings  into  the  fire,  in  their  name, 
after  the  manner  prescribed  in  the  Yeda,  in  uttering 
the  syllables  of  the  songs  that  hymn  them,  as  to  insure 
attainment  of  celestial  abodes.” 

The  learned  Pandit  does  not  quote  a single  text  from 
the  Mimansa  Sutras  in  support  of  his  summary,  and 
specially  in  support  of  his  assertion  that  the  Miman- 
sakas  “ repudiate  the  idea  of  a God.”  In  a foot-note 
he  gives  his  reason  in  these  words  : “To  name  one 
Mimansaka,  Parthasarathi  Misra,  in  the  first  chapter 
of  the  Sastra  Dipika,  labors  at  length  to  overset  the 
arguments  adducible  to  prove  the  existence  of  Deity.” 
And  with  reference  to  his  assertion  that  the  gods  men- 
tioned in  the  Yedas,  Indra,  Yaruna,  etc.,  are  regarded 
as  myths  rather  than  real  persons,  he  quotes  the  fol- 
lowing verse  from  a manuscript  called  Bhatta-Dipika  : 
“ Therefore  it  is  not  by  any  means  to  be  acknowledged 
that  a god  is  an  embodied  form,  and  so  forth  ; but  he 
is  to  be  regarded  as ' a mere  verbal  expression  of  the 
Yeda.  As  for  the  thing  signified  by  that  expression, 
it  is  held  to  be,  according  to  the  expression,  some  sen- 
tient being  or  unsentient  object — not  endowed,  how- 
ever, with  a figure,  etc.,  i.e.  purely  notional.  But  in 
devotion  and  so  forth,  mere  meditation  on  him,  in  pict- 
uring to  one’s  self  the  unreal  as  real,  is  to  be  observed. 
Such  is  the  gist  of  the  doctrine  of  Jaimini  here  consid- 
ered. But,  by  the  very  repetition  of  this  blasphemy, 
my  tongue  contracts  defilement — from  which  the  re- 
membrance of  Hari  is  the  only  safeguard.” 

The  atheistic  feature  of  the  Mimansa  as  it  now  exists 
in  its  fully  developed  form  is  certainly  not  inconsistent 
with  its  original  principles,  and  it  perhaps  grew  out  of 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


281 

them  when  they  were  pushed  to  their  legitimate  conse- 
quences. It  was  not  brought  into  bold  relief,  and 
perhaps  not  definitely  apprehended  at  the  time  of 
Jaimini,  whose  Sutras  simply  throw  God  and  the  Yedic 
pantheon  of  gods  and  goddesses  into  the  background. 
The  worshipper,  according  to  these,  does  not  need 
either  him  or  them  to  stir  up  devotion  within  him,  or 
to  pave  his  way  to  the  speedy  realization  of  his  object. 
His  attention  is  withdrawn  from  them,  and  concen- 
trated on  the  work  he  has  to  do,  and  he  is  assured  that 
that  work  has  an  inherent  potency,  and  will  bear  its 
fruits,  good  or  bad,  in  its  own  tune.  Whether  this 
innate  tendency  is  dependent  on  an  econonvp  unalter- 
ably established  by  God,  or  whether  it  is  entirely  inde- 
pendent of  the  power,  will,  or  the  decrees  of  God— these 
questions  the  Mimansa  Sutras  do  not  meet  in  the  face 
or  attempt  to  solve.  But  their  tone  is  in  favor  of  the 
position  that  work  derives  its  efficacy,  its  mysterious 
power,  from  itself,  rather  than  from  a Being  or  force 
apart  from  it,  and  that  it  would  bear  fruit  even  if  God 
and  the  array  of  beings  called  gods  and  goddesses  did 
not  exist,  or  existed  as  mere  ciphers  rather  than  living, 
working  agents.  There  is  therefore  no  use  of  looking 
up  to  them  or  making  them  objects  of  contemplation, 
and  asking  them  to  hear  our  prayers  and  answer  them. 
Let  them  live,  if  they  live  at  all,  behind  the  veil,  and 
let  us  perform  conscientiously  the  work  which  will  bear 
its  own  fruits,  whether  they  exist  or  not. 

This  mysterious  power  is  called  Apurva.  Colebrookc 
makes  the  following  observations  on  it  : “ The  subject 
which  most  engages  attention  throughout  the  Mimansa, 
recurring  at  every  turn,  is  the  invisible  or  spiritual 
operation  of  an  act  of  merit.  The  action  ceases,  yet 
the  consequence  does  not  immediately  ensue.  A virtue 


THE  PUKVA  MIMANSA. 


285 


mean  time  subsists  unseen,  but  efficacious  to  connect 
the  consequence  with  its  past  and  remote  cause,  and  to 
bring  about  at  a distant  period,  or  in  another  world, 
the  relative  effect.” 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  this  mysterious  potency  is 
acknowledged  in  almost  all  schools  of  Indian  Philoso- 
phy, and  it  is  the  characteristic  feature  of  Buddhism,  to 
which  the  Mimansa  is  favorable  in  some  respects  and 
hostile  in  others.  Like  it,  the  Mimansa  throws  God 
and  His  worship  into  the  background,  and  renders  His 
existence  superfluous  by  maintaining  the  efficacy  of 
work,  if  not  its  creative  power.  And  like  it,  the 
Mimansa  seems  to  maintain  the  eternity  of  the  world, 
or  its  successive  evolutions  and  involutions  in  cycles, 
beginningless  and  endless.  But  ivhile  Buddhism  de- 
clares a war  of  extermination  against  the  doctrine  of 
sacrifice,  the  Mimansa  gives  the  greatest  prominence  to 
it— upholds,  enjoins,  and  exalts  it  in  varieties  of  ways, 
through  varieties  of  express  declarations,  and  by  the 
varieties  of  laudations  of  which  it  is  made  the  favored 
theme.  Sacrifice,  in  short,  is  the  duty  enjoined  in  the 
Mimansa,  and  paradise  is  the  end  proposed. 

A sacrifice,  according  to  the  Mimansa,  is  a thing  or 
animal  voluntarily  and  cheerfully  offered.  Sacrifices 
are,  therefore,  of  two  kinds — bloodless  and  bloody. 
The  sacrifices  connected  with  the  soma-plant  ( asclepias 
ocida ) and  the  exhilarating  juice  expressed  out  of  it, 
being  more  or  less  like  simple  libations  of  wine,  are 
examples  of  bloodless  sacrifice,  as  also  simple  oblations 
called  ishtis , and  burnt-offerings  called  homa,  consist- 
ing of  ghi  or  clarified  butter,  and  other  things  thrown 
into  a fire  raked  up  into  a flame.  The  bloody  sacri  flees 
of  the  Yedic  Age,  such  as  the  asmci-medha , the  horse- 
sacrifice  ; the  pasu-medlxa , or  the  sacrifice  of  smaller 


286 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


animals,  goats,  sheep,  etc. ; the  nar-bali , or  human 
sacrifices,  had  received  a check  from  the  spread  of 
Buddhism,  and  were  less  common  in  the  age  of  the 
Mimansa.  According  to  its  teaching,  while  all  these 
are  helps,  paradise  is  secured  by  the  model  sacrifice, 
called  Jyotistoma , which  is  a permanent  sacrifice,  and 
the  complicated  ceremony  connected  with  which  must 
be  performed  by  a Hindu  at  least  once  in  his  lifetime. 
With  reference  to  this  sacrifice,  let  us  present  two  ex- 
tracts from  Mr.  Ivunte’s  serial  (Ho.  for  October,  1877)  : 
“ Jyotistoma  is  a big  model  sacrifice.  Agnistoma, 
Atyagni stoma,  Ukthya,  Sodeslii,  Atiratra,  Aptiryama, 
and  Yajapaya — these  are  the  seven  big  sacrifices  or 
sansthas.  They  are  modifications  of  Jyotistoma,  the 
model  sacrifice.” 

“ The  Yaidikacharjya  observes  : ‘ It  must  not  be 
stated  that  the  seven  sacrifices  and  the  Jyotistoma  are 
not  all  model  sacrifices.  Only  the  Jyotistoma  sacrifice 
is  the  model  sacrifice,  and  the  seven  sacrifices  are  its 
modifications.’  Baudhacliarjya,  you  will  ask,  why 
such  a distinction  should  be  made  ? Listen,  then,  to 
what  I have  to  say.  The  Jyotistoma  sacrifice  is  a per- 
manent and  obligatory  sacrifice,  and  is  distinguished 
from  occasional  or  optional  sacrifices.  Every  Ary  a 
must  in  his  lifetime  perform  the  Jyotistoma  sacrifice. 
The  Jyotistoma  sacrifice  is  not  performed  for  accom- 
plishing any  human  desire.  He  that  seeks  to  obtain 
heaven  ought  to  perform  the  Jyotistoma  sacrifice.” 

This  great  sacrifice  is  offered  twice  every  month  at 
the  full  and  change  of  the  moon,  and  it  consists  of  vari- 
ous parts — principal,  subordinate,  and  those  subsidiary 
to  the  subordinate.  Hot  only  does  the  whole  sacrifice 
exercise  a mysterious  and  unseen  influence,  but  each  of 
the  subordinate  and  subsidiary  parts  has  its  peculiar 


THE  PUltVA  MIMANSA. 


287 


efficacy  ; and  they  all  combined  prepare  the  soul  for  a 
prolonged  season  of  enjoyment  in  paradise.  The 
“ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha”  thus  speaks  of  the  efficacy 
of  each  of  the  parts,  principal  or  subordinate  : ‘ ‘ These, 
however,  the  new-moon  and  full-moon  sacrifices,  only 
produce  their  unseen  effect,  which  is  the  principal 
apurva , by  means  of  the  various  minor  effects  or  sub- 
ordinate apurvas,  produced  by  the  various  subordinate 
parts  of  the  whole  ceremony.  ”... 

It  ought  here  to  be  mentioned  that  a mysterious 
efficacy  is  attributed  to  the  mere  reading  of  the  Y edas, 
the  chanting  of  the  hymns,  the  repetition  of  certain  mys- 
tic words  and  syllables,  as  om , etc. , and  the  utterance 
of  certain  prayers  and  imprecations.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  carry  with  us  an  intelligent  appreciation  of  the 
varied  parts  of  this  most  complex  ceremony,  or  to  un- 
derstand the  hymns,  chants,  prayers,  and  exorcisms 
connected  with  it.  The  bare  repetition  of  them,  even 
when  accompanied  with  an  utter  failure  to  comprehend 
their  meaning  or  keep  in  view  the  varied  ends  they  are 
intended  to  subserve,  is  enough  to  secure  some  degree, 
if  not  the  fulness,  of  the  merit  promised.  A great  deal 
of  care  is  taken  to  insure  correct  pronunciation  and  in- 
tonation, but  merit  is  not  withheld  even  where  the 
words  are  mispronounced  and  the  tones  misapplied.  A 
more  complete  system  of  ritualism  in  its  worst  form  it 
is  perhaps  impossible  to  find  apart  from  these  records  ! 

But  was  self-immolation  practised  in  the  early  times 
of  which  the  Sutras  present  so  vivid  a picture  ? The 
various  kinds  of  religious  suicide  with  which  the  student 
of  Indian  history  is  most  familiar — such  as  widows  burn- 
ing themselves  on  the  funeral  pyres  of  their  deceased 
husbands,  or  men  drowning  themselves  in  sacred  rivers 
and  seas,  or  burying  themselves  alive,  or  throwing 


288 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


themselves  headlong  from  precipices,  or  having  them- 
selves crushed  underneath  the  wheels  of  a huge  car — 
were  unknown.  The  only  species  of  self-immolation 
practised  was  that  exemplified  by  the  Indian  devotee 
Calanus,  who  accompanied  Alexander’s  army  to  Baby- 
lon, and  who,  when  ripe  for  immediate  translation  into 
heaven,  had  a funeral  pyre  made  and  set  on  flame, 
cheerfully  mounted  it,  and  had  himself  burned  on  it. 
As  has  already  been  said,  the  Brahmin  anxious  to 
secure  extraordinary  merit  divided  his  life  into  four 
parts,  devoting  the  first  to  studentship,  the  second  to 
the  duties  of  a householder,  the  third  to  those  of  a 
hermit,  and  the  fourth  and  last  to  those  of  a mendi- 
cant. But  before  the  last  act  of  the  drama  was  played 
out,  he  burned  himself  alive,  and  passed  into  glory 
through  a path  less  tedious  than  that  of  disease  and 
death.  Suicide  was  considered  in  India,  as  in  other 
lands  demoralized  by  philosophy  falsely  so  called,  not 
merely  not  censurable,  but  positively  praiseworthy,  at 
least  under  particular  circumstances  ! 

The  Purva  Mimansa  has  nothing  directly  to  do  with 
the  great  subject  of  the  schools,  the  emancipation  of 
the  soul  from  the  bonds  of  ignorance.  It  is  not,  how- 
ever, wholly  unconnected  with  that  blessed  state,  as 
the  initiatory  or  preparatory  work,  without  which  com- 
plete deliverance  is  unattainable,  is  the  grand  theme  of 
its  dissertations.  A devotee  must  pass  through  two 
distinct  stages  before  the  liberation  of  his  ignorance- 
bound  spirit  can  be  an  accomplished  fact,  or  the  sum- 
mum  bonum  is  realized.  These  are  the  Karma-Kand 
and  the  Gyan  -Kernel,  the  stage  of  Duty  and  the  stage 
of  Knowledge,  the  Department  of  Works  and  the  De- 
partment of  Contemplation.  The  exercises  connected 
with  the  initiatory  stage  are  set  forth  in  the  Mimansa, 


THE  PUBVA  MIMANSA. 


289 


while  those  connected  with  the  higher  stage  are  set 
forth  in  the  Yedanta,  which,  therefore,  is  as  decidedly 
•the  counterpart  of  this  school  as  the  Yoga  is  the  coun- 
terpart of  the  Sankhya.  The  reward  promised  in  the 
Mimansa  to  a faithful  discharge  of  the  duties  enjoined 
therein  is  only  a temporary  season  of  bliss  in  paradise 
followed  by  a renewed  life  ; but  ultimate  emancipation 
from  the  thraldom  of  transmigration  must  be  attained 
through  exercises  of  a loftier  order. 

It  is  desirable,  before  taldng  leave  of  this  school,  to 
raise  one  important  question  : Has  the  Mimansa  noth- 
ing to  do  with  worship  ? It  certainly  has,  the  Karma- 
Hand  being  divided  into  two  subsidiary  departments — 
the  Karma-Kand  exclusively  so  called,  and  the  ITpa- 
sana-Kand,  Duty  and  Worship.  It  is  not,  however, 
necessary,  according  to  its  teaching,  to  have  a god  or 
a pantheon  of  gods  and  goddesses  to  enforce  the  one 
and  render  the  other  practicable.  Elaborate  forms  are 
prescribed,  along  with  prayers,  hymns,  chants,  impre- 
cations, deprecations,  incantations,  and  exorcisms  ; and 
if  these  are  carefully  attended  to  and  rightly  observed, 
the  preparatory  work  is  completed  and  the  reward 
promised  is  insured.  The  champions  of  the  Mimansa 
do  not  rise  up  to  the  level  of  the  progressive  scientists 
of  the  day,  who  maintain  that  no  worship  is  needed  be- 
sides the  performance  of  one’s  own  duty  to  society  and 
a calm  contemplation  of  the  order  of  nature.  They 
maintain  the  paramount  necessity  of  devotional  and 
ritualistic  observances  ; and  they  act  very  wisely  in 
throwing  such  abstractions  as  the  impersonal  God  of 
Hindu  Philosophy,  and  such  phantasms  as  Cosmos  and 
Primal  Force,  into  the  background,  together  with  deities 
who  are  monsters  either  of  cruelty  or  vice.  How  many 
who  believe  in  a personal  God  and  in  His  brightest 


290 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


revelation  in  Christ  Jesus  look  upon  their  mill-horse 
method  of  going  round  a cycle  of  lifeless  ceremonies, 
with  no  thought  beyond  their  stated  return  and  mo- 
notonous observance,  as  enough  to  make  us  happy  here, 
and  pave  our  way  to  heavenly  bliss  ! 


CHAPTER  X. 


TEE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM,  OK  HINDU  PANTHEISM. 

How  we  come  to  the  last  of  the  systems  called  ortho- 
dox, the  Uttara  Mimansa,  or  the  Vedanta.  The  order 
in  which  the  systems  were  elaborated,  one  after  an- 
other, cannot  possibly  be  set  forth  ; but  the  first  and 
last  links  of  the  chain  may,  as  lias  already  been  said, 
be  fixed  with  tolerable  certainty.  The  systems  began 
with  materialism  of  the  rankest  type,  and  terminated  in 
absolute  pantheism.  The  Sankhya,  with  its  apparent 
dualism  but  real  materialistic  monism,  was  decidedly 
the  first  of  the  varied  forms  in  which  orthodox  specula- 
tion appeared  in  ancient  India,  and  its  claim  to  ortho- 
doxy was  substantiated  by  the  fact  that  its  champions 
appealed  to  the  Vedas  in  support  even  of  its  most  ob- 
noxious theories.  The  Yoga  system,  its  counterpart, 
silenced  popular  clamor  by  adding  to  its  admitted  enti- 
ties a god  as  passive,  quiescent,  and  useless  as  the  soul 
posited  by  it.  The  atomic  theory  was  then  propounded 
by  the  schools  called  Analytic,  the  Xaiyayika,  and 
Vaiseshika  schools  ; and  creation  was  traced,  not  to 
the  quiescent  and  useless  God,  whose  existence  was 
admitted  by  their  champions  ; not  to  the  human  soul, 
equally  quiescent  and  useless  in  their  estimation,  but  to 
an  unseen,  mysterious  force  called  Adrishta,  the  accu- 
mulated merit  and  demerit,  or  the  work  of  all  the  past 
stages  of  existence.  The  consequence  of  these  schemes 
of  thought  was,  and  could  not  but  be,  the  prevalence 


292 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


of  a species  of  scepticism  unfavorable,  if  not  avowedly 
hostile,  to  the  popular  faith  ; and  against  this  really,  if 
not  avowedly,  antagonistic  force  or  influence  a reaction 
was  brought  about  by  the  speculations  of  Jaimini,  the 
father  of  resuscitated  ritualism. 

Inchan  Philosophy  was  in  its  inception  and  early  prog- 
ress a reaction  against  ritualism.  The  simple  worship 
of  the  forces  and  agencies  of  nature  in  the  compara- 
tively pure  Vedic  age  had  been  supplanted  by  a cum- 
brous system  of  ritualism  ; and  sacrifices,  great  and 
small,  each  consisting  of  a regular  paraphernalia  of 
ceremonial  observances,  accompanied  with  varieties  of 
hymns  and  chants,  imprecations  and  deprecations,  in- 
cantations and  exorcisms,  washings  and  purifications, 
and  presided  over  by  accredited  representatives  of  a 
hierarchy  almost  deified,  had  taken  the  place  of  prayers 
and  songs,  rhapsodical  indeed,  but  on  the  whole  natural 
and  impassioned.  But  mummeries  and  tomfooleries, 
however  thoroughly  systematized  and  sanctified  by 
religion,  could  only  cast  a veil  over  the  important  prob- 
lems of  life,  but  not  burke  them  ; might  bury  the  spirit 
of  inquiry  for  a time,  but  could  not  extinguish  it. 
And,  therefore,  when  this  system  of  externalism  ap- 
peared in  its  most  obnoxious  forms,  a reaction  was 
realized,  and  rationalism  made  its  appearance  in  forms 
more  or  less  attractive. 

But  rationalism  is  as  wild  and  unmanageable  as  ritual- 
ism, and  it  developed  in  India  into  a series  of  forms  as 
obnoxious  as  the  types  of  ritualism  from  which  it  had 
derived  its  existence.  It  is  very  common  to  laugh  at  a 
person  who  attaches  a great  deal  of  importance  not 
only  to  certain  prayers  and  hymns,  but  to  the  manner 
in  which  the  prayers  are  said  and  the  hymns  are 
chanted  ; who  looks  upon  certain  turnings  of  the  face 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


293 


and  postures  of  the  body  as  peculiarly  meritorious,  and 
others  as  fraught  with  mischievous  consequences  ; who 
regards  the  proper  intonation  of  certain  mystical  words 
and  syllables  as  fitted  to  send  away  impure  spirits,  and 
bring  in  those  whose  presence  is  a source  of  strength 
and  consolation  ; and  who,  in  a word,  converts  religion 
into  a scheme  of  ceremonialism  and  casuistry,  mimicry 
and  masquerade,  hollow  professions  and  wrong  prac- 
tices. But  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  our  risibility 
is  equally  stimulated  by  the  absurdities  into  which 
those  thinkers  are  betrayed  who  find  it  hard  to  ascribe 
creation  to  an  intelligent  voluntary  Being,  but  exceed- 
ingly easy  to  trace  it  to  blind  chance  or  an  inscrutable 
force  ; who  throw  the  Creator  into  the  background,  if 
not  into  the  limbo  of  non-existence,  and  at  the  same  time 
prescribe  devotion  to  a phantom  like  the  genius  of  hu- 
manity, or  the  spirit  of  progress,  or  the  shade  of  liberty, 
or  the  beauty  of  womanhood  ; who  wipe  away  the 
essential  distinction  between  virtue  and  vice,  and  then 
exhort  us  to  be  self-sacrificing  in  obedience  to  a code  of 
morality  framed  by  selfishness  ; and  who,  like  Hindu 
philosophers,  recommend  austerity,  penance,  and  ascetic 
contemplation,  while  refusing  to  recognize  any  being 
higher  than  self,  and  reducing  that  self  to  the  level  of 
inanimate  matter  by  depriving  it  of  its  intelligence  and 
instinctive  or  volitional  activity.  If  ritualism  has  its 
absurdities,  rationalism  has  its  also  ! 

Rationalism  in  India  developed  into  varied  grotesque 
and  absurd  forms,  and  its  extravagance  brought  on  a 
reaction  against  it.  This  reaction  was  headed  by 
Jaimini,  the  founder  of  the  Purva  Mimansa  school, 
who  strove  successfully  to  draw  away  public  attention 
from  the  unsolvable  problems  of  existence,  and  concen- 
trate it  on  the  practical  portions  of  revelation — the  por- 


294  HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 

tions  in  which  human  duty  is  pointed  out  in  the  clearest 
terms  possible.  lie  revived  the  age  of  the  Brahmanas, 
and  applied  to  those  hoary  documents  a system  of  ex- 
egesis which  he  had  elaborated  with  great  care.  The 
question  of  the  origin  of  the  Yedas  and  their  authorita- 
tiveness did  not  engage  his  attention  so  thoroughly  as 
the  principles  involved  in  their  correct  interpretation. 
"With  unflinching  logic  he  applied  his  own  canons  of  in- 
terpretation to  their  miscellaneous  contents,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  evolving  from  them  a system  of  ritualism 
even  more  complicated  than  that  from  which  the 
rationalism  of  the  Upanishads  had  been  a relief. 

But  ritualism  revived  and  carried  to  excess  bore  its 
fruit,  and  rationalism  once  more  made  its  appearance. 
It  appeared  at  first  in  its  less  repellent  forms,  and  in- 
stead of  ostensibly  or  even  really  striving  to  overturn 
the  sacred  Scriptures,  it  freely  admitted  their  authori- 
tativeness, and  professed  unreserved  veneration  for 
them.  It  modestly  represented  its  great  work  as 
simple  interpretation  of  its  contents,  not  their  modifica- 
tion or  revision.  Jaimini  had  applied  certain  canons  of 
interpretation  to  the  earlier  portions  of  the  Yedas,  the 
Mantras,  and  the  Brahmanas  ; and  these  had  now  to 
be  applied  with  logical  force  to  the  later  portion,  the 
Upanishads.  The  whole  of  revelation  must  be  accepted 
and  correctly  interpreted,  not  merely  a part,  or  the  part 
suited  to  our  inclinations  and  tastes.  The  liymnology 
and  the  ritual  had  been  made  the  subjects  of  elaborate 
exegetical  dissertations,  and  thus  far  a great  work  had 
been  accomplished.  But  something  remained  to  be 
done.  The  concluding  portions  of  these  venerable 
records  had  not  been  analyzed  and  explained  ; and  as 
they,  constituting  part  and  parcel  of  revelation,  could 
not  be  dispensed  with  or  neglected  without  a serious 


THE  VEDAHTA  SYSTE1T. 


295 


and  irreparable  loss,  somebody  must  undertake  the  task 
of  elucidating  their  contents,  as  Jaimini  had  done  in 
the  case  of  the  earlier  portions. 

The  great  man  who  undertook  this  important  task, 
and  who  is  honored  and  revered  as  the  head  of  the 
Vedantic  school,  was  Badarayuna,  or  Yyas.  He  is 
called  Yeda-Yyas  ; and  a legend  is  preserved  fitted  to 
show  the  propriety  of  his  assumption  of  this  title,  or 
ascription  of  it  to  him  by  general  consent.  He  had  in 
a former  life  made  himself  ripe  for  beatitude  by  aus- 
terity and  meditation  ; but  he  was  sent  back  to  the 
world  to  do  a work  which  no  other  person  could  do — 
viz.,  that  of  compiling  the  Yedas,  with  which  his  name 
is  inseparably  associated.  A great  many  other  legends 
are  related  in  the  sacred  books  of  the  Hindus  illustra- 
tive of  his  greatness  and  manifold  labors.  In  the 
Purans  he  is  said  to  have  been  an  incarnation  of 
Yishnu,  a fact  which  no  amount  of  ingenuity  can 
reconcile  to  the  notion  of  his  having  in  a former  life 
worked  up  his  way  to  complete  emancipation,  and 
being  sent  back  to  perform  a work  of  love  when  almost 
in  the  arms  of  beatitude  ; though  Colebrooke  sees  no 
difficulty  in  effecting  the  reconciliation.  If  all  that  is 
said  about  him  is  reliable,  he  seems  to  have  been  the 
most  voluminous  writer  the  country  ever  saw.  He  is 
said  to  have  composed  the  Mahabharat,  written  several 
of  the  Purans,  compiled  the  Yedas,  and  indited  the 
Sutras  in  which  the  principles  of  the  Yedantic  school 
are  set  forth.  But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  state- 
ments which  make  him  the  author  of  such  a hetero- 
geneous mass  of  literature  ascribe  to  him  a great  deal 
of  versatihty  indeed,  but  very  little  of  consistency  and 
of  sound  sense.  It  is  by  no  means  possible  to  reconcile 
to  one  another  the  books  he  is  said  to  have  penned,  or 


29G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


to  evolve  out  of  them  a consistent  scheme  of  thought 
or  principle  ; and  therefore  the  supposition  that  there 
were  several  persons  of  this  name,  who  lived  and  wrote 
at  different  times  and  under  diverse  circumstances,  is 
the  only  one  that  appears  tenable. 

The  great  work  of  Yyas,  with  which  we  have  to  do 
in  this  paper,  is  the  Saririka  or  Brahma  Sutras.  This 
work  consists  of  four  books,  each  subdivided  into  four 
chapters.  The  entire  number  of  aphorisms  thus  classi- 
fied is  555,  and  the  number  of  topics  treated  of  or  sec- 
tions is  191.  In  bulk,  therefore,  it  is  left  behind  by 
the  work  of  Jaimini  ; but  in  the  loftiness  of  its  themes 
and  depth  of  its  philosophy  it  surpasses  its  rival  ; while 
in  logical  precision  and  force  both  the  documents  are 
on  a par  and  equally  deserving  of  the  praise  bestowed 
upon  the  Mimansa  Sutras  by  Max  Muller. 

The  Brahma  Sutras,  however,  are  exceptionally  ob- 
scure in  their  phraseology  and  statements,  and  scholias 
upon  scholias  have  been  written  to  elucidate  their  con- 
tents. The  greatest  name  among  its  ancient  scholiasts 
or  commentators  is  Baudhayana,  a title  signifying  that 
the  bearer  of  it  was  a religious  devotee  entitled  to  pe- 
culiar reverence.  But  in  modern  times  his  exegetical 
dissertations  are  rarely  consulted,  they  having  been 
superseded  by  the  works  of  the  celebrated  scholiast 
Sankar  Acharya,  who  lived  about  seven  hundred  years 
after  the  birth  of  Christ,  and  whose  comments  on  the 
most  important  of  the  Upanishads  and  on  the  Saririka 
Sutras  are  masterpieces  of  acute  thought  and  philo- 
sophical reasoning. 

The  first  chapter  of  the  first  book  of  the  Sutras,  and 
four  aphorisms  of  the  second  were  translated  by  the 
Rev.  K.  M.  Banerjea,  LL.D.,  some  years  ago,  along  with 
Sankar’s  comments.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Dr. 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


297 


Banerjea,  the  greatest  native  scholar  in  and  out  of  the 
native  church,  has  not  been  able  to  continue  this  great 
work  of  his.  A fragment  also  was  translated  by  Dr. 
Ballantyne  ; but  we  have  failed  in  our  efforts  to  pro- 
cure a copy  of  his  translation.  Mr.  Kunte,  of  Ahmed- 
abad,  has,  in  his  serial,  Saddarsana-Chintanilca,  trans- 
lated all  the  four  chapters  of  the  first  book  ; but  he  has, 
instead  of  proceeding  further,  begun  the  work  of  trans- 
lating the  Yoga  Sutras  of  Batanjali.  His  comments  or 
notes  are  very  valuable  so  far  as  they  go,  inasmuch  as 
they  embody  the  sentiments,  not  merely  of  the  school 
of  Sankar  Acharya,  but  of  the  rival  school  set  up  in 
opposition  to  it  by  Ramanuja,  who  discarded  absolute 
pantheism  and  maintained  the  existence  of  three  enti- 
ties— the  ego,  the  non-ego,  and  the  infinite.  These 
translations  we  shall  lay  under  contribution  in  our 
treatment  of  the  subject,  and  the  copious  extracts 
presented  from  all  the  chapters  of  all  the  books  of  this 
standard  work  in  Colebrooke’s  celebrated  essay  on  the 
Vedanta. 

In  treating  of  the  Vedantic  system,  as  perhaps  of 
every  other  system  of  philosophy,  a broad  line  of  dis- 
tinction ought  to  drawn  between  its  earlier  forms  and 
later  developments.  A system  of  philosophy  appears 
at  first  in  a crude,  undigested  form,  very  likely  in  a 
series  of  unconnected  aphorisms  or  statements.  As  it 
makes  progress  its  different  parts  appear  loosely  joined 
or  inconsistent  with  one  another,  and  varieties  of  ques- 
tions with  reference  to  its  essential  truths  and  outer 
garment  of  diction  and  phraseology  are  raised  by  the 
inquisitive  mind.  To  reconcile  apparent  and  real  in- 
consistencies, to  explain  obscure  statements  and  lop  off 
excrescences,  new  theories  are  formed  and  new  specula- 
tions are  allowed  to  run  high.  And  in  process  of  time 


298 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


new  elements  of  truth  are  superadded  and  fresh  expla- 
nations given  ; and  the  original  system  appears  in  a 
new  form,  with  its  inner  life  matured  and  even  modi- 
fied, and  its  outer  garment  renovated.  And  therefore 
the  historian  of  the  system  in  question  cannot  do  justice 
to  it  without  discriminating  between  its  original  prin- 
ciples and  later  accretions. 

It  is  to  be  feared  that  such  discretion  is  not  shown 
by  our  learned  and  pious  brother,  Pandit  Kehemiah 
Goreh,  in  his  excellent  work  entitled  “ A Rational  Refu- 
tation of  the  Hindu  Philosophical  Systems.”  lie  pre- 
sents his  views  of  the  systems  with  perspicuity  and 
force,  hut  he  scarcely  quotes  from  the  original  Sutras 
or  aphorisms  in  support  of  his  statements.  His  foot- 
notes are  rich  in  citations,  though  the  body  of  his  work 
is  singularly  free  from  them  ; but  the  books  he  lays 
under  contribution  are  as  a rule  not  the  original  works 
of  the  founders  of  the  systems — the  Sutras  of  Kapila  or 
Patanjali  or  Gautama  or  Kanada  or  Jaimini  or  Bada- 
rayana — but  later  documents,  of  great  authority  indeed, 
but  not  such  as  are  entitled  to  the  honor  ascribed  or 
the  importance  attached  to  the  original  sources  of  in- 
formation. This  is  specially  the  case  in  the  large  por- 
tion of  his  great  work  devoted  to  a treatment  of  the 
Yedanta  system. 

The  learned  Pandit  devotes  about  half  of  his  work  to 
a very  able  exposition  of  the  principles  and  errors  asso- 
ciated with  the  Yedanta  system.  But  he  does  not  sus- 
tain his  views  of  the  system  by  quotations  from  the 
Brahma  Sutras,  which  are  entirely  thrown  into  the 
shade  in  his  very  able  disquisitions.  He  lays  under 
contribution  such  books  as  the  Yedanta  Paribhasa  and 
the  Yedanta  Sar,  and  such  manuscripts  as  the  Sank- 
shepa  Saririka  and  Sastra  Dipika.  His  object  does 


THE  VEDANTA.  SYSTEM. 


299 


not  perhaps  require  a reference  to  or  analysis  of  the 
original  Sutras  ; but  as  he  advocates  a view  different 
from  that  ordinarily  held  and  presented  of  Y edantism, 
it  is  a pity  that  his  sentiments  are  not  corroborated  by 
quotations  from  the  acknowledged  writings  of  its 
founder. 

The  Pandit  in  the  first  of  the  two  scholarly  pam- 
phlets he  has  very  recently  published  on  “ Theism  and 
Christianity”  goes  so  far  as  to  affirm  : “ First,  I must 
remove  a great  mistake  which  is  generally  made,  that 
of  considering  Vedantism  as  identical  with  pantheism. 
They  are  not  quite  the  same.”  Why  ? Because  Yedant- 
ism  attributes  a species  of  existence,  called  Yyavarika 
or  practical,  to  the  external  world.  In  the  first  chap- 
ter of  the  third  section  of  this  great  work,  “A  .Rational 
Ref utation, ” etc.,  the  section  devoted  to  an  analysis  of 
Yedantism  and  an  exposure  of  the  errors  associated 
with  it,  he  treats  of  the  three  sorts  of  existence  main- 
tained by  the  Yedantins,  and  he  quotes  in  one  of  his 
foot-notes  the  following  verse  from  the  Yedanta- 
Paribhasa  to  set  forth  what  they  are  : “ Existence  is 
of  three  sorts — true  ( paramarthika ),  practical  ( vya/oa - 
rika ),  and  apparent  ( pratibhashika ).  True  existence  is 
that  of  Brahma  ; practical,  that  of  ether,  etc.  ; appar- 
ent, that  of  nacrine  silver  and  the  like.”  But  the 
Pandit  must  admit  that  these  three  sorts  of  existence 
are  nowhere  found  in  the  Upanishads  and  the  Brahma 
Sutras,  the  original  documents  of  the  Yedantic  system, 
and  that  there  is  no  ground  for  denying  that  the  form 
of  faith  unfolded  in  them  is  pantheism. 

Ray,  the  Pandit  himself  admits  as  much  when  in  the 
pamphlet  alluded  to  he  says  : “If  any  one  would  say 
that  this  phase  of  Yedantism,  which  sets  forth  the 
theories  of  Maya,  of  the  falseness  of  the  world,  and 


300 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


different  kinds  of  existence,  is  not  found  clearly  enunci- 
ated in  tlie  Upanishads,  but  is  rather  a later  develop- 
ment, then  I would  answer,  that  if  you  would  appeal  to 
that  only  which  seems  expressly  stated  in  the  Upan- 
ishads, you  will  not  mend  the  matter.  For  if,  accord- 
ing to  the  literal  rendering  of  their  words,  Brahma 
itself  has  become  everything  in  reality — man,  beast, 
vfood,  stone,  yea,  good  men  as  well  as  most  vicious 
men — then  Brahma’s  omnipotence,  omniscience,  purity, 
etc.  are  changed  into  feebleness,  ignorance,  impurity, 
and  even  into  inanimate  substance.  And  it  is,  as  I said 
before,  to  save  the  Vedanta  from  this  absurdity  that 
the  Vedanta  doctors  explain  its  teaching  by  the  theo- 
ries of  Maya  and  different  kinds  of  existence.” 

In  this  passage  the  Pandit  virtually  yields  the  point, 
and  admits  that  Vedantism,  as  taught  in  the  Upan- 
ishads, is  pantheism,  and  implies  a real  change  of  the 
divine  into  material  substance,  and  the  forms  or  modes 
in  which  both  appear.  Vow  the  Brahma  Sutras  revive 
the  religion  of  the  Upanishads  as  thoroughly  as  the 
Sutras  of  Jaimini  revive  the  religion  of  the  other  parts 
of  the  Vedas,  the  Mantras,  and  the  Brahmanas.  And 
whatever  is  predicated  of  the  scheme  of  thought  de- 
veloped in  the  Upanishads  must  of  needs  be  predicated 
of  that  unfolded  in  the  Sutras  of  Badarayuna. 

We  shall  develop  the  system  in  this  paper  as  it  orig- 
inally  stood  by  quotations  from  the  Saririka  Sutras, 
and  reserve  our  remarks  on  its  later  developments  for  a 
separate  paper,  of  which  we  shall  make  the  Vedanta 
Sar,  recently  translated  by  Major  Jacob,  our  text-book. 

VThat  ground  have  we  for  stating  that  this  is  the  last 
of  the  systems  of  philosophy  called  orthodox  ? In  the 
first  place,  let  it  be  observed  that  all  the  other  systems 
are  referred  to  in  the  Brahma  Sutras  and  combated. 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


301 


The  Sankhya  cosmogony  is  adopted  in  its  salient  feat- 
ures, but  varieties  of  reasons  are  brought  forward  to 
show  that  its  Prakriti  or  Pradhau  could  not  possibly 
have  been  the  creator  of  the  universe.  In  the  very 
first  chapter  of  the  first  book  an  attempt  is  made  to 
prove  that  the  source  of  existence  in  its  multifarious 
forms  could  not  possibly  have  been  an  unintelligent, 
unsentient  material  form,  and  that  the  Sankhyas  have 
got  their  notions  simply  by  perverting  the  Scriptures. 
The  atomic  theory  of  Ivanada  is  made  the  subject  of 
many  a denunciatory  argument,  while  Jaimini  is  ex- 
pressly named  in  the  following  aphorism  : “ The  opin- 
ion of  Jaimini  is,  The  statement  that  the  Supreme 
Spirit  is  directly  to  be  worshipped  does  not  conflict 
(with  any  text).” 

But  Badarayuna  is  also  named  in  Jaimini’s  Sutras  as 
well  as  in  this.  That  he  is  named  in  his  own  Sutras 
the  following  aphorism  will  show  : “In  the  opinion  of 
Badarayuna,  there  are  beings  above  man  who  have  a 
title  to  the  contemplation  of  Brahma,  because  this  is 
possible.”  On  this  apparent  anomaly  Colebrooke 
makes  the  following  remarks  : 

“ The  name  of  Badarayuna  frequently  recurs  in  .the 
Sutras  ascribed  to  him,  as  does  that  of  Jaimini,  the 
reputed  author  of  the  Purna  Mimansa,  in  his.  I have 
already  remarked  in  the  preceding  essay  on  the  men- 
tion of  an  author  by  his  name,  and  in  the  third  person, 
in  his  own  work.  It  is  nothing  unusual  in  the  litera- 
ture or  science  of  the  other  nations  ; but  a Hindu  com- 
mentator will  account  for  it  by  presuming  the  actual 
composition  to  be  that  of  a disciple  recording  the  words 
of  his  teacher.” 

Badarayuna  accepts  the  six  proofs  or  sources  of 
knowledge  admitted  in  the  Purva-Mimansa  school — • 


302 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


viz.,  Perception,  Inference,  Comparison,  Presumption, 
Revelation,  or  Testimony  and  Privation.  Revelation, 
however,  is  the  only  proof  most  thoroughly  utilized  in 
his  Sutras,  and  the  others  are  brought  forward  only  to 
prop  up  its  declarations,  his  avowed  object  being  to 
revive  the  philosophy  embodied  in  it,  not  to  initiate  a 
new  scheme  of  thought.  Badarayuna  also  adopts 
•Jaimini’s  method  of  treating  of  a subject  or  “ topic,” 
which  is  represented  as  consisting  of  five  parts — (1)  the 
subject  or  matter  to  be  explained,  (2)  the  doubt  or  ques- 
tion concerning  it,  (3)  the  plausible  solution  or  primd- 
facie  argument,  (4)  the  answer  or  demonstrated  conclu- 
sion and  true  solution,  (5)  the  pertinence  or  relevancy 
and  connection.” 

It  is  superfluous  to  say  that  Badarayuna  admits  the 
canonicity  and  authoritativeness  of  the  Vedas,  as 
Jaimini  does.  He  also  adopts  Jaimini's  doctrine  of  the 
eternity  of  sound  and  the  eternity  of  the  Veda.  This 
is  distinctly  stated  by  Colebrooke  in  the  following  pas- 
sage : “ In  the  course  of  this  disquisition  the  noted 
question  of  the  eternity  of  sound,  of  articulate  sound  in 
particular,  is  mooted  and  examined.  It  is  a favorite 
topic  in  both  Mimansas,  being  intimately  connected 
with  that  of  the  eternity  of  the  Veda  or  revelation  ac- 
knowledged by  them.” 

But  there  are  aphorisms  in  which  the  Veda  is  ex- 
pressly traced  to  the  authorship  of  God  or  Brahma. 
The  very  third  aphorism  of  the  first  book  is  a proof  of 
this  statement  : “ Because  it  is  the  cause  of  the  Sastra, 
(or)  because  the  Sastra  is  its  manifesting  cause.”  San- 
kara in  commenting  on  these  words  says  : “ Brahma  is 
the  cause  of  the  great  Sastra,  the  Rig  Veda,  etc.,  sup- 
ported by  numerous  (subsidiary)  systems  of  science  ; 
bringing  to  light,  like  a lamp,  all  objects,  and  being,  as 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


303 


it  were,  all-knowing.  Indeed,  of  sack  a Sastra,  defined 
as  the  Big  Yeda,  etc.,  endowed  with  the  quality  of  all- 
knowledge, the  production  cannot  be  from  any  other 
than  the  omniscient.”  Again  : “What  shall  I say, 
then,  of  the  supreme  omniscience  and  omnipotence  of 
that  Great  Being,  from  which  Great  Being,  as  the 
cause,  proceeded  without  effort  and  as  a mere  sport, 
after  the  manner  of  the  human  breath,  that  mine  of  all 
knowledge  called  Eig  Yeda,  etc.,  diversified  by  many 
varieties  of  Sakhas,  and  the  source  of  the  classification 
into  varna  and  asram , of  gods,  animals,  and  men  V ’ 
How  are  these  two  truths — the  eternity  of  the  Yeda 
and  its  procession  from  Brahma — to  be  reconciled  ? 
Hot,  certainly,  without  very  great  difficulty.  One  of 
the  theories  regarding  the  Yeda  is  that  it  has  from  all 
eternity  issued  from  Brahma  as  a breath,  just  as  light 
lias  issued  from  the  sun  since  the  very  first  moment  of 
his  existence  as  a luminous  body.  In  other  words,  as 
breath  is  inseparable  from  a living  person  in  this  world, 
as  light  is  inseparable  from  a luminous  body,  as  fluidity 
is  inseparable  from  water,  so  is  the  Yeda  inseparable 
from  the  Supreme  Spirit,  as  well  when  in  a state  of 
quiescence  as  when  in  its  creative  moods.  It  is,  how- 
ever, said  to  issue  as  an  efflation  from  Brahma  when, 
after  a long  period  of  quiescence,  it  begins  to  develop 
into  a renewed  creation  “as  a sport.”  The  Sankkya 
doctrine,  that  at  every  renovation  of  creation  the  Yeda 
issues  like  an  efflation  from  Prakriti,  is  transferred 
mutatis  mutandis  to  the  Yedanta  school,  with  perhaps 
this  addition,  that  during  the  long  periods  of  divine 
quiescence,  which  alternate  with  periods  of  creative 
activity,  the  sacred  volume  continues  its  manifestation 
as  a breath,  although  unperceived  and  unappreciated 
by  any  rational  being.  And  in  this  way  the  doctrine 


304 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


of  its  eternity  is  made  to  harmonize  with  that  of  its 
procession  from  the  Supreme  Spirit.  Does  not  this 
doctrine  tend  to  remind  the  Church  of  its  dogma  of  the 
eternal  procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit  ? 

The  sacredness  of  the  smritis  is  also  admitted,  though 
many  of  the  statements  embodied  in  them  are  attacked 
with  unflinching  severity.  The  twenty -third  aphorism 
of  the  third  chapter  of  the  First  Book  refers  to  these 
writings  as  authorities  : “ Again,  in  works  called  the 
smritis  (the  same)  is  found.”  The  Sutras  of  the  fore- 
going champions  of  philosophy,  or  founders  of  philo- 
sophical schools  of  an  orthodox  type,  are  ranked  with 
the  smritis  properly  so  called.  But  they  are  at  the 
same  time  criticised  with  the  greatest  freedom,  and 
condemned  as  if  they  were  mere  human  compositions 
when  they  appear  as  a whole  or  in  part  worthy  of  con- 
demnation. Ivapila  and  his  followers  are  referred  to 
with  the  veneration  due  to  Maharishis  or  apostolic 
teachers  ; and  yet  an  exterminating  crusade  is  fought 
by  Badarayuna  in  his  Sutras  against  their  opinions  and 
principles.  The  Yoga  Sastra  or  Patanjali  is  called 
“ Yoga-smriti,”  and  yet  the  philosophy  with  which 
its  practical  directions  are  inseparably  associated  is 
made  the  subject  of  many  a vehement  denunciation. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  the  treatment  with  which 
Kanada,  whose  writings  are  also  classed  with  smritis, 
is  favored. 

Such  treatment  of  the  writings  to  which  the  sacred 
appellation  of  the  Smritis  is  attached  by  universal  con- 
sent, proves  what  we  said  in  our  last  paper — viz. , that 
tradition  is  to  be  accepted  only  when  it  agrees  with  the 
Scriptures.  But  when  it  obviously  runs  counter  to 
them,  or  has  for  its  basis  a misinterpretation  of  its 
express  declarations,  it  ought  to  be  unceremoniously 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


305 


rejected  as  a thing  of  no  authority  or  consequence 
whatever.  This  is.  we  believe,  the  firm  conviction  of 
all  sensible  men  in  the  Church  with  reference  to  the 
body  of  tradition  it  inherits.  The  traditions  of  the 
Church  are  authoritative  only  when  they  agree  with 
the  Scriptures ; but  when  they  are,  in  spirit  or  in  letter, 
not  in  harmony  with  or  in  direct  contradiction  to  the 
word  and  the  testimony,  they  should  be  thrown  aside 
as  mere  rubbish.  But  as  in  the  Christian  Church  there 
are  those  who  raise  the  traditions  above  the  Scriptures, 
there  are  multitudes  in  India  who  throw  the  Vedas  into 
the  background  and  transfer  the  homage  due  to  them 
to  the  writings  called  Smritis. 

But  why  are  the  writings  of  Ivapila,  Patanjali,  and 
Kanada  regarded  as  Smritis  or  sacred  traditions,  while 
those  of  Buddha  and  others  are  regarded  as  heretical  ? 
Because  the  systematists  uphold  the  canonicity  or 
authoritativeness  of  the  Vedas,  while  Buddha  and  his 
followers  looked  upon  them  as  human  compositions — 
venerable  indeed,  but  of  no  authority — dust  as  large 
bodies  of  professors  in  the  Christian  Church  look  upon 
the  writings  of  the  fathers.  Orthodoxy  and  heterodoxy 
seem  to  have  consisted  in  acceptance  and  rejection  of 
these  records  as  authoritative,  rather  than  of  any  for- 
mulated schemes  of  doctrine  and  precept.  And  the 
result  was  that  doctrinal  errors  of  the  most  obnoxious 
type  were  promulgated,  and  irregularities  of  practice  of 
the  most  disastrous  stamp  were  legah'zed  by  men  who 
ostensibly  paid  reverence  to  the  Vedas,  but  secretly 
undermined  their  authority.  It  may  perhaps  be  proved 
that  Buddha  and  his  followers  were  not  entirely  free 
from  the  meanness  and  dishonesty  associated  with  such 
procedure,  though  as  a rule  they  referred  to  the  Vedas 
as  writings  which  should  be  accepted  when  they  agreed 


306 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


with  reason,  but  rejected  when  they  were  out  of  the 
boundary  line  of  such  agreement. 

The  object  of  this  philosophy  is  set  forth  in  the  open- 
ing aphorism  of  this  book  : “ Then,  therefore,  Brahma- 
inquisitiveness  or  Brahma-investigation.”  The  Sutras 
of  Jaimini  direct  our  attention  to  Duty,  and  throw  the 
Being  from  whom  Duty  receives  its  power  to  challenge 
obedience  or  its  obligatory  character,  into  the  back- 
ground. The  Sutras  of  Badarayuna  advance  a step 
further  and  make  this  being  the  object  of  inquiry  and 
investigation.  IIow  is  this  great  inquiry  or  investiga- 
tion to  be  conducted  ? But  before  we  settle  this  ques- 
tion we  have  to  set  at  rest  another  of  a preliminary 
nature — viz.,  Who  are  entitled  to  the  honor  of  being 
engaged  in  so  important  and  glorious  an  investigation  ? 

In  reply  to  this  question,  the  first  remark  to  be  made 
is  that  the  Sudras  (members  of  the  lowest  caste,  or 
rather  outcasts)  are  excluded  from  the  privilege,  and 
that  peremptorily  and  unconditionally.  Colebrooke 
plainly  states  this  : “ Hot  to  interrupt  the  connection 
of  the  subjects,  I have  purposely  passed  by  a digres- 
sion, or  rather  several,  comprised  in  two  sections  of  this 
chapter  (third  of  Book  I.),  wherein  it  is  inquired 
whether  any  besides  a regenerate  man  (a  Hindu  of  the 
first  three  tribes)  is  qualified  for  theological  studies  or 
theognostic  attainments  ; and  the  solution  of  the  doubt 
is  that  a Sudra,  or  a man  of  an  inferior  tribe,  is  incom- 
petent, and  beings  superior  to  man  (the  gods  of  mythol- 
ogy) are  qualified.” 

Hor  are  all  the  members  of  the  three  higher  castes 
indiscriminately  entitled  to  the  privilege  of  being  per- 
mitted to  carry  on  this  sublime  inquiry.  The  women 
are  looked  upon  as  Sudras,  and  are  excluded  as  a body  ; 
though  solitary  examples  of  learned  females  being 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


307 


engaged  in  such  investigation,  but  not  exactly  in  the 
prescribed  manner,  are  not  wanting.  In  the  Brihad 
Aranyaka  Upanishad  a legend  is  preserved  fitted  to 
show  that  some  degree  of  encouragement  was  accorded 
to  such  women  ; but  the  privilege  of  being  engaged 
in  the  inquiry  in  the  approved  fashion  or  prescribed 
manner  is  withheld.  Yajnavalkya  had  two  wives, 
Maitreyi  and  Ivatyayani,  the  former  “ fond  of  discuss- 
ing the  nature  of  Brahma,”  and  the  latter  “ wise  in 
the  duties  of  a housewife.”  Yajnavalkya  made  up  his 
mind  to  give  up  the  duties  of  a householder,  and  to 
retire  to  a forest  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  the  right 
knowledge  of  Brahma,  and  calling  in  his  wife  Maitreyi 
expressed  his  determination  to  divide  his  property  be- 
tween his  two  wives  and  depart.  She  inquired  if  she 
could  “obtain  immortality”  by  wealth.  On  being 
assured  that  she  could  not,  she  signified  her  wish  to 
have  that  explained  to  her  which  might  prove  to  her  a 
stepping-stone  to  immortality.  Her  husband  was  ex- 
ceedingly pleased  with  the  good  sense  she  evinced,  and 
strove  to  satisfy  her  liberal  curiosity  in  a long  dis- 
course. But  when  the  discourse  was  over,  Yajnavalkya 
“ went  to  the  forest”  alone,  she  not  being  considered 
entitled  to  the  privilege  of  accompanying  him. 
Women,  then,  are  excluded  from  this  path  of  inquiry. 

Of  the  male  members  of  the  higher  castes,  those  only 
are  encouraged  who  have  proper  qualifications,  or  who 
have  passed  through  a preliminary  course  of  training 
and  discipline.  The  candidates  for  Brahma  knowledge 
must  have  studied  the  Yedas  under  an  accredited 
teacher  either  in  this  or  in  a previous  life.  They  must 
have  performed  the  ordinary  and  extraordinary  rites, 
gone  through  the  prescribed  devotions  and  penances, 
and  cleansed  their  minds  from  all  impurity  by  avoiding 


308 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


vice  and  practising  virtue,  without  any  regard  to  re- 
ward, present  or  prospective.  The  qualified  person  is 
thus  described  in  the  Yedanta  Sar  : 

“ The  qualified  person  is  one  who  possesses  due  in- 
telligence— that  is,  one  who,  by  reading  the  Yedas  and 
Yedangas  according  to  rule,  either  in  this  life  or  in  a 
former  one,  has  obtained  a general  idea  of  the  meaning 
of  the  whole  ; who,  by  performing  the  constant  and 
occasional  rites,  the  penances  and  devotional  exercises, 
and  abstaining  from  things  done  with  desire  of  reward 
and  from  those  forbidden,  has  got  rid  of  all  sin  and  so 
thoroughly  cleansed  his  mind,  and  who  is  possessed  of 
the  four  means.” 

The  four  means  are  thus  set  forth  : 

“ The  four  means  (Sadhana)  are  : (a)  discrimination 
between  eternal  and  non-eternal  substances,  (6)  indiffer- 
ence to  the  enjoyment  of  rewards  here  and  hereafter, 
(c)  the  possession  of  quiescence,  self-restraint,  and  {cl) 
desire  for  release. ' ’ 

We  cannot  read  what  is  said  in  the  Sutras  and  in  the 
Yedanta  Sar  of  these  preparatory  exercises  without 
being  reminded  of  parallel  pasages  or  corresponding  in- 
junctions in  the  Upanishads.  Brahma-inquisitiveness 
is  a stage  to  which  man  must  pass,  through  Duty -in- 
quisitiveness ; the  Uttara  Mimansa  through  the  Purva 
Mimansa ; the  teaching  of  Badarayuna  through  the 
teaching  of  Jaimini.  But  an  attempt  is  made  by  the 
most  redoubtable  of  the  champions  of  the  Yedantic 
school  to  undo  this  connection,  or  to  make  its  philoso- 
phy stand  on  its  own  legs.  Sankara,  in  his  comments 
on  the  opening  verse  of  the  work,  thus  speaks  of  the 
qualifications  needed  by  the  inquirer  : “ The  study  of 
the  Yedas  is  a general  antecedent  (qualification).  But, 
then,  is  the  comprehension  of  prescribed  acts  here  the 


THE  VEDAXTA  SYSTEM. 


309 


special  antecedent  (qualification)  ? By  no  means  ; be- 
cause even  before  Duty-inquisitiveness,  Brahma-inquisi- 
tiveness is  possible  in  one  that  has  studied  the  Vedanta.” 
This,  however,  is  a later  development  of  the  system 
utterly  at  war  with  its  earlier  indications. 

The  great  inquiry  is  conducted  in  these  Sutras,  and 
ought  therefore  to  be  conducted  by  every  sensible 
Hindu  by  a rigid  application  of  the  rules  of  exegesis, 
framed  by  Jaimini  to  the  latter  portion  of  the  Yedas, 
the  Upanishads.  These  documents  are  sifted  and 
analyzed,  and  the  conclusions  they  are  fitted  to  uphold 
are  stated  and  supported  by  appropriate  quotations  and 
conclusive  arguments.  They  are,  in  a word,  correctly 
interpreted,  and  the  untenable  nature  of  the  false  con- 
struction put  upon  many  of  their  passages  and  state- 
ments by  the  champions  of  Sankhya  and  Vaislieshika 
Philosophy  is  set  forth  ; while  apparent  contradictions 
are  reconciled  and  obscurities  cleared  up.  A great 
portion  of  the  Sariliika  Sutras  is  therefore  argumenta- 
tive. Colebrooke,  in  his  able  analysis  of  its  contents, 
thus  sets  forth  its  controversial  character  : “ The 
second  chapter  of  the  second  lecture  (book)  is  contro- 
versial. The  doctrine  of  the  Sankhyas  is  confuted  in 
the  first  section,  that  of  the  Vaiseshikas  in  two  more, 
of  the  Baudhas  in  as  many,  of  the  Jainas  iu  one,  of  the 
Pasupatas  and  Pancharatras  likewise  in  one  each.  . . . 
It  is  remarkable  that  the  Ay  ay  a of  Gautama  is  entirely 
unnoticed  in  the  text  and  commentaries  of  the  V edant 
Sutras.  ’ ’ 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  a correct  interpretation  of 
the  Upanishads  cannot  be  attempted  without  resorting 
to  the  approved  weapons  of  logic.  These  documents 
were  roughly  handled,  twisted,  and  tortured  by  all 
classes  of  thinkers,  both  orthodox  and  heterodox,  by 


310 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


friend  and  foe.  They  were  appealed  to,  not  only  by 
the  Sankhyas  in  support  of  their  apparently  dualistic 
but  really  materialistic  creed,  not  only  by  the  Yaishe- 
shikas  in  support  of  their  theory  of  various  kinds  of 
atoms  led  into  varieties  of  combinations  by  an  unseen 
force,  but  even  by  the  champions  of  heterodoxy  in 
favor  of  their  anti-Yedic  sentiments  and  theories.  TCe 
are  tempted  to  quote  from  the  Yedanta  Sar  a long  pas- 
sage to  show  how  these  venerable  documents  were 
handled  by  the  sects  called  heretical,  as  well  as  by  the 
orthodox  : 

“For  example,  the  very  illiterate  man  says  that  his 
son  is  his  self,  on  account  of  the  text  of  the  Yeda 
(Satpatha  Brahmana,  Id.  3.  d.  26)  : ‘ Self  is  born  as  a 
son  ; ’ and  because  he  sees  that  he  has  the  same  love 
for  his  son  as  for  himself,  and  because  he  finds  that  if  it 
is  well  or  ill  with  his  son,  it  is  well  or  ill  with  himself. 

“ A Charvaka  says  that  the  gross  body  is  his  self  ; 
on  account  of  the  text  of  the  Yeda  (Taithiriya  Upan- 
ishad,  2.  1)  : ‘ This  is  man  as  made  up  of  the  extract  of 
food  ; ’ and  because  he  sees  that  a man  leaving  his  own 
son  (to  burn)  departs  himself  from  a burning  house,  and 
because  of  the  experience,  ‘ I am  fat,’  ‘ I am  lean.’ 

“Another  Charvaka  says  that  the  organs  of  sense 
are  his  self,  on  account  of  the  text  of  the  Yeda  (Clilian- 
dogya  Upanishad,  Y.  I.  7)  : ‘ They,  the  organs  of 
sense,  went  to  Prajapati  and  said,  (“  Lord,  which  of  us 
is  the  chief  ?”  He  said  unto  them,  “ lie  is  chief 
among  you  whose  departure  makes  the  body  seem 
worthless”)  ; ’ and  because  in  the  absence  of  the 
organs  of  sense  the  functions  of  the  body  cease,  and 
because  of  the  experience,  ‘ I am  blind  of  one  eye,  ’ 4 1 
am  deaf.  ’ 

‘ 1 Another  Charvaka  says  that  the  vital  airs  are  his 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


311 


self,  on  account  of  the  text  of  the  Yeda  (Taittiriya 
IJ panishacl,  2.  2)  : £ There  is  another,  an  inner  self, 
made  of  the  vital  airs,  ’ and  because  in  the  absence  of 
the  vital  airs  the  organs  of  sense  are  inactive,  and 
because  of  the  experience,  ‘ I am  hungry,  ’ ‘ I am 
thirsty.  ’ 

“ Another  Charvaka  says  that  the  mind  is  his  self, 
on  account  of  the  text  of  the  Yeda  (Taittiriya  Upan- 
ishad,  2.  3)  : ‘ There  is  another,  inner  self,  made  of  the 
mind,’  and  because  when  the  mind  sleeps  the  vital  airs 
cease  to  be,  and  because  of  the  experience,  ‘ 1 resolve,’ 
£ I doubt.  ’ 

‘ ‘ A Baudha  says  that  intellect  is  his  self,  on  account 
of  the  text  of  the  Yeda  (Taittiriya,  2.  4)  : £ There  is 
another,  an  inner  self,  made  of  cognition,’  and  because 
in  the  absence  of  an  agent  an  instrument  is  powerless, 
and  because  of  the  experience,  ‘ I am  an  agent,  ’ ‘ I am 
a patient.  ’ 

“The  Prabhakara  and  the  Tarkika  say  that  igno- 
rance is  their  self,  on  account  of  the  text  of  the  Yeda 
(Taittiriya,  2.  5)  : ‘ There  is  another,  an  inner  self, 
made  up  of  bliss,’  and  because,  during  sleep,  intellect 
and  the  rest  are  merged  in  ignorance,  and  because  of 
the  experience,  c I am  ignorant.  ’ 

“ The  Bhatta  says  that  intelligence  associated  with 
ignorance  is  his  self,  on  account  of  the  text  of  the  Yeda 
(Mandukya  Upanishad,  5)  : ‘ Self  is  a mass  of  knowl- 
edge and  comprised  of  bliss,  ’ and  because  during  sleep 
there  are  both  the  light  (of  intelligence)  and  the  dark- 
ness (of  ignorance),  and  because  of  the  experience, 
£ Myself  I know  not.  ’ 

“ Another  Baudha  says  that  nihility  is  his  self,  on 
account  of  the  text  of  the  Yeda  : ‘ In  the  beginning 
this  was  a mere  nonentity,  ’ and  because  during  sleep 


312 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


everything  disappears,  and  because  of  the  experience  of 
the  man  who  lias  just  awoke  from  sleep — an  experience 
in  the  shape  of  a reflection  on  his  own  non-existence — 
when  he  says,  1 1 slept  ; during  sleep  I was  not.’  ” 

This  long  extract  corroborates  what  we  have  so  often 
affirmed,  that  the  Upanishads  are  the  sources  not  only 
of  Hindu  pantheism,  but  of  Hindu  Philosophy  in  all  its 
phases  of  development.  But  the  Brahma  Sutras  make 
it  evident  that  if  they  were  interpreted  on  fair  princi- 
ples, and  if  allowance  were  made  for  the  contradictions 
in  which  they  abound,  they  could  be  legitimately  mar- 
shalled only  in  favor  of  that  species  of  pantheism 
which  presupposes  a real  change  of  divine  into  material 
substance.  The  great  doctrine  the  Sutras  prove  is  that 
Brahma  is  both  the  efficient  and  material  cause  of  the 
universe.  Dr.  Mullens  objects  to  the  use  of  the  term 
“ materi  til  ? * 111  this  connection,  on  the  ground  that  the 
substance  of  the  world  is  after  all  spiritual  and  divine  ; 
but  he  forgets  that,  according  to  the  teaching  of  the 
Upanishads,  the  divine  substance  actually  becomes 
matter,  and  constitutes  the  world  thus  changed.  Mat- 
ter in  these  days  is  said  to  be  a double-faced  entity, 
because  it  in  particular  conditions  becomes  mind,  not 
merely  appears  in  spiritual  forms.  According  to  the 
Avriters  of  the  Upanishads,  and  to  Badarayuna,  who 
merely  revives  in  the  Brahma  Sutras  the  teaching  of 
these  records,  the  divine  substance  is  a double-faced 
entity,  and  becomes  matter,  not  merely  appears  in 
material  forms,  in  particular  conditions.  Such  being 
the  case,  Brahma  may  properly  be  called  the  material 
cause  of  the  world  ; but  his  efficiency  is  problematical, 
as  we  shall  show  in  the  proper  place. 

IIoav  is  the  great  doctrine  that  Brahma  is  the  mate- 
rial as  well  as  the  efficient  cause  of  the  world  proved  in 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


313 


the"  Brahma  Sutras  ? In  the  first  place,  by  citations 
from  and  direct  references  to  many  passages  in  the 
Upanishads.  In  the  second  place,  by  proving  the  iden- 
tity of  the  elements  or  other  substances  here  and  there 
represented  as  creative  principles  in  the  Upanishads 
with  the  Supreme  Spirit.  In  the  third  place,  by  a re- 
production of  the  imagery  by  which  the  identity  of  the 
universe  with  the  Supreme  Spirit  is  set  forth.  In  the 
fourth  place,  by  proving  the  untenableness  of  the  San- 
khya  and  Vaiseshika  and  other  theories  of  creation. 
And  lastly,  by  refuting  the  objections  advanced  against 
the  pantheistic  notion  of  creation  set  forth  in  the  Upan- 
ishads and  revived  and  defended  in  the  Brahma  Sutras. 

1.  We  shall  observe  this  order  in  our  treatment  of 
the  subject.  In  the  first  place,  let  us  remark  that 
Brahma  is  set  forth  as  the  Creator,  Preserver,  and 
Destroyer  of  the  world,  in  the  second  aphorism  of  the 
work  : “From  whom  the  production,  etc.,  of  this.” 
Sankar,  in  his  comments  upon  this  verse,  cites  some  of 
the  passages  herein  referred  to.  He  expressly  says 
that  the  relation  of  Brahma  as  Creator,  to  the  world  as 
the  created,  is  proved  neither  by  the  direct  testimony  of 
the  senses  nor  by  inference,  but  by  the  Scripture  texts 
alluded  to.  Hear  what  he  says  : “ Had  Brahma  been 
an  object  of  sense,  it  might  have  been  held  that  this 
work  (the  universe)  was  done  by  Brahma.  But  where 
the  work  alone  (and  not  its  author)  is  receivable  by  the 
senses,  it  is  not  possible  to  determine  whether  the  work 
was  done  by  Brahma  or  some  other  agent.  Therefore 
the  Sutra  : ‘ From  whom  the  Production,”  etc.,  is  not 
for  setting  up  Inference.  What  then  ? It  is  for  the 
illustration  of  Yedanta  texts.  But  what  are  the 
Yedanta  texts  which  are  here  designed  to  be  illustrated 
by  the  Sutra  ? ‘ Bhrigu  Yaruni  resorted  to  his  father 


314 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


Yanina.  Teach  me,  sir,  Brahma  ’ — thus  introducing 
the  question,  the  Yeda  concludes  : £ From  whom  these 
entities  are  produced,  by  whom  the  productions  subsist, 
in  whom  departing. they  are  resolved,  inquire  of  Him. 
He  is  Brahma”  (Taittiriya).  And  the  specifications  of 
that  text,  ‘ From  Joy  indeed  these  entities  are  pro- 
duced, by  Joy  the  productions  subsist,  in  Joy  departing 
they  are  resolved  ” (Taittiriya).  And  other  texts  are 
also  to  be  illustrated  of  the  same  kind  relating  to  the 
cause,  which  is  verily  eternal,  pure,  intelligent,  free, 
and  all-knowing:.  ” 

According  to  Sankar,  almost  every  text  in  this  work 
refers  either  directly  or  obliquely  to  several  verses  in 
the  Upanishads,  and  the  quotations  he  presents  are  so 
numerous  that  if  they  were  abstracted  from  his  work 
its  bulk  would  not  be  half  so  repelling  as  it  is.  It  is 
enough  to  give  here  one  more  of  the  almost  innumer- 
able verses  referred  to  and  cited  in  the  Sutras  and  their 
commentaries  : ££  All  this  universe  indeed  is  Brahma  ; 
from  him  does  it  proceed  ; into  him  it  is  dissolved  ; in 
him  it  breathes.  So  let  every  one  adore  him  calmly.” 
Dr.  Monier  Williams  very  appropriately  calls  this  the 
Yedantist’s  simple  confession  of  faith. 

2.  But  sometimes  the  elements,  ether,  fire,  etc.,  or 
such  substances  as  life  or  the  individual  soul,  are  sepa- 
rately and  individually  represented  as  the  creator  in 
the  Upanishads.  How  is  the  discrepancy  to  be  ac- 
counted for  ? By  a simple  recognition  of  the  fact  that 
they  are,  when  set  forth  as  omnific  powers,  identical 
with  Brahma.  The  following  string  of  quotations  from 
the  Upanishads  make  this  clear  : ££  The  omnipotent, 
omniscient,  sentient  cause  of  the  universe  is  essentially 
happy  (Taittiriya).  He  is  the  brilliant,  golden  person 
seen  within  the  solar  orb  and  the  human  eye  (Chhan- 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


315 


(logy a).  He  is  the  ethereal  element  ( akcisa ) from  which 
all  things  proceed,  and  to  which  all  return  (Chhan- 
dogya).  lie  is  the  breath  (Prana),  in  which  all  beings 
merge,  into  which  they  all  rise  (Udgitha).  He  is  the 
light  ( jyotish ) which  shines  in  heaven,  and  in  all  places, 
high  and  low,  everywhere  throughout  the  world,  and 
within  the  human  person.  He  is  the  breath  (Prana) 
and  intelligent  self,  immortal,  undecaying,  and  happy, 
with  which  Inclra,  in  a dialogue  with  Pratardana,  iden- 
tifies himself  (Kaushitaki).” 

One  of  the  substances  represented  as  omnific  is  Yais- 
wanara , which  is  fire,  or,  as  Mr.  Ivunte  says,  the  gas- 
tric fire.  Let  us  see  what  is  said  about  this  substance 
in  the  second  chapter  of  the  first  book  : 

“ 21.  Because  there  is  a special  sense  of  ordinary 
words,  the  term  Vaiswanara  (signifies  the  Supreme 
Spirit). 

“ 25.  That,  which  should  be  so  remembered,  would 
be  inference. 

“ 26.  If  anybody  objects  that  because  such  descrip- 
tions— as  he  abides  inside,  and  others — lead  to  the  con- 
clusion that  he  (Vaiswanara)  is  not  the  Supreme  Spirit, 
then  the  conclusion  is  wrong,  because  the  Acharyas 
state  that  there  is  a direct  precept  that  there  would  be 
absurdity,  and  that  therefore  Vaiswanara  is  the  Person 
(the  Supreme  Spirit). 

“ 27.  Therefore,  indeed,  any  element  or  god  is  not 
the  Supreme  Spirit  (Vaiswanara). 

“ 28.  The  opinion  of  Jaimini  is,  The  statement,  that 
the  Supreme  Spirit  is  directly  to  be  worshipped,  does 
not  conflict  (with  any  text). 

“ 29.  The  opinion  of  Aswarathya  Acharya  is,  (that  a 
description  of  a visible  form  is  given)  for  manifesting 
(the  Supreme  Spirit). 


aio 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


“ 30.  The  opinion  of  Badiri  is,  (that  the  statement 
that  the  Supreme  Spirit  is  as  big  as  a span,  is  made) 
that  his  form  may  be  conceived. 

“ 31.  Jaimini  shows  that  such  descriptions  are  given 
for  showing  the  perfection  of  God.” 

These  verses  set  forth  the  obscure  manner  in  which 
discussions  are  conducted  in  this  work.  The  proposi- 
tion to  be  proved  is  that  Yaiswanara,  which  is  fire,  is 
no  other  than  the  Supreme  Spirit.  What  line  of  dem- 
onstration is  adopted  ? Objections  to  the  correct  inter- 
pretation are  stated  and  refuted  in  the  first  place.  The 
first  objection  is  : Yaiswanara  or  fire  has  a visible 
form,  and  cannot  therefore  be  tire  invisible  Supreme 
Spirit.  In  reply,  the  proof,  which  rises  from  the  known 
to  the  unknown,  the  visible  to  the  invisible — viz.,  in- 
ference is  utilized.  Yaiswanara  is  the  form  in  which 
the  Supreme  Spirit  appears.  But  Yaiswanara,  as  gas- 
tric fire,  abides  within  us  ; how  can  it  be  the  Supreme 
Spirit  ? The  objectors,  however,  forget  that  there  is 
direct  affirmation  in  the  Yeda  in  favor  of  the  correct 
interpretation.  Mr.  Kunte,  whose  translation  of  these 
Sutras  is  given  above,  quotes  the  Upanishad  texts  con- 
nected with  them,  and  one  of  these  runs  thus  : “ That 
Yaiswanara,  who  by  his  light  extends  the  earth  and 
the  heavens.”  This  verse  may  be  represented  as  “a 
direct  precept”  in  favor  of  the  interpretation  contended 
for.  Besides,  any  other  interpretation  involves  a reduc- 
tio  ad  dbsurdum. 

Add  to  all  this  the  testimony  of  Maharshis  or  demi- 
gods like  Jaimini,  Aswarathya,  and  Badiri,  and  the 
conclusion  becomes  irresistible.  They  all  maintain  that 
sensible  images  are  utilized  in  Yedic  descriptions  of 
Brahma,  because  human  minds  fail  to  comprehend  him 
without  their  aid.  Jaimini  in  particular  maintains  that 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


317 


such  descriptions  tend  to  set  forth  the  perfection  of 
the  Supreme  Spirit,  which  is  both  great  and  small, 
amorphous  and  with  form,  all-knowing  and  unknowing. 

3.  The  imagery  by  which  the  essential  identity  of 
the  universe  with  Brahma  is  set  forth  in  the  Upan- 
ishads  is  revived  in  the  Brahma  Sutras.  Here  is  a 
string  of  images  revived  : “ Him,  invariable,  the  wise 
contemplate  as  the  source  (or  cause)  of  beings.  As  the 
spider  puts  forth  and  draws  in  his  thread,  as  plants 
spring  from  the  earth  (and  return  to  it),  as  hair  of  the 
head  and  body  grows  from  the  living  man,  so  does  the 
universe  come  of  the  unalterable.”  . . . Here  is  an- 
other : “As  milk  changes  to  curd,  and  water  to  ice,  so 
is  Brahma  variously  transformed  and  diversified  with- 
out aid  of  tools  or  exterior  means  of  any  sort.  In 
like  manner  the  spider  spins  his  web  out  of  his  sub- 
stance ; spirits  assume  various  shapes  ; cranes  propa- 
gate without  male  ; and  the  lotus  proceeds  from  pond  to 
pond  without  organs  of  motion.”  In  many  passages 
Brahma  is  said  to  be  related  to  the  universe  as  yarn  to 
cloth,  clay  to  the  jar,  gold  to  the  bracelet.  Some  of 
the  images  employed  indicate  a real  change  of  sub- 
stance, while  others  merely  a change  of  form. 

Though  a real  change  of  substance  is  shown  in  many 
passages  in  which  Brahma  is  described  in  the  Sutras, 
he  is  emphatically  declared  unchangeable  in  some. 
Here  is  one  of  Colebrooke’s  extracts  from  the  Sutras, 
and  the  comments  : “ He  is  described  in  many  pas- 
sages of  the  Yeda  as  diversified,  and  endued  with  every 
quality  and  particular  character  ; but  in  other  and  very 
numerous  texts  as  without  form  or  quahty.  The  latter 
only  is  truly  applicable,  not  the  former,  nor  yet  both. 
He  is  impassible,  unaffected  by  worldly  modifications, 
as  the  clear  crystal,  seemingly  colored  by  the  red  bios- 


318 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


som  of  a hibiscus,  is  not  less  really  pellucid.  He  does 
not  vary  with  every  disguising  form  or  designation,  for 
all  diversity  is  expressly  denied  by  explicit  texts  ; and 
the  notion  of  variableness  relative  to  him  is  distinctly 
condemned  in  some  sheikhas  of  the  Veda.” 

Here  is  a contradiction  which  is  even  more  apparent, 
in  the  following  extracts  presented  by  Colebrooke  : 
“ lie  is  amorphous,  for  so  he  is  expressly  declared  to 
be,  but  seemingly  assuming  form,  as  sunshine  or  moon- 
light impinging  on  any  object  appears  straight  or 
crooked.”  “ The  luminous  sun,  though  single,  yet 
reflected  in  water  becomes  various,  and  so  does  the  un- 
born divine  soul  by  disguise  in  diverse  modes.”  “ The 
Veda  so  describes  him  as  entering  into  and  pervading 
the  corporeal  shapes  by  him  wrought.  He  framed 
bodies,  biped  and  quadruped  ; and  becoming  a bird  he 
passed  into  those  bodies,  filling  them  as  their  informing 
spirit.” 

The  last  of  these  extracts  embodies  a principle  by 
which  the  passages  in  which  a real  change  of  substance 
is  indicated  may  be  reconciled  to  those  in  which  the 
immutability  of  the  divine  spirit  is  set  forth  with  equal 
distinctness  and  emphasis.  Brahma  is  the  informing 
spirit  or  inspiriting  soul  of  all  corporeal  frames— bodies 
of  bipeds,  quadrupeds,  and  centipeds,  and  of  all  material 
substances.  The  idea  of  lifeless  matter  was  scouted  in 
the  V edantic  school  as  thoroughly  as  it  is  in  the  writ- 
ings of  Professor  Tyndall,  who  may  be  represented  as 
a champion  of  materialistic  pantheism.  Every  particle 
of  matter  is  instinct  with  divine  life,  and  its  inspiriting 
soul  never  changes,  though  it  appears  in  endless  varie- 
ties of  combinations.  Brahma  appears  in  various 
bodies  and  frames,  which  are  evolved  out  of  his  sub- 
stance as  the  spider’s  web  is  evolved  out  of  its  sub- 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


319 


stance;  but  underneath  these  infinitely  diversified  as- 
sumed forms  he  remains  unchanged  and  unchangeable. 
This  explanation,  it  must  be  confessed,  does  not  entirely 
free  the  descriptions  of  Brahma  given  in  the  Upan- 
ishads  and  the  Brahma  Sutras  from  the  charge  of  inco- 
herence and  contradictoriness. 

4.  One  of  the  great  objects  of  these  Sutras  seems  to 
be  the  explosion  of  the  Sankhya  notion  that  the  word 
Brahma  is  simply  a synonym  of  the  word  Pradhan  or 
Prakriti.  The  Sankhya  philosopher  maintains,  in  other 
words,  that  the  source  of  creation  in  the  Upanishads  is 
in  reality  his  Pradhan  or  Prakriti,  though  called  by  a 
different  name,  Brahma.  The  Sutras  explode  this 
notion  by  pointing  out  the  essential  difference  or  dis- 
tinction between  the  Brahma  of  the  Yeda  and  the 
Pradhan  of  Sankhya  Philosophy.  The  axiom  on  which 
they  build  their  argument  is  that  no  unsentient  and 
unintelligent  substance  could  possibly  be  the  creator  of 
the  world.  The  Yeda  attributes  creation  to  a percep- 
tion of  solitariness.  The  creator  perceived  his  lonc- 
someness,  and  said  : “I  am  one  ; let  me  be  many.” 
Sankar,  in  his  comments  on  the  fifth  aphorism  of  the 
book,  “ Not  so,  because  of  observation,  it  is  unheard,” 
says  : “ Unsentient  Pradhan  of  Sankhya  fabrication  as 
the  cause  of  the  universe  has  no  place  in  Yedanta 
texts.”  lie  makes  the  following  observations  to  show 
that  there  was  perception  or  “observation”  on  the 
part  of  the  Creator  before  the  commencement  of  His 
omnific  work  : 

“ Thus  commencing  with  the  texts,  ‘ O gentle  pupil, 
this  was  in  the  beginning  an  entity,’  c One  without  a 
second,’  it  is  added  : ‘ It  observed,  “ Let  me  be  multi- 
plied, let  me  be  produced,”  and  it  “created  the 
right.”’  In  these  texts  the  universe  manifested  by 


320 


HIHDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


names  and  forms  and  expressed  here  by  the  word  idem 
(this)  being  determined  before  production  to  be  an 
existing  spirit,  its  creativeness,  in  its  antecedent  state 
indicated  by  the  word  entity,  of  light  and  other  things 
after  observation , is  declared.  Also  in  other  texts, 
‘ This  was  in  the  beginning  one  (only)  spirit.  There 
was  nothing  else.  He  observed  (saying),  Let  us  create 
the  worlds.  He  created  these  worlds.  ’ These  declare 
also  a creation  after  observation.” 

The  Pradhan  of  the  Sankhyas  is  confessedly  un- 
sentient  and  unintelligent,  and  it  could  not  therefore 
have  observed  and  created.  The  Sankhyas,  however, 
maintain  that  knowledge  and  sentience  existed  poten- 
tially in  Pradhan,  or  in  one  of  the  three  gunas  or  quali- 
ties of  which  it  consists,  and  that  therefore  the  possi- 
bility of  its  being  the  source  of  creation  must  even  on 
Y edantic  principles  be  admitted.  The  Y edantist  retorts 
that  ignorance  and  stolidity  also  existed  potentially  in 
Pradhan,  and  whatever  of  science  existed  in  it  was 
neutralized  by  its  nescience.  “ If,”  says  Sankar,  “ in 
the  equipoise  of  the  (three)  qualities,  Pradhan  can  be 
called  all-knowing,  by  pleading  the  capacity  for  knowl- 
edge, inherent  in  the  sattwa  (attribute),  then  it  may 
also  be  called  little-knowing,  on  the  plea  of  the  capacity 
of  precluding  knowledge  inherent  in  (the  other  two 
attributes)  rajas  and  tamas.  Further,  the  state  of 
sattwa  without  an  observant  (spirit)  is  not  called 
knowledge.  Nor  has  unintelligent  Pradhan  any  inhe- 
rent observantness.” 

The  Yedantist  adopts  the  cosmogony  of  the  Sankhyas 
in  its  main  features,  as  will  be  shown  in  the  next  paper  ; 
but  he  attacks  their  assumption  of  a material  form  as 
its  starting-point  with  the  greatest  vehemence.  Yor 
does  he  spare  the  atomic  theory  of  Gautama  and 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


321 


Kanada.  Many  of  tlie  arguments  arrayed  against  the 
former  are  marshalled  against  the  latter  theory,  and 
the  conclusion  upheld  is  that  of  a divine  rather  than  a 
material  substance  evolving  creation  out  of  itself,  con- 
sequent on  its  perception  of  its  own  solitariness,  and  of 
its  determination  to  multiply  itself. 

5.  The  objections  to  this  conclusion  raised  by  the 
Sankhyas  and  others  are  stated  and  confuted.  The 
first  of  these  is  based  on  the  similarity  which  should, 
according  to  Hindu  logic,  subsist  between  cause  and 
effect.  The  argument  may  be  stated  thus  : An  effect 
must  be  of  a piece  with  or  similar  to  its  material 
cause  ; but  there  is  dissimilarity  between  the  world 
and  Brahma  ; therefore  Brahma  cannot  be  looked  up 
to  as  the  cause  of  the  world.  In  reply  it  is  maintained 
that  apparent  dissimilarity  between  a cause  and  its 
effect  is  noticeable  in  many  cases.  “ Hair  and  nails, 
which  are  insensible,  grow  from  a sensible  animal 
body,  and  sentient  vermin  (scorpions,  etc.)  spring  from 
inanimate  sources  (cow-dung,  etc.).”  But  the  argu- 
ment, it  is  added,  may  be  advanced  against  the  Sankhya 
theory,  which  brings  sentient  beings  out  of  an  unsen- 
tient  material  form.  The  atomic  theory,  or  that  which 
brings  creation  out  of  a universal  void,  may  be  shown 
as  untenable  precisely  in  this  way. 

Another  of  the  objections  advanced  hinges  on  “ frui- 
tion,” which  discriminates  between  the  party  who 
enjoys  or  suffers,  and  that  which  is  enjoyed  or  suffered, 
and  which  mars  thereby  the  unity  of  Brahma.  The 
imagery  brought  forward  in  reply  is  that  of  the  sea  and 
the  numerous  changes  on  its  surface,  the  earth  and  its 
contents  and  products,  and  the  food  eaten  and  the  visi- 
ble objects  into  which  it  is  converted.  “ The  sea  is 
one,  and  not  other  than  its  waters  ; yet  waves,  foam, 


322 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


spray,  drops,  froth,  and  other  modifications  of  it  differ 
from  each  other.”  Brahma  is  the  sea,  and  the  innu- 
merable souls  enjoying  or  suffering  are,  together  with 
the  sources  of  their  enjoyment  and  suffering,  the 
changeable  currents,  waves,  froth,  and  foam.  Again  : 
“An  effect  is  not  other  than  its  cause.  Brahma  is 
single,  without  a second.  lie  is  not  separate  from  the 
embodied  self.  lie  is  sold,  and  the  soul  is  he.  Yet  he 
does  not  do  that  only  which  is  agreeable  and  beneficial 
to  self.  The  same  earth  exhibits  diamonds,  rock  crys- 
tals, red  orpiment,  etc.  ; the  same  soil  produces  a 
diversity  of  plants,  the  same  food  is  converted  into 
various  excrescences,  hairs,  nails,  etc.”  Brahma’s  ob- 
ject in  creation  is,  not  self-enjoyment,  not  self -inflic- 
tion, but  mere  “ sport”  in  diversity,  self-manifestation 
in  matter  and  mind,  in  virtue  and  vice,  joy  and  sorrow, 
bondage  and  liberation  ! 

Again  the  objectors  ask,  How  could  Brahma  act 
without  organs  of  action — hands,  feet,  etc.  ? Creation 
presupposes  action,  action  presupposes  organs  ; but  as 
Brahma,  a pure  spirit,  is  without  these,  he  cannot  prop- 
erly be  represented  as  a creator  and  therefore  actor. 
This,  in  the  estimation  of  some  Hindu  philosophers,  is 
a great  objection,  and  it  was  urged  against  the  theory 
of  the  Indian  atomists.  Their  reply,  alluded  to  in 
a foregoing  paper,  is  that  Brahma,  though  bodiless, 
can  assume  bodies,  and  act  through  the  organs  at- 
tached to  them.  The  Brahma  Sutras,  however,  ad- 
vance a step  further  and  maintain  that  Brahma  can  - 
act  without  organs.  “ Brahma  is  omnipotent,  able 
for  every  act  without  organ  or  instrument.”  But  the 
old  difficulty  is  here  encountered  : What  motive  could 
Brahma  possibly  have  for  creating  ? The  Vedant- 
ist’s  reply  is  : “ Ho  motive  or  special  purpose  need 


THE  VEDANTA  SYSTEM. 


323 


be  assigned  for  his  creation  of  the  universe  besides 
his  will.” 

The  most  formidable  objection  and  its  reply  we  shall 
state  in  Sankar’s  words,  as  translated  by  Monier  Will- 
iams in  his  “ Indian  Wisdom”  : 

“ It  may  be  objected  that  God  is  proved  not  to  be 
the  cause  of  the  universe.  Why  ? From  the  visible 
instances  of  injustice  and  cruelty.  Some  he  makes 
happy,  as  the  gods,  etc.  ; some  very  miserable,  as  the 
brutes,  etc.  ; and  some  in  a middling  condition,  as 
men,  etc.  Being  the  author  of  such  an  unjust  creation, 
he  is  proved  to  be  subject  to  passions  like  other  persons 
— that  is  to  say,  to  partiality  and  prejudice — and  there- 
fore his  nature  is  found  wanting  in  spotlessness.  And 
by  dispensing  pain  and  ruin  He  is  chargeable  with 
malice  and  cruelty,  deemed  culpable  even  among  the 
wicked.  Hence,  because  of  the  instances  of  injustice 
and  cruelty,  God  cannot  be  the  cause  of  the  universe. 
To  this  we  reply  : Injustice  and  cruelty  cannot  be 
charged  upon  God.  Why  ? Because  lie  did  not  act 
independently.  God,  being  dependent,  creates  this 
world  of  inequalities.  If  you  ask  on  what  He  is  de- 
pendent, we  reply,  on  merit  and  demerit.  That  there 
should  be  an  unequal  creation,  dependent  on  the  merit 
or  demerit  of  the  souls  created,  is  no  fault  of  God.  As 
the  rain  is  the  common  cause  of  the  production  of  rice 
and  wheat,  but  the  causes  of  their  specific  distinctions 
as  rice  and  wheat  are  the  varying  powers  of  the  irrespec- 
tive seeds,  so  is  God  the  common  cause  in  the  creation 
of  gods,  men,  and  others  ; but  of  the  distinctions  be- 
tween gods,  men,  and  others,  the  causes  are  the  vary- 
ing works  inherent  in  their  respective  souls.” 

The  original  Sutras  commented  upon  in  the  words 
quoted  above  are  thus  translated  by  Dr.  Mullens,  whose 


324= 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


translation,  by  the  way,  is  simpler  than  that  of  Cole- 
brooke  : “ Injustice  cannot  be  attributed  to  Brahma 
because  some  are  happy,  some  miserable,  and  some 
both.  Every  one  has  his  lot  in  the  world,  according  to 
his  merit  in  a former  stage  of  the  universe.  So  the 
rain-cloud  distributes  his  rain  equally,  but  the  plants 
vary  according  to  the  seed  whence  they  spring” 
(Brahma  Sutras,  II.  31-37). 

These  aphorisms  and  these  comments  make  it  evident 
that  the  ultimate  source  of  creation  is  not  the  divine 
will,  but  some  power  by  which  that  will  is  determined, 
the  power  of  merit  or  demerit  or  of  work.  Why  is, 
then,  creation  expressly  attributed  to  the  will  of  God, 
to  His  perception  of  His  solitariness,  and  His  determi- 
nation to  create  ? Ko  explanation  can  possibly  be  given 
of  this  bit  of  inconsistency  and  contradiction,  excepting 
the  acknowledged  fact  that  Hindu  logicians,  like  some 
modem  heroes,  never  scrupled  to  silence  a body  of 
objectors  by  a recourse  to  principles  inconsistent  with 
others  for  which  they  at  other  times  were  compelled 
by  their  theories  to  stand  up.  The  Sanldiya  notion  of 
creation  evolved  out  of  a dead  substance  had  to  be  ex- 
ploded, and  sentience  and  knowledge  and  desire  and 
determination  were  attributed  unscrupulously  to  a 
Being  who  was  held  up  as  incapable  of  being  influenced 
by  these  attributes  and  predicates. 

But  after  all  the  universe  cannot  properly  be  said  to 
have  been  created  at  all  ! And  this  brings  us  to  an- 
other objection  and  reply,  which  we  shall  present  in 
Sankar’s  words,  as  translated  by  Monier  Williams  : 

“ The  Supreme  Being  existed  at  the  beginning,  one 
without  a second.  Hence,  before  the  creation  there 
could  be  no  works  in  dependence  on  which  inequalities 
might  be  created.  God  may  be  dependent  on  works 


THE  YE  DA  NT  A SYSTEM. 


325 


after  distinctions  are  made.  But  before  the  creation 
there  could  be  no  works  caused  by  varying  instruments, 
and  therefore  vTe  ought  to  find  a uniform.  We  reply  : 
This  does  not  vitiate  our  doctrine,  because  the  world  is 
without  beginning.  The  world  being  without  begin- 
ning, nothing  can  prevent  works  and  unequal  creations 
from  continuing  in  the  state  of  cause  and  effect,  like 
the  seed  and  its  plant.  ’ ’ 

Here  is  another  flagrant  inconsistency.  But  there  is 
one  way  of  accounting  for  it.  Brahma  is  uncaused, 
and  has  therefore  lived  from  eternity.  How  ? Either 
in  a state  of  quiescence,  or  in  a state  of  activity,  or  in 
states  of  activity  alternating  with  states  of  quiescence. 
The  first  two  suppositions  are  untenable  because  of  the 
long,  long  seasons  called  haljoas,  each  preceded  by  the 
consummation  of  one  stage  of  mundane  existence  and 
succeeded  by  another.  Periods  of  activity  alternating 
with  periods  of  quiescence  are,  properly  speaking,  the 
salient  features  of  the  divine  existence  ; and  they  have 
followed  one  another  in  succession  throughout  eternity. 
Just  as  the  Yeda  has  been  breathed  out  and  breathed 
in  by  Brahma  throughout  eternity,  the  world  has  been 
evolved  out  of  his  substance  and  swallowed  up  in  it 
throughout  eternity  ; and  if  he  can  properly  be  called 
the  author  of  the  one,  he  may  legitimately  be  called 
the  creator  of  the  other.  But  the  question  arises,  By 
what  law  is  this  beginningless  and  endless  series  of 
evolutions  and  involutions  regulated — an  inherent  law 
of  necessity,  or  an  extraneous  force  ? If  by  an  inher- 
ent law  of  necessity,  all  talk  of  freedom  on  the  part  of 
Brahma  is  bosh.  If  by  an  extraneous  force,  such  as 
Karma  (work),  he  cannot  be  the  ultimate  source  of 
creation  ! 

We  reserve  our  remarks  on  the  theory  of  bondage 


32G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


and  liberation  propounded  in  these  Sutras,  as  well  as 
on  their  physiological  teaching,  for  our  next  paper. 
Meanwhile  we  conclude  with  the  remark  that  the  con- 
tradictions with  which  they  abound  are  the  inevitable 
results  of  the  attempt  made  in  them  to  reconcile  varied 
and  conflicting  lines  of  thought.  Some  scholars  incline 
to  the  opinions  expressed  by  Mr.  Ivunte  that  in  the 
Vedanta  Sutras  we  find  the  germ  of  the  eclecticism, 
which  was  brought  to  perfection  in  the  Swetaswara 
Upanishad  and  the  Bhagvada-Gita.  It  is  a matter  of 
fact  that  the  Sankhya  cosmogony  is  adopted,  and  the 
Vaisheshika  view  of  work.  But  all  attempts  to  recon- 
cile these  systems  to  it  are  repelled  with  firmness  and 
even  contumely.  But  the  author  does  not  seem  to  have 
freed  himself  from  the  prevailing  lines  of  philosophic 
thought  sufficiently  to  be  able  to  elaborate  a consistent 
system  of  pantheism  ; and  to  the  homage  he  paid  to 
established  schools  is  to  be  attributed  the  glaring  con- 
tradictions into  which  he  seems  to  have  been  betrayed. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


THE  MAYA,  OE  THE  ILLUSION  THEOEY. 

The  great  teachers  in  ancient  India  of  the  orthodox 
stamp  may  be  divided  into  six  classes — viz.,  the  Rishis, 
the  Yedavadins,  the  Parinamavadins,  the  Sankhyas  or 
Dualists,  the  Vaiseshikas  or  Trialists,  and  the  Maya- 
vadins  or  Illusionists. 

The  Rishis  were  shepherd- warriors,  who  came  into 
the  country  with  their  hosts  of  brave  followers,  drove 
the  aborigines  from  some  of  its  fertile  provinces,  and 
organized  colonial  settlements  within  the  precincts  of 
the  territory  thus  vacated.  They  did  not  belong  to  the 
most  advanced  branch  of  the  great  Aryan  family,  but 
they  had  great  natural  abilities,  which  had  crowned 
their  schemes  of  conquest  and  colonization  with  brill- 
iant success,  and  which  were  called  into  vigorous  play, 
and  sharpened  and  improved  by  the  dangers  by  which 
they  found  themselves  surrounded,  and  the  varied 
exigencies  of  nascent  communities  which  they  had  to 
meet.  Nor  did  the  scenery  around  their  new  homes,  in 
vast  plains  overshadowed  by  ranges  of  magnificent 
mountains,  intersected  by  broad  rivers,  and  surrounded 
by  dense  forests,  fail  to  stimulate  their  natural  love  of 
the  sublime  and  the  beautiful,  and  stir  up  the  poetic 
fervor  of  their  brave,  generous  natures.  And  conse- 
quently, in  the  midst  of  their  warlike  pursuits,  the 
varied  aspirations  of  their  hearts  evoked  by  present 
necessities,  rather  than  by  a calm  foresight  of  future 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


328 


contingencies,  were  vented  in  strains  of  impassioned 
poetry  and  metrical  prayer.  The  hymnology  thus 
elaborated  is  characterized  by  archaic  simplicity,  natu- 
ralness, and  devotional  enthusiasm,  but  it  is  lamentably 
deficient  in  keenness  of  insight,  depth  of  knowledge, 
and  breadth  of  view  ; while  the  puerility  characteristic 
of  it  as  a whole,  and  the  obscenity  by  which  not  a 
small  portion  of  it  is  vitiated,  are  blemishes  from  which 
it  were  to  be  wished  it  had  been  free.  The  Rishis 
were  worshippers  of  nature,  had  rites  and  ceremonies 
of  the  simplest  kind,  and  could  justly  claim  some  virtues 
of  a rugged  but  sterling  nature  ; and  their  teachings, 
though  below  par  judged  by  a modern  standard,  were 
fitted  to  curb  the  ferocity  of  growing  communities  of 
successful  marauders,  and  raise  them  to  a low  stage 
of  civilization — the  stage  attained  by  their  Iranian 
brethren. 

But  simple  naturalism  gave  place  in  course  of  time  to 
a complicated  system  of  polytheism,  the  practical 
requirements  of  which  could  not  be  met  except  by  an 
elaborate  ritual.  Nor  could  a cumbrous  system  of 
ceremonial  observances  be  reduced  to  practice  without 
a stated  and  recognized  ministry,  or  rather  priesthood. 
And  thus  the  Vedavadins  sprung  into  existence.  The 
Rishis  were  poets  and  priests,  as  well  as  warriors  and 
statesmen  ; and  they  supervised  and  controlled  both  the 
secular  and  spiritual  concerns  of  the  new  settlements, 
of  which  they  were  recognized  chieftains.  But  when 
the  objects  of  worship  were  multiplied,  and  a complex 
ceremonial  system  was  elaborated,  a division  of  labor 
was  realized,  and  a broad  fine  of  demarcation  was 
drawn  between  the  functions  of  the  State  and  the 
functions  of  the  Church.  "While  ldngs  and  statesmen 
managed  the  concerns  of  the  State,  those  of  the  Church 


THE  HAYA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY. 


329 


were  left  in  the  hands  of  a hierarchy,  the  members  of 
which  enjoyed  peculiar  privileges,  and  gradually  arro- 
gated to  themselves  all  power,  temporal  as  well  as 
spiritual,  regal  as  well  as  sacerdotal.  The  result  was  a 
mock  theocracy,  under  the  blight  of  wThich  the  spirit  of 
inquiry  was  crushed,  poetry  vanished  into  thin  air,  and 
nothing  remained  but  an  endless  round  of  mummeries 
and  tomfooleries.  The  age  of  the  Brahmanas  was  em- 
phatically an  age  of  degrading  superstition,  priestcraft, 
and  formality  ; of  spirit  crushed,  mind  enslaved,  and  the 
noblest  instincts  and  emotions  of  the  heart  paralyzed. 

The  Yedavadins  or  the  royal-priests  began  to  lose 
their  influence  and  ascendency  as  soon  as  the  spirit  of 
inquiry  was  aroused  by  a rationalistic  reaction  against 
lifeless  externalism  ; and  the  Parinamavadins  appeared 
on  the  stage  to  dispute  their  once  unrestricted  but  now 
limited  sway.  The  Parinamavadins  assumed  a modest 
tone,  and  professed  to  do  nothing  more  than  simply 
disclose  the  esoteric  meaning  of  the  hymns,  which  had 
been  composed  and  sung  by  the  Pisliis,  and  the  ritual, 
which  had  been  elaborated  and  reduced  to  practice  by 
the  Yedavadins.  They  did  not  ostensibly  raise  the 
standard  of  revolt  against  current  beliefs  and  supersti- 
tions— perhaps  they  did  not  mean  to  do  so.  Neverthe- 
less they  undermined  the  influence  of  such  beliefs  and 
superstitions  by  leading  public  attention,  or  the  atten- 
tion of  the  intelligent  portion  of  the  public,  away 
from  them  toward  an  all-embracing  spiritual  essence, 
changed,  by  a necessitated  process  of  evolution  or  self- 
development, into  the  objects  of  nature  and  the  phe- 
nomena of  life.  The  Parinamavadins  are  also  called 
Yikarvadins,  or  the  teachers  who  insisted  on  a real 
change  of  spiritual  into  material  substance  in  the  process 
of  development  to  which  creation  is  to  be  traced. 


330 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


Eut  their  scheme  of  thought,  unfolded  somewhat 
incoherently  in  the  Upanishads,  had  to  pass  through  a 
prolonged  period  of  warfare  waged  against  it  by  two, 
if  not  several,  antagonistic  systems  of  philosophy.  The 
Sankliyas,  with  their  dualism,  which  denied  the 
existence  of  God  or  divine  substance  altogether,  and 
affirmed  that  of  an  ever-active,  self-evolving  material 
form  and  innumerable  quiescent  souls,  maintained  a 
dire  struggle  with  the  Parinamavadins,  and  succeeded 
in  crippling  their  power  and  circumscribing  their  influ- 
ence for  a time.  But  they  themselves  had  to  retreat 
before  the  triumphant  flag  of  the  Vaiseshikas,  who 
propounded  the  atomic  theory,  and  courted  popular 
favor  by  admitting  the  existence  of  a quiescent  God 
as  well  as  quiescent  souls.  The  Yaiseshikas  succeeded 
in  further  undermining  the  influence  of  the  Parinama 
theory. 

But  the  Parinamavadins  had  their  triumph  restored 
to  them  by  the  ritualism  revived  and  further  developed 
by  Jaimini  and  the  Purya-Mimansa  school.  But  their 
theory  had  to  be  remodelled,  and  the  work  of  recon- 
struction and  renovation  was  effected  by  the  Mayava- 
dins  or  the  illusionists.  It  is  but  fair  to  add  that  but 
for  this  timely  change  the  system  of  the  Parinamavadins 
could  not  have  risen  to  that  ascendency  which  it  has 
enjoyed  for  so  many  cycles  of  ages  in  India. 

The  defects  which  rendered  its  reconstruction  a 
necessity  ought  to  be  categorically  stated  and  carefully 
examined  before  the  Maya  or  illusion  theory  is  treated 
of  and  explained. 

1.  The  theory  of  the  Parinamavadins  is  in  antago- 
nism to  that  monism  which  both  the  Upanishads  and  the 
Brahma  Sutras  are  so  obviously  intended  to  uphold. 
The  watchword  of  these  documents  is  Ekamevadithjam , 


THE  MAYA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY.  331 

One  without  a Second  ; and  the  reasonings  embodied 
in  them,  together  with  the  legendary  matter  introduced 
and  the  illustrative  imagery  pressed  into  service,  are  all 
fitted  to  bolster  up  non-dualism.  But  the  Parinama 
theory  involves  dualism,  derivative,  if  not  original  ; 
and  it  therefore  runs  counter  to  this,  the  central  or 
vital  principle  of  Yedantic  speculations.  It  will  not 
avail  to  say  that  the  dualism  we  notice  in  creation  is, 
after  all,  monism  ; that  the  diverse  objects  around  us, 
as  well  as  the  phenomena  of  our  inner  consciousness 
and  life,  are  evolutes  of  one  primal  substance,  having 
originally  sprung  from  it,  and  being  in  process  of  reso- 
lution into  it.  The  fact  is,  that  two  classes  of  phe- 
nomena, each  obviously  implying  a substrate  different 
from  that  of  the  other,  exist  ; and  the  conclusion  is 
irresistible  that  there  is  at  present  a dualism,  a dualism 
emanating  from  monism  and  sure  to  terminate  in 
monism,  but  yet  a dualism.  The  Parinama  theory  is, 
therefore,  incompatible  with  or  hostile  to  the  root-prin- 
ciple of  Yedantism,  and  it  had  in  consequence  to  be 
remodelled. 

2.  Again,  the  Parinama  theory  is  inconsistent  with 
the  Hindu  notion  of  causality.  According  to  this 
notion,  the  effect  must  be  of  the  same  nature  with  the 
cause.  If  the  effect  is  spiritual,  the  cause  must  be 
spiritual  ; and  if  the  effect  is  material,  the  cause  must 
be  material.  From  spiritual  substance  material  sub- 
stance cannot  be  derived.  Matter  is  the  very  antipodes 
of  Brahma,  or  the  divine  essence.  Brahma  is  pure, 
while  matter  is  impure  ; Brahma  is  intelligent  and 
sentient,  while  matter  is  unintelligent  and  insensible  ; 
Brahma  is  unchangeable,  while  matter  is  mutable. 
How  could  matter  have  possibly  sprung  from  Brahma  ? 
Besides,  it  ought  not  to  be  forgotten  that  the  idea  of 


332 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


impure  matter  emanating  from  pure  spiritual  substance 
is  abhorrent  or  most  offensive  to  Hindu  susceptibilities, 
and  cannot  be  entertained  for  a moment.  Hence  the 
inconsistency  in  the  reasonings  of  the  Parinamavadins 
in  the  Upanishads  and  the  Saririka  Sutras  ; inconsis- 
tency so  glaring  that  some  have  gone  so  far  as  to  deny 
the  existence  of  the  theory  in  these  documents. 

3.  The  theory,  moreover,  is  inconsistent  with  an  ac- 
knowledged attribute  of  Brahma.  In  the  Upanishads 
Brahma  is  described  as  impartite  ( aklianda ),  or  without 
parts.  What  is  meant  by  this  technical  term  when 
apphed  to  the  Deity  ? Major  Jacob,  in  his  annotations 
appended  to  his  excellent  translation  of  the  Yedanta 
Sar,  thus  discloses  its  meaning  : “ According  to  the 
commentator  Trisemhasarasavati,  this  term  (akhanda) 
means  ‘ devoid  of  anything  of  a like  kind  or  of  a differ- 
ent kind,  and  without  internal  variety.’  A tree,  for 
example,  has  the  ‘ internal  variety  ’ of  leaves,  flowers, 
and  fruit  ; it  has  things  ‘ of  a hke  kind  ’ in  other  trees, 
and  things  ‘ of  a different  kind  ’ in  stones,  etc.  But 
Brahma  is  not  so,  he  being  absolute  and  unchangeable 
unity.”  According,  however,  to  the  theory  con- 
demned, the  variety,  resemblance,  and  dissimilarity 
from  which  Brahma  is  declared  free,  may  justly  be 
predicated  of  him.  The  theory  had,  therefore,  to  be 
either  abandoned  or  reconstructed. 

4.  But  the  most  formidable  objection  to  the  theory  is 
its  incompatibility  with  a proper  scheme  of  theodicy. 
Sin  and  misery  exist  in  the  world,  and  human  life  is 
only  a tissue  of  sighs  and  groans.  What  is  the  cause 
of  this  anomalous  state  of  things  ? Wh}7-  did  God 
knowingly  allow  the  ingress  of  sin,  with  its  interminable 
train  of  distress  and  -wretchedness  ? Is  God  omnipo- 
tent ? If  so,  wrliy  did  He  not  interpose  His  all  sufn- 


THE  MAYA,  01t  TIIE  ILLUSION  THEORY. 


333 


cient  and  limitless  power  between  sin  and  the  world 
converted  by  it  into  a favored  abode  of  disease  and 
death  ? Is  God  omniscient  and  all-wise  ? If  so,  why 
did  He  not,  while  foreseeing  the  impending  danger, 
adopt  judicious  measures  to  avert  it  ? Maintain  that 
sin  and  misery  are  realities,  and  the  justice  and  mercy 
of  God  cannot  but  be  impugned.  But  regard  sin  and 
misery  as  illusions  and  dreams,  and  these  attributes  of 
God  are  left  intact.  A proper  system  of  theodicy  is 
possible  only  when  the  Parinama  theory  is  abandoned. 

These  are  some  of  the  reasons  assigned  for  the  reno- 
vation of  the  theory  of  real  transformation  propounded 
in  the  Upanishads  and  the  Brahma  Sutras.  The  work 
of  reconstruction  was  accomplished  when  their  cogency 
was  clearly  seen,  and  the  Parinama  theory  was  super- 
seded by  the  Yivarta  or  Illusion  theory.  The  small 
treatise  in  which  this  latter  theory  is  unfolded  is 
Yedanta  Sar,  translated  by  Dr.  Ballantyne  years  ago, 
but  very  recently  presented  in  an  excellent  translation, 
with  copious  notes,  by  Major  Jacob.  Of  his  version  we 
shall  avail  ourselves  in  our  attempt  to  set  forth  the 
broad  features  of  a doctrine  which  is  one  of  the  queerest 
this  world  has  seen,  but  which,  though  obviously  lu- 
dicrous, some  modern  philosophers  have  not  been 
ashamed  to  revive. 

Yedantism  appears  in  its  incipient  stage  of  develop- 
ment in  the  Upanishads  and  the  Sutras,  in  which  the 
doctrine  of  the  Upanishads  is  simply  revived,  with  its 
approved  arguments  and  stock  illustrations.  It  appears 
in  a state  of  maturity  in  the  Yedanta  Sar,  a compendi- 
um of  Yedanta  principles  of  a much  later  date.  But  its 
latest  phasis  of  development  is  noticeable  in  another 
standard  treatise  of  a still  later  date,  called  Yedanta 
Paribhasa,  the  contents  of  which  are  analyzed  in 


334 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


Pandit  Nehemiah  Goreh’s  able  and  acute  dissertations 
on  Yedantism,  in  his  book  already  referred  to.  He 
presents  in  liis  footnotes  numerous  extracts  from  this 
work,  and  of  these  we  shall  avail  ourselves.  And  first 
of  all  let  us  dwell,  as  the  learned  Pandit  does,  on  the 
three  sorts  of  existence  posited  by  the  Yedantins  of  the 
most  modern  school. 

These  three  sorts  of  existence  are  Paramarthika  or 
True,  Yyavaharika  or  Practical,  and  Pratibhasika  or 
Apparent.  They  are  thus  set  forth  in  the  Yedanta- 
Paribhasa,  p.  18  : “ Existence  is  of  three  sorts — time 
(paramarthika),  practical  (Yyavaharika),  and  apparent 
(pratibhasika).  True  existence  is  that  of  Brahma  ; 
practical,  that  of  ether,  etc. ; apparent,  that  of  nacrine 
silver  and  the  like.  ” Brahma  truly  exists,  and  therefore 
he  is  really  real  ; the  world  exists  practically,  but  not 
truly,  and  therefore  it  is  unreal ly  real  ; and  nacre,  mis- 
taken for  silver,  or  serpent  imagined  in  a rope,  has  only 
apparent,  deceptive  existence,  and  it  is  also  unreally 
real.  Practical  and  apparent  existence  agree  in  one 
respect,  and  differ  on  three  points.  They  agree  in 
their  being  both  false,  though  ignorantly  imagined 
real.  They  differ,  inasmuch  as  apparent  existence  is 
now  and  then  mistaken  for  veritable  existence,  not  con- 
stantly as  practical  existence.  Apparent  existence, 
moreover,  cannot  be  the  source  or  centre  of  practical 
business,  as  nacre,  mistaken  for  silver,  can  never  be  sold 
as  silver.  In  the  third  place,  our  belief  in  apparent  ex- 
istence is  the  result,  not  of  ignorance  only,  as  our  belief 
in  practical  existence,  but  of  some  defects  superadded 
to  ignorance,  such  as  distance,  etc. 

What  is  practical  or,  as  Professor  Banerjea  calls  it, 
conventional  existence  ? Is  it  simply  our  assumption 
of  the  existence  of  the  world  for  purposes  of  business 


THE  MAYA,  Oil  THE  ILLUSION"  THEOHY. 


335 


and  pleasure  ? Some  of  our  modern  philosophers  do 
not  believe  in  an  essential  distinction  between  virtue 
and  vice  ; but  they  kindly  allow  or  overlook  its  recog- 
nition by  mankind  in  general  for  the  benefit  of  society. 
The  moral  beliefs  of  humanity  are  all  myths  in  their 
opinion  ; but  their  utility  is  recognized,  and  their  prac- 
tical ascendency  is  left  uninterrupted,  that  the  business 
of  society  in  its  present  state  of  ignorance  may  go  on 
undisturbed.  Do  the  Tedantins  allow  the  existence  of 
the  world  only  on  this  principle,  or  do  they  maintain 
that  after  all  it  has  a sort  of  existence  to  which  the 
name  practical,  in  contradistinction  to  the  real,  ought 
to  be  given  ? Pandit  Nehemiah-  Goreli  maintains  that 
their  practical  existence  is  a sort  of  existence,  an  inter- 
mediate link,  so  to  speak,  between  true  existence  and 
non-existence.  They  divide  objects  into  three  classes 
— those  which  are  really  real,  those  which  are  unreally 
real,  and  those  which  are  positive  unrealities.  Brahma 
is  truly  existent,  really  real  ; the  world,' its  creator, 
souls,  etc.,  are  practically  existent,  but  not  non-exist- 
ent, and  therefore  unreally  unreal  ; and  such  figments 
of  the  head  as  “ a hare’s  horn,”  “ the  son  of  a barren 
woman,”  etc.,  are  non-existent  or  positive  nonentities. 

Mr.  Goreli  represents  practical  existence,  as  unfolded 
by  the  Yedantin,  “ as  a combination  of  two  contradic- 
tory ideas.”  The  Pandit’s  authorities  are,  however, 
enemies,  not  friends,  of  the  Yedanta  system,  Parthasa- 
rathi  Misia  and  Yijnana  Bhikshu,  “ writers  on  the 
Mimansa  and  on  the  Sankhya,  respectively.”  The 
former,  Partliasarathi,  in  his  Sastra  Dipika,  introduces 
a Yedantic  opponent,  who  speaks  thus  : “ We  do  not 
say  that  the  universe  is  unreal,  since  it  is  established, 
by  perception  and  other  proofs,  to  exist.  Nor  do  we 
say  that  it  has  true  existence,  it  being  falsified  by  right 


33G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


apprehension  of  spirit.  The  universe  cannot,  therefore, 
he  described  either  as  true  or  as  unreal.”  The  same 
controversialist  is  also  represented  as  saying  : “ That 
which  never  presents  itself — as  the  horn  of  a hare — is 
held  for  unreal  ; and  that  which  presents  itself,  and  is 
never  falsified — as  the  true  nature  of  spirit — is  held  for 
true  ; and,  as  for  the  universe,  since  it  presents  itself, 
and  yet  is  falsified  by  right  apprehension,  it  is  not  to 
be  described  as  true,  or  yet  as  unreal.” 

The  other  writer,  Vijnana  Bhikshu,  the  author  of  the 
Sankhya-Pravachana-Bhashya,  says,  p.  25  : “ If  it  be 
held  that  nescience  is  essentially  of  two  contradictories? 
But  ‘ should  ’ it  be  alleged  that  nescience  ought  to  be 
pronounced  ‘ essentially  of  two  contradictories,’  entity 
and  nonentity,  or  else  to  be  different  from  both  ; and 
thus  there  would  be  no  invalidation  thereby — that  is,  by 
nescience — of  non-duality,  the  only  true  ( par  am  arth  i ka) 
state.  Such  is  the  case.  . . . ‘Not  so;’  for  such  a 
thing  is  unknown.”  These  quotations  certainly  tend 
to  prove  that  practical  existence  is  not  tantamount  to 
non-existence.  And  therefore  Ignorance  or  Nescience, 
which  according  to  the  system  has  practical,  not  true, 
existence,  is  said  to  be  “ not  describable  as  existent  or 
non-existent”  in  the  Yedanta  Sar. 

But  from  one  point  of  view  practical  existence  ap- 
pears sheer  non-existence.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
true  existence,  the  objects  practically  existent  appear 
non-existent;  as  from  the  point  of  view  of  practical  ex- 
istence, even  Brahma,  the  really  and  truly  existent, 
appears  non-existent.  The  correct  view  is  obtained  by 
the  Vedantin,  who  occupies  an  intermediate  station 
between  practical  and  true  existence,  and  who  sees  on 
one  side  objects  practically  but  not  really  existent,  and 
on  the  other  Brahma,  really  but  not  practically  existent. 


T1IE  MATA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY.  337 

A word  about  apparent  existence,  and  we  shall  have 
done  with  this  portion  of  our  knotty  subject.  Appar- 
ent existence  has  also,  according  to  Yedantic  teach- 
ing, a reality  in  it.  When  a rope  is  mistaken  for 
a snake,  an  apparent  snake  is  really  formed.  Let  us 
reproduce  Mr.  Goreh’s  own  words  and  the  proofs  he 
adduces  in  their  support : “ Respecting  apparent 

things,  the  partisans  of  the  Yedanta  hold  this  language  : 
that  when  a man  on  seeing  nacre  takes  it  for  silver, 
apparent  silver  is  really  produced.  If  silver,  I ask,  is 
then  really  produced,  how  is  this  proved  to  be  a mis- 
conception ? In  reply  I am  told  that,  if  the  silver  were 
true  or  practical,  there  would  be  no  room  to  speak  of 
misconception  ; but  since  it  is  neither,  but  apparent, 
misconception  has  place.’  ’ 

Mr.  Goreh’s  proofs  are  all  borrowed  from  Yedanta- 
Paribhasa.  His  first  extract  is  from  page  10  : 
“ Though  by  the  efforts,  however  belying,  of  a misap- 
prehensive  person,  to  obtain  possession  of  an  illusory 
object,  such  an  object  is  established  as  existent  ; yet 
there  is  no  proof  that  it,  the  misapprehension,  has 
reference  to  an  apparent  object,  as  silver,  etc.,  pro- 
duced at  that  time.  For  silver,  which  is  extant  else- 
where, may  be  taken  as  its  object.  If  this  be  said,  I 
demur,  since  that  silver  elsewhere,  not  being  in  contact 
with  an  organ  of  sense,  cannot  be  an  object  of  percep- 
tion.” 

This  extract  is  somewhat  obscure,  but  it  will  become 
luminous  when  we  look  upon  the  objector  as  pressing 
into  his  service  the  JSTaiyayika  theory,  that  when  nacre 
is  mistaken  for  silver  the  memory  is  a factor  in  the  pro- 
duction of  the  mistake.  The  Yedantin  in  reply  affirms 
the  principle  that  perception  is  possible  only  when 
there  is  a contact  between  the  thing  perceived  and  a 


338 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


percipient  organ,  and  that,  therefore,  silver  not  present 
where  the  nacre  is  seen  cannot  possibly  occasion  the 
mistake  alluded  to. 

Lt  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  take  notice  of  Mr. 
Goreh’s  other  extracts,  besides  the  one  in  which  the 
process  of  the  formation  of  apparent  silver  is  set  forth. 
The  apparent  silver  is  evolved  out  of  ignorance  through 
the  media,  so  to  speak,  the  “ nacreness”  of  nacre,  its 
“ glitter,”  the  impression  of  silver  before  seen,  and  some 
defect,  such  as  bile,  or  distance,  etc.  The  Yedantic 
theory  of  perception  is  not  less  strange  than  complicat- 
ed, and  it  will  have  to  be  referred  to  before  the  sequel. 

Meanwhile  let  us  remark  that  the  recondite  disquisi- 
tion on  existence,  embodied  in  books  like  Yedanta- 
Paribhasa,  is  an  after-growth,  arising  from  the  difficul- 
ties with  which  the  illusion  theory  appeared  beset  some 
time  after  it  had  been  propounded.  The  Yedanta  Sar, 
the  compendium  in  which  that  theory  is  presented  in 
detail,  says  nothing  about  the  three  sorts  of  existence 
by  which  it  was  rendered  consistent  with  human  con- 
sciousness. Men  cannot  be  easily  led  to  believe  that 
the  universe,  which  in  varieties  of  ways  manifests  its 
existence,  is  false ; and  if  a conclusion  so  obviously  in- 
compatible with  all  our  instinctive  beliefs  has  to  be 
naturalized,  it  must  be  backed  by  a mass  of  sophistic 
reasoning.  The  Yedantic  philosophers  recognized  such 
necessity  ; and  they  met  it  by  manufacturing  a theory 
of  existence  which,  while  it  loudly  proclaimed  the 
falseness  of  the  world,  attributed  what  may  be  called  a 
subtle  species  of  existence  to  it.  And  besides,  this 
queer  theory  of  existence  proved  the  salvation  of  the 
world,  inasmuch  as  it  successfully  counteracted  that 
tendency  to  indolence  and  dereliction  which  the  illusion 
theory  is  so  eminently  fitted  to  foster  and  mature. 


THE  MATA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY. 


339 


It  must  also  be  admitted  that  the  great  champions  of 
the  Yedantic  system  could  not  emancipate  themselves 
thoroughly  from  the  materialistic  speculations  of  the 
Sankhya  school  ; and,  therefore,  while  denying  most 
emphatically  the  existence  of  gross  matter,  they  seemed 
inclined  to  achnit  that  of  tenuous  matter  or  material 
principles,  such  as  the  unperceived  principles  immedi- 
ately emanating  from  Prakriti,  according  to  Sankhya 
notions.  This  fact  we  hope  to  be  able  to  prove  after 
we  have  set  forth  the  nature  of  that  ignorance  to  which 
creation  is  traced  by  the  Yedantin.  . 

blow  we  raise  the  important  question,  What  is  the 
Illusion  theory,  by  which  the  Parinama  or  Yikara  the- 
ory of  the  Upanishads  and  the  Brahma  Sutras  was  so 
thoroughly  superseded  ? This  question  cannot  be 
rightly  answered  till  another  question  is  raised  and  set 
at  rest.  What  is  Illusion  or  Ignorance  ? There  are 
three  well-known  Sanscrit  words  which  are  met  with 
in  almost  every  page  of  every  standard  work  on 
Yedantic  philosophy.  These  are  Ajnana,  Ignorance  ; 
Avidya,  Nescience  ; and  Maya,  Illusion.  These  words 
are  interchangeable,  or  of  the  same  import  ; and  it  is 
because  they  are  somewhat  indiscriminately  used — the 
first  for  the  second,  and  the  second  for  the  third— that 
uniformity  of  phraseology  is  endangered,  and  mystifi- 
cation is  realized.  We  shall,  therefore,  make  use  of 
the  word  Ignorance,  and  avoid  the  use  of  the  other  two 
synonyms  as  far  as  possible. 

What  is  Ignorance  ? The  third  section  of  the 
Yedanta  Sar  thus  furnishes  the  reply  : — 

“ Illusory  attribution  is  the  attributing  to  the  real  of 
that  which  is  unreal,  as  a snake  is  imagined  in  a rope 
which  is  not  a snake. 

“ The  ‘ real  ’ is  Brahma,  existence,  intelligence,  and 


340 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


joy,  without  a second.  The  1 unreal  ’ is  the  whole  mass 
of  unintelligent  things,  beginning  with  Ignorance. 

“ Ignorance,  they  say,  is  not  describable  as  existent 
or  non-existent— an  entity  composed  of  the  three  quali- 
ties antagonistic  to  knowledge. 

“ (Its  existence  is  established)  by  one’s  own  con- 
sciousness of  being  ignorant,  and  also  by  the  Yeda, 
(which  speaks  as)  the  own  power  of  God,  concealed  by 
its  emanations”  (Swetaswatara  Upanishad). 

Ignorance  is  in  this  passage  called  the  ‘ ‘ unreal  ’ ’ and 
placed  in  sharp  antithesis  to  Brahma,  who  is  called  the 
“real.”  It  is,  moreover,  said  to  be  “unreal,”  along 
with  the  whole  mass  of  unintelligent  things  which  has 
emanated  from  it,  as  a source  of  existence.  But  the 
moment  the  conjunction  is  indicated,  or  the  causal  rela- 
tionship between  Ignorance  as  the  cause  and  the  uni- 
verse as  the  effect,  a difficulty  arises.  IIow  can  that 
which  is  unreal  be  a productive  cause  at  all  ? The 
causal  efficacy  of  Ignorance  being  admitted,  its  un- 
reality must  be  qualified.  It  is,  therefore,  said  to  be 
“ something  not  describable  as  existent  and  non- 
existent,” having  a subtle  species  of  existence,  a species 
of  existence  which  may  be  described  as  an  intermediate 
link  between  existence  and  non-existence.  In  these 
words  we  may  see  the  doctrine  of  varieties  of  existence 
developed  in  Vedanta- Paribhasa  foreshadowed. 

It  is  also  said  to  be  an  entity,  not  a positive  unreality, 
like  the  horn  of  a hare  or  the  son  of  a barren  woman. 
And,  moreover,  it  consists,  like  Prakriti  of  the  San- 
khyas,  of  three  qualities — sattioa,  the  attribute  which 
generates  and  promotes  goodness  ; rajas,  that  which 
generates  and  promotes  activity,  and  tamas,  or  that 
which  leads  to  indolence  and  stolidity. 

If  Ignorance  is  an  entity,  eternal,  all-diffusive,  like 


THE  MATA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY.  341 

ether,  or  rather  like  Prakriti,  its  dissolution  or  destruc- 
tion is  impossible.  The  Hindus  maintain,  like  some 
modern  scientists,  that  what  is  eternal  is  indestructible. 
Ignorance  is  eternal,  and  it  is  the  source  of  our  bond- 
age,  which  will  last  as  long  as  its  cause  lasts.  Igno- 
rance being  eternal  is  everlasting,  and  consequently  our 
bondage,  which  is  co-eternal  with  it,  will  last  forever. 
There  can,  therefore,  be  no  hope  of  emancipation  held 
forth  to  alleviate  the  misery  of  suffering  humanity. 
But  happily  Ignorance,  though  eternal,  is  annihilable. 
It  is  “ antagonistic  to  knowledge,”  and  flees  before 
knowledge  as  darkness  flees  before  light.  What  the 
Sankhyas  say  about  their  non-discrimination,  as  regards 
its  eternity  and  annihilability,  the  Yedantists  predicate 
of  their  Ignorance. 

How  is  the  existence  of  Ignorance  proved  ? By  uni- 
versal consciousness  in  the  first  place.  We  are  all  con- 
scious of  being  Ignorance-bound,  and  all  the  varied 
systems  of  Indian  Philosophy  concur  in  representing 
man  in  his  unregenerate  state  as  fettered  by  Ignorance. 
Its  existence,  therefore,  is  universally  admitted.  Its 
existence  is  further  proved  by  revelation. 

How  does  Ignorance  manifest  itself  ? Both  as  “ a 
collective  aggregate”  and  as  “ a distributive  aggre- 
gate.” Every  soul  is,  according  to  the  Yedantic  sys- 
tem, a synthesis  of  a particle  of  Ignorance  and  a parti- 
cle of  Brahma  invariably  called  Intelligence.  Every 
soul,  therefore,  represents  Ignorance  in  its  distributive 
form  or  as  a distributive  a^gre^ate.  The  Ignorances 
attached  to  the  innumerable  souls  in  the  world  ema- 
nated from  and  are  to  be  reabsorbed  in  one  mass  of 
Ignorance,  called  “ Collective  Ignorance.”  This  Col- 
lective Ignorance,  or  totality  of  Ignorance,  is  called 
Iswar  or  God,  the  Creator  and  Preserver  and  Destroyer 


342 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


of  the  world.  It  is,  however,  not  appropriately  called 
Iswar,  for  it  forms  only  “the  causal  body”  of  this 
Being.  Iswar,  like  the  individual  soul,  is  a synthesis, 
and  consists  of  the  compound  of  all  Ignorances,  called 
Collective  Ignorance,  and  a very  large  portion  of 
Brahma,  the  sum  total  of  all  the  particles  of  Brahma 
attached  to  the  innumerable  souls  in  the  world.  Col- 
lective Ignorance  is,  therefore,  his  causal  body  rather 
than  his  entire  self.  Distributive  Ignorance  is  in  the 
same  way  the  “ causal  body”  of  the  individuated  soul, 
and  not  its  entire  self.  The  relationship  between  Col- 
lective Ignorance  and  Distributive  Ignorance  is  illus- 
trated in  the  Yedanta  Sar  by  that  subsisting  between  a 
“ forest”  and  “ the  trees”  of  which  it  consists,  or  that 
between  a “ lake”  and  “ the  waters”  of  which  it  con- 
sists. 

The  relationship  between  Collective  and  Distributive 
Ignorances  is  thus  set  forth  in  section  four  of  Yedanta 
Sar  : “ As,  when  regarding  a forest  as  a distributive 
aggregate  composed  of  trees,  there  is  a perception  of 
its  manifoldness,  which  is  also  perceived  in  the  case  of 
a lake  regarded  as  a distributive  aggregate  of  waters ; 
so,  when  viewing  Ignorance  distributively,  we  perceive 
it  to  be  multiplex.  • As  the  Yeda  says,  ‘ Indra,  by  his 
supernatural  powers,  appears  multiform  ’ ” (Big  Yeda, 
C,  47,  18). 

“ Thus,  then,  a thing  is  regarded  as  a collective  or 
distributive  ang-re^ate  according  as  it  is  viewed  as  a 
whole  or  as  a collection  of  parts.” 

The  portion  of  Brahma  associated  with  Collective 
Ignorance,  or  forming  the  soul  of  Iswar,  is  called  ‘ ‘ the 
most  excellent,”  and  has  the  qualities  of  “ omniscience, 
omnipotence,  and  universal  control  ’ ’ attributed  to  it. 
It  is  said  to  “ abound  in  pure  goodness,”  to  be  “real 


THE  MATA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION"  THEORY. 


343 


and  unreal,”  ££  imperceptible,  tlie  internal  ruler  and  the 
cause  of  the  world.”  It  will  be  shown  in  the  proper 
place  that  all  these  attributes  belong,  properly  speak- 
ing, to  Collective  Ignorance  rather  than  to  the  portion 
of  Brahma  associated  with  it  ; to  the  causal  body  rather 
than  the  indwelling  soul  of  Iswar. 

The  very  small  portion  or  particle  of  Brahma  associ- 
ated with  Distributive  Ignorance,  or  forming  the  indi- 
vidual soul,  is  called  “ humble,”  and  it  “ abounds  in  im- 
pure goodness.  ’ ’ It  has  ‘ £ the  qualities  of  parvipotence 
and  parviscience”  attributed  to  it.  Distributive  Igno- 
rance is  its  causal  body,  ££  because  it  is  the  cause  of  the 
making  of,  etc.”  The  portion  of  Brahma  attached  to 
Collective  Ignorance  is  called  its  Illuminator.  ££  Om- 
niscience is  attributed  to  him  (this  portion  of  Brahma) 
as  the  illuminator  of  the  whole  of  Ignorance.  As  the 
Yeda  says,  who  knows  all  (generally),  who  knows 
everything  (particularly)”  (Mundaka  i.  1,  3).  The  por- 
tion of  Brahma  attached  to  the  individual  soul,  called 
Prajna  in  contradistinction  to  Iswara,  is  parviscient 
because  it  illuminates  only  one  Ignorance.  ££  The 
smallness  of  its  intelligence  is  owing  to  its  being  the 
illuminator  of  one  Ignorance  only.”  It  will  be  shown 
that  both  the  collective  portion  of  Brahma  and  the  dis- 
tributive portion  are  called  Illuminators  more  by  court- 
esy than  owing  to  any  inherent  fitness  in  them  to  do 
the  work  for  which  they  get  credit. 

There  is,  moreover,  a disengaged  portion  of  Brahma, 
appropriated  neither  to  Collective  Ignorance  nor  to 
Distributive  Ignorance  ; and  this  is  called  the  Fourth, 
the  absolute,  unrelated,  unconditioned  Brahma.  Why 
this  term  is  applied  to  him  will  be  shown  when  the 
work  of  creation,  or  rather  self -distribution,  performed 
by  Collective  Ignorance,  is  set  forth.  Meanwhile  let  us 


344 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


present  a couple  of  extracts  from  the  fourth  section  of 
the  hook  under  review  in  corroboration  of  our  state- 
ments : 

“ For  is  there  any  difference  between  Iswara  and 
Prajna,  who  are  associated  respectively  with  these  (col- 
lective and  distributive  aggregates  of  Ignorance),  just 
as  there  is  none  between  the  ether  appropriated  (ie.  the 
space  occupied)  by  the  forest  and  that  appropriated  by 
the  trees  composing  it,  or  between  the  sky  reflected  in 
the  lake  and  that  reflected  in  its  waters.  As  it  is 
written  in  the  Yeda,  ‘ This  is  the  Lord  of  all,  omnis- 
cient, the  internal  ruler,  the  source  of  all,  for  it  is  the 
source  and  reabsorbent  of  all  creatures  ’ ’ ’ (Mandukva 
[Jpanishad  6). 

“ As  there  is  an  unappropriated  ether,  the  source  of 
that  appropriated  by  a forest  or  by  its  trees,  and  of 
that  reflected  in  a lake  or  its  waters,  so  too  there  is  In- 
telligence (Brahma)  which  is  not  associated  with  Igno- 
rance, the  source  of  these  two  Ignorance-associated 
Intelligences  (Iswara  and  Prajna).  It  is  called  the 
Fourth.  As  it  is  written  in  the  Yeda,  ‘ They  consider 
that  calm,  blissful,  secondless  one  to  be  the  Fourth. 
That  is  Soul — that  is  to  be  known  ’ ’ ’ (Mandukva  7)- 

"Why  the  unassociated  portion  of  Brahma,  the  abso- 
lute, unrelated  entity,  is  called  the  Fourth,  will  become 
apparent  when  we  have  set  forth  the  order  of  creation 
according  to  this  system.  The  creative  power  resides, 
in  reality,  in  Ignorance,  not  in  the  Brahma  portion 
associated  with  it.  Ignorance  has  two  powers — the 
power  of  Concealment  and  that  of  Projection. 

By  its  power  of  envelopment  or  concealment,  Igno- 
rance, though  limited,  throws  a veil  over  the  infinite 
soul,  and  completely  cuts  it  off  from  our  view,  just  as  a 
small  bit  of  cloud  sometimes  covers  the  entire  disk  of 


THE  MAYA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY. 


345 


the  sun  and  makes  the  luminary  invisible.  On  account 
of  this  covering  or  overshadowing  Ignorance,  the 
quiescent  soul  “ appears  to  be  an  agent  and  a patient, 
and  to  experience  pleasure,  pain,  and  other  mundane 
conditions,  just  as  a rope,  covered  by  ignorance  as  to 
its  real  nature,  appears  to  be  a snake.” 

The  power  of  concealment  is  the  enveloping,  not  the 
creative  power.  This  last  is  the  power  of  Projection, 
and  “ is  such  that  just  as  Ignorance,  regarding  a rope 
by  its  own  power,  raises  up  the  form  of  a snake,  etc. , 
on  the  rope,  which  is  covered  by  it  ; so  Ignorance  too, 
by  its  own  power,  raises  up,  on  soul  which  is  covered 
by  it,  ether  and  the  whole  universe.  As  it  has  been 
said,  “ The  projective  power  (of  Ignorance)  can  create 
the  world,  beginning  with  subtle  bodies,  and  ending 
with  the  terrene  orb.” 

It  is  to  be  observed  here  that  Intelligence  or  Brahma 
is  associated  with  Ignorance  in  the  work  of  creation, 
and  represented  as  the  efficient  cause.  The  fourth  sec- 
tion of  the  book  concludes  with  this  statement  : “ In- 
telligence, associated  with  Ignorance  possessed  of  these 
two  powers,  is,  when  itself  is  chiefly  considered,  the 
efficient  cause  ; and  when  its  associate  is  chiefly  con- 
sidered, is  the  material  cause.  Just  as  a spider,  when 
itself  is  chiefly  considered,  is  the  efficient  cause  of  its 
web,  the  effect  ; and  when  its  body  is  chiefly  consid- 
ered, is  the  material  cause  of  it.” 

This,  however,  is  one  of  those  statements  in  the  book 
which  are  obviously  inconsistent  with  the  spirit  and 
letter  of  all  Vedantic  teaching — nay,  of  all  Hindu  Phi- 
losophy. Brahma  is  described  in  the  latest  of  the 
Upanishads,  the  Swetaswatara  Upanishad,  as  “ with- 
out parts,  devoid  of  action,  tranquil,  irreproachable, 
emotionless.”  In  this  very  book  Brahma  is  called 


34G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


“ the  substrate  of  all” — that  is,  of  all  the  creations  of 
Ignorance,  but  not  certainly  its  associate  in  creation. 
Brahma  could  not  possibly  have  a desire  to  create, 
could  not  possibly  have  displayed  any  activity  in  crea- 
tion, without  neutralizing  that  perfect  quiescence  in 
which  all  that  is  characteristic  of  him  is  concentrated. 

The  creative  power  resides  in  Ignorance,  not  in  the 
portion  of  Brahma  associated  with  it.  But  it  may  be 
said  that  its  juxtaposition  or  association  is  needed  to 
lead  Ignorance  to  energize.  "Why  ? Is  it  because  it 
stirs  up  the  creative  power  latent  in  Ignorance  by  a 
voluntary  action  ? or  is  it  because  it  makes  Ignorance 
fruitful  by  emitting  unconsciously  an  automatic  influ- 
ence ? The  Brahma  portion  attached  to  Ignorance 
could  not  have  led  to  its  energization  by  a voluntary 
exertion,  because  the  absolute  spirit  is,  under  all  circum- 
stances, associated  or  unassociated,  incapable  of  volition 
and  action.  And  its  proximity  is  not  needed  to  drive 
Ignorance  to  action,  because  Ignorance  is  moved  by  an 
inherent  power  to  energize  or  evolve.  Ignorance, 
therefore,  is  both  the  efficient  and  the  material  cause 
of  the  universe. 

From  Ignorance,  “ attended  by  its  projective  power, 
in  which  the  quality  of  insensibility  ( tamas ) abounds, 
proceeds  ether  ; from  ether,  air  ; from  air,  heat  ; from 
heat,  water  ; and  from  water,  earth.”  These  are  the 
subtle,  rudimentary,  or  non-quintuplicated  elements  ; 
and  in  them  “ arise  the  qualities  pleasure,  pain,  and 
insensibility  in  the  proportion  in  which  they  exist  in 
their  cause.”  From  them,  when  these  qualities 
manifest  themselves,  spring  the  subtle  or  rudimentary 
bodies,  each  of  which  consists  of  seventeen  mem- 
bers— the  five  organs  of  sense,  the  five  organs  of  action, 
the  five  vital  airs,  mind,  and  intellect.  The  subtle 


THE  MAYA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY. 


347 


body  consists  of  three  sheaths — the  intellectual  or 
cognitional  (vij nanarnayalmsa)  sheath,  consisting  of  the 
organs  of  sense,  the  ear,  skin,  eye,  tongue,  and  nose, 
and  intellect  ; the  mental  or  sensorial  ( manomayakosa ) 
sheath,  consisting  of  mind  and  the  organs  of  action, 
the  mouth,  hand,  foot,  excretory  and  generative 
organs  ; and  respiratory  ( prana-may akosa ) sheath, 
consisting  of  the  fire  vital  airs,  respiration,  inspiration, 
flatuousness,  expiration,  and  digestion.  The  subtle 
body,  consisting  of  these  sheaths,  migrates  with  the  soul 
from  one  body  to  another,  and  is  not  dissolved  till  its 
final  liberation  and  absorption  into  the  universal  soul. 

These  subtle  organisms  or  bodies,  brought  into  exist- 
ence by  the  subtle  elements,  appear  both  as  a collective 
aggregate  and  as  a distributive  aggregate.  “ Here, 
too,  the  totality  of  subtle  bodies,  as  the  seat  of  one 
intellect  (i.e.  Sutratma’s),  is  a collective  aggregate,  like 
the  forest  or  the  lake  ; or  as  the  seat  of  many  intellects 
(viz.,  those  of  individual  souls)  is  a distributive  aggre- 
gate, like  the  forest  trees  and  the  lake  waters.” 

The  portion  of  Brahma  ‘ ‘ associated  with  the  collec- 
tive aggregate  (of  subtle  bodies)  is  called  Sutratma 
(thread-soul),  Hiranyagarbha,  or  Prana,  because  it 
passes  as  a thread  through  all  (the  subtle  frames),  and 
on*  account  of  the  conceit  that  it  is  the  five  uncom- 
pounded elements  possessing  the  faculties  of  knowing, 
desire,  and  activity  {i.e.  that  it  is  the  subtle  body 
itself).”  And  the  portion  of  Brahma  “ associated  with 
the  distributive  aggregate  of  subtle  organisms  is  called 
Taijasa  (the  brilliant),  because  it  has  the  luminous  in- 
ternal organ  as  its  associate.” 

The  subtle  bodies,  in  their  collective  and  distributive 
forms,  have  an  “ experience”  which  the  gross  frames 
can  never  have.  “ These  two,  the  Thread-soul  (Su- 


34S 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


tratma)  and  Taijasa,  by  means  of  the  subtle  modifica- 
tions of  the  mind,  have  experience  of  subtle  objects. 
As  it  is  said  in  the  Yeda,  ‘ Taijasa  lias  fruition  of  the 
supersensible.’”  It  ought  to  be  mentioned  here  that 
of  the  three  sheaths  of  the  subtle  organism,  “ the  intel- 
lectual, being  endowed  with  the  faculty  of  knowing,  is 
an  agent  ; the  mental,  having  the  faculty  of  desire,  is 
an  instrument,  and  the  respiratory,  having  the  faculty 
of  activity,  is  an  effect.  ’ ’ 

The  unity  of  the  Thread-soul  and  Taijasa  is  thus  set 
forth  : “ There  is  no  difference  between  the  collective 
and  distributive  aggregates  of  the  subtle  frames,  or  be- 
tween Sutratma  and  Taijasa,  who  are  associated  with 
them,  just  as  there  is  none  between  the  forest  and  its 
trees,  or  between  the  space  occupied  by  each,  or  be- 
tween the  lake  and  its  waters,  and  the  sky  reflected  in 
each.” 

From  subtle  elements  and  subtle  bodies  let  us  proceed 
to  those  of  a grosser  kind.  The  gross  elements  are 
evolved  out  of  the  subtle  ones  by  a process  called  quin- 
tuplication.  It  is  thus  explained  : “ After  dividing 
each  of  the  five  subtle  elements,  ether  and  the  rest, 
into  two  equal  parts,  and  then  subdividing  each  of  the 
first  five  of  the  ten  moieties  into  four  equal  parts,  mix 
those  four  parts  with  the  others,  leaving  the  undivided 
second  moiety  of  each.  As  it  has  been  said,  ‘ After 
dividing  each  into  two  parts,  and  the  first  halves  again 
into  four  parts,  by  uniting  the  latter  to  the  second  half 
of  each,  each  contains  the  five  ’ ” (Panchadasi,  i.  27). 

These  quintuplicated  elements  are  earth,  water,  fire, 
air,  and  ether.  From  them  “ spring,  one  above  the 
other,  the  worlds  Bhur,  Bhuvar,  Swar,  Mahar,  Janas, 
Tapas,  and  Satya  ; and,  one  below  the  other,  the  nether 
worlds,  called  Atala,  Yitala,  Sutala,  Itasatala,  Talatala, 


THE  MAYA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY. 


349 


Mahatala,  and  Patala.”  They  also  give  birth  to 
“ Brahma’s  egg,  the  four  kinds  of  gross  bodies  in- 
cluded in  it,  and  food  and  drink.”  These  four  kinds 
“are  the  viviparous,  the  oviparous,  the  moisture- 
engendered,  and  the  germinating. 

“ The  viviparous  are  those  produced  from  the  womb, 
as  man  and  animals  ; the  oviparous  are  those  born 
from  eggs,  as  birds  and  snakes  ; the  moisture-engen- 
dered are  those  which  spring  from  moisture,  as  lice  and 
gnats  ; the  germinating  are  those  which  shoot  up  from 
the  ground,  as  creepers  and  trees.” 

The  gross  bodies,  like  the  subtle  ones,  appear  as  a 
collective  aggregate  and  as  a distributive  aggregate. 
“ In  this  case,  too,  the  fourfold  gross  body,  viewed  as 
the  seat  of  one  (collective)  intellect  or  of  many  (indi- 
vidual intellects),  is  a collective  aggregate,  like  a forest 
or  a lake,  or  a distributive  aggregate,  like  the  forest 
trees  or  the  lake  waters.”  The  portion  of  Brahma 
associated  to  the  collective  gross  body  is  called  vais- 
wanara  (the  spirit  of  humanity)  or  meat  ; “ (the 
former)  because  of  the  conceit  that  it  is  in  the  whole  of 
humanity,  and  (the  latter)  because  it  appears  in  various 
forms.  The  portion  of  Brahma  associated  to  each  dis- 
tributed body  is  called  viswct,  because,  without  aban- 
doning the  conceit  of  the  subtle  body,  it  enters  into  all 
gross  bodies.  ” The  gross  body  in  its  collective  and 
distributive  form  is  called  the  nutrimentitious  (anna- 
mayakosa)  sheath,  “ on  account  of  the  changes  of  food 
(which  go  on  within  it  and  build  it  up).” 

It  is  time  to  refer  in  detail  to  the  divisions  and  sub- 
divisions of  Brahma  in  creation.  The  Deity  is,  in  the 
first  place,  divided  into  two  main  portions,  one  left  in 
its  original  state  of  absolute,  unconditioned  existence, 
and  the  other  appropriated  to  Ignorance,  which  has 


350 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


three  qualities.  This  portion  of  Brahma  has  various 
titles,  being  called  Brahma  with  qualities,  Brahma 
adulterate,  illusion- associated  Brahma,  illusive  Brahma. 
This  portion  of  Brahma  is  divided  into  innumerable 
particles  appropriated  to  the  innumerable  objects  of 
creation.  A portion  of  it  is  attached  to  the  collective 
or  universal  subtle  body,  and  through  it  appropriated 
to  all  varieties  of  subtle  bodies  and  the  subtle  elements 
called  Tanmatras.  Another  portion  is  attached  to  the 
collective  or  universal  gross  body,  and  appropriated 
through  it  to  all  varieties  of  gross  bodies,  and  the  gross 
elements  and  their  products,  the  seven  upper  and  the 
seven  nether  worlds.  Brahma  therefore  is  found  in 
four  different  states,  which  are  thus  indicated  by  Major 
Jacob  : 

“ Firstly,  with  a causal  body,  composed  of  Ignorance 
or  Illusion,  which  in  the  aggregate  is  Iswar  or  God, 
and  distributively,  individual  souls  or  Prajna.  It  is 
likened  to  a state  of  dreamless  sleep. 

“ Secondly,  with  a subtle  body,  composed  of  the  five 
organs  of  sense  and  of  action,  mind,  intellect,  and  the 
five  vital  airs,  seventeen  in  all.  This,  in  the  aggregate, 
is  called  Hiranyagarbha,  or  the  Thread-soul,  and  in  the 
distributive  state,  Taijasa.  It  is  likened  to  a state  of 
dream. 

“ Thirdly,  with  a gross  body,  composed  of  the  com- 
pounded elements.  Viewed  in  the  aggregate,  it  is 
called  Vaiswanara,  and  distributively,  Viswa.  It  is 
likened  to  the  waking  state. 

“ A fourth  state  is  that  of  the  unassociated  pure 
Brahma,  who  is  technically  styled  the  Fourth.” 

But  these  divisions  and  subdivisions  of  Brahma  into 
innumerable  parts,  associated  to  various  spheres  of  ex- 
istence and  various  classes  of  objects,  subtle  and  gross, 


THE  MATA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY.  351 

cannot  but  suggest  the  idea  of  dualism.  How  is  the 
integrity  of  monism  to  be  maintained  in  the  teeth  of 
descriptions  so  obviously  at  war  with  it  ? To  under- 
stand this  it  is  necessary  to  comprehend  theYedantic 
notion  of  “ illusory  attribution”  and  its  “ withdrawal.” 
Of  the  former  we  have  the  following  definition  in  Sec- 
tion 3 : “ Illusory  attribution  is  the  attributing  to  the 
real  of  that  which  is  unreal,  as  a snake  is  imagined  in 
a rope  which  is  not  a snake.”  The  meaning  is  obvious. 
Brahma  is  real , absolute,  unconditioned,  unrelated 
existence,  without  consciousness,  without  feeling,  with- 
out qualities.  But  in  all  ordinary  descriptions  of 
Brahma  certain  attributes  and  operations  are  attributed 
to  him.  He  is  represented  as  omnipotent  and  omni- 
scient, as  creator  and  preserver,  as  associated  to  various 
spheres  of  existence  and  various  classes  of  objects,  as 
enslaved  by  and  emancipated  from  ignorance.  But  the 
representations  by  which,  he  is  set  forth  as  conditioned 
and  related,  determined  by  qualities,  states,  and  acts, 
are  all  “ false,”  knowingly  resorted  to  by  the  learned 
for  the  purpose  of  making  the  absolute  intelligible  to 
the  unlearned. 

The  pupil  who  has  qualified  himself  for  Brahma  lore 
and  found  the  accredited  teacher,  is  not  expected  to 
grasp  the  idea  of  the  absolute  all  at  once.  He  must 
advance,  step  by  step,  from  the  related  to  the  non- 
related,  from  the  conditioned  to  the  unconditioned, 
from  the  phenomenal  to  the  real.  And  therefore,  in 
accommodation  to  his  inferior  capacities,  descriptions 
are  resorted  to  such  as  lead  him  to  look  upon  the  abso- 
lute Brahma  as  a being  conditioned  and  related.  But 
when  his  understanding  power  is  expanded,  the  illusory 
attribution  is  gradually  withdrawn,  and  the  uncondi- 
tioned is  finally  set  forth  in  his  original,  immutable 


352 


niNDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


state  of  absolute  existence.  It  is  therefore  said  in 
Section  2 : “ That  teacher,  with  great  kindness,  in- 
structs him  by  the  method  of  illusory  attribution  {adhy- 
aropd),  followed  by  its  withdrawal  (apavada).” 

On  this  process  of  instruction  Pandit  Goreh  makes 
the  following  remarks  : “ Then,  an  objector  may  urge, 
the  efficient  causativity  and  material  causativity  of  the 
spider  both  appertain  to  its  body  ; for  the  internal 
organ  is  called  the  subtle  body,  and  it  must  therefore 
be  regarded  as  body  ; and,  this  being  the  case,  why  is 
a distinction  taken  between  the  spider  and  its  body, 
and  the  former  called  efficient  cause,  and  the  latter 
material  cause  (of  its  web)  ? My  reply  is  that,  in  the 
passage  of  the  Yedanta  Sar  under  discussion,  the  ex- 
oteric notion  is  adopted.  For  when  the  Yedantins 
speak  of  the  origin  of  the  world,  for  instance,  they  do 
not  believe  its  origin  to  be  true.  This  mode  of  expres- 
sion they  call  false  imputation.  It  consists  in  holding 
for  true  that  which  is  false,  in  accommodation  to  the 
intelligence  of  the  uninitiated.  At  a further  stage  of 
instruction,  when  the  time  has  arrived  for  propounding 
the  esoteric  view,  the  false  imputation  is  gainsaid,  and 
this  gainsaying  is  termed  rescission.” 

The  divisions  and  subdivisions  of  Brahma  set  forth  in 
the  Yedanta  Sar,  together  with  what  is  said  about  his 
association  with  ignorance  and  the  ignorance-imagined 
creation,  are  examples  of  false  attribution  ; and  all  that 
is  needed  to  make  Brahma  intelligible  in  its  original 
essence  is  its  “ withdrawal.”  Section  7 shows  how  this 
gradual  withdrawal  takes  place,  and  the  Absolute  set 
forth  in  his  original  state  : 

“ The  ‘ withdrawal’  ( apavada ) is  the  assertion  that 
the  whole  of  the  unreal,  beginning  with  Ignorance, 
which  is  ail  illusory  effect  of  the  Real,  is  nothing  but 


THE  MAYA,  OH  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY. 


353 


the  Real  ; just  as  a snake,  which  is  the  illusory  effect 
of  a rope,  is  nothing  whatsoever  but  the  rope. 

“ It  has  been  said,  ‘ An  actual  change  of  form  is 
called  ViTcara,  while  a merely  apparent  change  of  form 
is  called  Vivartta.  ’ This  shall  now  be  illustrated. 

“ The  whole  of  the  four  classes  of  gross  bodies  con- 
stituting the  seat  of  enjoyment,  food  and  drink  neces- 
sary for  their  use ; the  fourteen  worlds,  Bhur  and  the 
rest,  the  repository  of  these,  and  Brahma’s  egg,  which 
is  the  receptacle  of  all  these  worlds — all  these  are  noth- 
ing more  than  the  quintuplicated  elements  of  which 
they  are  made. 

“ The  quintuplicated  elements,  with  sound  and  the 
objects  of  sense,  and  the  subtle  bodies — all  these  are 
nothing  more  than  the  non-quintuplicated  elements  of 
which  they  are  made. 

“ The  non-quintuplicated  elements,  with  the  qualities 
of  goodness  and  the  rest,  in  the  inverse  order  of  their 
production,  are  nothing  more  than  Ignorance-associated 
Intelligence,  which  is  their  material  cause. 

“ Ignorance,  and  Intelligence  associated  with  it,  con- 
stituting Iswara,  etc. , are  nothing  more  than  Brahma, 
the  Fourth,  the  unassociated  Intelligence,  which  forms 
their  substrate.” 

By  this  process  of  false  imputation  or  illusory  attri- 
bution and  its  withdrawal,  the  meaning . of  the  great 
Yedantic  watchword,  Tat  Twam  Asi,  That  art  Thou, 
is  made  manifest.  The  word  “that”  in  this  mystic 
sentence  embraces  the  first  Yedantic  triad — viz.,  Col- 
lective aggregate  of  Ignorance,  Intelligence  associated 
with  it,  called  Iswar  or  God,  and  represented  as  pos- 
sessed of  such  divine  attributes  as  omnipotence,  omni- 
science, etc.,  and  unassociated,  unrelated  Intelligence 
destitute  of  qualities.  Of  this  triad  the  first  two 


354 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


members,  Collective  Ignorance  and  Intelligence  associ- 
ated with  it,  owe  their  existence  to  illusory  attribution, 
and  have  therefore  no  real  existence.  The  word 
“that”  therefore  means  absolute,  unrelated  Brahma, 
which  really  exists,  and  is  the  substrate  of  all  that  ex- 
ists— viz. , of  Ignorance  and  the  Brahma-portion  associ- 
ated with  it.  The  word  “ thou”  in  this  great  sentence 
embraces  the  second  Yedantic  triad — viz. , Ignorance  in 
its  distributive  aggregate,  the  Brahma-portion  or  Intel- 
ligence associated  with  it,  called  Prajna,  and  repre- 
sented as  possessed  of  parviscience,  parvipotence,  etc., 
and  the  portion  not  thus  associated,  or  associated  at 
all.  The  first  two  members  of  this  triad  owe  their 
existence  to  false  imputation,  and  are  therefore  really 
non-existent.  These  being  thrown  out  of  calculation, 
what  is  left  is  pure,  unassociated  Brahma.  The  sen- 
tence, then,  resolves  itself  into  this  : Brahma  is 
Brahma.  Therefore  the  words  inscribed  on  the  banner 
of  Yedantism  are  : Brahma  satyam  Jag  an  mithya  jiva 
Brahmaiva  naapara  (Brahma  is  true,  the  ayorld  is 

FALSE,  THE  SOUL  IS  BRAnMA  AND  NOTHING  ELSE). 

Mr.  Goreh  proves  clearly  and  indisputably  that  ac- 
cording to  Yedantic  principles  the  \Tery  existence  of 
Brahma  cannot  be  proved.  The  cosmological  or  teleo- 
logical argument  is  the  great  argument  by  which  the 
Hindu  philosopher  proves  the  existence  of  God  ; and 
this  argument  cannot  be  arrayed  in  favor  of  divine 
existence,  according  to  Yedantic  principles.  The  ex- 
istence of  the  world  must  be  presupposed  before  that  of 
God  can  be  deduced  as  a corollary  from  it.  But 
Yedantism  represents  the  world  as  non-existent,  a mere 
illusion,  an  unreality,  a nonentity.  The  very  founda- 
tion, therefore,  of  the  teleological  argument  is  under- 
mined. But  Brahma,  it  may  be  said,  is  the  illumina- 


THE  MAYA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY. 


355 


tor,  and  enables  the  internal  organ  or  the  inner  sensory 
to  perceive  and  cognize  ; and  the  teleological  argument 
may  be  based  upon  its  operations,  if  not  upon  the  phe- 
nomena of  nature.  But  Brahma  is  called  the  illumina- 
tor or  creator  by  courtesy  only  ; by  false  imputation 
rather  than  with  a due  regard  to  truth.  Besides,  the 
internal  organ  itself  is  an  illusion,  and  all  its  operations 
are  illusions  ! 

But  Ignorance  exists  both  in  a collective  and  in  a 
distributive  capacity.  May  not  the  teleological  argu- 
ment be  made  to  rest  on  it  ? But  Ignorance  itself  is 
ignorantly  imagined,  and  therefore  false.  Ignorance 
certainly  cannot  be  regarded  as  a material  substance  of 
extreme  tenuity,  all-diffusive  and  all-embracing  ; for 
it  is  emphatically  said  to  be  different  from  the  Prakriti 
of  the  Sankhya  school.  Nor  can  Ignorance  be  regarded 
as  a spiritual  substance,  for  by  hypothesis  spiritual  sub- 
stance, apart  from  Brahma,  called  Intelligence,  does  not 
and  cannot  exist.  It  has  what  Dr.  Banerjea  calls 
“ conventional  existence,”  which  is,  as  he  says,  tanta- 
mount to  non-existence. 

The  conclusion,  then,  to  which  we  are  brought  is 
that,  as  nothing  exists  but  Brahma,  the  great  teleolog- 
ical argument  has  not  a peg  to  hang  on  in  the  Vedantic 
system.  The  other  arguments  in  favor  of  the  existence 
of  God — those  based  on  our  intuitive  convictions,  our 
sense  of  responsibility,  and  our  moral  nature  in  general — 
share  its  fate.  The  only  argument  the  Vedantin  can 
utilize  is  based  on  what  he  calls  “ testimony”  or  revela- 
tion. But,  after  all,  revelation  is  an  illusion,  and  there- 
fore nothing  in  the  shape  of  a reason  can  possibly  be 
assigned  for  his  unequivocal  statements  regarding  the 
existence  of  Brahma. 

Let  it  also  be  noted  that  Brahma,  as  described  in  the 


356 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


standard  documents  of  tlie  Maya  school,  if  not  of  all 
Yedantic  schools,  is  a nonentity.  Brahma  is  without 
attributes,  both  material  and  moral.  When  he  is  de- 
scribed as  having  extension  and  other  material  proper- 
ties, the  description  is  merely  conventional,  provision- 
ally resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  his 
unrelated  and  unqualified  being.  Again,  when  spiritual 
powers  and  dispositions  are  attributed  to  him,  the 
attribution  is  illusory,  and  must  be  withdrawn  before  a 
proper  idea  of  his  existence  can  be  formed.  Ife  is 
therefore  destitute  of  both  material  and  moral  attri- 
butes. lie  is  neither  matter  nor  mind — an  inconceivable 
phantom,  an  illusion,  a nonentity.  Yedantism  is  equiv- 
alent to  the  absolute  nihilism  of  Buddha  and  his  fol- 
lowers ! 

A brief  reference  to  the  Yedantic  theory  of  bondage 
and  emancipation  is  enough  to  bring  us  to  the  conclu- 
sion of  our  discourse.  The  cause  of  the  bondage  of  the 
soul  is,  as  in  all  the  schools,  Ignorance,  which  leads  to 
desire,  work,  and  the  long  chain  of  transmigration. 
Ignorance,  by  its  encompassing  and  projecting  power, 
conceals  “ the  Secondless,  Indivisible  Brahma”  from  the 
view  of  the  soul,  breeds  an  idea  of  its  difference  from 
the  Being  with  which  it  is  identical,  generates  a desire 
to  secure  pleasure  and  avoid  pain,  and  leads  to  works 
which  must  bear  their  fruits  in  an  almost  interminable 
series  of  births  and  deaths.  And  therefore  to  ensure 
liberation,  all  that  is  necessary  is  to  destroy  ignorance  or 
supersede  it  by  right  knowledge.  The  devotee  must 
not  only  comprehend  the  meaning  of  the  sentence 

That  art  Thou,”  but  understand  its  counterpart,  “ I 
am  Brahma.”  lie  must  notice  the  illusory  character 
of  all  that  appears  to  exist,  or  all  that  is  besides  the 
absolute  spirit,  and  thereby  be  in  a position  to  say,  “ I 


THE  MAYA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY. 


357 


am  Brahma,  the  unchanging,  pure,  intelligent,  free, 
undecaying,  supreme  joy,  eternal,  secondless,” 

How  is  such  self-knowledge  to  be  attained  ? To 
acquire  that  right  knowledge  which  is  a stepping-stone 
to  liberation  "‘it  is  necessary  to  practise  (a)  hearing 
( sravancc ),  (l)  consideration  (mananaf),  (c)  profound 
contemplation  ( nididhyasano ),  and  (d)  meditation 
( samadhi ).”  “ Hearing  is  the  ascertaining  of  the  drift 

of  all  the  Vedantic  writings  regarding  the  secondless 
Reality.”  “ Consideration  is  unceasing  reflection  on 
the  secondless  Reality,  which  has  been  heard  of  in  con- 
junction with  arguments  in  support  of  the  Vedanta.” 
“ Profound  contemplation  is  the  continuance  of  ideas 
consistent  with  the  secondless  Reality,  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  notion  of  body  and  such-like  things,  which  are 
inconsistent  (with  Him).”  “ Meditation  is  of  two 

kinds — viz.,  (1)  with  recognition  of  subject  and  ob- 
ject (saviJcalpaJca),  and  (2)  without  such  recognition 
{ 'virvikalpaJca ).  ’ ’ 

Here  we  have  the  "‘seeded”  and  the  “seedless” 
meditation  of  Toga  Philosophy,  the  meditation  in  which 
the  triad  of  subject,  object,  and  thought  are  recognized 
as  different  entities,  and  that  in  which  they  are  merged 
into  a unity.  The  means  to  the  attainment  of  the 
latter,  enumerated  in  Chapter  XIII.  of  the  Vedanta  Sar, 
are  the  eight  accessories  of  Yoga — viz.,  “ (1)  For- 
bearance (ijama)  ; (2)  Religious  observances  (niyama) ; 
(3)  Religious  postures  ( asana ) ; (4)  Regulation  of  breath 
( pranayama ) ; (5)  Restraint  of  the  organs  of  sense 
(pratyahara)  ; (6)  Fixed  attention  ( dharana ) ; (7) 

Contemplation  ( dhyana ) ; (8)  Meditation  (samad- 
hi)” 

The  hindrances  to  such  meditation,  or  “ the  medita- 
tion without  recognition  of  subject  and  object,”  are  not 


358 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


exactly  those  enumerated  in  the  Yoga  Sastra.  They 
are  : 

“1.  Mental  Inactivity  {lay a). 

“ 2.  Distraction  (vikshepa). 

“ 3.  Passion  {kashaya),  and 

“ 4.  The  tasting  of  enjoyment  ( rasaswada ).” 

The  first  of  these  obstacles  may  strike  us  as  strange 
in  a system  which  makes  mental  inactivity  its  goal. 
But  the  explanation  removes  the  difficulty  : “ : Mental 
inactivity  ’ is  the  drowsiness  of  the  modification  of  the 
internal  organ  while  not  resting  on  the  second!  ess 
Reality.”  "When  the  obstacles  are  removed,  and  dis- 
criminative knowledge  followed  by  perfect  quiescence 
in,  not  apart  from,  the  secondless  Brahma  is  attained, 
the  state  of  the  soul  is  called  jivamnukti,  which  is, 
being  interpreted,  “ liberated,  but  still  living.”  The 
devotee  in  this  state  is  in  a manner  petrified,  though 
alive.  lie  moves  not,  being  “ as  (the  flame  of)  a lamp 
standing  in  a sheltered  spot”;  ho  sees  not,  hears  not, 
thinks  not,  breathes  not  as  ordinary  mortals  do. 
“ Though  he  has  eyes,  he  is  as  though  he  had  them 
not  ; though  he  has  ears,  he  is  as  though  he  had  them 
not  ; though  he  has  a mind,  he  is  as  one  without  a 
mind  ; though  he  has  vital  airs,  he  is  as  though  he  had 
them  not.”  Being  alive,  he  cannot  but  see,  but  he 
" sees  not  duality,  or,  if  seeing  it,  regards  it  as  non- 
duality ;”  and  when  he  acts  he  “is  free  from  (the 
results  of)  actions.  ” He  is  above  responsibility,  and  all 
distinctions,  even  those  between  virtue  and  vice,  purity 
and  impurity,  neatness  and  sliabbiness,  etc.,  vanish 
before  him  into  thin  air.  “If  he  who  knows  the  sec- 
ondless Reality  may  act  as  he  likes,  what  difference  is 
there  between  the  lcnowers  of  truth  and  dogs  in  respect 
of  eating  impure  food  ? Except  the  fact  of  knowing 


THE  MAYA,  OR  THE  ILLUSION  THEORY. 


359 


Brahma,  there  is  no  difference  ; the  one  knows  the  Self, 
the  other  (the  dog)  does  not.” 

Such  is  the  goal  of  the  system  ! The  Paramhansa, 
o?  the  Knower  of  Brahma,  feeding  as  swine  upon  filth 
and  living  as  swine  without  self-consciousness,  thought, 
perception  of  physical  and  moral  beauty,  recognition  of 
distinction  between  good  and  had  ; without  taste, 
refinement,  sublimity  of  thought,  elevation  of  feeling, 
holiness  of  purpose,  and  grandeur  of  aspiration,  left  not 
even  to  the  guidance  of  instinct,  and  reserved  for  a state 
of  annihilation  in  a Being  destitute  of  intelligence  and 
volition,  as  well  as  of  material  properties,  and  therefore 
a nonentity  ! 

This  system  has  proved  a refuge  of  lies  to  many  a 
hardened  sinner.  The  perplexed  minds  which  have 
found  shelter  in  its  solution  of  the  problems  of  exist- 
ence are  few  indeed  ; but  the  number  of  the  wicked 
hearts  which  have  been  composed  to  sleep  by  the  opiate 
of  its  false  hopes  is  incalculable.  The  astute  politician, 
whose  past  life  is  a record  only  of  malversation  and 
successful  intrigue  ; the  tyrant,  whose  progress  in  life 
lias  been  marked  by  violence  and  wanton  cruelty  ; the 
rake,  whom  a course  of  unblushing  licentiousness  has 
brought  to  the  verge  of  a premature  grave  ; the  man 
steeped  in  the  vice  of  intoxication  and  determined  not 
to  abandon  ; the  villain,  the  ruffian,  the  criminal,  the 
cunning  cheat  and  the  daring  rogue,  and  the  false 
friend  and  the  sneaking  hypocrite — what  a balm  to  the 
seared  but  not  deadened  consciences  of  these,  and  others 
as  bad  as  they,  in  a system  which  assures  them  that  all 
their  fears  arising  from  their  recognition  of  moral  dis- 
tinctions are  groundless,  and  that  perfect  beatitude  will 
be  their  reward  if  they  can  only  bring  themselves  to  the 
conclusion  that  there  is  no  difference  between  God  and 


3C0 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


man,  virtue  and  vice,  cleanliness  and  filth,  heaven  and 
hell  ! Nowhere  has  the  system  been  so  universally 
tried  as  in  India,  and  its  results  here  are  fitted  to  lead 
any  candid  observer  to  re-echo  the  statement — Pan- 
theism is  Pandiabolism. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


THE  HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED. 

A good  deal  of  morbid  sentimentalism  is  arrayed  in 
behalf  of  what  is  called  the  ancient  civilization  of 
India.  An  attempt  is  made  to  give  prominence  to  and 
speak  in  terms  of  praise  of  the  commendable  features 
of  national  life  and  the  excellences  of  individual  char- 
acter it  has  fostered  ; and  thus  far  a work,  not  merely 
unobjectionable  but  positively  useful,  is  accomplished. 
But  when  an  argument  is  based  on  these  admirable  ele- 
ments of  an  effete  civilization  in  favor  of  its  perpetua- 
tion, or  against  its  supersession  by  a higher  and  a 
healthier  civilization,  a move  in  a direction  on  the 
whole  right  is  transformed  into  a drag  on  genuine 
progress.  The  civilization  of  the  country,  though  em- 
balmed amid  sacred  recollections,  is  dead  • and  it  is  as 
impossible  to  fnake  it  live  as  a plastic,  formative  power 
as  it  is  to  convert  the  dead  language  with  which  it  is 
intimately  associated  into  a living  tongue  ! 

It  is  very  easy  to  say  that  Western  and  Eastern 
civilizations  ought  to  help  each  other  by  an  unrestricted 
interchange  of  beauty  and  glory,  the  one  being  ready 
to  adopt  and  incorporate  with  its  substance  the  peculiar 
excellences  of  the  other,  and  both  being  ready  to  co- 
operate in  the  great  work  of  raising  fallen  nationalities 
and  degraded  peoples.  But  the  two  forces  refuse  to 
march  alongside  of  each  other,  raised  above  petty  jeal- 
ousies and  unseemly  antagonisms.  The  stronger  over- 


302 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


comes  the  feebler,  and  evinces  an  irresistible  tendency 
to  reign  alone  and  unrivalled.  The  law  of  the  survival 
of  the  fittest  reigns  here  as  elsewhere  ! Those  who 
have  carefully  watched  the  progress  Western  civiliza- 
tion has  made  in  the  country  will  never  hesitate  to  ad- 
mit that  no  compromise  is  possible  between  it  and  the 
decrepit  civilization  it  has  had  to  encounter  ; and  that, 
if  its  superstructure  is  to  be  raised  at  all,  it  is  to  be 
reared  on  the  ruins  of  its  rival  ! 

But  Western  civilization  is  by  no  means  faultless, 
and  therefore  the  fatality  in  favor  of  its  triumphant 
march  and  ultimate  ascendency  cannot  be  contemplated 
with  unmixed  satisfaction.  And  it  were  to  be  wished 
that  its  progress  had  not  been  ensured  till  it  had  been 
completely  shorn  of  its  objectionable  features.  But 
this  is  not  the  case  with  the  heaven- bestowed  religion 
with  which  the  very  best  elements  of  that  civilization 
are  intimately  and  indissolubly  associated.  Christianity 
cannot  amalgamate  with  the  religions  of  the  country, 
and  if  it  is  at  all  to  rear  its  superstructure  on  Hindu 
soil,  it  will  be  on  the  ruins  of  the  Hindu  religion  and 
the  others  by  which  its  sway  has  been  for  ages  and  is 
now  being  curtailed. 

Christianity  represents  a philosophy — a philosophy 
not  methodically  developed,  not  intrenched  behind  a 
network  of  definitions,  propositions,  and  syllogisms, 
but  sublime  and  deep  nevertheless,  suited  to  man’s  con- 
dition in  life,  and  in  accord  with  his  common-sense  and 
highest  reason.  Between  this  philosophy  and  that 
enshrined  in  Sanscrit  literature  there  is  very  little  in- 
deed that  is  common,  while  in  all  essential  features  the 
one  is  the  antipodes  of  the  other.  How  is  a compro- 
mise possible  ? A lasting  peace  or  even  a temporary 
truce  ? A compromise  may  be  effected,  a peace  nego- 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  363 


tiated,  between  the  dead  civilization  of  Asia  and  the 
living  civilization  of  Europe,  between  languages  dead 
and  gone  and  those  which  are  full  of  life  and  vigor. 
But  a compromise  between  a God-given  and  a man- 
invented  religion,  a philosophy  true  and  a philosophy 
falsely  so  called,  is  monstrous,  and  should  be  deprecated. 

But  is  there  not  an  indissoluble  connection  between 
ancient  and  modern  philosophy  ? Yes  ; there  is  that 
sort  of  connection  between  the  one  and  the  other  which 
exists  between  the  parent  and  his  offspring,  between 
the  cause  and  its  effect,  between  the  producing  power 
and  the  thing  produced.  Modern  philosophy,  falsely 
so  called,  is  the  child  of  ancient  philosophy,  and  differs 
from  it  in  external  drapery  rather  than  in  any  feature 
of  an  essential  character.  Christianity  does  not  ally 
itself  to  the  self-sufficient  philosophy  which  in  these 
days  is  reviving  some,  if  not  all,  of  the  aberrations  of 
ancient  thought.  And  therefore  a compromise  between 
the  varied  types  of  ancient  and  modem  speculation  does 
not  indicate  any  approach  on  the  part  of  Christian  phi- 
losophy toward  a reconciliation  at  once  unnatural  and 
irrational. 

It  is  our  intention  in  this  paper  to  set  forth  the 
difference  or  rather  the  contrast  between  the  vital  doc- 
trines of  Christian  philosophy  and  those  of  Hindu  Phi- 
losophy. But  before  we  do  so  it  is  desirable  to  offer  a 
remark  or  two  on  the  ingenious  way  in  which  the 
sombre  character  of  Hindu  Philosophy  is  explained. 
Hindu  Philosophy  is  Pessimism.  It  begins  with  a recog- 
nition of  human  sorrow,  goes  out  in  vain  in  quest  of  a 
proper  remedy,  and  ultimately  arrives  at  annihilation 
as  the  goal  where  human  misery  terminates  only  in  the 
extinction  of  life.  Even  Schopenhauer  does  not  speak 
of  the  phenomena  of  life  in  terms  more  lugubrious  than 


3G4 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


those  which  form  the  prominent  features  of  the  phrase- 
ology and  nomenclature  of  philosophy  in  our  country. 
How  is  its  gloomy  character  explained  ? 

According  to  Max  Muller  the  Greek  intellect  was  the 
very  antipodes  of  the  Hindu  intellect.  The  Greek  was 
sensuous,  of  a volatile  temperament,  alive  to  the  varied 
charms  of  the  world  of  the  eye,  and  the  ear,  and  ab- 
sorbed in  its  occupations  and  pleasures.  His  intellect 
was  vivacious,  but  not  profound  ; ready  to  catch  the 
significance  that  lies  on  the  surface  of  things,  but  un- 
able to  apprehend  the  deep  meaning  that  underlies  it  ; 
while  his  earth-born  impulses  drove  him  toward  the 
present  business  of  life  and  its  ephemeral  enjoyments. 
He  therefore  distinguished  himself  as  a man  of  busi- 
ness, a statesman,  an  orator,  a dramatist,  an  artist,  a 
son  of  Mars,  or  a devotee  of  pleasure  ; and  he  failed  to 
unfold  and  expound  the  deep  meaning  of  the  universe 
or  the  recondite  truths  of  philosophy.  The  Hindu,  on 
the  contrary,  was  highly  intellectual,  insensible  to  ex- 
ternal charms,  and  averse  to  the  grovelling  realities  of 
sense  and  the  commonplace  incidents  of  life.  His  in- 
tellect was  deep,  and  led  him  to  penetrate  instinctively 
beneath  the  surface  of  external  nature,  and  to  bring 
out  the  jewels  of  profound  truth  hidden  in  its  inmost 
recesses  ; while  his  feelings,  chastened  by  domineering 
intellectualism,  tended  to  draw  him  away  from  the  busy 
scenes  of  life,  with  its  monotonous  round  of  occupations 
and  pleasures.  And  therefore  he  failed  to  distinguish 
himself  on  the  busy  theatre  of  worldly  success  and 
worldly  renown,  and  succeeded  only  as  an  ascetic 
thinker  and  recluse  philosopher.  This  contrast  can  be 
very  beautifully  drawn  out  from  universals  to  particu- 
lars, from  the  region  of  magnificent  generalizations  to 
that  of  petty  details.  There  are,  however,  some  facts 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  365 


incompatible  with  the  assumption  of  such  a sharp  an- 
tithesis between  the  intellect  of  ancient  Greece  and  an- 
cient India.  It  is  a matter  of  fact  that  the  generality 
of  people  in  India  were,  as  they  are  now,  as  thoroughly 
immersed  in  the  revocations  and  pleasures  of  life  as  the 
generality  of  people  in  Greece  ; while  in  that  favored 
cradle  of  taste  and  artistic  beauty  schools  of  philosophy 
wTere  not  wanting  wherein  the  deep  problems  of  life 
were  as  earnestly  and  as  fruitlessly  pondered  and 
analyzed  as  in  India.  The  peculiarly  gloomy  type  of 
Indian  Philosophy  cannot  be  satisfactorily  explained  by 
a reference  solely  to  the  intellectual  differences  pointed 
out  by  scholars  like  Max  Muller. 

Nor  will  the  specious  theory  propounded  in  Buckle’s 
£<  History  of  Civilization  in  England  ” of  itself  account 
for  the  peculiar  type  of  intellectual  development  no- 
ticeable in  Hindu  Philosophy.  Buckle  traces  all  the 
ethnological  peculiarities  by  which  one  race  is  distin- 
guished from  the  others  to  the  omnipotent  influence  of 
physical  causes  ; and,  according  to  him,  food,  soil,  cli- 
mate, and  general  aspects  of  nature  are  enough  to  ex- 
plain the  idiosyncrasy  of  Hindu  Philosophy,  especially 
as  it  was  elaborated  in  a country  and  at  a time  where 
and  when  man  had  not  learned  to  modify  nature,  and 
was  therefore  irresistibly  propelled  by  its  laws  and 
forces.  Our  Aryan  ancestor  had  in  the  country  a rich 
5 soil,  and  much  labor  was  not  needed  on  his  part  to 
make  it  yield  enough  for  his  sustenance.  He  was, 
moreover,  temperate  and  abstemious  ; and  his  diet, 
being  simple  and  spare,  combined  with  the  enervating 
influences  of  a tropical  climate  in  making  him  indolent 
and  sluggish,  prone  to  fruitless  meditation,  and  averse 
to  the  stirring  incidents  of  an  active  and  busy  life. 
Nor  were  the  general  aspects  of  nature  in  the  plains 


366 


HINDU  PIIILOSOPIIY. 


fitted  to  magnetize  his  intellect,  during  especially  the 
time  justly  called  the  season  of  universal  lassitude  and 
languor.  This  beautiful  theory  might  be  adopted  but 
for  one  serious  objection,  besides  the  one  which  nullifies 
Max  Muller’s  representation  of  the  opposite  tendencies 
of  the  Greek  and  Hindu  intellect.  It  is  a matter  of 
fact  that  these  identical  physical  causes  did  not  prevent 
the  Rishis  of  the  Rig  Yeda  times  and  their  followers 
from  leading  a life  very  much  like  that  of  the  ancient 
Greeks,  and  in  marked  contrast  to  that  of  the  philoso- 
phers whose  excogitations  assumed  so  gloomy  a form. 
It  may  be  said  that  the  physical  causes  enumerated  by 
Buckle  had  not  produced  their  legitimate  fruits  among 
the  Aryans  of  Rig  Yeda  times,  who,  having  come  from 
a colder  climate,  retained  that  mental  activity  and 
bodily  vigor  which  were  impaired  gradually  under  the 
tropical  heat  of  our  country.  But  it  must  not  be  for- 
gotten that  this  era  of  vaunted  purity  was  long  enough 
to  give  the  climate  a fine  opportunity  of  displaying  its 
disastrous  power  in  deteriorated  physique  and  enfeebled 
intellect,  the  interval  between  the  composition  of  the 
earlier  hymns  and  later  ones  being  admittedly  no  less 
than  a period  of  three  hundred  years.  It  should,  more- 
over, be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Brahmana  period,  almost 
equally  long,  and  separated  from  it  by  an  interval  of  at 
least  two  hundred  years,  presents  the  same  picture  of 
devotion  to  sensuous  enjoyment  which  we  find  depicted 
in  the  Rig  Yeda. 

The  truth  is,  no  single  theory  cut  and  dried  can  of 
itself  satisfactorily  explain  tne  peculiar  bent  of  the 
Hindu  intellect,  and  the  sombre  type  of  the  philosophy 
to  which  it  gave  birth.  A variety  of  conditions  tended 
to  give  the  one  its  introspective  character  and  the  other 
its  dark  color.  Food  and  climate  had  their  appreci- 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  3G7 


able  influence,  but  they  did  not  constitute  the  sole 
cause  of  the  unique  effect.  The  theocracy  established 
by  our  Aryan  ancestors,  so  obviously  fitted  to  lead  to 
political  inaction  by  burking  independence  of  thought 
and  freedom  of  speech  in  matters  affecting  the  interests 
even  of  this  life,  combined,  with  the  absence  of  that 
spirit  of  scientific  inquiry  which  the  ancient  world 
rarely  if  ewer  saw  evoked  in  its  vigor  and  enthusiasm, 
to  breed  in  the  Indian  philosopher  his  habit  of  morbid 
introspection,  and  give  his  speculations  a gloomy  char- 
acter. His  intellect  was  too  lofty  to  allow  him  to  rest 
content,  as  common  minds  do,  with  the  petty  concerns 
of  life  ; and  as  he  was  driven  away  from  its  nobler 
objects  and  ambitions  by  the  very  constitution  of  the 
society  of  which  he  was  an  integral  part,  he  had  to  fall 
back  upon  himself  for  the  exercise  of  those  powers  of 
which  the  world  around  him  refused  to  make  a proper 
use.  He  made  himself  the  subject  of  his  study  and 
meditation,  and  the  gloominess  he  saw  within  himself 
was  by  an  easy  transition  transferred  to  the  picture  he 
drew  of  human  life  and  the  conclusions  he  based 
thereon.  The  Greek  philosopher,  who  had  a grand 
theatre  of  activity  opened  for  him  in  a healthier  politi- 
cal atmosphere,  looked  out  of  himself  \ and  made  happi- 
ness the  object  of  his  search  ; while  the  Hindu  philoso- 
pher, cut  off  from  such  stirring  scenes,  looked  within 
himself  and  made  extinction  of  pain  the  object  of  his 
life  and  thought.  His  philosophy  was  emphatically 
esoteric , or  subjective , while  that  of  his  Greek  brother 
was  on  the  whole  exoteric , or  objective. 

To  return  to  the  great  object  of  this  paper — to  show 
that  in  all  important  features  the  philosophy  we  have 
been  trying  patiently  to  unfold  is  the  very  antipodes, 
not  of  ancient  Greek  philosophy,  which  was  its  repro- 


368 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


duction  in  some  respects  and  its  counterpart  in  others  ; 
not  of  the  boasted  modern  philosophy,  in  which  almost 
all  its  important  doctrines  are  revived  and  presented  in 
fresh  garments,  but  of  the  philosophy  of  the  New  Tes- 
tament. This  antithesis  or  antagonism  will  be  manifest 
if  we  take  into  consideration  its  descriptions  of  (1)  God, 
(2)  Creation,  (3)  Providence,  (4)  Man,  (5)  his  Duty  in 
Life,  (6)  the  Source  of  his  Present  Degradation,  (7)  his 
Salvation,  and  (8)  the  Prospect  before  him. 

1.  To  begin  with  God.  According  to  Hindu  Phi- 
losophy, God  is  a nonentity.  One,  the  very  first  of  its 
six  orthodox  schools,  declares  Him  non-existent,  and 
opposes  a series  of  arguments,  ingenious  though  incon- 
clusive, to  those  brought  forward  by  common-sense  to 
prove  Ilis  existence.  The  other  schools,  however, 
thought  fit  to  abandon  its  attitude  of  rank  atheism,  and 
substitute  for  its  appalling  negation  a Being  wrapped 
up  in  grandiloquent  phraseology,  but  destitute  of  any 
quality  fitted  to  determine  it  or  discriminate  it  from 
nothing.  God,  when  kindly  allowed  to  exist,  is  with- 
out power,  without  intelligence,  without  feeling,  with- 
out material  properties  and  spiritual  attributes,  or,  to 
speak  philosophically,  without  power,  without  quali- 
ties, and  without  relations.  lie  is  the  Pure  Being  of 
some  schools  of  Greek  philosophy  ; but  as,  according 
to  no  less  a philosopher  than  Hegel,  Pure  Being  equals 
nothing,  He  is  a nonentity.  Ancient  philosophy 
labored,  not  only  in  India,  but  in  all  famous  centres  of 
speculative  thought,  to  reduce  God  to  nothing  ; and 
such  phrases  as  “ the  Eternal  Void,”  “ the  Everlasting 
Night,”  etc.,  were  most  ingeniously  invented  to  set 
forth  Ilis  real  nothingness  under  a cloud  of  high-sound- 
ing words.  And  modern  philosophers  are  simply  fol- 
lowing their  example  in  their  attempts  to  maintain  the 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  3G9 


nothingness  of  God  behind  an  array  of  imposing  tech- 
nicalities. According  to  them,  God  is  the  Absolute  and 
the  Unconditioned.  If  these  technical  expressions 
mean  anything,  they  represent  God  as  Pure  Being  and 
nothing  more — that  subtle,  impalpable  nonentity  which 
defies  every  attempt  to  determine  it  or  give  it  some- 
thing like  a definite  shape.  God  again  is  the  Infinite, 
and  as  such  He  fills  all  states  and  pervades  all  condi- 
tions. He  cannot  be  existent,  for  were  He  so  He 
would  be  out  of  the  condition  of  non-existence.  He 
cannot  be  omnipotent,  for  if  He  were  so  He  would  not 
fill  the  state  of  parvipotence.  He  cannot  be  perfect, 
for  imperfection  is  a condition  He  must  pervade  as 
well  as  perfection.  This  miserable  Being,  hanging 
between  life  and  death,  power  and  weakness,  moral 
excellency  and  moral  turpitude,  indeterminate,  undefin- 
able,  out  of  relation  to  all  things,  yet  the  fountain  of 
creation,  is  the  God  of  modern  philosophy.  Better  by 
far  the  idol  of  the  semi-civilized  man,  which  represents 
some  hero  of  a bygone  age,  who  to  a host  of  vices  added 
at  least  a few  virtues  ! Better  by  far  the  fetich  of  the 
savage,  which  is  in  his  opinion  instinct  with  life  and 
armed  with  power,  and  which  when  propitiated  is  be- 
lieved able  to  protect  the  worshipper  from  some  tangi- 
ble danger  or  calamity  ! 

The  God  of  the  Bible  is  not  such  a Being.  He  is  not 
an  inscrutable  force,  a nondescript  power  of  natural 
selection,  a mass  of  potentialities,  a blind,  self-evolv- 
ing principle  acting  under  an  iron  necessity  immanent 
in  or  foreign  to  it.  He  is  a Person,  intelligent,  volun- 
tary, infinite  in  power,  wisdom,  and  holiness.  He 
pervades  creation,  and  is  at  the  same  time  above  it, 
immanent  and  transcendent,  intramundane  and  extra- 
mundane.  He  is  not  merely  the  Creator  and  Upholder, 


370 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


but  the  Ruler  and  Governor  of  the  universe.  He  loves 
and  hates — loves  order,  harmony,  righteousness  ; hates 
disorder,  disharmony,  and  unrighteousness.  lie  has 
not,  therefore,  that  sentimental  weakness  which  unfits 
a ruler  for  the  sterner  elements  of  his  vocation.  The 
consistency  of  the  Bible  picture  of  God,  drawn  by 
different  hands  in  different  places  and  at  different 
times,  under  endless  varieties  of  circumstances,  and 
presented  in  diversified  modes — now  in  a series  of  provi- 
dential dealings,  then  in  denunciations  of  an  appalhng 
nature,  and  anon  in  exhortations  and  appeals  which  are 
fitted  to  melt  the  hardest  heart  or  bedew  the  driest 
eye — is  a standing  miracle  ; while  prophetic  announce- 
ments of  what  God  is  to  do  combine  with  narratives  of 
what  God  has  done  in  upholding  that  perfect  character 
of  severity  and  tenderness  which  nature,  through  its 
beneficent  and  destructive  agencies,  gives  to  its  Author. 

Yvr e do  not  wish  here  to  insist  on  that  crowning  rev- 
elation of  God  which  is  the  characteristic  glory  of  our 
holy  religion,  Ilis  revelation  in  Christ  Jesus,  in  whom 
lie  is  brought  down  to  the  level  of  our  comprehension 
more  than  in  natural  phenomena  and  providential  deal- 
ings, and  in  whom  therefore  He  is  presented  in  the 
only  form  in  which  it  is  possible  for  us  to  know,  love, 
and  serve  Him.  Nor  do  we  wish  to  dwell  upon  His 
great  work,  in  which  both  the  sterner  and  milder  feat- 
ures of  the  divine  character  are  brought  into  bold  relief, 
and  which  therefore  is  pre-eminently  fitted  to  discour- 
age sin,  and  at  the  same  time  encourage  the  sinner  to 
come  where  pardon,  peace,  and  joy  are  held  in  reserve 
for  him. 

2.  Let  us  next  contrast  the  notion  of  creation  em- 
bodied in  Hindu  Philosophy  with  that  presented  in  the 
Bible.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  the  ex-nihilo  theory 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  371 

of  creation  witliin  the  compass  of  Hindu  literature  in 
general,  or  philosophy  in  particular.  The  maxim 
navastunovastusiddki,  which  is  the  Sanscrit  version  of 
ex  nihilo  nihil  fit,  underlies,  runs  through,  or  permeates 
all  the  grotesque  cosmogonies  associated  with  it.  The 
Sankhya  school  assumes  a self -evolving  material  princi- 
ple called  Prakriti,  and  evolves  creation  out  of  its  trini- 
tarian substance.  The  Yoga  school  adds  God  to  its 
categories,  but  the  being  whose  existence  is  postulated 
is  a nonentity,  and  has  consequently  nothing  to  do 
with  the  creation,  preservation,  and  destruction  of  the 
world,  all  which  operations  are  left  exactly  where  the 
Sankhya  school  leaves  them,  hanging  on  the  potential- 
ities of  its  primordial  principle.  The  Logical  schools 
have  a God  equally  passive  and  quiescent,  equally 
devoid  of  power,  quality,  and  relation  ; while  the  orig- 
ination and  preservation  of  the  universe  are  left  in  the 
hands  of  a mysterious  and  irresistible  force  called 
Adrishta,  which  has  atoms  of  various  kinds  as  its  work- 
ing material.  And  these  four  schools  concur  with  one 
another  in  maintaining  the  pre-existence  of  souls  and 
rendering  them  useless  appendages  by  forcing  them  out 
of  all  power,  quality,  and  relation.  The  Mimansa 
throws  all  questions  of  a recondite  character  into  the 
background,  and  seems  to  maintain  the  eternity  of  the 
world  along  with  the  Yedas  ; while  to  its  champions  it 
is  a matter  of  perfect  indifference  whether  God  exists 
or  not.  And  finally,  the  Yedantic  system  in  its  earlier 
forms  evolves  creation  out  of  the  substance  of  God, 
modified  according  to  its  exigencies,  and  in  its  later 
forms  represents  the  whole  universe  as  a gigantic 
dream. 

In  marked  contrast  to  all  this,  the  Bible  represents 
God  as  the  Creator  of  the  world,  of  its  substance  as 


s:2 


HIXDU  PHILOSOPHY, 


well  as  of  its  form,  as  the  Personal,  Intelligent,  and 
Voluntary  Agent  who  brought  entity  out  of  nonentity, 
things  that  appear  out  of  nothing,  not  as  the  Architect 
who  builded  up  the  universe  out  of  pre-existing  mate- 
rials. The  Bible  does  not  compel  us  to  oppose  the 
modern  theory  of  evolution ; but  according  to  it  the 
process  begins  with  an  act  of  creation  thoroughly 
ex  nihilo , and  progresses  in  a line,  not  uninterrupted 
by  fresh  acts  of  direct  intervention,  under  the  guidance 
of  infinite  wisdom,  backed  by  unlimited  power  and 
infinite  goodness.  The  idea  of  creation,  or  something 
brought  out  of  nothing,  is  as  distasteful  to  modern 
scientists  as  it  was  to  our  ancient  philosophers  ; and 
that  because  it  is  inconceivable.  But  it  is  forgotten 
that  the  theory  of  spontaneous  generation,  or  of  life 
coming  out  of  dead  matter,  or  that  of  thought  spring- 
ing out  of  slime,  is  equally  inconceivable.  And  if  we 
have  to  swallow  the  one  theory,  we  may  as  well  swal- 
low the  other  ! 

3.  God,  according  to  Hindu  Philosophy,  is  a non- 
entity, and  therefore  cannot  rule  or  provide  for  the 
exigencies  of  life.  He  is  in  the  same  predicament  with 
an  idol  of  stone — nay,  decidedly  worse  off.  The  idol  of 
stone  has  eyes,  but  it  sees  not  ; ears,  but  it  hears  not  ; 
a nose,  but  it  smells  not  ; but  it  consists  of  some  mate- 
rial of  which  a proper  use  may  be  made.  But  the  God 
of  philosophy  is  a phantom,  and  has  no  existence  be- 
yond the  compass  of  an  imagination  prone  to  frivolity, 
though  not  destitute  of  creative  power.  How  is  it 
possible  for  Him  to  govern,  to  control  the  laws  of  the 
material  world,  guide  human  volitions,  and  regulate  the 
complicated  machinery  of  life  ? He  is  therefore  very 
properly  thrust  into  the  background  ; and  a material 
form  such  as  Prakriti,  or  metaphysical  phantasms  such 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  373 


as  Karma  or  work,  Maya  or  illusion,  are  posited  to 
regulate  the  evolutions  of  providence.  Modern  philos- 
ophers have  not  been  slow  to  follow  the  example,  and 
such  fantastic  creations  of  a prurient  imagination  as 
.Natural  Selection,  Kosmos,  Moral  Order,  Thought, 
Idea,  etc. , have  been  pressed  into  service,  clothed  with 
gubernatorial  powers,  and  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
economy  of  providence.  The  scientist  substitutes  his 
immutable  laws  for  these  intangible  chimeras  ; but  he 
does  not  see  that,  apart  from  a moving  or  a regulating 
power,  they  are  as  chimerical  as  the  subtlest  phantasy 
conceived  or  invented  by  the  spirit  of  metaphysical 
refinement  or  generalization. 

God,  according  to  the  Bible,  is  the  Author  of  Crea- 
tion and  the  God  of  Providence.  Nor  is  TIis  govern- 
ment general,  confined  to  operations  and  events  which 
are  invested  with  peculiar  importance  and  glory  by 
human  beings.  His  government  is  minute,  particular, 
or  individual,  and  it  comprehends  all  material  move- 
ments, from  those  of  the  largest  heavenly  bodies  the 
advancing  light  of  which  has  not  yet  reached  our  globe, 
down  to  those  of  a mote  scarcely  visible  in  a bright  ray 
of  light,  and  all  events,  from  the  political  convulsions 
by  which  great  empires  are  shaken  to  their  centres,  or 
sanguinary  wars  by  which  their  boundary  lines  are  ex- 
tended, down  to  the  pettiest  occurrences  of  the  most 
prosaic  of  fives — the  fife  say  of  a shoeblack  or  a chim- 
ney-sweep. “ Are  there  not  two  sparrows  sold  for  a 
farthing  ? and  one  of  them  shall  not  fall  on  the  ground 
without  your  Father.  But  the  very  hairs  of  your  head 
are  all  numbered.”  Some  theistic  philosophers  are 
willing  to  allow  a sort  of  general  government  of  the 
world  and  its  concerns  by  God,  but  they  revolt  from 
the  idea  of  representing  Him  as  condescending  enough 


374 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


to  take  an  interest  in  tlie  dry  details  of  every-day  life, 
or  in  local  idiosyncrasies  and  individual  peculiarities. 
These  persons,  however,  forget  that,  as  great  things 
are  often  evolved  out  of  little  things,  there  can  he  no 
government  at  all  unless  the  minutiae,  of  life  are  in- 
cluded, and  that  our  petty  distinctions  between  great 
and  small  are  not  recognized  in  heaven.  Alexander 
Yinet  refers,  in  one  of  his  very  suggestive  discourses,  to 
an  event  in  the  life  of  our  Lord  eminently  fitted  to 
show  that  Heaven  takes  special  notice  of  many  things 
passed  over  by  us  as  uninteresting  and  useless.  While 
Ilis  disciples  were  wrapped  in  admiration  of  the  great 
buildings  of  Jerusalem  and  its  magnificent  temple, 
together  with  multitudes  of  rich  and  well-to-do  people 
passing  to  and  fro  in  processions  more  or  less  pompous, 
Ilis  eyes  were  fixed  on  the  poor  widow  who  cast  into 
the  treasury  of  the  Lord  all  her  living  ! 

4.  Let  us  now  advert  to  the  picture  of  man  as  pre- 
sented in  Hindu  Philosophy  and  that  presented  in  the 
Bible.  Man,  according  to  Hindu  Philosophy,  is  either 
a lump  of  matter,  or  a particle  of  the  divinity,  or  a mere 
dream.  His  dualistic  nature  is  admitted  apparently  in 
the  Naturalistic  and  Logical  schools  ; but  the  soul  to 
which  his  body  is  attached  is  devoid,  like  the  God  gen- 
erally admitted  as  existent  by  their  champions,  of  power 
and  quality,  and  really,  if  not  apparently,  thrown  out 
of  all  relation  to  things  heavenly  as  well  as  earthly. 
The  soul  is  doubtless  said  to  be  related  to  the  body  or 
to  nature  in  general  through  its  material  organ,  the 
mind,  and  is  represented  as  witness  of  its  sufferings  and 
ruler  of  its  movements.  But  such  representation  is 
meaningless,  as  its  ability  to  see  and  rule  is  emphati- 
cally denied  ; and  it  is  moreover  neutralized  by  counter- 
representations,  which  make  it  the  passive  and  unfeel- 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  375 


ing  recipient  of  impressions  made  upon  the  mind  by 
mischievous  Prakriti,  both  pleasurable  and  painful. 
But  may  not  its  proximity  to  nature,  such  as  makes  it 
seem  active  and  impressionable  when  it  in  reality  is 
thoroughly  passive  and  impassible,  suggest  the  idea  of 
relation  ? But  its  proximity  to  nature,  after  having 
been  posited  and  made  the  basis  of  many  a weighty 
conclusion,  is  emphatically  denied.  Both  its  entangle- 
ment and  emancipation  are  declared  fictitious,  not 
real  ! The  soul,  therefore,  being  set  aside,  all  that 
remains  of  man  is  the  body,  a lump  of  matter  moved 
by  a law  over  which  he  has  no  control  whatever.  The 
Yedantic  school  converts  this  lump  into  a particle  of 
the  essence  of  the  divinity,  or  one  of  its  modes.  The 
question,  How  the  infinite  becomes  the  finite  ? is  not 
categorically  stated  and  perspicuously  treated  of  ; but 
the  theory  of  self- dirempt ion  is  in  a somewhat  clumsy 
manner  elaborated  in  the  later  documents  of  the  sys- 
tem. That  the  infinite  is  modified  in  all  its  infinitude, 
now  into  a material  form  and  then  into  a spirit,  may  be 
the  import  of  some  passages  at  least  in  the  Upani  shads 
and  the  Brahma  Sutras  ; but  later  expositions  of 
Vedantism  ascribe  to  the  deity  an  almost  endless  divis- 
ibility, by  virtue  of  which  one  portion  remains  absolute 
and  unrelated,  and  others  are  endlessly  divided  and 
subdivided  into  the  innumerable  realities  of  life,  both 
material  and  spiritual.  But  the  dualism  or  rather  mul- 
teity involved  in  such  endless  emissions  and  modifica- 
tions of  the  divine  substance  is  obviated  by  the  Maya 
or  Illusion  Theory,  which  represents  everything,  spirit- 
ual or  material,  as  unreal  besides  God — the  real  unity 
mistaken  for  variety.  According  to  this  last  refinement 
of  speculative  thought,  man  is  an  illusion,  or  an  unreal 
mode  of  divine  existence  ! 


376 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


But  whatever  man  is — a modification  of  the  infinite 
in  its  entirety,  a particle  of  the  divine  essence,  or  an 
illusion — he  is  not  essentially  different  from  the  brute 
that  perisheth,  or  even  from  inanimate  matter.  Ac- 
cording to  Hindu  Philosophy  in  its  later  manifestations, 
the  inferior  animals  have  souls  as  well  as  man,  and  the 
precedence  the  lord  of  creation  might  legitimately 
claim  is  the  superiority  of  degree  rather  than  of  hind, 
lie  is,  moreover,  not  generically  different  from  particles 
of  matter,  as  each  of  these  either  is  or  has  a particle  of 
the  universal  soul  latent  in  it.  Ho  where  is  the  modern 
theory  of  continuity  carried  to  such  perfection  as  in 
India  ! 

Man,  according  to  the  Scriptures,  is  the  crowning 
apex  of  the  pyramid  of  creation  in  this  nether  sphere. 
He  is  dualistic,  consisting  of  body  and  soul,  indissolu- 
bly or  all  but  indissolubly  united.  Some  Christian 
philosophers  maintain  that  the  body  and  the  soul 
united  in  man  form  a third  substance,  a tertium  quid ; 
but  though  this  theory  may  justly  be  represented  as 
suggesting  a chemical  fusion  inconceivable,  the  sharp 
lines  of  distinction  by  which  the  one  is  separated  from 
the  other  are  by  no  means  sanctioned  by  the  Scripture 
representations  of  man.  According  to  these,  man  is  a 
dualism,  the  relation  between  his  body  and  soul  being 
permanent,  and  involving  interpenetration  and  constant 
interaction  ; and  the  current  belief  in  a Hades  peopled 
with  disembodied  spirits  needs,  in  the  opinion  of  some 
eminent  Christian  philosophers,  correction.  Man  is 
intelligent,  and  his  intelligence  is  not  either  a particle 
or  a mode  of  the  Divine  Intelligence.  There  are  even 
among  Christians  habits  of  thought  and  expression  to 
which,  when  not  properly  explained,  serious  exceptions 
may  be  taken.  The  relation,  for  instance,  between  a 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  377 


cause  ancl  effect  has  been,  it  is  to  be  feared,  pressed 
too  far  by  some  Christian  writers  in  its  parallelism  to 
that  subsisting  between  God  and  the  universe.  It  is 
affirmed  that,  as  the  effect  must  be  potentially  in  the 
cause,  intelligence  and  fsee  agency  in  man  must  poten- 
tially exist  in  God.  But  it  is  not  perceived  that  such 
language  tends  to  make  human  intelligence  and  will,  in 
all  their  weakness  and  perversity,  simply  modes  of  the 
unerring  intelligence  and  the  absolutely  uncontrolled 
and  uncontrollable  will  of  God  ; and  that,  as  divine 
attributes  are  inseparable  from  the  divine  essence,  an 
identity  is  established  between  the  nature  of  God  and 
the  nature  of  man.  W e Christians  believe  in  a sort  of 
anthropomorphism,  not  in  pantheistic  unity  between 
God  and  man  ; and  the  Christian  position  is  that  man 
was  created  in  the  image  of  God — that  is,  clothed  with 
intelligence,  power,  and  free  agency  similar  to  but  not 
identical  with  these  elements  of  the  divine  nature. 
We  have  by  anticipation  already  stated  that  man  is  a 
free  agent,  and  as  such  a first  cause,  capable  of  setting 
in  motion  lines  of  second  causes  within  certain  limits 
and  under  certain  conditions.  But  is  his  free  agency 
absolute  and  uncontrolled  ? Some  Christian  theolo- 
gians maintain  that  his  will  is  absolutely  free,  while 
others  admit  some  degree  of  control,  not  only  in  the 
region  of  action,  but  in  that  of  volition  also.  But 
happily  they  all  concur  in  maintaining  that  man  is 
responsible  for  his  thoughts,  words,  and  deeds,  even 
when  they  are  placed  under  the  control  of  God  and 
are  made  subservient  to  the  grand  purposes  of  His  gov- 
ernment. Christianity  upholds  divine  sovereignty  and 
human  responsibility  without  pointing  out  the  line  in 
which  these  two  apparent  contradictions  or,  to  adopt  a 
well-known  Kantian  phrase,  antinomies,  meet. 


378 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


5.  "We  now  come  to  man’s  duty  in  life.  Representa- 
tions of  this  embodied  in  Hindu  Philosophy  are  low, 
and  fitted  to  demoralize  him.  Ilis  aim,  according  to 
them,  is  personal  and  seltish — his  own  deliverance  from 
pain.  The  Hindu  philosopher  is  pre-eminently  sub- 
jective, but  his  views  of  pain  are  characterized  by  an 
objectivity  inconsistent  with  the  general  tenor  of  his 
philosophy.  Among  the  varieties  of  power  from  which 
deliverance  is  described  as  desirable  and  necessary,  those 
of  an  external  character — viz. , pains  of  the  body  resulting 
from  impurity,  disease,  and  death,  or  from  the  inclem- 
encies of  the  weather,  or  from  the  malignant  influences 
of  evil  stars,  or  from  the  cruelty  of  demons  and  hob- 
goblins— occupy  the  most  prominent  place  ; while  the 
excruciating  mental  sufferings  attendant  on  sinful  dis- 
positions and  vile  passions  are  rarely,  if  at  all,  referred 
to.  The  great  Buddha  attributed  the  awful  amount  of 
suffering  noticeable  on  the  surface  of  the  glebe  to  birth, 
old  age,  disease,  and  death  ; and  the  grossness  of  con- 
ception he  displayed  on  this  head  is  characteristic  of 
Hindu  Philosophy  in  general.  It  was,  in  short,  derived 
from  one  of  its  systems,  and  gave  its  color  and  com- 
plexion to  those  elaborated  after  that  reformer’s  death. 
Be  this  as  it  may,  the  aim  of  the  Hindu  philosopher 
is  essentially  selfish  : his  own  deliverance  from  pain  in 
its  varieties  of  ghastly  forms.  That  of  the  Greek  phi- 
losopher was  by  no  means  higher,  his  summmn  bonum 
being  happiness.  An  aim  so  selfish  cannot  but  lead  a 
man  to  concentrate  his  attention  upon  his  own  self,  to 
be  self-centred  and  self-absorbed.  Under  its  influence 
he  makes  self  the  centre  of  his  thoughts,  feelings,  and 
desires,  and  all  his  schemes  and  projects  revolve  around 
it  as  their  pivot  or  pole.  Is  it  possible  for  a per- 
son to  be  thus  absorbed  in  self  without  being  de- 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  379 


graded  and  debased,  enfeebled  in  mind  and  vitiated  in 
soul  ? 

Man’s  duty  in  life  is,  according  to  the  Bible,  to  glo- 
rify God,  bis  Maker,  Preserver,  Ruler,  and  Redeemer. 
Christianity  requires  him  to  renounce  and  mortify  self, 
and  make  God  the  centre  of  his  thoughts  and  feelings, 
the  goal  of  his  plans  and  projects,  the  end,  in  a word, 
of  his  existence.  Self-deliverance,  self-improvement, 
or  self-glorification  is  not  to  be  made  the  aim  of  life, 
though  these  blessings  are  sure  to  crown  his  efforts  to 
serve  God  with  a singleness  of  eye  to  His  glory.  He 
is  delivered  from  sorrow,  exalted  and  glorified,  not  be- 
cause he  seeks  with  all  his  heart  his  own  beatification, 
but  because  his  fife  is  unreservedly  devoted  to  the 
adoration  and  service  of  Him  by  whom  he  has  been 
redeemed.  Hay,  in  proportion  as  his  mind  is  with- 
drawn from  selfish  aims  and  purposes  and  set  “ on 
things  above,”  his  sorrow  of  heart  disappears,  his 
thought  becomes  exalted,  his  feelings  purified,  and  his 
soul  made  instinct  with  an  abiding  sense  of  peace,  tri- 
umph, and  gladness.  The  true  philosophy  of  happiness 
is  with  him,  and  him  alone.  Happiness  flies  the  more 
it  is  sought,  and  the  Greek  philosopher  who  eagerly 
pursued  it  as  the  sole  business  of  life  found  it  receding 
from  his  grasp  in  proportion  as  it  was  run  after,  and 
was  ultimately  covered  with  disappointment  and  shame, 
as  the  alchemist  in  the  Middle  Ages  in  his  search  after 
the  philosopher’s  stone  or  the  elixir  of  life  ! This  was 
also  true  of  the  Hindu  philosopher,  ivhose  pains  multi- 
plied in  proportion  as  he  sought  deliverance  from  them, 
and  who  therefore  was  forced  to  make  self-annihilation, 
in  the  literal  sense  of  the  term,  his  summum  bonum. 
The  Christian,  however,  by  following  the  principle 
“not  enjoyment  and  not  sorrow,”  does  succeed,  in  a 


380 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


pre-eminent  degree,  in  securing  the  one  and  fleeing 
from  the  other. 

But  how  is  man  to  glorify  God  ? By  properly  and 
conscientiously  doing  his  work,  not  certainly  by  fleeing 
from  the  world.  Ilis  work  will  become  manifest  if  we 
take  into  consideration  the  position  he  occupies  in  this 
nether  creation.  lie  is,  in  the  first  place,  a king,  and 
as  such  he  is  to  subdue  the  world,  to  people  it,  to  de- 
velop its  resources,  and  to  make  all  within  his  power 
subservient  to  the  varied  purposes  of  life,  the  higher  as 
well  as  the  lower.  He  is,  in  the  second  place,  a Proph- 
et, and  as  such  he  is  to  observe,  reason,  inquire,  and 
investigate,  and  in  this  way  to  rise  from  the  varied  ob- 
jects of  nature  around  him  and  the  events  of  providence 
to  their  correct  ideas  in  the  mind  of  God — the  eternal 
repertory  of  truth  in  all  its  entireness  and  glory.  As 
a Prophet  man  is  to  acquire  and  spread  knowledge, 
and  thereby  to  benefit  the  world  and  his  own  self. 
And  in  the  third  place,  man  is  a Priest,  and  as  such  he 
is  to  bring  all  the  precious  things  in  his  possession,  and 
his  own  self  as  an  offering  to  God,  to  be  under  His 
direction  utilized  in  promoting  the  highest  welfare  of 
the  world  at  large.  This  threefold  duty  presupposes  a 
standing  revelation  and  perpetual  guidance  on  the  part 
of  God,  and  the  full  development  of  every  side  of  his 
nature  on  the  part  of  man  ; and  it  enables  him  to  dis- 
play, in  what  may  be  called  the  outgoings  of  his  life,  a 
beautiful  union  of  piety  with  activity,  devotion  with 
philanthropy,  the  sublimity  of  contemplative  retire- 
ment with  the  enthusiasm  of  practical  humanitarianism. 
Man,  therefore,  glorifies  God  by  making  every  force 
within  and  without  him  do  its  appointed  work,  and  so 
prove  conducive  to  the  adornment  of  the  inanimate  and 
the  enjoyment  of  the  sentient  creation. 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  381 


G.  But  in  the  case  of  man  the  quid  est  is  by  no  means 
the  quid  ojporte.  In  his  present  condition  he  neither 
occupies  the  lofty  position  intended  for  him,  nor  per- 
forms the  duty  intrusted  to  him.  He  is  obviously  de- 
graded very  far  below  his  natural  station  and  voca- 
tion, despised  by  the  meanest  of  those  over  whom  he  is 
appointed  to  rule,  debased  by  error,  enslaved  by  preju- 
dice, brutalized  by  passion,  and  dragged  into  the  lowest 
depths  of  shame  and  misery  by  a downward  tendency, 
which  has,  in  consequence  of  an  anomalous  state  of 
things  introduced  by  his  own  folly,  grown  with  his 
growth,  strengthened  with  his  strength,  and  become 
almost  omnipotent  and  irresistible.  One  cannot  look 
at  his  present  condition  even  cursorily  without  raising 
the  question,  What  is  the  cause  of  his  not  merely  obvi- 
ous but  most  obtrusive  degradation  ? Ignorance,  says 
the  Hindu  philosopher  ; and  his  reply  would  not  be  far 
from  truth  if  by  ignorance  he  meant  ignorance  of  God. 
Sin  debases  and  ruins  us  by  darkening  our  views  of 
God,  and  thereby  leading  us  to  commit  the  twofold 
error  of  withholding  confidence  from  Him  and  placing 
it  in  our  own  selves.  The  history  of  the  fall  illustrates 
the  way  in  which  moral  apostasy  in  man  is  initiated 
and  consummated.  Adam  was  induced  to  believe  that 
the  only  restriction  by  which  his  freedom  of  action  was 
curtailed  was  a hardship,  not  a blessing  ; and  he  most 
foolishly  threw  off  all  allegiance  to  a Being  who  had 
resorted  to  a mean  artifice  to  check  his  rise  to  a proper 
level,  became  his  own  master  and  guide,  and  grievously 
misdirected  all  the  energies  of  his  complex  nature. 
Ignorance  may  be  represented  as  the  cause  of  man’s 
present  degradation  and  misery  ; and  if  the  Hindu 
philosopher  had,  in  his  theory  of  ignorance,  any  refer- 
ence to  the  repulsive  views  of  God  entertained  by  man- 


3S2 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


land  in  general,  much  might  he  said  in  favor  of  his 
position.  Eut  by  ignorance  he  meant  not  ignorance  of 
God,  but  ignorance  either  of  the  difference  between  the 
soul  and  non-soul,  or  of  the  essential  identity  of  the  ego, 
non-ego,  and  the  infinite — that  is,  ignorance  in  either 
case  of  what  is  a palpable  untruth,  an  ignorance  which 
is  bliss  indeed  ! The  Greek  philosopher,  especially 
of  the  Socratic  school,  also  traced  human  depravity  to 
the  same  cause — to  ignorance  of  Duty,  Moral  Beauty, 
and  subtle  moral  distinctions  ; to  ignorance  of  the  path 
of  justice  to  be  trodden,  and  the  path  of  injustice  to  be 
avoided.  Eut  he  failed  to  perceive,  amid  the  cobwebs 
of  his  subtleties  and  refinements,  that  knowledge  of 
duty  is  not  in  this  life  always  associated  with  the  power 
to  perform  it  ; and  that,  when  not  supplemented  by 
grace  from  on  high,  it  is  neither  a restraint  to  vice  nor 
an  incentive  to  virtue.  The  moral  life  of  the  philoso- 
phers of  antiquity  in  general  was,  alas  ! a proof  that 
the  knowledge  of  virtue  is  but  too  often  accompanied 
in  this  world  with  the  practice  of  vice  ! 

The  Christian  traces  human  degradation  and  misery 
to  a deliberate  and  wilful  transgression  of  a known  law 
of  God.  Adam,  the  progenitor  of  the  human  race,  be- 
came the  author  of  sin  by  an  act  of  disobedience  delib- 
erately committed  ; and  his  sin  has,  by  what  may  be 
called  incessant  self-propagation,  plunged  into  misery 
all  his  descendants,  one  alone  excepted,  because  pre- 
ternaturally  introduced  into  the  all  but  endless  chain  of 
life.  The  Christian  believes  in  original  sin  ; and 
science,  after  having  laughed  at  it  for  centuries,  finds 
it  convenient  now  to  uphold  his  belief  to  maintain  the 
credit  of  its  all-embracing  theory  of  evolution  and  con- 
tinuity. The  Christian,  moreover,  believes  that  in- 
herited sin  is  in  every  man  of  mature  understanding 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTBASTED.  383 


aggravated  by  wilful  transgression,  and  that,  there 
being  no  one  that  sinneth  not,  all  flesh  is  guilty  before 
God.  “ There  is  none  righteous,  no,  not  one.  There 
is  none  that  nnderstandeth,  there  is  none  that  seeketh 
after  God.  They  are  all  gone  out  of  the  way,  they  are 
together  become  unprofitable  ; there  is  none  that  doeth 
good,  no,  not  one.”  This  sad  picture  is  justified  by 
every-day  experience,  and  it  sets  forth  the  essence  of 
sin  as  well  as  its  dire  consequences.  The  essence  of  sin 
is  godlessness,  of  which  even  the  man  who  fulfils  the 
duty  of  social  life  faithfully  and  passes  for  a man  of 
probity  and  benevolence  is  as  guilty  as  the  licentious 
wretch  who  lias  not  what  a brilliant  writer  calls  “ a rag 
of  reputation.  ” Ignorance  of  God,  recoil  from  Him, 
distrust  in  Ilis  all-embracing  goodness,  aversion  to 
what  is  good,  proneness  to  what  is  evil,  unrighteous- 
ness and  unprofitableness,  are  all  consequences  of  sin, 
which  therefore  is  the  parent  of  all  the  degradation  and 
misery  which  we  see  heaped  up  in  the  world. 

Sin  makes  us  miserable  in  two  different  ways.  It  in 
the  first  place  separates  us  from  God,  the  source  of  life, 
light,  and  joy  ; from  that  dependence  without  which 
liberty  is  but  license  ; from  that  cheerful  submission 
without  which  our  will  becomes  stubborn  and  intrac- 
table ; that  communion  without  which  the  soul  is  bereft 
of  its  genuine  enjoyment,  and  that  grace  without  which 
true  progress  is  an  impossibility.  It  then  darkens  our  un- 
derstandings, vitiates  our  affections  and  passions,  and 
proves  thereby  a source  of  ineffable  restlessness  and  tor- 
ment to  our  own  selves,  and  to  all  around  us.  F or,  though 
its  seat  is  the  heart,  it  is  perpetually  issuing  out  in  pu- 
trid streams  of  corruption  in  our  life  and  conversation. 
The  springs  and  fountains  of  life  within  are  vitiated  by 
it,  and  its  outgoings  cannot  but  partake  of  the  corrup- 


384 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


tion.  The  history  of  the  world  is  the  history  of  sin 
incarnated  in  words  and  deeds  ; and  if  the  history  of 
the  human  heart  could  be  written,  it  would  be  the  his- 
tory of  sin  in  its  original  form,  in  its  naked  ghastliness. 
Wilberforce’s  argument,  that  the  existence  and  univer- 
sality of  sin  may  be  proved  by  the  same  sort  of  argu- 
ment which  led  Newton  to  his  discovery  of  the  law  of 
gravitation,  has  not  so  much  stress  laid  upon  it  in  these 
days  as  it  deserves.  All  nature  combines  with  all  his- 
tory to  prove  the  universality  of  sin,  its  early  develop- 
ment, and  its  controlling  power  ; and  it  is  the  height 
of  unphilosophical  temerity  to  deny  its  existence  in  the 
teeth  of  the  universal  ruin  around  us,  or  to  speak  of  it 
in  sentimental  terms  as  “ virtue  in  the  making.” 

7.  Now  we  come  to  the  plan  of  salvation  embodied 
in  Hindu  Philosophy.  That  salvation  is,  in  the  first 
place,  not  universal.  It  does  not  embrace  in  its  broad 
sweep  all  races,  nations,  languages,  and  tongues,  or 
overleap  all  geographical,  ethnological,  social,  and 
chronological  landmarks.  Nor  is  this  salvation  the 
common  property  of  the  Hindu  nation  at  large.  It  is, 
even  within  the  narrow  bounds  of  our  own  countiy,  the 
monopoly  of  the  few,  not  the  heritage  of  the  many. 
From  it,  as  has  already  been  indicated,  all  orders  of 
society  below  the  sacerdotal  are  mercilessly  excluded. 
It  is  true  that  Kapila,  the  father  of  Hindu  Philosophy, 
did  strive  to  include  in  his  scheme  distinguished  appli- 
cants from  the  lower  orders,  and  even  select  members 
of  the  weaker  sex  ; but  his  example,  though  backed  by 
the  mighty  reform  of  Buddha,  was  not  followed  ; and 
the  exclusiveness  by  which  philosophical  salvation  had 
been  characterized  became  stereotyped.  Again,  the 
female  sex  in  almost  all  its  entireness  is  excluded  from 
this  salvation.  Half  the  population  of  the  country, 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  385 


therefore,  and  the  greater  portion  by  far  of  the  remain- 
ing half,  must  pine  away  under  the  sweeping  ban  of 
exclusion.  A sort  of  inferior  salvation,  with  some  tem- 
poral and  temporary  advantages,  is  reserved  for  them  ; 
and  the  hope  of  their  rise  in  a future  birth  to  the  dig- 
nity of  the  priesthood,  and  therefore  a share  in  the 
privilege  of  final  emancipation,  is  held  out.  But  their 
immediate  exclusion  is  protected  by  a series  of  iron 
rules  which  nothing  can  break  or  even  relax.  But 
even  of  the  Brahmin  caste  the  majority  are  debarred 
from  this  grand  boon.  Only  those  Brahmins  who  have 
fitted  themselves  by  a long  and  painful  process  of  prep- 
aration, have  successively  performed  the  duties  of  the 
student  and  the  householder,  may  aspire  to  the  blessed 
exercises  which  result  in  emancipation.  The  narrow- 
ing process  almost  brings  the  privilege  down  to  a 
point  ! Need  we  say  that  the  Christian  salvation  is 
for  all  mankind,  who  are  invited  to  accept  of  it  just  as 
they  are  ? 

The  way  in  which  philosophic  salvation  is  attained  is 
a way  of  thorns  and  briers,  the  rugged  path  of  asceti- 
cism. Separation  from  family  life  or  family  entangle- 
ments, as  the  expression  is ; retirement  tp  a forest,  fast- 
ing, mortification,  and  penance  practised  for  many  a 
long  year  ; and,  above  all,  self-oblivious  meditation — - 
these  are  the  weapons  of  war,  and  the  victory  is  literal 
annihilation  of  self.  There  is  no  harm  in  making  one’s 
own  self  the  subject  of  one’s  meditation,  provided  the 
object  is  the  ascertainment  of  truth.  From  the  partic- 
ular ego  within  we  are  led  by  subjective  or  introspec- 
tive meditation  to  the  Universal  Ego  without,  from 
created  intelligence  to  the  primal  intelligence,  from  the 
will  of  limited  potency  to  the  will  of  unlimited  power. 
But  such  progress  from  the  finite  to  the  infinite  is  not 


386 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


the  object  of  the  Hindu  philosopher.  His  object  is  to 
kill  the  varied  states  of  the  mind,  thought,  feeling,  and 
volition  ; to  paralyze  the  nerves  and  muscles  of  the 
body,  and  deaden  consciousness  by  sheer  inaction.  But 
before  this  state  of  the  positive  death  of  the  body  and 
the  mind  is  attained,  the  devotee  is  raised  above  the 
polarities  of  nature,  and  he  cannot  in  consequence  bo 
affected  by  heat  and  cold,  light  and  darkness,  storm 
and  calm.  The  instincts  of  his  aesthetic  nature  are  ex- 
tinguished, and  he  sees  no  difference  between  beauty 
and  ugliness,  proportion  and  disproportion  of  form, 
harmonious  and  heterogeneous  mixture  of  colors.  His 
moral  nature  is  extinguished,  and  he  is  raised  above 
moral  distinctions,  virtue  and  wisdom  being  to  him  in 
no  way  different  from  vice  and  folly.  It  is  a relief 
that  he  does  not  continue  long  in  this  state,  and  that 
absolute  death  comes  apace  to  swallow  up  and  remove 
from  the  possibility  of  doing  mischief  a mind  so  com- 
pletely separated  from  its  legitimate  functions  ! 

The  salvation  offered  by  Christianity  is  not  depend- 
ent on  our  righteousness.  Our  vows  and  prayers,  our 
devotions  and  meditations,  our  penances  and  mortifica- 
tions cannot  buy  it.  In  its  germinal  state  it  is  a gift 
bestowed  upon  us  freely  the  moment  we  accept  Christ 
as  our  Saviour  by  faith,  and  in  its  advanced  stages  it  is 
matured  and  perfected  by  the  spiritual  nourishment  we 
obtain  by  simply  “looking  unto  Jesus.”  The  theory 
of  gratuitous  salvation  is  a peculiarity  of  our  religion, 
and  appears  to  be  the  soundest  philosophy,  when  we 
consider  man’s  utter  helplessness  in  spiritual  matters, 
his  inability  to  make  an  atonement  for  his  past  sins  and 
transgressions,  and  effect  within  himself  that  radical 
change  without  which  religion  is  a sham  and  an  illu- 
sion ; his  inability,  in  a word,  to  make  amends  for  past 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  387 


follies,  to  shun  the  bad  and  cleave  to  the  good.  The 
history  of  the  world,  of  philosophy  and  religion,  proves 
to  a demonstration  that  man  can  neither  find  God  by 
wisdom  nor  save  himself  by  work.  Supernatural  rev- 
elation and  supernatural  help  are  needed  from  Alpha  to 
Omega  to  enable  man  to  know,  love,  and  serve  God  ; 
and  our  heaven-bestowed  religion  embodies  the  one  and 
shows  the  way  in  which  the  other  is  obtained  and 
availed  of. 

The  present  result  of  this  salvation,  so  gratuitously 
bestowed  and  so  mercifully  matured  and  perfected,  is 
the  complete  development  of  man,  or  his  development 
as  far  as  possible  under  present  circumstances.  The 
result  of  Hindu  salvation  is  not  the  subordination  of  his 
lower  nature  to  the  higher,  not  the  evolution  under 
proper  culture  of  an  exalted  character,  with  varied  ex- 
cellences harmoniously  blended,  but  the  absolute  extinc- 
tion of  his  inner  and  outer  nature.  Greek  philosophy 
oscillated  between  sensationalism  and  intellectualism  ; 
and  its  aim  was,  under  the  guidance  of  the  Sophists, 
the  extinction  of  intellectual  life  and  the  exclusive  sway 
of  sensibility  ; and  under  the  guidance  of  the  philoso- 
phers of  the  Socratic  school  a reversal  of  this  process — - 
the  death  of  feeling  and  the  exclusive  sway  of 
thought.  Greek  philosophy  was,  with  reference  to  this 
and  other  matters,  onesided,  while  Hindu  Philosophy 
may  be  described  as  no-sided.  Christianity  recognizes 
the  undesirability  and  the  absolute  impracticability  of 
the  Hindu  ideal,  and  holds  an  even  balance  between 
sensationalism  and  intellectualism.  Asceticism  has 
prevailed  in  the  Church,  and  has  by  no  means  been  an 
unmixed  evil,  its  aim  being  not  the  extinction  of  human 
nature,  but  the  due  subordination  of  its  lower  to  its 
higher  element.  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 


388 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


asceticism  was  brought  into  the  Church  by  heathen 
philosophy,  and  it  has  never  appeared  but  in  apparent 
disharmony  with  the  genius  of  Christianity.  The 
Christian  principle  is  the  development  of  all  the  ele- 
ments of  the  complex  nature  of  man,  and  we  fully 
accept  Buckle’s  dictum , that  if  the  religious  nature  of 
man  were  exclusively  developed  and  the  other  elements 
thrown  out  of  culture,  the  result  would  be  a monk  or  a 
saint,  but  not  a complete  man.  Man  has  varieties  of 
instincts  which  may  be  repressed,  but  which  cannot 
possibly  be  extinguished.  These  are  love  of  property, 
love  of  comfort,  love  of  society,  love  of  esteem,  love  of 
beauty,  love  of  knowledge.  Human  nature  being  dis- 
eased to  the  very  core,  it  may  be  desirable  under  pecul- 
iar circumstances  to  suppress  a few  of  these  instincts, 
just  as  it  is  desirable  in  cases  of  bodily  malady  to  ab- 
stain from  proper  food.  And  God  may  call  upon  us  to 
hold  a few  of  them  in  abeyance  for  the  public  weal  ; but 
it  ought  never  to  be  forgotten  that  they  are  all  God-given 
and  heaven-implanted,  and  therefore  sacred  and  inviola- 
ble. Properly  cultivated  and  developed,  they  are  sources 
of  pleasure  and  improvement,  as  when  ill-cultured  and 
misdirected  they  occasion  unutterable  agony.  Chris- 
tianity does  not  stand  up  for  their  annihilation,  but 
for  their  proper  culture  and  development.  Christianity 
therefore  is  not  ascetic,  nor  anti-social,  nor  anti- 
economical,  nor  communistic,  nor  subversive  of  order 
either  in  human  nature  or  in  human  society.  It  is  the 
only  religion  that  has  encouraged  and  fostered  culture 
of  the  broadest  stamp — culture  spiritual,  intellectual,  and 
aesthetic,  culture  of  piety  and  humanity  in  their  highest 
forms.  The  philosophy  of  the  world  extinguishes 
either  the  religious  nature  of  man,  or  his  longing  after 
the  infinite,  or  his  social  nature,  or  that  principle  of 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  389 


benevolence  to  which  the  amenities  and  charities  of  life 
are  to  bo  traced.  But  Christianity  unfolds  both  these 
apparently  antagonistic  elements  of  his  nature  ; and  in 
the  character  matured  under  its  influence  we  have  the 
enthusiasm  of  humanity  now  so  much  talked  of,  plus 
the  enthusiasm  of  piety  now  thrown  into  the  back- 
ground ! 

8.  And  lastly  we  come  to  the  prospect  before  man, 
first,  according  to  Hindu  Philosophy,  and  afterward 
according  to  Christianity.  The  prospect  according  to 
Hindu  Philosophy  is  annihilation  ! The  soul,  when 
freed  from  bondage  by  mortifications  and  penances, 
isolation  and  meditation,  loses  its  being  as  a drop  in 
the  ocean,  either  in  the  one  physical  or  in  the  one 
spiritual  substance  of  the  universe.  The  Greek  philos- 
opher did  not  always  point  to  a better  goal.  Socrates, 
not  to  speak  of  the  schools  that  preceded  him,  did  at 
times  speak  of  beatific  abode  with  the  gods  in  a better 
world  as  the  crowning  reward  of  virtuous  life  ; but  his 
disciple,  Plato,  oscillated  between  materialism  and 
pantheism  ; and  his  followers,  the  Heo-Platonists,  held 
up  the  theory  of  an  eternal  substance  of  a spiritual 
nature  engaged  in  the  agreeable  work  of  disgorging 
and  gorging  world  after  world  in  endless  succession  ! 

The  Gospel  has  brought  life  and  immortality  to 
light.  Christian  salvation  has  results  which  are  proxi- 
mate and  results  which  are  ultimate — a present  and  a 
prospective  efficacy.  Under  its  auspices,  if  we  are 
allowed  the  expression,  a new  life  is  begun  here,  and 
matured  under  varieties  of  conditions,  each  eminently 
fitted  to  retard  its  development  ; but  it  is  not,  it  can- 
not be  perfected  on  this  side  the  grave.  But  its  perfec- 
tion will  be  realized,  under  circumstances  more  propi- 
tious, in  a better  and  more  durable  world.  Heavenly 


390 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


bliss  is  described  in  the  Bible  by  images  and  symbols, 
which,  though  not  gross  and  debasing  as  those  in  the 
Koran,  are  more  or  less  material  ; and  these  have 
given  birth  to  some  grave  misapprehensions  in  the 
Church  and  some  foolish  objections  out  of  it.  Chris- 
tianity is  represented  as  an  incentive  to  the  dominant 
selfishness  of  our  nature,  and  the  Christian  is  held  up 
as  one  who  serves  God  and  practises  virtue  solely  with 
a view  to  the  glittering  prize  or  crown  placed  before 
him.  His  own  aggrandizement,  if  not  in  this  world, 
at  least  in  the  world  to  come,  is  his  paramount  motive 
— his  own  deliverance  from  the  troubles  of  this  life,  his 
own  happiness,  his  own  glorification.  This  objection 
is  perhaps  not  groundless  when  advanced  against  the 
gross  views  of  heaven  entertained  by  ill-informed 
Christians,  but  it  is  ludicrously  groundless  when 
brought  against  the  sublime  views  presented,  though  in 
a material  garb,  in  the  Hew  Testament.  The  crown 
held  up  as  the  great  reward  of  piety  and  virtue  in  the 
other  world  is  a crown  of  righteousness,  the  crown 
which  sets  forth  the  immutable  righteousness  of  God 
and  the  completed  righteousness  of  the  beatified  man  : 
the  perfection  of  his  nature  and  the  happiness  proceed- 
ing.  necessarily  from  it,  not  material  comfort  and  pleas- 
ure. lie  looks  away  from  himself  in  this  life,  and  is 
happy  in  proportion  as  he  serves  God  with  a singleness 
of  eye  to  His  glory  ; his  happiness  in  heaven  will  pro- 
ceed from  the  same  source — service  rendered  to  God 
with  all  the  powers  of  a perfected  nature,  and  without 
the  hindrances  of  this  life.  Unselfish  love  to  God 
begun  here  and  perfected  in  heaven — such  is  the  soui’ce 
of  the  happiness  Christians  experience  here,  and  of 
that  they  look  forward  to  as  their  reward. 

Men  are  consciously  and  unconsciously  assimilated  in 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY"  CONTRASTED.  391 

■ t 

character  to  the  gods  they  worship.  Augustine  in  his 
Confessions  sets  forth  the  principle  in  these  well-known 
words  : “ Terence  introduces  a profligate  young  man, 
justifying  his  lewdness  by  the  example  of  Jove,  while 
he  beholds  on  the  wall  a picture  of  Jupiter  and  Danse, 
and  excites  himself  to  lust  as  by  divine  intuition  : 
£ Shall  he,  who  shakes  heaven  with  his  thunder,  do 
these  things,  and  may  not  I,  a poor  mortal,  do  the 
same  ” The  vices  current  in  the  country  are  in 
nine  instances  out  of  ten  fac  similes  of  the  vices  of  the 
gods  and  goddesses  adored  by  our  countrymen.  The  wor- 
shippers of  Krishna  become  as  a rule  licentious ; of  Ma- 
hadeva,  smokers  of  intoxicating  drugs  ; of  Kali,  blood- 
thirsty Thugs.  From  this  law  of  assimilation  the  phi- 
losopher is  not  excluded.  The  object  of  his  worship,  or 
rather  contemplation,  is  a Being  without  power,  qual- 
ity, and  relation,  a magnificent  Nothing  ; and  it  is  no 
wonder  that  he  should  by  a painful  process  of  mortifi- 
cation endeavor  to  reduce  himself  to  nothing  by  extin- 
guishing his  consciousness,  thought,  feeling,  and  mus- 
cular energy.  That  he  does  not  succeed  is  no  fault  of 
his.  He  wishes  and  strives  to  be  like  his  god,  and  his 
present  aim  as  well  as  his  future  prospect  is  annihila- 
tion. The  Christian  also  tries  to  be  like  the  object  of 
his  worship — the  Lord  Jesus  Christ — and  he  daily 
grows  in  piety,  humility,  meekness,  and  benevolence  ; 
and  the  prospect  before  him  is  perfection  in  these  and 
other  kindred  virtues.  Is  it  necessary  to  say  that 
while  Hindu  Philosophy  is  Pessimism  Christian  philoso- 
phy is  Optimism  in  the  highest  sense  of  the  term  ? 

A word  ought  to  be  said  under  this  head  about  what 
Christian  salvation  has  in  reserve  for  the  body.  Ko 
mercy  was  shown,  no  quarter  given  the  human  body  in 
the  schools,  generally  speaking,  of  ancient  philosophy, 


392 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


in  our  own  or  in  foreign  countries.  It  was  described 
as  the  seat  of  corruption  and  impurity,  and  its  purifica- 
tion was  placed  beyond  the  confines  of  possibility. 
Matter  and  sin  could  not,  according  to  approved  phil- 
osophical maxims,  be  dissociated  from  each  other  any 
more  than  breath  and  physical  life  ; and  the  only  way 
in  which  the  soul  can  be  saved  from  sin  is  by  its  com- 
plete deliverance  from  material  claims.  So  irreclaim- 
ably  impure  is  matter,  that  God  was  thrown  out  of 
direct  relation  to  it  that  He  might  not  be  contaminated 
by  its  inherent  and  inalienable  corruption.  The  Hindus 
made  an  emergent  Deity  the  nexus  between  God  and 
creation,  and  the  Heo-Platonists  held  the  doctrine  of 
the  transcendence  of  God  at  the  expense  of  His  imma- 
nence, making  a primal  potency,  the  idea  of  ideas,  the 
intermediate  link  of  connection.  The  mystics  of  the 
Middle  Ages  adopted  the  notion,  and  in  our  time  Swe- 
denborg recognized  in  Christ  the  nexus  between  God 
and  the  universe.  Christianity,  however,  sets  forth 
the  original  purity  if  not  the  absolute  impeccability  of 
the  body,  and  offers  it  a share  in  its  salvation.  The 
body  is  involved  in  the  consequences  of  sin,  and  has 
become  the  abode  of  deformity,  disease,  and  death  ; 
but  its  deliverance  from  these  fatal  results  and  its  ulti- 
mate glorification  are  insured.  The  whole  man  sins, 
the  whole  man  is  involved  in  the  dire  consequences  of 
sin,  the  whole  man  is  delivered  from  these,  and  the 
whole  man  is  glorified — such  is  the  glorious  fruit  of  the 
scheme  of  salvation  revealed  in  the  Gospel. 

In  conclusion  let  us  ask,  Is  an  amalgamation  between 
Hindu  and  Christian  philosophy  possible  ? The  ques- 
tion is  ahnost  as  absurd  as  the  other,  Is  an  amalgama- 
tion between  darkness  and  light  possible  ? A God 
without  power,  quality,  and  relation  amalgamated  with 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  393 


a God  with  power,  quality,  and  relation  ! A man  with 
a perfectly  quiescent  soul,  thoughtless,  passionless,  in- 
voluntary, with  a man  with  a soul  endowed  with 
thought,  emotion,  and  volition  ! The  idea  of  enthral- 
ment occasioned  by  sin,  with  the  idea  of  enthralment 
occasioned  by  failure  to  recognize  the  essential  distinc- 
tion between  soul  and  non-soul  ! The  idea  of  gratui- 
tous salvation,  with  the  idea  of  salvation  wrought  by  a 
painful  process  of  penance  and  meditation  ! Life  in 
an  utterably  more  glorious  stage  of  existence,  with  the 
frightful  void  of  absolute  annihilation  ! The  reconcili- 
ation  is  impossible,  and  the  less  people  talk  of  it  the 
better  ! 

The  history  of  the  Church  is  full  of  warnings  against 
any  attempt  on  our  part  to  allow  our  doctrine  to  be  in 
the  slightest  degree  influenced  and  modified  by  human 
philosophy.  The  experiment  was  unhappily  tried  in 
the  Church  not  long  after  the  days  of  the  apostles,  and 
the  result  is  known.  Justin  Martyr  in  the  Sub- Apos- 
tolic, and  Tertullian  and  Origen  in  the  Post- Apostolic 
times  incorporated  a little  of  their  philosophy  with  the 
pure  theology  of  the  Xew  Testament,  and  ages  elapsed 
before  the  Church  was  emancipated  from  the  influence 
of  the  heterogeneous  mixture.  Asceticism  crept  into 
the  Church  and  tinctured  its  theology  and  practical 
morality  ; and  it  was  not  till  science  had  discovered 
the  correct  principles  of  hygiene,  sanitation,  political 
economy,  and  social  science  that  its  fetters  began  to  be 
broken  and  shaken  off.  Perhaps  they  have  not  been 
entirely  cast  off  yet  ; but  the  day  is  not  far  off  when 
the  influence  of  an  asceticism  imported  from  schools  of 
false  philosophy  and  self-righteous  Pharisaism  will  not 
be  felt,  at  least  to  an  appreciable  degree.  Science  has 
in  various  ways  benefited  the  Church.  It  has  dis- 


394 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


enthralled  it  from  many  wrong  notions  and  erroneous 
interpretations  of  revealed  truth,  and  it  is  destined  to 
he  a potent  antidote  to  those  gloomy  ideas  of  morality 
which  have  placed  Christianity  in  antagonism  to  the 
spirit  of  broad  and  comprehensive  progress  it  has  fos- 
tered. False  science  and  false  Christianity  are  antag- 
onistic to  each  other,  the  object  of  the  one  being  the 
adornment  of  our  temporal  life  to  the  exclusion  of  that 
to  which  it  is  a stepping-stone,  and  that  of  the  other 
being  the  maintenance  of  the  interests  of  the  soul  at 
the  expense  of  those  of  the  body. 

Christianity  successfully  points  out  the  path  of  true 
felicity  in  this  life,  as  well  as  in  that  which  is  to  come. 
In  its  work  of  renovating  man  it  begins  with  humility, 
perfect  self-distrust,  and  perfect  self-abnegation.  It 
sets  forth  the  feebleness,  the  utter  inadequacy  of  our 
own  resources,  so  far  as  our  spiritual  emancipation  and 
elevation  are  concerned,  and  it  leads  us  to  look  aloft 
for  that  help  which  we  cannot  possibly  derive  from  our 
own  selves.  It  begets  faith  in  us,  and  leads  us  eagerly 
to  avail  ourselves  of  the  revelation  which  God  has 
made  of  Himself  and  our  duty  to  Him,  and  of  the 
plenitude  of  help  He  has  promised  on  condition  of 
simple  reliance  on  His  goodness  and  might.  It  invites 
the  soul  to  God,  and  the  soul  has  freely  communicated 
to  it  that  life  of  love  and  beneficence  of  which  He  is  the 
fountain.  Nor  are  faith  and  love  the  only  source  of 
felicity  opened  up  in  the  tempest-tossed  heart.  Hope 
is  also  generated  which  raises  him  above  temporal 
mists  and  clouds,  and  exultingly  grasps  the  inheritance 
which  is  incorruptible  and  undefiled,  and  which  fadeth 
not  away.  Without  this  lively  hope  our  joy  cannot 
bo  complete.  Trials  and  temptations  will  cross  our 
path,  and  imperfections  cling  to  us  till  the  last  moment 


HINDU  AND  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  CONTRASTED.  395 


of  our  earthly  life.  One  of  the  great  Fathers  of  the 
Church  said  very  justly  : “ This  is  the  only  perfection 
of  men — to  know  themselves  imperfect.  ’ ’ And  holy 
men  have  in  every  age  been  conscious  of  imperfection 
and  impurity  in  proportion  to  the  nearness  attained  by 
them  to  God  and  heavenly  things.  Such  conscious- 
ness, growing  as  years  roll  on,  will,  in  addition  to  the 
inevitable  trials  of  life,  be  a source  of  sorrow  and  de- 
pression to  the  godly  soul  in  the  midst  of  its  earnest 
endeavors  to  serve  God.  Something  is  needed  to  sus- 
tain it  amid  the  fluctuations  of  the  inner  and  the  vicis- 
situdes of  the  outer  man  ; something  to  prove  a coun- 
terpart to  that  intense  longing  for  perfection  which 
the  very  best  men  are  the  most  conscious  of.  Chris- 
tianity, with  the  most  complete  knowledge  of  the  deep- 
est yearnings  of  the  heart,  supplies  this  something — - 
a hope  which  will  survive  the  crash  of  our  earthly  feel- 
ings, and  end  only  in  fruition.  The  path  of  humility, 
faith,  love,  hope  is  the  path  of  pleasantness  and  peace 
pointed  out  by  our  holy  religion  ; while  the  path  of 
self-sufficiency,  self-dependence,  self-deception,  and 
self-destruction  is  that  which  philosophy  points  its 
finger  to  ! 


SUPPLEMENT. 


HINDU  ECLECTICISM. 

One  of  the  trials  incident  to  missionary  life  in  a 
semi-civilized  country  like  India  has  scarcely  had  due 
prominence  given  it.  The  Indian  missionary  lives,  like 
his  brother  worker  in  less  civilized  heathen  lands,  in  what 
the  late  good  Bishop  Thompson  very  appropriately 
called  “ a moral  pest-house  and  he  has  difficulties  of 
a general  character,  arising  out  of  human  nature,  cur- 
rent systems  of  belief,  defective  intellectual  culture,  a 
low  type  of  morality,  and  various  other  sources,  to 
grapple  with.  But  he  has  some  peculiar  trials,  and 
these  begin  as  soon  as  he  begins  his  conscientious 
preparation  for  his  work.  lie  has  to  study  languages 
which,  whatever  might  be  said  by  the  champions  of 
philology  of  their  affinity  to  his,  are  to  him  a jargon  to 
be  mastered  with  immense  trouble.  lie  has,  more- 
over, to  master  a literature  which  is  barren  and  unin- 
structive,  a philosophy  which  bewilders  rather  than 
strengthens  the  mind,  a mythology  which  is  a tissue  of 
puerility  and  obscenity,  and  systems  of  religious  belief 
so  corrupt  that  their  ascendency  is  the  best  proof  that 
can  be  given  of  the  Scripture  doctrine  of  human  de- 
pravity. Is  it  a wonder  that,  in  the  teeth  of  such  a 
formidable  mass  of  useless  reading,  a few  missionaries 
have  proved  recreant  and  taken  to  work  less  trouble- 
some and  apparently  more  productive  ? 


HINDU  ECLECTICISM. 


397 


The  idea  deserves  expansion.  Quiet  and  system- 
atic study  is  a pleasure  of  the  most  refined  if  not  the 
sublimest  stamp,  to  a minister  of  the  Gospel  in  a 
Christian  land.  His  mind  literally  feasts  and  fattens 
on  the  graces  of  genuine  poetry,  the  facts  of  reliable 
history,  the  verities  of  true  science,  and  the  truths  of 
sound  philosophy  ; and  even  when  he  has,  in  the  due 
discharge  of  his  duty,  to  master  current  systems  of  er- 
ror, he  finds  them  embodied,  as  a rule,  in  readable 
books,  or  propounded  with  some  regard  to  approved 
rules  of  taste  in  composition  and  logic  in  reasoning. 
His  reading  is  not  only  pleasant  but  profitable,  and  the 
more  thoroughly  he  gives  himself  to  it  the  more  thor- 
oughly he  expands  his  mind  and  broadens  his  sym- 
pathies. His  brother  worker  in  the  vineyard  of  the 
Lord  in  Hindustan  is  very  differently  circumstanced  in 
this  as  in  many  other  respects.  Study  is  to  him  a 
painful  rather  than  a pleasurable  duty,  and  the  result 
is  often  a burdened  rather  than  an  invigorated  mind,  a 
bewildered  rather  than  an  expanded  intellect.  The 
trouble  he  has  to  take  in  mastering  foreign  languages 
and  making  them  his  own  is  not  without  profit,  is 
amply  repaid  by  accessions  of  intellectual  vigor,  such  as 
linguistic  study  is  invariably  accompanied  with  and 
followed  by.  But  whatever  study  he  applies  himself  to 
after  having  done  this  preliminary  work  is  a weari- 
some task.  If  he  wishes  to  study  poetry,  and  through 
it  to  obtain  an  insight  into  the  manners  and  customs  of 
the  people  he  has  to  deal  with,  he  has  to  fight  his  way 
not  only  through  extravagances  of  an  exceedingly 
vicious  style  of  composition,  but  through  a heap  of  epi- 
grams, anagrams,  chronograms,  and  stuff  such  as  his 
sold  abhorretli.  If  history  attracts  him,  he  has,  in 
order  to  glean  a few  sporadic  facts  of  at  best  doubtful 


398 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


historical  value,  to  vratle  neck-deep  through  the  rub- 
bish of  mythology  and  fable.  If  philosophy  is  his 
forte,  a tremendous  mass  of  verbosity  and  logomachy, 
of  sophisms  and  quibbles,  before  which  those  embodied 
in  the  wildest  speculations  of  the  Middle  Ages  are  as 
specimens  of  correct  reasoning,  is  before  him  ; while 
he  can  scarcely  get  a correct  idea  of  the  many-sided 
and  hoary  religion  he  has  to  understand,  face,  and 
overcome,  except  after  being  literally  lost  in  the 
dreary  wastes  of  an  unnaturally  developed  and  corrupt 
literature. 

But  what,  it  may  be  asked,  has  the  missionary  to  do 
with  such  literature  and  such  philosophy  ? He  has  to 
preach  Jesus  Christ  and  Him  crucified,  and  his  busi- 
ness is  to  fit  himself  by  rapidly  picking  up  a foreign 
tongue  for  this  work  of  paramount  importance.  Such 
assertions  have  been  more  than  once  ventured  by  men 
who,  while  earnestly  engaged  in  doing  good  among  a 
nominally  Christian  people,  find  time  to  elaborate  beau- 
tiful theories  on  the  best  method  of  carrying  on  evan- 
gelistic work  among  the  heathen.  That  the  simple 
story  of  Jesus  Christ  and  Him  crucified  is,  after  all,  the 
truth  on  which  the  regeneration  of  Christian  and  non- 
Christian  lands,  as  well  as  that  of  individual  souls, 
must  ultimately  hang,  no  sane  Christian  will  venture 
to  deny.  This  story,  ever  fresh,  is  inherently  fitted  to 
touch  the  dead  heart  into  life  and  infuse  vigor  and 
vitality  into  effete  nationalities  and  paralyzed  civili- 
zations. But  a great  deal  of  rubbish  has  to  be  re- 
moved, especially  in  heathen  lands  like  our  own,  ere 
its  legitimate  consequences  can  be  realized  ; and  a 
patient  and  persistent  study  of  false  religions,  and  the 
complicated  systems  of  false  philosophy  indissolubly 
associated  with  them,  enables  the  missionary  to  throw 


HINDU  ECLECTICISM. 


399 


out  of  the  way  those  heaps  of  prejudices  and  errors 
which  make  it  impossible  for  the  simple  story  of  the 
cross  to  reach  and  influence  the  heart.  The  theorists 
who  think  that  modes  of  operation  which  have  been 
successful  among  nominal  Christians  must  needs  be  suc- 
cessful among  the  heathen,  brought  up  amid  time-hal- 
lowed systems  of  theology  and  philosophy,  falsely  so 
called,  have  only  to  migrate  from  the  one  department 
of  work  to  the  other  to  be  convinced  of  their  error,  and 
forced  to  exclaim,  with  redoubled  vehemence,  “ Old 
Adam  is  too  strong  for  young  Melanchthon  !” 

One  of  the  many  ancient  books  fitted  to  illustrate  the 
peculiar  trial  to  which  attention  has  been  called  is  the 
4 ‘ Bhagavad  Gita, 5 ’ the  precious  book  which  may 
justly  be  represented  as  the  fountain-head  of  Hindu 
eclecticism  besides  the  Suaredasware  Upanishad.  The 
missionary  can  scarcely  maintain  any  intercourse  with 
the  reading  classes  in  India  without  hearing  the  work 
eulogized  and  extolled  in  the  most  extravagant  terms 
possible.  It  embodies  the  loftiest  flights  of  the 
sublime  philosophy  of  Asia,  and  presents  the  cream, 
so  to  speak,  of  Hindu  morality  and  Hindu  religion. 
It  is  replete  with  doctrines  which  stand  unrivalled  in 
sublimity  and  grandeur,  truths  of  a transcendental 
order  set  off  by  sentiments  of  an  elevated  type, 
and  precepts  which,  if  generally  reduced  to  practice, 
would  convert  this  sin-stricken  world  into  a veritable 
paradise.  As  regards  its  style,  human  tongue  can 
scarcely  describe  its  beauty  and  loftiness,  while  the 
man  must  be  a consummate  dullard  who  fails  to  see 
that  it  is  a masterpiece  of  correct  reasoning  as  well  as 
a model  of  composition.  The  missionary,  moreover, 
finds  these  testimonials  indorsed  by  learned  oriental- 
ists, who,  as  a class,  have  the  knack  of  perceiving 


400 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


beauty  where  ordinary  mortals  see  nothing  but  deform- 
ity, excellency  of  arrangement  and  cogency  of  reason- 
ing where  others  see  nothing  but  confusion  worse  con- 
founded. With  bright  anticipations — anticipations 
generated  by  recommendations  both  indigenous  and 
foreign — he  opens  the  book  and  enthusiastically  begins 
its  perusal,  and  lo  ! his  disappointment  commences. 
Instead  of  an  elegant  style,  he  finds  extravagances  of 
diction  from  which  even  the  worshippers  of  Dr.  John- 
son in  his  own  country  would  recoil  in  horror.  lie 
sees  incoherence  rather  than  logical  consistency,  con- 
fusion rather  than  lucidness  of  thought,  naked  sophisms 
instead  of  convincing  arguments,  and  crude  notions  and 
jarring  sentiments  agglomerated  into  a philosophy  of 
the  most  heterogeneous  and  the  wildest  character, 
while  the  harsh  transitions,  incongruous  metaphors,  and 
tiresome  repetitions  he  has  to  wade  through  would 
justify  even  a prostrating  fit  of  homesickness  on  his 
part. 

One  must  one’s  own  self  read  this  book  in  the  original, 
or  a literal,  verbatim  translation  of  it,  such  as  Thomp- 
son’s, which  will  be  our  itinerary  or  guide-book  in  our 
research  into  its  contents,  to  be  convinced  of  the  sound- 
ness of  these  remarks.  We  do  not  expect  the  general 
reader — we  mean  the  reader  who  has  not  made  Orien- 
tal literature  his  specialty — to  indorse  our  criticism  or 
to  extend  to  the  toil-worn  foreign  missionary  the  sym- 
pathy we  have  always  felt  for  him  ; and  we  are  afraid 
that  our  self-imposed  task  of  setting  forth  the  contents 
of  this  time-hallowed  book  may,  after  all,  be  thankless. 
But  we  must  correct  an  error  carefully  tended  and 
nourished  by  a class  of  philosophers  in  America  who 
are  striving  to  naturalize  the  belief  that  the  fundamen- 
tal ideas  of  all  religions  are  alike,  and  that  an  attempt 


HINDU  ECLECTICISM. 


401 


to  set  up  one  religion  on  the  ruins  of  others  is  unjust 
as  well  as  uncalled  for.  And  we  therefore  raise  the 
question,  What  is  Hindu  eclecticism  ? The  proper 
answer  to  this  question  is  furnished  by  the  Theol- 
ogy, Anthropology,  Soteriology,  and  Eschatology 
of  the  “ Bhagavad  Gita.”  Let  us  call  attention  to 
these  departments  of  the  book,  or  rather  to  the  con- 
tents of  the  book,  which,  though  presented  in  promis- 
cuous heaps,  without  much  regard  to  the  advantages  of 
a luminous,  concatenated  arrangement,  may,  by  a not 
unnatural  application  of  the  laws  of  analysis,  be 
classed  under  these  heads. 

To  a correct  appreciation  of  its  teaching  under  these 
heads  some  account  of  the  work  itself,  its  origin,  its 
relative  position  in  Hindu  literature,  and  its  influence 
in  the  development  of  religious  life  in  our  country  is  a 
sine  qua  non. 

Some  preliminary  remarks  of  a somewhat  historical 
character  will  therefore  be  first  made.  The  “ Bha- 
gavad Gita,”  or  the  Song  of  Bhagavad  or  Krishna,  ono 
of  the  nine  incarnations  of  Yishnu,  appears  in  the  “ Ma- 
habharat’ 3 as  one  of  its  multitudinous  and  grotesque 
episodes,  one  of  those  almost  innumerable  legend- 
ary tales  to  which,  along  with  those  enshrined  in  the 
“ Itamayana,”  the  peculiar  excellences  and  defects  of 
our  national  character  are  to  be  traced.  It  presents,  in 
poetical  language,  a philosophical  dialogue  between 
Arjun,  the  most  estimable  of  the  characters  depicted 
in  that  epic,  and  the  above-named  god,  Krishna,  who, 
in  the  form  of  man,  acts  in  the  humble  capacity  of  his 
charioteer.  The  origin  of  this  dialogue,  or  rather 
monologue,  as  Arjun  appears  more  as  a hearer  than  as 
a speaker,  is  set  forth  with  poetic  coloring  and  exaggera- 
tion. Arjun  sees  before  him  the  two  hostile  branches 


402 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


of  tlie  tribe  to  which  he  himself  belongs — that  is,  his 
own  relatives  and  kinsmen — in  battle  array  facing  each 
other,  and  ready  to  plunge  in  dire  conflict,  and  the 
siprht  sends  a chill  of  horror  into  a heart  distinguished 
alike  by  courage  and  tenderness.  He  is  unnerved,  his 
limbs  become  palsied,  the  hairs  on  his  body  stand  on 
end,  the  blood  of  his  heart  is  curdled,  his  head  becomes 
dizzy,  and  the  great  consecrated  bow  in  his  right  hand 
drops  down  as  if  from  an  arm  suddenly  struck  with 
paralysis.  lie  is  unwilling  to  fight,  to  further  schemes 
of  self-aggrandizement  by  slaughtering  his  own  kins- 
men in  cruel,  fratricidal  war,  or  to  wade  through  the 
blood  of  his  own  relations  to  the  unsubstantial  and 
ephemeral  glory  of  an  earthly  throne.  He  recognizes 
divine  nature  beneath  the  humble  exterior  of  his  char- 
ioteer, and  anxiously  inquires  if,  under  the  circum- 
stances, he  is  not  justified  in  retiring  from  the  field 
before  the  clang  of  trumpets  and  the  clash  of  arms 
make  retreat  on  his  part  dishonorable  and  cowardly. 
This  question  and  others,  which  as  his  mind  grasps  one 
new  truth  after  another  he  puts  one  by  one,  draw  out 
of  the  divine  interlocutor  a series  of  discourses  which, 
besides  nerving  him  for  the  approaching  conflict,  open 
the  eyes  of  his  mind  to  a variety  of  mystic  truths  re- 
garding his  own  personality,  that  of  the  being  he  is 
privileged  to  question,  and  the  real,  occult  nature  of 
the  inanimate  world  around  him.  The  immediate  re- 
sult of  the  conversation  is  a great  change  in  his  con- 
victions. lie  sees  truth  both  absolute  and  relative, 
shakes  off  his  temporary  weakness,  rushes  into  close 
encounters,  sweeps  everything  before  him,  and  main- 
tains, amid  scenes  of  carnage  and  desolation,  the  char- 
acter of  a brave,  all-conquering,  but  at  the  same  time 
noble-minded  and  generous  warrior. 


miTDTT  ECLECTICISM. 


403 


But  though  raised  up  in  popular  belief  with  the 
“ Mahabharat,”  and  presented  ordinarily  as  an  inci- 
dent of  its  great  plot,  it  bears  unmistakable  marks  of 
a much  later  origin.  It  is,  in  the  first  place,  replete 
with  references,  both  direct  and  incidental,  to  the 
varied  schools  of  philosophy  which  flourished  in  India 
long  after  the  stirring  scenes  of  its  Heroic  Age  had 
been  enacted.  The  Sankhya  philosophy  is  frequently 
referred  to  by  name,  and  the  author’s  predilection  for 
or  adherence  to  its  fanciful  cosmogony  is  discovered  in 
unmistakable  terms.  The  Toga  philosophy  is  the 
subject  of  a number  of  direct  as  well  as  oblique  allu- 
sions, and  its  doctrine  of  emancipation  consequent  on 
hermit  solitude,  meditation  and  penance  stands  out  in 
bold  relief  from  its  pages.  And,  lastly,  the  uncompro- 
mising pantheism  of  theYedant,  which  is  also  named,  is 
the  underlying  basis  of  all  its  characteristic  thoughts 
and  ideas.  Again,  the  “ Bhagavad  Gita”  sets  forth 
the  caste  system,  not  in  the  crude,  embryonic  state  in 
which  it  appears  in  the  “ Mahabharat,  ” but  in  the 
matured,  fully  developed  state  in  which  it  appears  in 
the  Institutes  of  Menu,  our  national  legislator,  whose 
caste  regulations  have  ruled  India  for  ages  untold. 
The  essential  difference  between  the  four  primal  castes 
is  herein  dwelt  upon  with  marked  emphasis,  and  the 
duties  devolved  upon  each,  and  carried  down  by  the 
law  of  heredity  from  father  to  son,  are  particularized  in 
such  a manner  that  its  composition  posterior  to  the  age 
of  the  compilation  of  the  Institutes,  and  consequently  to 
that  of  the  “ Mahabharat,”  appears  to  be  a certainty. 
And,  lastly,  the  Krishna  cultus,  with  its  mystic  notions 
of  Bhakti  or  faith,  is  the  most  characteristic  feat- 
ure of  this  philosophico-religious  treatise  ; and  no  one 
with  even  a superficial  knowledge  of  the  history  of  Hin- 


404 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


duisra  will  venture  to  call  in  question  the  compara- 
tively recent  origin  of  this  worship.  When  these 
chronological  data  are  put  together,  the  conclusion  at 
which  orientalists  like  Monier  Williams  have  arrived — 
namely,  that  the  book  was  written  about  the  second 
century  of  the  Christian  era,  or  about  the  time  when 
Greek  eclecticism  flourished  at  Alexandria — will  appear 
irresistible. 

The  state  of  things  which  led  to  its  composition  by 
an  unknown  author,  its  ascription  to  the  learned,  ver- 
satile author  of  the  “ Mahabharat,”  and  its  incorpora- 
tion with  that  long  epic,  may  be  guessed  rather  than 
ascertained  by  proper  investigation.  The  philosophi- 
cal systems  which  had  been  elaborated  and  matured  in 
the  schools  had  popularized  an  ideal  of  piety  which, 
though  incompatible  apparently  with  the  business  of  life, 
has  always  proved  peculiarly  attractive  to  the  Hindu 
mind,  if  not  to  the  human  mind  in  general.  Intense 
contemplation  in  solitude,  resulting  in  complete  mastery 
over  self,  stoic  indifference  to  the  occurrences  of  life, 
painful  or  pleasurable,  extinction  of  desire,  holy  calm, 
and  imperturbable  quiescence — such  had  been  the  stand- 
ard of  piety  set  up  by  the  philosophical  speculations  of 
the  varied  schools  of  thought,  of  which  the  eclecticism  of 
the  “ Gita”  may  justly  be  represented  as  an  offshoot. 
And  the  more  its  excellence  had  been  appreciated  the 
more  had  a distaste  for  the  avocations  of  life  been 
created  and  a rush  toward  hermit  solitude  realized. 
Kor  had  the  morbid  hankering  after  the  enjoyment  of 
undisturbed  meditation  in  sequestered  places  been  con- 
fined to  the  higher  orders  of  society,  to  the  sacerdotal 
and  military  castes  ; it  had  come  down  from  the  apex 
to  the  very  base  of  the  social  pyramid,  and  the  indus- 
trious trader  and  even  the  vile  serf  had  separated  them- 


HINDU  ECLECTICISM. 


405 


selves  from  useful  and  indispensable  toil,  and  swelled 
the  ranks  of  devotees  drawn  away  from  the  turmoil 
of  busy  life  to  the  repose  of  serene  contemplation. 
The  social  machinery,  worked  by  the  forces  emanating 
from  the  caste  system,  had  been  unhinged,  and  a reac- 
tion against  the  results  of  philosophical  speculation  was 
needed  to  secure  its  or  their  harmonious  operation. 
That  reaction  was  initiated  by  the  eclecticism  of  the 
“ Gita,”  which  not  merely  restated  with  emphasis  the 
divine  origin  of  the  caste  system,  but  made  the  duties 
enjoined  by  it  essential  to  salvation.  But  the  author 
of  this  ancient  treatise,  whoever  he  was,  could  not 
emancipate  himself  from  the  influences  either  of  the 
philosophical  speculations  which  he  tried  to  work  up 
into  a composite  system,  or  of  the  ideal  of  piety  popular- 
ized thereby.  And  so  he  vibrates  between  conflicting 
sentiments,  and  ultimately  upholds  what  at  first  he 
seems  determined  to  oppose  and  counteract.  The 
eclecticism  of  the  ‘ ‘ Gita,  ’ ’ like  every  other  syncretistic 
movement,  either  in  the  history  of  philosophy  or  that 
of  religion,  proved  a failure  ; but  some  of  the  ideas  it 
popularized  have  continued  to  influence  Hindu  society 
ever  since  the  period  of  its  composition.  Its  attempt 
to  work  heterogeneous  systems  of  philosophic  thought 
into  a homogeneous  whole  is  scarcely  appreciated,  even 
among  people  who  would  exhaust  the  vocabulary  of 
praise  in  speaking  of  its  literary  merit  and  ethical  pu- 
rity and  excellence.  But  its  attempt  to  uphold  the 
caste  system  and  make  the  duties  enjoined  by  it  step- 
ping-stones to  the  higher  degrees  of  perfection  attained 
only  by  quiet  meditation  in  sequestered  places,  has 
proved  a grand  success,  as  we  shall  have  an  opportuni- 
ty of  showing.  But  the  real  excellence  of  some  of  the 
principles  to  which  it  has  given  currency  cannot  screen 


40G 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


it  from  the  charge  of  a lack  of  earnestness  or  laxity  of 
principle  which  makes  its  speculations  incoherent  and 
its  conclusions  unsatisfactory.  The  lax  accommodating 
spirit  of  compromise,  the  evil  star,  so  to  speak,  of  all 
systems  of  eclecticism,  from  the  oldest  of  those  which 
flourished  in  times  of  yore  down  to  that  which  was 
recently  transferred  wholesale  from  Boston  to  Cal- 
cutta, is  at  once  the  most  characteristic  and  culpable 
feature  of  this  philosophico-religious  treatise. 

Having  brought  our  notice  of  the  state  of  things  to 
which  the  composition  of  the  “ Bhagavad  Gita”  is  to 
be  traced  to  a close,  we  are  at  liberty  to  call  attention 
to 

I.  Its  Theology.  The  theology  of  the  “ Gita”  is 
not  merely  tinctured  with,  but  is  nothing  more  or  less 
than  the  absolute  pantheism  of  the  Yedant.  The 
difference  is  not  to  be  traced  in  the  creed  of  the  sys- 
tems, which,  in  its  important  features,  is  one  and  the 
same,  but  in  the  manner  in  which  this  creed  seems  to 
have  been  arrived  at.  The  Yedant  arrived  at  its  un- 
mitigated pantheism  through  the  pathway  of  judicious 
rejection,  while  the  “ Gita”  arrived  at  the  same  goal 
through  the  pathway  of  a somewhat  unnatural  though 
dexterously  effected  amalgamation.  The  Yedant  came 
to  its  grand  idea  of  unity  of  substance  by  rejecting  two 
of  the  three  entities  held  by  three  of  the  foregoing 
schools  of  philosophic  thought,  while  the  “ Gita”  came 
to  its  grand  idea  of  unity  by  merging  these  three  en- 
tities into  one  substance.  To  explain  this,  a little  refer- 
ence to  the  foregoing  schools  of  philosophy,  or  rather 
to  the  principles  inculcated  in  these  schools,  is  neces- 
sary. Let  us  begin  with  the  Sankliya  system  of 
Kapila,  which  is  chronologically,  perhaps,  the  first  of 
the  six  systems  into  which  philosophical  speculation 


HINDU  ECLECTICISM. 


407 


developed  in  India  about  five  or  six  centuries  before  the 
birth  of  Christ.  This  system,  apparently  if  not  really, 
is  dualistic,  and  it  admits  the  eternal  co-existence  of 
two  entities,  the  primordial,  self-evolving  form,  called 
Prakriti,  and  the  human  soul,  Purush.  The  primordial 
form,  or  nature  in  its  original  essence,  passes  through 
varied  processes  of  evolution,  gives  birth  to  intelli- 
gence, egoism,  the  elements,  both  subtle  and  gross, 
the  senses,  and  the  powers  of  action,  and  finally 
the  mind,  called  the  eleventh  organ,  through  which  it 
entraps  the  soul,  eternal  and  pure,  and  makes  it  miser- 
able by  begetting  in  it  desire  and  aversion,  such  as  neces- 
sarily lead  to  action.  This  system  explains  the  phenom- 
ena of  creation  on  thoroughly  atheistic  principles  ; 
and  its  rampant  atheism  led  to  its  condemnation  among 
a people  more  thoroughly  religious  than  even  the 
Athenians,  whose  fervor  in  religious  matters  was  eulo- 
gized by  the  Apostle  of  the  Gentiles.  It  was  therefore 
supplanted  by  the  theistic  Sankhya  of  Patanjali,  who 
to  the  two  admitted  entities  of  his  atheistic  prede- 
cessor added  another  entity,  namely,  God.  This 
triadism  was  upheld  by  the  two  Logical  schools  which 
eventually  followed  the  Sankhya  schools  in  the  path- 
way of  philosophical  investigation  ; but,  though  fitted 
to  satisfy  the  religious  longings  and  aspirations  of  the 
Hindu  heart,  it  was  too  complex  to  satisfy  the 
generalizing  tendency  of  the  Hindu  mind.  And  so  it 
was  made  to  shrink  into  monism  under  the  auspices  of 
the  Yedantic  school,  which  retained  God  and  cast  over- 
board the  other  two  entities  associated  with  Him. 
But  the  pantheism  of  the  “ Gita”  is  not  elaborated  in 
this  way.  The  “ Gita”  admits  the  existence  of  the 
three  entities  of  the  Sankhya  philosophy  of  the  the- 
istic type,  and  of  the  Logical  schools.  The  divine 


408 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


interlocutor,  Krishna,  dilates  in  the  fifteenth  chapter, 
as  in  many  other  places,  on  his  identity  with  the 
world  at  large,  but  at  the  same  time  calls  attention  to 
the  existence  of  two  entities  beside  or  rather  in  himself. 
Here  are  the  words  : 

“ And  I alone  am  known  to  be  by  all  the  Vedas,  and 
I am  the  composer  of  the  Vedant,  and  also  the  inter- 
preter of  the  Vedas.  These  two  spirits  exist  in  the 
world,  the  divisible  and  also  the  indivisible.  The  di- 
visible is  every  living  being.  The  indivisible  is  said  to 
be  that  which  pervades  all.  But  there  is  another,  the 
highest  spirit,  designated  by  the  name  of  the  Supreme 
Soul,  which,  as  the  imperishable  master,  penetrates 
and  sustains  the  triple  world.  Since  I surpass  the  di- 
visible and  am  higher  than  the  indivisible,  I am,  there- 
fore, celebrated  in  the  world  and  in  the  Vedas  as  the 
highest  Person.” 

This  extract  shows  how  the  triadism  of  the  theistic 
Sankhya  is  made  to  consist  with  the  monism  of  the  V e- 
dant.  The  divisible  spirit  is  the  essence  of  the  soul, 
dwelling  in  the  Supreme  Spirit  as  his  better  or  superior 
portion,  and  individualized  in  man — the  individuated  soul 
being  but  a portion  of  this  element  of  divinity.  The  in- 
divisible spirit  is  the  Prakriti  of  former  schools,  or  es- 
sence of  matter,  which  forms  the  inferior  part  of  the 
divine  nature,  and  which  appears  in  varied  forms  in  the 
objects  of  nature  around  us.  These  two  entities  which 
Vedantism  casts  overboard  are  merged  in  the  all-em- 
bracing divine  nature  by  the  author  of  the  “ Gita,”  ac- 
cording to  whom  the  Supreme  Soul  is  a compound  of 
the  essence  of  all  individuated  souls  and  the  essence  of 
all  material  phenomena.  The  Supreme  Spirit  is  repre- 
sented as  evolving  the  world  out  of  his  inferior  element, 
and  the  souls  of  men  out  of  his  superior  element.  The 


HINDU  ECLECTICISM. 


409 


union,  therefore,  effected  in  the  “ Gita”  is  exactly 
similar  to  the  union  between  the  tiger  and  the  lamb 
when  the  latter  was  in  the  former  ! 

Pantheism  thus  elaborated  is  the  theology  of  this 
philosophico-religious  dialogue  or  monologue  ; and  in- 
numerable are  the  passages  in  which  the  divine  inter- 
locutor, Krishna,  represents  himself  as  the  original,  es- 
sential, all-embracing,  all-pervading  Deity.  The  sub- 
limest  type  of  egoism  with  which  even  pantheism 
familiarizes  us  are  tame  in  comparison  with  that  which 
characterizes  his  discourses  concerning  his  own  mystic 
personality.  All  the  figures  and  images  by  which  the 
essential  identity  of  the  Creator  with  the  creation  is  set 
forth  in  the  sacred  books  of  the  Hindus,  and  which, 
moreover,  give  a peculiarly  imposing  aspect  to  their 
voluminous  literature,  are  heaped  upon  him  in  these 
discourses.  He  represents  himself  as  the  luminous  ele- 
ment of  the  sun  and  moon,  the  heat  of  the  fire,  the 
brilliance  of  the  flame,  the  light  of  lights,  and  the  radi- 
ance of  all  radiant  objects.  He  represents  himself  as 
the  sound  of  ether,  the  fragrance  of  the  earth,  the 
everlasting  seed  of  existing  things,  the  life  of  all  living 
things,  the  father,  mother,  husband,  forefather,  sus- 
tainer,  friend,  and  lord  of  the  world.  According  to 
Monier  Williams’s  somewhat  free  version,  he  concludes 
his  description  of  his  own  all-pervading  personality,  or 
rather  essence,  with  these  words  : 

. . . “ I am  its  (world’s)  way  and  refuge, 

Its  habitation  and  receptacle. 

I am  its  witness.  I am  victory 

And  energy  ; I watch  the  universe 

With  eyes  and  face  in  all  directions  turned. 

I dwell  as  wisdom  in  the  heart  of  all  ; 

I am  the  goodness  of  the  good  ; I am 
Beginning,  middle,  end,  eternal  time, 


410 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


The  birth  and  death  of  all.  I am  the  symbol  A 
Among  the  characters.  I have  created  all 
Out  of  one  portion  of  myself.” 


This  passage,  so  decidedly  instinct  with  lofty  egoism, 
gives  prominence  to  the  second  of  the  fundamental  ideas 
of  the  system  of  theology  propounded  in  this  book.  It 
ought  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  “ Bhagavad  Gita” 
embodies  an  attempt  not  merely  to  reconcile  jarring 
schools  of  philosophic  thought,  but  to  effect  a union 
between  philosophy  and  popular  mythology.  And  so, 
on  the  system  of  absolute  pantheism  evolved  out  of  the 
dissertations  of  the  schools,  we  see  grafted  the  theory 
of  incarnation,  propounded  and  illustrated  in  popular 
mythology.  The  speaker  is  not  an  ordinary  emanation 
from  the  Deity,  but  the  Deity  himself  in  the  form  of 
man,  and  he  calls  himself  not  only  Adhyatma,  the 
Supreme  Soul  ; Adhibhuta,  the  Supreme  Exist- 
ence ; Adhidaivata,  the  Supreme  God  ; but  Adhi- 
yajna,  the  Supreme  Sacrifice.  The  Hindu  doctrine 
of  the  cyclic  incarnation  of  Yishnu,  the  second  per- 
son of  the  Hindu  triad,  is  clearly  set  forth,  and  the 
object  of  these  periodic  manifestations  of  the  Deity  is 
mentioned,  namely,  ‘ £ to  establish  righteousness.  ’ ’ 
The  divine  interlocutor  not  merely  represents  himself 
as  an  incarnation  of  God,  not  merely  refers  to  his  past 
incarnation,  not  merely  dwells  on  the  great  object  to 
accomplish  which  he  comes  down  periodically  in  va- 
rious forms  from  on  high,  but,  at  Arjun’s  special  re- 
quest, appears  in  his  “ celestial  form”  (Monier  'Will- 
iams’s translation)  : 

“ Endowed  with  countless  mouths  and  countless  eyes. 

With  countless  faces  turned  to  every  quarter, 

With  ornaments  and  wreaths  and  robes  divine. 

With  heavenly  fragrance  and  celestial  weapons, 


HINDU  ECLECTICISM. 


411 


It  was  as  if  the  firmament  were  filled, 

All  in  an  instant,  with  a thousand  suns 
Blazing  with  dazzling  lustre  ; so  beheld  he 
The  glories  of  the  universe  collected 
In  the  one  person  of  the  God  of  gods.” 


The  last  two  lines  are  eminently  fitted  to  correct  the 
mistakes  into  which  Mr.  Thompson  has  fallen,  of  as- 
suming that  the  personality  of  the  Godhead  is  clearly 
set  forth  in  the  “ Gita.”  God  is  certainly  spoken  of 
in  many  places  as  a person  endowed  with  attributes 
generally  ascribed  to  the  Deity,  and  even  moved  by 
infinite  compassion  to  come  down,  in  various  forms,  to 
establish  righteousness  ; but  the  personality  ascribed  to 
God  is  merely  a collection  of  the  “ glories  of  the  uni- 
verse.” A consistent,  coherent  system  of  theology 
cannot  possibly  be  evolved  out  of  the  jarring  sentiments 
brought  into  one  focus  in  the  “ Gita,”  any  more  than  a 
homogeneous  body  of  speculative  divinity  or  practical 
religion  can  be  evolved  out  of  the  vaunted  eclecticism 
of  the  nineteenth  century — the  eclecticism,  we  mean, 
which  has  been  distilled  from  the  writings  of  Theodore 
Parker  at  Calcutta,  if  not  transferred  wholesale.  But 
the  theology  embodied  therein  settles  down,  after  ap- 
pearing in  varied  forms,  into  that  pantheism  which  as- 
sumes the  existence  of  an  all-pervading  substance  rather 
than  of  an  intelligent  voluntary  agent,  as  the  founda- 
tion of  existence  in  all  its  diversified  aspects  or  modes. 

II.  The  Anthropology  of  the  “ Gita”  is  in  keeping 
with  its  theology,  and,  like  it,  vibrates  between  the  tran- 
scendental notions  of  the  schools  and  the  coarse  ideas 
embedded  in  popular  mythology  and  religion.  Man  is 
represented  as  a union  of  body  and  soul,  the  former  a 
portion  of  the  indivisible  material  essence  in  the  Deity, 
and  the  latter  a portion  of  his  higher  nature,  the  spirit- 


412 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


ual  essence.  The  dualistic  nature  of  man  is  set  forth 
in  the  following  extract  (Chapter  XIII.): 

“ This  body,  O Son  of  Kunti,  is  called  Kshetra. 
Those  who  know  the  truth  of  things  call  that  which 
knows  this  (Kshetra)  Kshetrajna  (knower  of  the 
body).  And  know,  also,  that  I am  the  Kshetrajna  in 
all  Kshetras,  Bharat.  That  which  is  the  knowledge  of 
the  Kshetra  and  Kshetrajna  is  considered  by  me  spirit- 
ual knowledge.  The  great  elements,  the  egoism,  the 
intellect,  and  also  the  principle  of  life  and  the  eleven 
organs  and  the  five  objects  of  sense — desire,  aversion, 
happiness  and  unhappiness,  multiplicity  of  condition, 
reflection,  resolution— (all)  this  is  briefly  denominated 
Kshetra  with  its  passions.  ’ ’ 

Place  this  in  juxtaposition  with  the  following  quota- 
tion from  Chapter  XY. : 

“ An  eternal  portion  of  me  only,  having  assumed  life 
in  this  world  of  life,  attracts  the  mind  and  the  five 
senses,  which  belong  to  nature.  Whatever  body  the 
Sovereign  Spirit  enters  or  quits,  it  is  connected  with  it  by 
snatching  those  senses  from  nature,  even  as  the  breeze 
snatches  perfumes  from  their  very  bed.  This  spirit  ap- 
proaches the  objects  of  sense  by  presiding  over  the  ear, 
the  eye,  the  touch,  the  taste,  and  the  smell,  and  also 
over  the  mind.  The  foolish  do  not  perceive  it  when  it 
quits  the  body,  nor  when  it  remains  (in  it),  nor  when 
actuated  by  the  qualities  it  enjoys  (the  world).  But 
those  who  have  the  eyes  of  knowledge  do  perceive  it.  ’ ’ 

These  two  extracts  set  forth  the  author’s  predilection 
for  and  belief  in  the  cosmogony  of  the  Sankhya  school, 
and  his  anxiety  to  infuse  thereinto  the  pantheism  of 
the  Yedant,  as  Yedantic  philosophers  themselves  did 
less  conspicuously.  Indeed,  the  author  does  nothing 
more  or  less  than  transfer  wholesale  the  cosmogony  of 


HIMDU  ECLECTICISM. 


413 


the  former  school  and  substitute  for  its  self-evolving 
material  principle,  Prakriti,  the  self-evolving  spiritual 
substance  of  the  latter  school.  The  process  of  evolu- 
tion remains  the  same,  intelligence  giving  birth  to 
egoism  or  consciousness,  and  through  it  to  the  subtle  ele- 
ments, namely,  sound,  feel,  color,  sapidity,  and  odor  ; 
and  the  five  organs  of  action,  namely,  the  larynx,  hands, 
feet,  and  the  excretory  and  generative  organs.  And, 
lastly,  the  mind  or  the  eleventh  organ  is  created,  and  all 
the  evils  of  life  are  realized  through  its  ceaseless  and 
malignant  activity.  The  ultimate  power  of  this  series 
is,  however,  not  the  primordial  form  of  materialism,  but 
the  spiritual  substance  of  pantheism,  with  its  conscious- 
ness and  varied  mental  powers  potentially,  if  not  actu- 
ally, present  in  it.  This  spiritual  substance,  it  must  be 
borne  in  mind,  appears  in  the  “ Gita”  embodied  as  a 
rule  in  an  all-embracing  infinite  personality  with  a two- 
fold nature,  the  inferior  element  manifested  in  the  va- 
rious modes  of  material  existence,  and  the  superior  in 
those  of  spiritual  life. 

But  how  does  the  theory  of  cyclic  incarnation,  or  of 
a series  of  incarnations  culminating  in  Krishna,  the 
divine  interlocutor,  consist  with  this  view  of  pantheistic 
thought  ? Are  ive  to  suppose  that  the  modern  theory 
of  incarnation,  that  we  mean  which  makes  the  Lord 
Jesus  Christ  the  crowning  point  of  a graduated  scale  of 
incarnations,  was  anticipated  in  India  about  two  millen- 
niums ago  ? We  have  no  doubt  but  that  it  was,  though 
the  theory  does  not  appear  stated  with  logical  precision 
either  in  this  book  or  any  other  work  on  Hindu  Phi- 
losophy and  Hindu  religion.  Plow  little  has  modern 
rationalism  added  to  the  results  philosophical  specula- 
tion displayed  in  ancient  times  ! The  theology  of  the 
“ Gita”  renders  the  essential  unity  of  the  human  race 


414 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


a logical  necessity  or  an  inevitable  logical  sequence. 
If  all  men  are  portions  of  the  Deity,  both  as  regards 
their  bodies  and  as  regards  their  souls,  whatever 
difference  we  may  notice  among  them  must  be  a differ- 
ence of  degree,  not  a difference  of  kind — quantitative, 
not  qualitative.  This  irresistible  conclusion  is,  how- 
ever, evaded  by  the  author.  He  is  a Brahman  as  well 
as  a philosopher,  and  one  of  his  main  objects  in  the  com- 
position and  circulation  of  this  philosophico-religious 
treatise  is  to  uphold  the  caste  system  in  its  fully  devel- 
oped form  at  all  hazards.  And  so  he  cheerfully  sacri- 
fices logical  consistency  at  the  altar  of  the  social  god, 
whose  ascendency  must  be  re-established  after  the  tem- 
porary confusion  created  by  philosophical  speculation. 
And  he  unhesitatingly  maintains  the  essential  difference 
between  the  recognized  castes.  The  following  passage 
shows  that  the  division  of  labor  introduced  by  that 
system  is  dependent,  according  to  our  author,  on  original 
propensities  rather  than  on  the  mere  accident  of  educa- 
tion : 

“ The  offices  of  Brahmans,  Ivshatriyas,  Yaishyas, 
and  Sudras,  O harasser  of  thy  foes  ! are  distributed 
according  to  the  qualities  which  predominate  in  the 
dispositions  of  each.  Tranquillity,  continence,  mortifi- 
cation, purity,  patience,  and  also  rectitude,  spiritual 
knowledge,  and  spiritual  discernment,  belief  in  the  ex- 
istence of  another  world,  comprise  the  office  of  a Brah- 
man, sprung  from  his  disposition.  Valor,  glory, 
strength,  firmness,  ability  in  warfare,  and  also  keeping 
one’s  ground,  liberality,  and  a lordly  character,  are  the 
office  of  a Kshatriya,  sprung  from  his  disposition. 
Agriculture,  herding  of  kine,  and  commerce  are  the 
office  of  a Vaishya,  sprung  from  his  disposition.  Ser- 
vitude is  the  peculiar  office  of  a Sudra,  sprung  from  his 


HINDU  ECLECTICISM. 


415 


disposition.  Each  man  who  is  satisfied  with  his  office 
attains  perfection.” — Chapter  X'Y  II. 

III.  The  last  line  brings  us  to  the  Soteriology  of 
the  “ Gita,”  a subject  of  paramount  importance,  inas- 
much as  we  see  reflected  in  it  the  notions  of  salvation 
now  current  among  our  countrymen.  The  soteriology 
of  the  “ Gita”  appears  at  first  sight  to  have  been  a re- 
action against  that  of  the  schools,  the  jarring  theories 
of  which  it  endeavored  to  weld  into  a homogeneous 
whole.  The  watchword  of  the  schools  was  quiescence, 
but  that  of  the  “ Gita”  seems  to  have  been  action. 
The  schools  systematically  opposed  action,  and  repre- 
sented it  as  the  source  of  all  our  trouble.  According 
to  their  teaching  attachment  to  the  world  breeds  desire, 
and  desire  breeds  action,  and  action  breeds  merit  or 
demerit,  and  merit  or  demerit  brings  in  its  train 
reward  or  punishment  and  a fresh  transmigration,  and 
all  the  evils  associated  with  it.  Action,  therefore,  with 
its  antecedents  and  consequents,  should  be  annihilated 
or  superseded  by  meditative  stillness  and  quiescence, 
ere  the  vexed  spirit  can  be  liberated  from  the  thral- 
dom of  transmigration  and  merged  into  the  material 
or  divine  essence  as  a drop  in  the  ocean.  The  schools 
were  certainly  at  loggerheads  with  one  another  on  many 
of  the  fundamental  questions  of  theology  and  science, 
but  they  were  unanimous  in  denouncing  action  and  up- 
holding passive  contemplation  as  essential  to  salvation, 
in  the  Hindu  sense  of  the  term — that  is,  absorption  into 
the  Deity.  Moreover,  this  doctrine  of  the  schools  was 
by  no  means  received  by  the  people  at  large  as  a beau- 
tiful theory  to  be  revolved  in  the  mind  for  a few  min- 
utes and  then  quietly  shelved.  On  the  contrary,  ear- 
nest souls  from  all  ranks  of  society  succumbed  to  its  fas- 
cinating influence,  separated  themselves  from  needed 


41G 


IIINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


work,  botook  themselves  to  hermit  solitude,  and  wasted 
their  energies  in  indolent  meditation.  To  remedy  this 
growing  evil  the  “ Gita'  ’ appeared,  with  its  watch- 
word action , opposed  to  the  passiveness  and  quiescence 
of  the  schools  ; and  the  arguments  by  which  it  sustains 
its  position  are  eminently  fitted  to  influence  for  good 
even  the  contemplative  Hindu,  who  looks  forward  to 
annihilation  in  the  Deity  as  the  sumrrmm  bonum. 
Action,  the  “ Gita”  maintains,  is  inevitable.  The  dev- 
otee must  breathe,  his  blood  must  circulate,  the  varied 
portions  of  his  body  must  discharge  their  functions  to 
enable  him  to  give  himself  to  that  quiet  and  contem- 
plative life  which  has  such  an  irresistible  charm  for 
him.  Moreover,  he  must  eat  and  drink  a little  in 
order  to  sustain  life,  and  this  means  action.  Action, 
then,  being  inevitable,  to  denounce  it  as  the  cause  of 
all  our  sorrows  and  discomforts,  and  attempt  its  ex- 
tinction, is  not  true  philosophy. 

But  action,  the  schools  maintain,  is  fructescent,  and 
must  bear  its  fruit  either  in  reward  or  in  punishment, 
and  thereby  prolong  the  chain  of  transmigrations. 
The  author  of  the  “ Gita”  admits  that  action  is  fruc- 
tescent, but  he  maintains  that  it  is  not  invariably  so. 
When  action  is  performed  with  a view  to  rewards  or 
punishments — that  is,  when  action  is  performed  with 
interested  motives,  it  bears  fruit,  prolongs  the  chain  of 
transmigrations,  and  perpetuates  the  misery  of  exist- 
ence. But  when  action  is  performed  without  any 
regard  to  consequences  its  effect  is  salvation,  not  pro- 
longed enthralment.  Hot  action  in  general,  but  ac- 
tion with  interested  motives,  action  from  selfish  desires 
and  selfish  aims,  ought  to  be  denounced.  The  neces- 
sity of  action  being  admitted,  the  question  arises,  W hat 
course  is  action  to  take  ? Or,  in  other  words,  What 


HINDU  ECLECTICISM. 


■417 


are  men  to  do  to  be  saved  from  the  misery  of  pro- 
longed existence  % The  “Gita,”  in  reply  to  this  im- 
portant cpiestion,  does  not  give  an  uncertain  sound. 
Men  are  to  perform  the  duties  of  their  castes,  nothing 
more  and  nothing  less.  The  track  chalked  out  for  a 
man  by  the  rules  and  regulations  of  his  caste  is  to  him 
the  path  of  righteousness  and  salvation  ; and  on  it  he 
is  safe,  it  being  absolutely  impossible  for  him  to  go 
wrong  while  treading  it  patiently  and  perse  veringly. 
“ It  is  better  to  perform  one’s  own  duty,  even  thougli 
it  be  devoid  of  excellence,  than  another’s  duty  well. 
He  who  fulfils  the  office  obligated  by  his  own  nature 
does  not  incur  sin.  One  should  not  reject  the  duty  to 
which  one  is  born,  even  if  it  be  associated  with  error, 
for  all  (human)  undertakings  are  involved  in  error,  as 
fire  is  by  smoke.  ’ ’ 

But  the  soteriology  of  the  book,  like  its  theology  and 
its  anthropology,  is  involved  inextricably  in  confusion, 
because  the  author,  while  determined  to  give  prominence 
to  some  principles  of  a practical  stamp,  seems  to  have 
been  unable  to  free  himself  from  the  fascinating  influ- 
ence of  the  ideal  of  piety  held  up  by  the  schools — the  dev- 
otee seated  cross-legged  or  standing  still  and  immova- 
ble beneath  the  outstretched  branches  of  a shady  tree, 
with  his  eyes  fixed  on  the  tip  of  his  nose,  his  breath  reg- 
ulated according  to  fixed  rules,  his  mind  concentrated 
on  one  theme  or  object  of  contemplation,  his  passions 
and  appetites  not  merely  controlled  but  extinguished, 
his  desires  and  aspirations  subsiding  into  a holy  calm, 
the  serenity  of  his  soul  making  him  impassible  or  in- 
different to  hunger  and  thirst,  heat  and  cold,  pleasure 
and  pain,  and  his  entire  self,  separated  from  its  acciden- 
tal surroundings,  merged  into  the  Deity.  Ho  Hindu 
thinker,  in  the  days  of  our  author,  however  broad 


418 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


might  lie  his  thoughts,  could  contemplate  this  picture 
of  tranquil  meditation  without  being  instinctively  led 
to  recognize  its  immense  superiority  to  the  hustle  and 
turmoil  of  an  active  life.  And  so  the  author  of  the 
“ Gita,”  like  the  great  Buddha  himself,  after  flying 
from  it  for  a moment,  swung  back  to  it  with  redoubled 
momentum.  And  its  theory  of  salvation  is  the  theory 
to  which  universal  homage  is  paid  in  Hindustan  to- 
day— the  theory,  we  mean,  which  makes  an  inferior 
degree  of  salvation  hang  on  karmayoga,  or  the  devo- 
tion of  works,  while  salvation  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the 
term  is  only  attainable  through  the  pathway  of  gvan- 
yoga,  or  the  devotion  of  knowledge  or  hermit  solitude 
and  concentrated  meditation. 

IV.  The  Eschatology  of  the  book  need  not  de- 
tain us  long.  The  Hindu  doctrine  of  transmigration, 
with  its  ascending  and  descending  series  of  animated 
bodies,  innumerable  births  and  deaths,  terminating, 
after  the  slow  cycle  of  ages  innumerable,  in  absorption 
in  the  Deity,  is  the  basis  in  all  its  speculations  on  this 
subject.  It,  however,  recognizes  one  principle  which 
should  not  be  passed  over  unnoticed — namely,  tlial?  a 
man’s  condition  in  the  world  to  come  is  determined  by 
his  meditations  rather  than  action  in  this  life. 

“ He  who,  remembering  me  at  the  moment  of  death, 
quits  the  body  and  comes  forth,  enters  my  nature, 
there  is  no  doubt  about  that.  Or  again,  whatever  na- 
ture he  thinks  on  when  he  abandons  the  body  at  the 
last,  to  that  only  does  he  go,  O son  of  Ivunti  ! having 
been  always  conformed  to  that  nature.  Therefore 
think  of  me  at  all  times  and  fight.  ” 

It  is  impossible  to  enumerate  the  superstitions  to 
which  this  and  other  passages  of  the  sort  have  given 
birth,  or  the  various  expedients  adopted  to  direct  the 


HINDU  ECLECTICISM. 


419 


thoughts  of  the  dying  Hindu  to  the  incarnation  of 
Yishnu,  who  is  the  principal  interlocutor  in  this  dia- 
logue. The  Hindu  father  of  the  Yaishnab  sect,  or 
the  sect  which  upholds  the  worship  of  Yishnu  in  pref- 
erence to  that  of  any  other  god,  to  that  either  of 
Brahma,  the  first,  or  Maheshwar,  the  third  person  in 
the  Hindu  triad,  gives  names  to  his  male  children, 
such  as  may  in  the  hour  of  death  recall  the  Deity  to 
his  mind  ; or  he  writes  some  of  his  hundred  and  eight 
names  on  his  sacred  garments  and  on  his  arms  and  on 
the  palms  of  his  hands,  that  his  eyes  may  fall  on  them 
and  bring  up  associations  fitted  to  pave  his  way  to 
heaven  before  they  are  closed  forever.  The  immoral 
principle  that  man,  however  bad  his  life  has  been,  will 
enter  heaven  if  at  the  moment  of  his  death  he  repeats 
the  name  of  Yishnu,  is  a legitimate  deduction  from 
such  a passage,  though  perhaps  the  author  and  his  com- 
peers did  not  foresee  the  wrong  use  which  has  been 
made  in  subsequent  ages  of  their  unguarded  state- 
ments ! 

We  confess  we  do  not  rise  from  the  perusal  of  this 
time-hallowed  and  extravagantly  venerated  book  with 
a very  high  opinion  of  its  contents.  The  devotee 
who,  amid  the  enlightenment  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
represents  God  as  the  life  of  every  living  thing,  from 
man  down  to  the  meanest  worm,  and  the  aggregate  of 
all  forces,  mechanical,  chemical,  electric,  and  magnetic, 
as  the  sum  total,  in  short,  of  all  forms  of  life  and  all 
material  agencies,  may  be  in  raptures  when  speaking 
of  its  teachings.  The  self-styled  anthropologist,  who 
throws  overboard  the  supernatural  element  in  Chris- 
tianity, and  represents  it  as  a development  of  or  an 
outgrowth  from  pre-existing  religious  ideas,  may  see 
in  it  a grand  stepping-stone  to  the  rapid  progress  made 


420 


HINDU  PHILOSOPHY. 


in  subsequent  ages  in  religion  and  morals.  But  we  are 
ordinary  mortals,  with  no  pompous  titles,  and  we  can- 
not help  representing  its  general  teaching,  theological 
and  moral,  as  on  the  whole  pernicious,  even  while  we 
are  not  backward  in  recognizing  the  excellence  of  a few 
truths  and  principles  scattered  up  and  down  among  its 
miscellaneous  contents.  We  have  no  hesitation  what- 
ever in  affirming  that  this  and  other  books  of  the  sort 
have,  on  the  whole,  been  so  many  drags  on  rather  than 
incentives  to  the  progress  of  the  world  in  religion  and 
morals,  and  we  fearlessly  oppose  this  bold  assertion  to 
the  sentimental  talk  which  is  unhappily  gaining  ground 
even  in  the  churches  of  Christendom. 


DATE  DUE 


